

THE STALIN *Phenomenon*

SOVIET SCHOLARS ON THE SOURCES OF THE DEVIATIONS FROM SOCIALISM, THE CAUSES OF THE DEFORMATION IN THE MECHANISM OF POWER LINKED WITH THE PERSONALITY CULT

WRITING
ON THE
RESTRUCTURING

МОСКОВСКИЕ
НОВОСТИ

138 лет • Издается по пятницам • Распространяется в 148 странах

НАУКА И ЖИЗНЬ


Прочтите все статьи, опубликованные в
**СОВЕТСКАЯ
БЕЛОРУССИЯ**

Центральный Комитет Коммунистической партии
Беларуси, Верховного Совета и Совета Министров

НОВАЯ
СТРАНА
АУГУСТ 1977 г.

№ 207 (17170)

ЛИТЕРАТУРНАЯ
ГАЗЕТА



WRITING
ON THE
RESTRUCTURING

THE STALIN *Phenomenon*

*Soviet scholars on the sources of the deviations
from socialism, the causes of the deformation in
the mechanism of power linked with the
personality cult*



Novosti Press Agency Publishing House
Moscow, 1988

СОВЕТСКАЯ БЕЛОРУССИЯ



Anatoly BUTENKO,
D.Sc. (Philosophy)

"Today it is necessary to make an assessment of Stalin's own views and activities.

The personality cult is alien to the nature of socialism. It is a deviation from the basic principles of socialism and thus has no justification whatsoever. And of course it is far from being a law-governed pattern engendered by socialism."

НАУКА И ЖИЗНЬ



Gavriil POPOV,
D.Sc. (Economics)

"The inner logic itself of the Administrative System requires a subsystem of fear, the right of the Top to dismiss any subordinate at any moment without any explanation. And this right may—if the conditions are suitable—develop into a right to liquidate a subordinate in general."



Boris BOLOTIN,
senior research worker

“Stalin’s theoretical views have shaped, to a large extent, the outlook of all those who are now over 50. Therefore, it would be surprising if this outlook did not influence the attitude of many people towards the changes taking place in the country, or determine their stand on perestroika in one way or another.”



**Dmitry
VOLKOGONOV,**
D.Sc. (Philosophy)

“Only a very few people are destined to outlive their time. Stalin is one of them. But his immortality is a troubled one. Arguments about his role in Soviet history accompanied by epithets tainted with worship, hatred, bitterness, and everlasting bewilderment, are sure to continue unabated for a long time.”

Contents

Anatoly BUTENKO <i>To Avoid Mistakes in the Future</i>	5
Gavriil POPOV <i>From an Economist's Point of View</i>	11
Boris BOLOTIN <i>Dogma and Life</i>	25
Dmitry VOLKOGONOV <i>The Stalin Phenomenon</i>	34
Organisations and Institutions in the USSR	53
Short Biographical Notes	55

Translated from the Russian by Arkady ILLARIONOV
Designed by Galina SEMYONOVA

ФЕНОМЕН СТАЛИНА

Серия «Публицистика перестройки»

на английском языке

Цена 25 к.

0803010200

© Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988

СОВЕТСКАЯ БЕЛОРУССИЯ

Sovetskaya Belorussiya, a newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Byelorussia, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Byelorussian SSR. Established in 1927, it comes out 6 days a week. Circulation—300,000 copies.

Anatoly BUTENKO,
D.Sc. (Philosophy)

To Avoid Mistakes in the Future

An expert on the problems of the theory of socialism, you have been studying of late the “blank spots” in Soviet history. Studies in this field are necessary to understand how the mechanism of one-man power—the personality cult—was formed in the USSR and also to work out practical methods of preventing such things from happening in the future. From this point of view, how do you assess the report made by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the gala meeting devoted to the 70th anniversary of the 1917 Socialist Revolution?

I have made a careful study of Mikhail Gorbachev's report. It presents an interesting and substantiated analysis of many complex issues. It forces us to ponder once again the events of the past 70 years.

At present I am focussing on the late 1920s and the 1930s. In those days political discussions centred around the basic problems of the development of society, the fundamental issue being the possibility of building socialism in our country.

It is very important that the analysis of the problems that arose in those days and the explanation of the errors committed correspond to the present-day level of scientific knowledge. I understand that the present assessment of the events made by the Central Committee of the CPSU is based on the data available to society at the given moment. At the same time—and Alexander Yakovlev, member of the Politburo, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke about this—the Central Committee does not claim to know the ultimate truth. It is fair to say that we now have materials which need additional study.

What, in your view, needs to be studied first and foremost?

As far as I'm concerned, everything linked with Stalin's views and activities. The report delivered at the gala meeting made an assessment of Trotsky's erroneous positions. For instance, it was noted quite justifiably that the Trotskyite concept rejected the possibility of building socialism in the conditions of capitalist encirclement and that the Party's leading body headed by Stalin upheld Leninism in the ideological struggle and formulated both a strategy and tactics at the initial stage of socialist construction. The report also listed mistakes made by Bukharin whose views on the pace of socialist construction, the ways and forms of collectivisation* in agriculture differed from those held by Stalin and other members of the Politburo. At the same time the report noted Bukharin's positive role in the critique of Trotskyism.

Today it is necessary to make a similar assessment of Stalin's own views and activities. The facts show that on many issues his position was far from Leninist.

Take, for instance, his understanding of the socialist revolution and the armed uprising. In the spring of 1917 Lenin, having returned to Russia, advanced his famous *April Theses* which outlined a course for transforming the bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist one. On

* Collectivisation of agriculture in the USSR (1929-1936) was carried out by uniting small family farms into large cooperative or collective farms.

the eve of the 1917 Socialist Revolution Lenin substantiated the need for an armed struggle. It is known, however, that Stalin held a different view on this score. Together with Trotsky he came out against waging an armed struggle and advocated legal forms of seizing power.

Nevertheless, Stalin was elected to the Military Revolutionary Centre set up to lead the uprising and, moreover, later supported Lenin in extremely critical situations, for instance, on the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.* How do you assess Stalin's activities after the 1917 Socialist Revolution?

He committed a number of errors even while Lenin was still alive, in particular, on the nationalities question. Lenin described his attitude towards local Party cadres in Georgia and Transcaucasia as a policy which could be pursued only by "coppers" and "nationalists".

After Lenin's death Stalin made a number of deviations from Leninist ideas. For instance, he made his own interpretation of NEP** which envisaged the construction of socialism using economic methods. Stalin viewed NEP as just a "temporary retreat" which was soon ended. By the late 1920s he had already proclaimed the end of NEP and the resumption of the "offensive on capitalism". However, this development actually marked a move towards a system of Party and state leadership that was based on administration by injunction. As a matter of fact, Stalin—and this is no secret—put into practice some of the

* The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was concluded by Soviet Russia with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey in March 1918. It provided for the German annexation of Poland, the Baltic states, parts of Byelorussia and Transcaucasia, and the payment of indemnities of 6 billion marks. The Treaty was signed in view of the country's grave situation. It let the Soviet state withdraw from World War I and gave the country a respite for strengthening the state. The Soviet government abrogated the Treaty in November 1918.

** NEP (New Economic Policy) was adopted by the Soviet state during the transition from capitalism to socialism to overcome economic dislocation, strengthen the alliance between the working class and peasants on an economic basis, and establish links between socialist industry and small-scale commodity producers in agriculture by making broad use of commodity-money relations and by drawing peasants into socialist construction.

Trotskyite ideas: the policy of "tightening the screws" and administration by mere injunction; industrialisation by exploiting the peasant, using his labour power and accumulations.

Command-and-administer methods used to solve the problems of transforming agriculture contradicted Lenin's ideas of setting up voluntary peasant cooperatives and their stage-by-stage development.

As is noted in Mikhail Gorbachev's report, what was lacking in those days was an attentive attitude, a Leninist approach towards the interests of peasants. The fact that the peasantry had radically changed as a class in the years since the revolution was underestimated. The main figure in agriculture by the late 1920s was the middle peasant, an owner and a worker, who had received his land as a result of the revolution. And if more attention had been given to the social processes taking place in the countryside, if the attitude towards the working peasants had been more correct politically, and if the policy of an alliance with the middle peasants against the rich had been pursued consistently, the extremes and distortions that occurred during collectivisation might have been avoided.

I should also like to note that the mass reprisals and violations of the law have absolutely nothing in common with the Leninist position. They marked a complete revision of the Leninist principles and methods of building socialism. Moreover, it was socialist forces—the Party, military and administrative cadres—that were hit the hardest.

So when it comes to Stalin and his contradictory personality it is necessary, in my view, to speak of the negative aspects not only of his activities but also of some of his ideas. For instance, Stalin's theoretical conclusion that as the country moved closer and closer to socialism the class struggle was becoming more and more acute was erroneous. However, this standpoint, which was passed off as Marxist-Leninist, in fact had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. It was Stalin's own formula. He needed it to substantiate theoretically the lawlessness and the mass reprisals against those who did not suit him.

So the task now facing scholars is to establish on what issues and at what stage Stalin put forward his own ideas, contradicting Leninism. It is necessary to analyse those ideas and the Central Committee's stand on them. The opposition of Trotsky and his supporters to Leninist policy was one thing; its distortion by Stalin, who headed the Party's Central Committee and who described himself as a true Leninist, was an entirely different matter. This is one of the major problems historians and theoreticians of socialism have to study in order to present more fully, comprehensively and precisely the Soviet Union's path to socialism and the difficulties that had to be overcome along the way.

At the same time many difficulties of the 1930s, including rigidly centralised leadership, were enforced phenomena because of the threat of war looming large over the country, and over the rest of the world for that matter, from Nazi Germany.

Indeed, it is commonly believed that the accelerated rates of industrialisation and collectivisation, as well as the administrative and Party pressure were prompted by the inevitability of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. I think that this issue needs to be studied in greater detail. Undoubtedly, there was an interconnection between the state of affairs inside the country and the international situation.

It seems to me that Stalin's foreign policy cannot be regarded as absolutely correct in all aspects either. I have in mind not just the mistakes linked with the country's poor preparation for the war. The Stalinist concept which presented the Social Democrats as the Left Wing of fascism led to a split in the ranks of the peace activists opposing the Nazi threat. This factor, coupled with the reprisals against the military and Party cadres and the weak defence, facilitated the unleashing of World War II and Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. That is why I think that the inevitability of World War II and the impossibility of preventing that war have yet to be proved. From this point of view the sacrifices made to speed up the

pace of building the material and technical basis of socialism are not justified by Stalin's thesis on the military threat. In reality such a threat did not yet exist in the late 1920s. I think that this question also needs studying.

Our ideological opponents have repeatedly claimed that the personality cult is a natural off-spring of socialism...

The personality cult is alien to the nature of socialism. It is a deviation from the basic principles of socialism and thus has no justification whatsoever. And of course it is far from being a law-governed pattern engendered by socialism.

In any country where the patriarchal peasantry constitutes the majority of the population (and Soviet Russia was precisely such a country when the construction of socialism began) there are peasant traditions, peasant backwardness, and peasant psychology, which, according to Marx, gravitate towards "strong power", towards administrative leadership, towards worship of the patriarch. But does this mean that a cult of the leader is inevitable? No, not at all.

If the party in power in the given country realises this danger, if it takes steps to prevent the role of the individual at the head of the party and the state from being exaggerated, if it creates guarantees for democracy in society, it can stand up to the pressure the peasant mentality presents. And the working class can play a leading role in this.

At a certain period in history our Party failed to stand up to this pressure. Today, however, society, relying on the experience of the past and realising the danger stemming from the violation of collective leadership and the breaches of legality that go with it, is in a position to create guarantees to avoid such deviations and distortions in running the country in the future.

A study of our difficulties and mistakes is necessary to avoid their repetition. And this is what the Soviet social sciences are concentrating their efforts on today.

Interviewer: YELENA SHAKHOVA

НАУКА И ЖИЗНЬ

Nauka i Zhizn, a popular monthly put out by the All-Union Znaniye Society established in 1934. Circulation — 3,200,000 copies.

Gavriil POPOV,
D.Sc. (Economics)

From an Economist's Point of View*

(ON ALEXANDER BEK'S** NOVEL *NEW APPOINTMENT*)

Alexander Bek's novel *New Appointment* was written in the early 1960s, but it wasn't until a quarter of a century later that it reached the reader. It describes the events of thirty years ago: the abolition of ministries, the establishment of economic councils, and, in this connection, the transfer of one of the leading officials of the USSR Council of Ministers to an ambassadorial post. All this seems to me to be directly related to the problems of perestroika. So I would like to share my views on what is of direct concern to me as an economist dealing with the problems of managing social production.

* Abridged.

** Alexander Bek (1903-1972), a Soviet writer.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

The hero of the novel, Alexander Onisimov, is a fictitious character. He is Chairman of the State Committee for Metallurgy and Fuel, a creation of the author's imagination. The Committee, which functions under the USSR Council of Ministers, is in charge of a group of ministries of heavy industry. However, most of the figures living and working together with Onisimov are not fictitious characters but rather the most prominent leaders of those years—Ordzhonikidze, Tevosyan, Stalin, and Beria. The events of the novel, according to the writer, are chiefly documentary and based on the notes of people who witnessed the events. However, like any other genuine work of art, the novel turns into an analysis of typical phenomena. And that is why it has become an event for our managerial science.

What appears before us in its pages in a live, vivid and tangible form is a mechanism of management largely based on administrative methods—the Administrative System. While not leaving the framework of the novel, I will try to show the System's characteristic features.

It is based on centralised decision-making and the punctual, rigorous and utterly dedicated execution of the directives coming from the Top and, particularly, from Stalin—the Master. Sparing no efforts and working harder than anyone else, Onisimov “keeps his staff on their toes”. For a large portion of the high-ranking officials there is no difference between night and day. Conferences held at midnight, at one or even two o'clock in the morning are standard procedure.

To get the directive assignments carried out, Onisimov uses harsh words, reprimands his subordinates, strikes swinging blows, and spurs them on both in private and in public. But those on whom he comes down think all that is as it should be. It is the rule, the usual order of things.

Onisimov himself is also checked, spurred on and monitored. Tevosyan is an old friend of his. But that does not mean that Onisimov can count on any, even minor indulgence. Although Tevosyan knows Onisimov well, he

arranges regular interrogation checks for his friend every month. As always, Onisimov is irreproachable, but everything is repeated the following month.

Officialism is the basis of the administrative process. Officialism doesn't allow any talk or relationship which aren't connected to business. Onisimov's stiff, always white collar doesn't let us ever forget that we are dealing with a man of business, with a link in the mechanism.

The author describes how Onisimov, the People's Commissar (Minister.—*Ed.*) manages his staff. The head of one of the main departments makes a regular progress report. First, he reports the state of affairs in the department as a whole. Everything is in order. Then comes a report on the situation in factory shops and at the furnaces. Then there is a report on the mills. Why are some of the shops and furnaces lagging behind? The department chief is not ready for detailed answers: "I don't know, I have no data." Onisimov: "What are you doing here then? What are you sitting here for? What are you getting paid for?" The report is continued. How is the modernisation of the pipe works coming along? Are you keeping to the schedule? Any setbacks? What kind? Show the schedule! And so it goes on, one detail after another.

And here is a report made by Onisimov himself—at that time the chief of the tank department—to Stalin, to the Politburo. He does not need a notebook. He describes the state of affairs at some plant or another or even shop and reports the results of tests made in laboratories and on testing grounds. He cites figures from memory and analyses the difficulties. Onisimov reports in a straightforward manner, without trying to protect himself. Stalin does not need a notebook either. He is not interested in successes. Not a word is said, not a minute is spent on what has been done and achieved. Labour exploits are not even mentioned. Stalin emphasizes only the weaknesses of the tank-building industry: the fastening of track shoes, the oil differential, the gearbox, grey pig iron. Stalin lays bare one weak point after another.

Relations on the horizontal plane are as tough as they

are on the vertical one. The author describes an episode in which Onisimov, the People's Commissar for the Tank-Building Industry, has a talk with the acting People's Commissar for the Metal Industry, an old friend and neighbour of his. He cites the data of the analyses, the results of tests, pictures of microsection metallographic specimens, reports, and the minutes of conferences. He proves that the People's Commissariat for the Tank-Building Industry is not getting steel of the required quality. Everything is stated point-blank, there is nothing personal about the whole thing, no concessions. We are doing a government job and we must carry it through. The country, Stalin, demand hundreds and hundreds of tanks which are better than the German ones. And for that, Onisimov believes, it is necessary to develop the best technology, one beating world standards. It is necessary to work out detailed instructions and issue concrete assignments. And then it is necessary to make all the subordinates strictly follow the instructions down to the last detail without asking any questions and with precision. It is necessary to control everybody continuously and relentlessly, to catch the slightest mistakes so that they should not grow into failures and nip deviations in the bud. That is why the People's Commissar yells at the top of his voice at a foreman in the shop about the crust developed in steel casting: this crust is part of the instruction, the quality of steel will be lower without it.

Efficiency, technological competence, precision in every last detail—that is the style of industrial management.

The situation in the Administrative System becomes particularly tense when an assignment comes down from the Master himself. Whenever Onisimov gets an assignment from Stalin, he always puts himself into "high gear". He concentrates the efforts of his staff, design offices and scientists. He prepares to "report on the issue". He personally calculates and checks everything, bringing proposals to the height of perfection.

Truthfulness is a must in the Administrative System. When during the war a danger arises of a disruption in

metal output, Onisimov personally reports the danger to the State Defence Committee without making somebody else do this for him or hiding behind somebody else's back. He knows what the report might cost him. But he cannot let the country down. And he gets assistance. A number of troops are literally removed from the front. He is trusted: if he says, "I cannot do it", it means all human possibilities are indeed exhausted.

Onisimov is absolutely subordinated to the Top, but his staff is also absolutely subordinated to him—this is also a feature of the System. It is a system of concrete, natural, detailed leadership. It is a system of supervising production continuously, on a daily basis, from the centre. It is precisely an Administrative System.

THE ADMINISTRATOR

Onisimov is 53 years old. The dark circles under his eyes are proof that he has not been getting enough sleep for years.

His motto is irreproachability. He always seeks to act in such a way that he would have no reason for reproaching himself for anything. He is a leader who is extremely demanding of himself. The one person he never allows any, even the slightest indulgence, the person he gives no quarter, is himself. And reprimands from above, even if very mild and insignificant, are immensely painful for him.

The principle Onisimov follows in his activity is this: I carry out instructions from above, you carry out my instructions. His favourite slogan is "No arguing"! He works like a high-precision machine, he is perfectly at home with the technique of administration, he knows all the twisting and winding paths of the managerial mechanism, all the fine points of interdepartmental relations.

Of course, Onisimov is capable of evasion. But this capability disappears without a trace whenever he gets instructions from Stalin. His high precision and punc-

tuality are not only a matter of honour and a sacred duty to him. They are also a shield.

Among his colleagues he is famous for his tirelessness and for his strength. For instance, he goes straight to work as soon as he leaves the operating room. Doctors are the only ones who know that this 50-year-old man has the heart of a 70-year old. But he never allows himself to take a break from his work for treatment. Even his doctor has a hard time getting complaints out of him.

He calls himself "a soldier of the Party, a soldier of Stalin". He is proud to consider himself such a soldier and, undoubtedly, is justified in doing so. Onisimov says, "If you are a campaigner, then be a campaigner with a capital C". And, undoubtedly, he seeks to be such a campaigner.

Such is Onisimov. Such are his colleagues described by the writer as the "bosses and toilers of the industrial think tanks, the soldiers of industry". It is a stratum of workaholics whose historic mission is to take in hand their subordinates and spur them on. They are chary of giving praise and find self-admiration, as well as admiration of other people's successes, disgusting.

The System could not have emerged without such "cogwheels". Nor could it have achieved the successes which, quite deservedly, have been put to its credit. Onisimov has been shaped by the times and hardened by the system. And he is also its main pillar and bearer.

It would seem that we have something unusually integral before us—the System, the Style, and the Leader. It would seem that with such ideal coordination the only possible result would be success. And the successes have been quite numerous: the best tanks in World War II, the world's first spacecraft, jetliners, and hydropower stations in Siberia.

However, Bek's novel is remarkable for its truth. And this truth is not only success. Bek managed to show us something else just as important: the inevitability, the necessity of giving up the Administrative System and the start of the first attempt to reform it in the mid-1950s.

FAILURES IN MANAGEMENT

The Administrative System needs workers who have stamped out all individual traits, personifying only their concrete posts and the corresponding functions. They are not individuals or, to be more exact, they are individuals who must retain only those individual traits which are necessary to ensure that the System works efficiently.

But people are people. And even Onisimov, a man of iron, is not free from deep feelings of kinship. Secretly, deep in his heart, he is grief-stricken over his unfortunate brother who died in the camps and whom he himself had brought into the Party and underground activity in his youth. This spiritual wound has not healed. That is probably the only case when he fails to carry out Stalin's instructions, for Stalin advises him: "Forget your brother, think no more of him."

The novel gradually reveals the defect in the Administrative System—the overloading of the Top and the excessive burden of responsibility. The higher the post, the heavier the burden, and the more difficult it is for its holder to bear the "Cap of Monomakh".*

Trusting no one, checking and double-checking everything, Onisimov gradually narrows the range of problems he has time to deal with himself.

It is obvious that in such conditions there is a lot a leading official cannot do and a lot that cannot be resolved simply due to the physical limits of the human being.

To increase efficiency and protect the health of the leading officials, the System seeks to spare them any personal anxieties. The System provides for them in every way possible. They receive flats, country houses and can avail themselves of the services of exclusive snack bars. And it is not as if the System wants to make grand

* "Cap of Monomakh"—figuratively it means the burden of power. The actual "Cap of Monomakh", 14th-century headgear and part of the regalia of Russian grand dukes and tsars, is kept in the Armoury of the Moscow Kremlin.

gentlemen out of them. The System simply has no other choice. The more a leading official is free from concerns about himself and his family, the more he belongs to the System.

Onisimov not only does not know about the problems involved in buying food or clothes—he doesn't even know how much it costs to ride the Moscow subway. In general, he never has a single rouble in his pocket. There are many, many things this highly erudite man does not know. The System has made him a narrow professional so that he could serve it better.

Here again the innate contradiction of the System comes to the fore: the worker protected by the System comes to serve it worse and worse. This is because he becomes more and more cut off from real life, and his view of real life becomes narrower and narrower.

As a result, the bearer of power himself becomes different. Stalin no longer holds meetings in the hall, he does not even convene the entire Politburo. No one is invited to meetings except two or three persons from Stalin's retinue and those needed for discussing the matter on hand. The assessments of problems become distorted and proposals are accepted only because they are in accord with Stalin's own wishes.

But the Administrative System's most difficult problem is probably that of finding candidates for vacancies, the problem of promotions. After all, Ordzhonikidze, Tevosyan and Onisimov himself are not products of this System. They came to it from the outside—from underground Communist cells, from the Civil War.* They brought to the System their confidence in the Party, their discipline and their selfless devotion to the cause. And so long as those cadres (with their moral standards) remained in the System, the System functioned.

* The Civil War and foreign intervention in Russia (1918-1920) was a period of struggle of the country's workers and peasants to defend the gains of the 1917 Socialist Revolution against the forces of internal and external counter-revolution.

And then one day it becomes necessary to appoint a new Minister for the Metal Industry to replace Onisimov who has received a promotion. It is necessary to choose a candidate among the cadres of the System. And they—in keeping with its logic—have for years trained themselves not to meddle in the affairs of the Top and do only what they are told to do. The more ideal they became for their jobs, the less suitable they became for higher posts.

The man who succeeds Onisimov as Minister for the Metal Industry is Tsikhonya.

He is the most complaisant, most obedient among the capable. Which means the very first cycle of personnel changes in the System took into account not only competence, but also diligence, loyalty and complaisance.

As a matter of fact, Stalin saves Onisimov himself from reprisals and appoints him a People's Commissar, taking into account the latter's personal loyalty. By chance, Onisimov becomes a witness of an argument between Stalin and Sergo Ordzhonikidze. Although Onisimov understands nothing of what is being said (the two men speak in Georgian), he immediately takes Stalin's side. By the way, this is precisely what Stalin wants. He wants to hear Onisimov's reply about his attitude to the Master regardless of the matter discussed. And he receives a reply that indicates an assurance of personal loyalty.

"Onisimov wanted to walk by without saying a word, but Stalin stopped him.

"Hello, Comrade Onisimov. It seems that you have heard us talking here?"

"Excuse me, I didn't know."

"Well, that happens sometimes... But whom do you agree with? With Comrade Sergo or with me?"

"Comrade Stalin, I don't understand a word of Georgian."

"Stalin paid no attention to this phrase as if it had not been said. Looking gravely at Onisimov from under his low forehead, he repeated his question even more slowly and without raising his voice:

"So who do you agree with after all? With him?" Stalin paused, "Or with me?"

“The moment came, that very same moment that would lay on the scales later. Onisimov did not dare look at Sergo again. A force similar to instinct, a force acting faster than he could think made him answer as he did. And he said without hesitation: ‘With you, Iosif Vissarionovich.’”

The step Stalin takes in return is also logical. Several months later he writes in a note to Onisimov: “I held you among my friends and I continue to hold you among them. I believed you and I continue to believe you...”

In the Administrative System diligence blends with personal loyalty to become an inseparable whole. And this inevitably brings into the System an element of subjectivity. Its logic undermines the personal ties born out of it.

As a result, the System cannot produce the leaders it needs. It is doomed to having every new appointment be worse than the previous one, if only just a little bit. Within the System it becomes more and more difficult to find the cadres it needs.

The book contains yet another “stratum”. It shows how the System maims the individual. In this System the role of people, even of those occupying rather high posts on the “ladder of management”, amounts to that of a cogwheel in the huge state machine. What matters here is not only the unnatural way of life they, including Onisimov, lead in such conditions. The problem is much more serious. Under the influence of the System he, an active fighter for socialism, a Communist who took part in underground activities, actually becomes a hindrance to scientific and technological progress, to the onward march of the economy. This is to say nothing of how Onisimov’s life and activity contradict the very idea of socialism which focusses on man, his inner world and moral make-up.

THE CRISIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

This system is no good for any decisions other than centralised ones, for any solutions other than wilful ones.

It is capable of quest, but only in one specific and limited way: if it comes from above.

As the country was mastering the achievements of scientific and technological progress already existing in the world arsenal, the relative advantages of the Administrative System overshadowed its shortcomings. In the introduction of the achievements of scientific and technological progress, there is a stage at which the factories have already been built and all efforts must be concentrated on observing the rules of efficient operation. Onisimov's style of work was best suited for that particular stage of industrialisation.

However, when it becomes necessary to assess different variants of new scientific and technological achievements and permit various types of quests, wilful methods of leadership are bound to lead to mistakes. The Administrative System finds it particularly difficult to function in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution when industry has to deal on a daily basis not with just one or two inventions, but an avalanche of innovations. The decision-makers, possessing no objective economic criteria, inevitably become hostages to foreign countries: what is already being used there is always correct.

What matters, therefore, is not the Administrative System itself, but the entirely new tasks the economy, which has been created by the System's efforts, has to carry out. Specifically, the heart of the matter lies in the new scale and pace of scientific and technological progress.

The Administrative System proves to be more and more incompetent in dealing with the key problem of the second half of the 20th century—the problem of scientific and technological progress. This conclusion, though not formulated directly, is substantiated very thoroughly by the entire plot of the novel. And this conclusion is of fundamental importance for our reflections on the fate of the Administrative System, on the inevitability of its replacement, on the essence of its restructuring.

Alexander Bek manages to vividly show yet another

very important aspect of the crisis of the Administrative System. I would call it the Beria syndrome.

The reader comes across this name in the pages of the novel more than once. At one point Onisimov says straight to his face: "I cannot trust you, Beria!" And Beria never forgets that moment. Onisimov is aware that Beria is simply waiting for the right moment to take care of him. Onisimov and Beria, both members of the Central Committee, are on quite familiar terms with each other, but throughout the years Beria's hand has always been raised over Onisimov.

Most probably, Stalin is also well aware of this. But he feels safer precisely in an atmosphere of deathly hostility among his subordinates. He considers such hostility not only normal, but even useful for the Administrative System.

The course of events in the novel gradually makes it clear that the personal hostility between Beria and Onisimov overshadows something much more important—an intrinsic, characteristic feature of the leadership mechanism itself.

By himself Beria is not frightening; it is his connection with Stalin that makes him fearsome. Bek should be credited with giving us a more profound, I would say, more scientific understanding of Beriaism. On the one hand, Beriaism is lawlessness and excesses; it is the disease of the Administrative System. After all, reprisals against personnel inflict particularly grave damage precisely on rigid administrative systems. On the other hand, and the novel here takes a step forward in our view of that epoch, Beria is gradually seen both as a product and an indispensable component of the System. Stalin could never have become the Master without Beria, and without both of them the Administrative System could never have assumed its logical completeness, wholeness, and practical effectiveness.

Since Onisimov "looms large" over all of his subordinates like an interrogator, it stands to reason that somebody would "loom large" over Onisimov himself, and, for that matter, over all the Onisimovs. What is

needed here is a situation whereby Onisimov speaks very little even when riding in his car with his wife, for "with the driver present it's better to keep silent". And here the Master alone is not enough. What is needed is a powerful mechanism, and the existence of some kind of Beria is inevitable.

Fear is a must in any more or less rigid mechanism of administration. And it is hard to say to what extent Onisimov's boundless honesty and industriousness is linked with this fear and to what extent—with the belief that the Master is always right. And is there, in the end, a very big difference between this belief and this fear?

Onisimov himself also needs Beria. Unable to offer sufficient moral or material incentives, Onisimov efficiently bosses his subordinates around because, among other things, "the hand of Beria" is also raised over them—in the person of some of his subordinates. Onisimov would probably rather not think about this, but his subordinates understand the situation...

Thus, it turns out that the inner logic itself of the Administrative System requires a subsystem of fear, the right of the Top to dismiss any subordinate at any moment without any explanation. And this right may—if the conditions are suitable—develop into a right to liquidate a subordinate in general. Such a subsystem is necessary to ensure efficient administration by injunction.

That is why the renunciation of Beria can be genuine only if we realise that the entire system of administrative management needs restructuring.

And it is very significant that Onisimov, who hates Beria, views the camps, where his dearly-loved brother died not so long ago and masses of prisoners are kept behind barbed wire, as labour units of a kind, which are highly disciplined, cheap, always ready to move to new construction sites, and have proved to be quite reliable. To Onisimov this is something quite permissible in putting up the priority projects of communism.

Thus, the crisis of the Administrative System in the

novel *New Appointment* has three dimensions, as it were. Its social dimension calls for removing the Beria system. Its economic dimension underlines the need to mobilise all the reserves of growth in order to raise efficiency in production. And its scientific and technological dimension is linked with the need to master all types of scientific and technological progress, all the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. That is why a statement made in the novel by one of its characters, the factory manager Golovin, seems so emphatically significant: "INDUSTRY cannot live that way, and IN GENERAL it is IMPOSSIBLE to live that way."

Boris BOLOTIN,
senior research worker,
Institute of World
Economics and International
Relations, USSR Academy
of Sciences

**МОСКОВСКИЕ
НОВОСТИ**

Moscow News, a weekly newspaper of the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries and of the Novosti Press Agency. Established in 1930, *Moscow News* comes out in five languages. Circulation—one million copies. Sold in 140 countries.

Dogma and Life

ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

After 1965 Stalin's image as a military leader was revived in the memoirs of merited military leaders and he was praised in many literary and film epics, but his theoretical works have been forgotten. And that is very unfortunate, for a characteristic feature of Stalinism was precisely the gap between words and deeds. Stalin's words were much more correct and just than his deeds. These words bore an indelible impression of their own time and left an indelible mark on it. Stalin's theoretical views have shaped, in a large measure, the world outlook of all those now over 50. Therefore, it would be surprising if this world outlook did not influence in any way how many people think about the changes taking place in the country, or determine their stand on perestroika in one way or another.

The collection *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* occupies a special place in Stalin's theoretical works. This collection includes the notes and letters he wrote

during the discussion of the draft of the political economy textbook. That discussion ended in November 1951, but for a long time after that (for almost an entire month) the participants in it were held up in Moscow, waiting for Stalin to address them, as he was expected to do. But eventually the economists returned to their universities without ever having heard Stalin's address. His economic notes, which were later included in the collection, started being published in the press the next spring, 1952.

The entire country immediately began studying the collection. Just a short while before that, the materials of the August 1948 Session of the All-Union V. I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences had been studied, and the Morgan-Weismann teaching, together with the entire field of genetics, was utterly disgraced in the eyes of millions upon millions of students of political schools. Soon afterwards, the time came to get to know the problems of linguistics, which Stalin had solved, and then the turn of political economy rolled around.

Today, 35 years later, we read *Economic Problems* with a confused, strange feeling. We find the categorical conclusions, which we have already grown unaccustomed to, striking. The kaleidoscope of real and far-fetched problems, their excessive simplification, or, just the opposite, their complicated presentation, amaze us. But, as we close Stalin's book, we catch ourselves thinking that it did indeed reflect in its own way the understanding that changes in our economy were inevitable, and that the book had been prompted by a desire to forecast at least the main direction of these changes. And at the same time, in nearly each and every paragraph, we see an inability to get beyond frozen stereotypes and dogmas.

ON PERFECTING PRODUCTION RELATIONS

Stalin was an advocate of constantly perfecting socialist production relations. He returned to this idea again and again. I mention this for the benefit of those who today

express anxiety, to put it mildly, over the breakdown of a number of the well-established forms of our economic activities, identifying the very essence of socialism with them.

“Under socialism, too,” Stalin wrote, “the productive forces develop faster than production relations; they enter into a certain contradiction with everything that has become obsolete in production relations. And if things don’t usually go so far as a conflict between production relations and the productive forces, this is only because socialism is capable of taking timely steps to bring the lagging production relations into conformity with the nature of the productive forces. Socialist society is capable of doing this because it does not have any obsolescent classes that might organize resistance. Of course, even under socialism there will be backward, inert forces that do not realise the necessity for changing the relations of production. But they, of course, will not be difficult to overcome and things need not go so far as a conflict.”

How did Stalin think they could be overcome? Most probably by using the same methods that had done socialism so much harm in the 30s and 40s. But something else is more important here: Stalin realised that the economic system could not be cast once and for all in eternal forms. What in its time was very effective and secured unprecedented growth rates—and together with them, a major change in the image of the country and the people—can, as time goes on, become a brake on further progress. (Stalin added that this could happen “if we conduct the wrong policy”.)

If this is so, then why do some people regard reconstruction of the economic system, inherited from the periods of industrialisation and postwar rehabilitation, as an attack on the textbook—truths of Marxism-Leninism, truths which were learned according to Stalin’s perception of them. Most likely because the nature and the direction of the restructuring we have started are directly opposed to everything he foresaw and predicted.

ARE COMMODITY-MONEY RELATIONS THE STUMBLING BLOCK?

Changes in our production relations are inevitable because they embrace an element which is alien and counter to socialism: commodity-money turnover. That is how Stalin put it. And here we enter a realm where the strengths and weaknesses of his logic are combined into one whole.

Stalin's analysis is based on a premise which is irrefragably correct: it is impossible to manage the economy with methods alien to its nature. One should start with objective economic laws, familiarise oneself with them and learn how to follow them correctly. But in his analysis Stalin arrives at conclusions which cannot stand up to the most respectful or well-meaning criticism. The problem is that even the possibility of such criticism seemed absurd to him, for only he, Stalin, had a monopoly on the right to carry out theoretical research and develop Marxist-Leninist political economy (and any other science).

Today it is universally recognised that commodity-money relations are but a form of the operation of the law of value, and the law of value itself stems from the limited nature of society's material (including natural and manpower) resources, and from the need to correlate the goals and methods of achieving them, to correlate desires and possibilities. For Stalin, the law of value was simply a law determining the proportions of exchange, and exchange presupposes owners, and owners, of course, are "bad guys". Therefore, in the long run, both the law of value and the commodity-money relations connected with it became an anathema.

And this happened despite the correct and profound remark made earlier that commodity production does not, by any means, always develop into capitalism, or generate capitalism. According to Stalin, for this to happen the means of production must be owned privately (even if in the form of pre-capitalism ownership), and there must be an opportunity to exploit the labour of others (even if this labour is not hired), and so on. Such conditions do not exist under socialism, so there is no use talking about any

kind of erosion of socialism, or of any restoration of capitalism due to the preservation of commodity-money turnover (all this is practically a word-for-word retelling of Stalin's own ideas).

And right away an unexpected and strange conclusion is made—commodity production is not dangerous for us if only because it has a quite limited nature and appears only at the junction of two forms of property—state and collective-farm property—and at the junction of production and consumption. It thus becomes clear that for Stalin commodity turnover is undesirable if only because it presupposes a certain freedom of choice for both the seller and the buyer and does not allow for rigidly centralised distribution.

A very amazing inconsistency! Stalin declares that commodity-money relations are objectively necessary (although not very desirable) in the first phase of communism, when the state is strong and growing stronger, because of the existence of the two forms of property. And, just the opposite, commodity-money relations become absolutely undesirable as the state nears the phase when it must change, as we understand it now, and entrust a considerable part of its functions to the people's self-government. Why? Simply because commodity-money turnover is hard to plan from the centre!

THE MARKET AND THE COLLECTIVE FARMS

Therefore, according to Stalin, we must put up with commodity-money relations only because of the existence of collective farms. Now, he writes, "the state disposes only of the product of the state enterprises, while the product of the collective farms is disposed of only by them, as it is their property."

The reader is especially embittered by this section. How was it possible to imagine collective farms as "Rochdale cooperative"* concerned only with the interests of their

* A cooperative set up in Rochdale (Great Britain) in 1844 by followers of Robert Owen. The fundamental principles of that cooperative are characteristic of the cooperative movement in the West today.

own members, not wanting to be included in the state plan and disposing of their produce in a mercantile manner? And to say this in postwar conditions when the state had literally tied the collective farms hand and foot to the state system of obligatory purchases (essentially a system telling people what crops to grow)! At a time when the greater part of the collective-farm produce was "paid for" at prices which didn't cover even delivery to the procurement centres! This shows very well Stalin's art of juggling words with impunity and without even considering the possibility of criticism.

According to official statistics, under such terms the collective farms "sold" to the state in 1950-1953 60 per cent of the grain they produced (not counting what they used for seeds), 60 per cent of meat and milk, and all of the sugar beet and raw cotton they produced. All that was concentrated in centralised funds, was taken account of and distributed down to the last gram. Considering the circumstances, any talk about the non-planned nature of the activities of collective farms could be regarded as black humour.

I won't speak of collectivisation here—that is a separate and a very dramatic chapter of our history. I respect Anatoly Rybakov and his work on the novel *Children of Arbat** very much, but still I cannot agree with his explanation that Stalin had allegedly decided to carry out collectivisation (long before it had been prepared materially and psychologically) because he feared the emergence of a class of farmers in our land. As I understand it, the time of collectivisation and the schedule for its implementation in the USSR were determined by rigid circumstances which could not be circumvented in any way—by the need to build in a short space of time a heavy (above all, defence) industry and thousands of enterprises in these industries, to buy from the West (with grain) hundreds of

* In the novel *Children of Arbat* Soviet writer Anatoly Rybakov (born 1911) depicts the events that took place in the country in the first half of the 1930's, when widespread repressions were launched against innocent people for the purposes of consolidating Stalin's personality cult.

thousands of machines for those industries and to feed millions of new urban centres, which had grown with the inflow of workers from the countryside. All that was payment for building socialism in a backward country which was surrounded by enemies and deprived of state-organised support from Europe's working class. Of course it is also true that Stalin's personality left a tragic imprint on how collectivisation was carried out and what losses it produced. Suffice it to say, both before and after the war we were forced to resort to the expropriation of a considerable part of the output produced by the collective farms.

And at such a time Stalin was seriously expatiating on the idea that the expropriation of collective farms and their transformation into state enterprises (state farms) could certainly facilitate the establishment of a single production sector and phase out commodity turnover. But such a step, he added, was unacceptable for us.

For reference—a considerable number of collective farms was enlarged and turned into sectors of state farms soon after Stalin's death. As a result of that, in 1950-1960 the number of agricultural cooperatives decreased nearly three times, and the number of farmers' households in them—by nearly 20 per cent. This kind of "expropriation" did not arouse the protest of the collective farmers. It was regarded by them as an act of salvation, which secured them at least a guaranteed minimum income. Many collective farms had paid nothing for workdays* since 1941—neither in cash nor in kind—offering their members the "right" to feed themselves from their subsidiary plots of land in exchange for working the compulsory minimum of workdays in the social economy. I must add that this step towards a "single production sector" did not and could not narrow down the field of

* Workday the unit of labour of collective farm workers in the social economy and the unit of collective farmers' share in the distribution of income, used from 1930 to 1966. As the collective farm economy became stronger, conditions were created for switching over to a system of guaranteed monthly payment for labour in cash.

commodity turnover, or the sphere of the operation of the law of value.

The ideas expressed by Stalin on the nature of collective farms in *Economic Problems* are quite interesting. These "subjects of cooperative property" in real life have no property, because, I quote, "the collective farm is not the owner of the land it cultivates... is not the owner of the basic implements of production" and owns only that part of the output which remains after it has settled its accounts with the state. So, the collective farms—in the form they existed when *Economic Problems* was written—were peasant communes which were attached to state land and whose members tilled the land with state implements, receiving in exchange a small part of the output.

How little all that resembles Lenin's cooperative plan! And how far, fortunately, the collective farms have progressed since then, in spite of all the bureaucratic obstacles. (And how much further they could have gone if it hadn't been for those obstacles!) They are now already the owners of all the means of agricultural production. In a letter to Alexandra Sanina and Vladimir Venzher (who is still alive), well-known Soviet agrarian economists who were man and wife, Stalin rejected as heresy the proposal to strengthen collective farms by making the tractors, combine harvesters, trucks and other machines theirs. Seven years later, in 1959, that proposal was implemented and the collective farms, which had somehow managed to get 2,000 tractors before that, became the owners of 650,000 tractors (now they have over 1,150,000). And in contrast to Stalin's forecasts, the collective farms did not collapse when this happened.

THE MARKET AND THE PLAN

Stalin's refusal to accept the market in conditions of socialism, and his opinion that the market and a planned economy were incompatible, firmly shaped economic thinking not only among a considerable number of our econ-

omic managers but also among our scholars. Even after the 27th Congress and the 1987 January and June Plenary Meetings, strange discourses continued to appear in the press, including in quite prestigious publications about how nice it would be to "sterilise" commodity turnover, wash it clean of money, and settle accounts between enterprises, accounting for their output not in roubles but in some other unit, let's say, in units of energy. It is not my task to give a critical review of these energy-economic chimeras. But the very proposals being made to create such monsters show that we must not keep quiet about *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, but should analyse and criticise it. Everything that belongs to history (economic history included) should be returned to it.

ЛИТЕРАТУРНАЯ ГАЗЕТА

Literaturnaya Gazeta, a weekly newspaper of the Board of the Union of Writers of the USSR. Established in 1929. Circulation—3 million copies.

Dmitry VOLKOGONOV,
D. Sc. (Philosophy)

The Stalin Phenomenon

Only Stalin knew all there is to know about Stalin. Stalin liked things to be black or white, with no shades of grey. He clearly saw to it that his biography would be written in glowing terms. I do not know whether he knew about the existence in ancient Rome of the "Law of Denouncing Memory" according to which everything that did not suit the new emperor was consigned to oblivion. However, as we know, that law only emphasised the futility of attempts to regulate human memory. For this memory lives (or dies) according to entirely different laws—its own laws. The abyss of history is bottomless. However, not everyone falls through the meshes of the giant net spread over the chasm of oblivion. Such stupendous figures as Stalin have a chance to remain in the annals of history.

We are all gratified that an active process is now under way not only of renovating the present, but also of "restor-

ing" the past. And the personality of Stalin seems to have become the centre of public interest, both emotional and intellectual, in the past. I do not think there has ever been a more contradictory personality in our history (both Russian and Soviet). He has received enough praise and condemnation for a legion of illustrious names.

A journey into the future is marked by difficulties and uncertainty. A journey into the past is not any easier. As Ludwig Feuerbach once aptly said, it is always a "prick in the heart", alarming and disturbing. Stalin is one of the most complex people in all history. Whether we like it or not, such people belong not only to the past, but also to the present and to the future. Their fate is eternal ideological "food" for thought about life, time and conscience. One of the conclusions suggesting itself at the very outset of research on Stalin is that the story of his life highlights the extremely intricate dialectics of his epoch. The conditions of those days were just as complex as the personality of the man leading the Party and the people. To be honest before truth and history, one cannot but acknowledge Stalin's contribution to the struggle for socialism and its defence. Nor can one ignore his unforgivable political mistakes and crimes which manifested themselves in unjustified reprisals against thousands of innocent people. Stalin and the Party nucleus that defended Leninism in an ideological and political struggle paved the way for the accelerated construction of socialism. And then, when it seemed that the worst was over (in terms of the inner Party struggle), when major achievements had been scored in many spheres of the building of a new life, there emerged a profoundly erroneous political concept "sanctified" by Stalin—as socialism moved forward the class struggle would intensify. And this meant that the dictatorship of the proletariat for the common cause would come to perform punitive rather than constructive functions more and more. As the truth of history unfolds, there have naturally been radical changes in the evaluation of Stalin's character. Compare, for instance, the Message of Greet-

ings from the Central Committee of the AUCP (B)* and the USSR Council of Ministers on Stalin's 70th birthday in December 1949, and the dramatic report Nikita Khrushchev made to the 20th Congress of the CPSU on the night of February 24-25, 1956. Two entirely opposite views, and essentially the same people expressed them over a period of just a few years. After that the process of society recovering its sight entered a period of a kind of moratorium.

Upon hearing Stalin's name many people think first of all of the tragic year 1937, the reprisals, dehumanisation. It was as if invisible Valkyries, which, as is known, choose who is to be slain and who is to be left alive, began hovering over society. Yes, all that did happen. The people guilty of those crimes cannot be pardoned. But we also remember that it was in those very years that the Dnieper Hydropower Station and the Magnitogorsk Steel Complex** were built, and that those years knew such people as Papanin, Angelina, Stakhanov, and Busygin... Those years saw the laying of the foundations for everything we stand upon today: the Soviet people held out to defeat fascism in the Great Patriotic War, and the human spirit soared. That is why, while denouncing Stalin for the crimes, it is politically and morally incorrect to call into doubt the real achievements of socialism and its basic possibilities. It is wrong when assessing Stalin and his entourage to mechanically extend these assessments to the Party and the millions of ordinary people who fervently believed in the sincerity of the revolutionary ideals.

* The Central Committee of the AUCP (B) — the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). At its First Congress (1898) the Party was named the RSDLP (the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party). In 1917 it became the RSDLP (B). The Seventh Congress (1918) renamed the Party the RCP (B), that is, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); at the 14th Congress (1925) it was named the AUCP (B) and the 19th Congress (1952) gave it the name of the CPSU.

** Large development projects started in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

The veteran Bolshevik Kuptsov, who carried his tragic cross through many camps, terrible humiliations and trials, today says with great conviction, decades after his trying experiences: "Many of us in the camps had landed there as a result of arbitrary actions. But not once, I would like to repeat this in particular, not once did it even cross my mind that there was something wrong with our ideas, our system, our ideals. The monstrous injustice was associated only with some tragic mistakes, with errors of concrete persons. All my companions sharing my unfortunate fate thought likewise. We sincerely rejoiced when we got news from the outside about the commissioning of new plants and Chkalov's flights and later agonised over the staggering setbacks in the initial phase of the war... The prison did not and could not tear us away from the Motherland, from the cause to which we remained devoted even as we stood behind the barbed wire of Siberian camps."

It is impossible to assess the past in terms of arithmetic: which are more numerous in Stalin's record, his crimes or his good deeds? The question itself is immoral, for there are no good deeds that can justify savagery. The problem is much more complex—it involves learning more about the factors that caused the deformation of the mechanism of power. How could it happen that the great coexisted with the base, and evil camouflaged itself as good? Why did the social degeneration of many persons occur? Was the tragedy inevitable? Why did the institutions of social protection "fail to work"? These and many other questions are often raised in our press, reflecting a rapid increase in the political and historical culture of the Soviet people that had taken place since the 27th Party Congress. People, especially young people, having only a sketchy knowledge of the country's history, develop a kind of intellectual confusion as a result of the directly opposite opinions and subjectivist assessments they come across. And this confusion may lead to social nihilism and disrespect for our values. Under these circumstances the best way to quench the thirst for knowledge is to learn the truth.

Lenin's method of analysing the 1917 Socialist Revolution and its prospects as well as of assessing the political and human qualities of its leaders should be used as a basis for painting a philosophical and political portrait. Stalin remembered all his life that Lenin, in his notes to the Congress in December 1922, called him and Trotsky "two outstanding leaders". Nor did he ever forget Lenin's assessment of his complex and difficult character, an assessment scathing in its frankness and depth. And Stalin could not accept Lenin calling Bukharin "the favourite of the whole Party". A study of Stalin's speeches reveals that he disputed Lenin's assessments on more than one occasion, although he did this very cautiously and in a round-about way. For instance, arguing in his head with Lenin, he once said in one of his speeches: "We like Bukharin, but we like the truth, the Party and the Comintern* even more". This phrase just about sums up Stalin: devoted to an idea, but cunning and crafty.

General Secretary Stalin once interpreted in a speech Lenin's statement "Stalin is too rude" as meaning "he is rude only to enemies". When one turns to Lenin in analysing the Stalin phenomenon, one can see again and again that in his brilliant thinking Lenin was way ahead of us, as always. This is the quality of not merely wise and profound truths, this is the quality of prophetic truths.

In recent years Soviet biographies of many historical figures have appeared, including political biographies of Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Sir Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, and other persons who will remain in the annals of history forever. In our country it is not considered shameful or improper to publish books even about such a sinister figure as Hitler. But there is no biography of Stalin, while at the same time dozens of books have been written about him abroad. This gap in our history is today being filled by a multitude of literary and historical publications

* The Comintern (full name: The Communist International), the international revolutionary proletarian organisation of the Communist Parties of various countries (1919-1943).

about separate features of Stalin's activities. Their appearance shows the effect of rain after a long drought. Undoubtedly, historians will be making further serious studies of Stalin, as well as of Bukharin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and other leading figures of the Party and the state.

One of the reasons for this interest in Stalin lies in the fact that in terms of history Stalin departed this life only recently, less than four decades ago. And this means that his fate is closely connected with the fate of those alive today and their immediate predecessors.

Another reason for the unremitting interest in the story of Stalin's life stems from the new understanding of such social and human values as socialism, humanism, justice, truth, and moral ideals. The years of stagnation have shown once again that dogmatism in thinking can build only an illusory philosophical shrine in which everything is supposed to play the role of the "eternal". But it seems nothing is eternal except change. Dogmatic blindness is dangerous because it can turn an ideology into a religion. Dogmatism puts off all earthly joys until "tomorrow", while tomorrow is put off until the "day after tomorrow". The period of revolutionary renovation our society has entered has touched upon social consciousness first and foremost. And it is significant that the dogmatism and bureaucracy rooted in the years of Stalin's autocratic leadership have now become the main targets of criticism and negation.

Finally, there is yet another reason (there are even more reasons, of course) for the steady interest in the life of the man who was at the top of the power pyramid for more than thirty years. And he was not next to such people as Lenin, not among them as Lenin had been. He stood above them. The Soviet people actually knew nothing about Stalin despite the countless laudatory articles, portraits, statues, and numerous copies of his works. His short biography which came out after World War II has only "compilers" as is stated on the title-page and not authors.

The biography, which had been edited by Stalin himself, gives a sketch of a man's heroic deeds while the man himself is absent from it.

True, some of his contemporaries did make attempts to paint a political portrait of him. For instance, before World War II Academician E. M. Yaroslavsky published the book *About Comrade Stalin* in which, besides the unbridled eulogising, he observed quite correctly that to write about Stalin meant to describe all the twists and turns of the Party struggle in the course of building socialism in the Soviet Union. Karl Radek, in his book *Portraits and Pamphlets* (1933) devoted a lengthy article to Stalin which was essentially an unrestrained glorification of the Messiah. Incidentally, the eulogy of the leader humiliating to Radek did not save the author of *Portraits and Pamphlets* from a sad fate. Needless to say, such works are of little scientific value.

A human life burns out quickly, like a Northern summer. One could also compare human life with a fire: the sparks, the merry, light tongues of the fire, the strong flame, the quiet embers, the weak shimmering, the smouldering embers, and the cold ashes. Sooner or later non-existence awaits us all, both the great and the ordinary. And this is an eternal night, which will most definitely arrive, and this is the day that will never come again. This truth is equally merciless to all. Stalin realised that. Stalin and his associates have a lot to do with the many "blank" spots in Soviet history, and with the places where the pages of the annals have been distorted or simply ripped out. This is one difficulty.

Another difficulty is of a more general nature. The mind of a person is a hidden, enigmatic world which dies with that person. We will never know everything about the dead. But the scope for discovery is infinite here. Stalin's essays, memoranda and resolutions tell us less about the man's thoughts than his deeds, his accomplishments, actions, and, to our regret, crimes. In this sense the mysteries of the mind are not so much mysteries if one knows what "feeds" them, how they express themselves, and what their

source of inspiration is. The multi-coloured, many-stringed, long-suffering world of human existence around us is the master key to unravelling the mysteries of any human mind, including the mind of such a man as Stalin. But at times the logic of a scientific analysis of his actions leads us into a blind alley when we try to explain some of those actions.

For instance, Stalin knew of Lenin's warm feelings for Bukharin. For years Stalin himself maintained friendly relations with Bukharin and his family. Bukharin gave Stalin considerable help in the fight against Trotsky and Trotskyism. Stalin must have realised that the charges of spying, conspiracy, etc., brought against Bukharin were absurd. Bukharin, with his high intellectual and cultural standards, knew how to respect argumentation. And when he saw that his programme of **unhurried** social development might lead to failure, for history had given our country no time for "getting into gear", he honestly admitted his mistakes. Moreover, he took an active part in the efforts to carry out Party directives. But all that did not prevent Stalin from sanctioning the death of the exceptionally popular Party worker and in fact, a close Party comrade. How can this be explained or understood?

A few years ago, as I was preparing to write a philosophical and biographical essay on Stalin, I somehow, without noticing it myself, began to take interest in literature on Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Oliver Cromwell, Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great... I became interested in the psychology of "leaders", dictators, tyrants, and other absolutist rulers. And although I understand that any historical parallels are risky, I would like to present one preliminary conviction I reached. People with unlimited power who are beyond democratic control, inevitably develop a sense of infallibility. They come to believe they have a licence to do anything and tend to overestimate their personal abilities. As a rule, such people, although they live among others, are infinitely lonely. Although, as has been established, Stalin very seldom talked with anyone tête-à-tête (he always had either Molotov or

Kaganovich, Voroshilov or Malenkov, Beria, etc., with him), he was extremely lonely at heart. He had nobody to relate to, discuss things with or argue and explain himself to... Isolation at the top and unlimited power, chilling in its reality, desiccated his feelings and turned his mind into a cold calculator. Every step that immediately becomes "historic", "fateful" and "decisive" gradually kills everything human in a man.

Stalin tried his whole life (and not without success!) to turn one of his weaknesses into a strength. Even during the revolutionary days, when it was necessary to go to factories, army regiments, street rallies, to go to the crowds, Stalin suffered from a lack of self-confidence and anxiety which, true enough, he managed to conceal. Stalin did not like and indeed did not know how to speak in front of people. His speech was simple, clear and bore no flight of fancy, or aphoristic element specially for the rostrum. A strong Georgian accent, constraint and monotony, made his speeches inexpressive. It is no accident that Stalin spoke at meetings, rallies and manifestations less frequently than any other Lenin's associate. He preferred to draw up directives and instructions, write essays, articles, and commentaries for newspapers on various political events. For instance, after his return from exile in mid-March 1917, Stalin published more than sixty articles and reviews in such newspapers as *Pravda*, *Soldatskaya Pravda*, *Rabochiy i Soldat*, and other newspapers! He was a mediocre writer in terms of style, but he was consistent, precise and the invariably categorical in his conclusions. In Gori*, where Stalin was born, at noon the sun lies directly above head, casting no shadows. And the same was true of his newspaper articles: they were always written in black and white, with no shadowy grey.

Later Stalin would get used to the rostrum at congresses and conferences. But the situation would be different

* Gori, a town in the Georgian SSR, where the Joseph Stalin museum house is located.

then: people would listen to his low, quiet voice in a ringing silence, ever ready to break that silence with loud applause that would grow into an ovation. Stalin made restraint in direct contacts with the masses a rule. For rare exceptions, he never visited factories, cooperative farms, other Soviet Republics or frontline units. The leader's voice sounded only occasionally from the very top of the pyramid. Millions listened to it at the foot of that pyramid with sacred trepidation. The leader turned his unsociable and withdrawn features into attributes of his cult and his exclusiveness.

I once again emphasise that I am not a historian. I am sure that more detailed **historical** works will see the light of day. But as a philosopher I have tried to keep to the principle of the unity of the historical and the logical. My analysis and conclusions are first and foremost based on Lenin's works, Party documents, and materials from a number of archives. For instance, while studying the military aspect of Stalin's activities I acquainted myself with many interesting original documents that have not been published from the Defence Ministry Archives. Even a first glance at Stalin's resolutions in military documents reveals the extremely contradictory nature of their author. Here is just one example. Stalin reads a report saying that attempts to master night flights led to numerous accidents in the Air Force. The report submitted by the People's Commissar of Defence points out that the accidents are due to the lack of discipline encouraged by the Air Force command. In those days such an assessment was tantamount to an indictment. Stalin decides that it is necessary to give pilots better training and that the Air Force commander accused of "aiding and abetting laxity" should be sent to the Military Academy for further training. But resolutions on this issue in other papers next to that document are quite different, even cruel.

Glancing at the well-preserved lines of Stalin's resolutions, written, as a rule, in red or blue pencil, legibly and in a sweeping manner, one asks: where were the roots of this man's irrationality? Perhaps in the religious dogmat-

ism he was subjected to in his childhood? Or perhaps in the strange intellectual jealousy he felt when listening to the brilliant speeches of Lenin, Plekhanov, Akselrod and Martov at the Party congresses in London and Stockholm? Or perhaps the origins of that irrationality lie in the bitterness he developed even before the 1917 Revolution? In a letter written on December 30, 1922, Lenin noted that one of the features of Stalin's character was spite. And, as Lenin observed, "in politics spite generally plays the basest of roles". Stalin's record prior to the 1917 Revolution includes seven arrests and five escapes. From the age of nineteen he had to go into hiding time and again as he carried out Party committee instructions. He was arrested, changed his name, secured false passports, expropriated money to give to the Party, and moved from place to place... He never stayed long in prison. He would escape and go into hiding again. However, the idea of going abroad never crossed his mind.

I have read the works of Stalin's political and ideological opponents inside the country: Trotsky, Zinovyev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, and others. All of them were associates and pupils of Lenin. And not one of them considered himself to be a protege of Stalin, while later Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov and other new figures who had taken their place openly spoke about themselves as such proteges. Here Stalin followed the ancient rule of all dictators. He knew that people promoted by him would be more loyal to him and would never make claims to the top roles. In the 1920s people like Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev were better known in the Party than Stalin. It should be pointed out that some of them were quite prolific. Trotsky, for example, by 1927 had seventeen volumes of essays to his name. As he created his works, this energetic politician and talented writer, invariably flaunted himself before the mirror of history, trying to justify his claims to Party leadership. As I read the volumes of his correspondence, I was astonished by his concern for what would be left about him for future generations. Letters, applauding him, notes sent up to him

during his numerous speeches, the lists of diplomats who sought an audience with him, press comments on his moves and actions—all that was carefully filed and preserved. Trotsky was getting ready to seize Party leadership after Lenin's death.

Stalin was more often than others the target of Trotsky's criticism, both direct and veiled. True, Trotsky published his main anti-Soviet, anti-Stalinist works after having been exiled from the USSR. It is well known that Trotsky described Stalin as "the most outstanding mediocrity in our Party". As a matter of fact, Trotsky, who didn't even try to conceal his opinion about himself as an intellectual genius, often resorted to such descriptions to humiliate his opponents (for instance, that was how he spoke about Zinovyev in 1924 describing the latter as an "importunate mediocrity"; he called Vandervelde a "brilliant mediocrity", and Tsereteli a "gifted and honest mediocrity", etc.). After his expulsion from the Soviet Union, Trotsky retained one lasting and maniacal passion to the end of his life: hatred for Stalin. Nobody wrote as many caustic, malicious, offensive, vile, and degrading remarks about Stalin as Trotsky. In these works Trotsky's true self shone through even more: he was fighting not for the truth, but for himself, the would-be dictator.

On the tragic day of January 21, 1924, the day Lenin died, Stalin dictated the following telegram: "To Comrade Trotsky. At 6.50 a.m., January 21, Comrade Lenin died suddenly. Cause of death: paralysis of the respiratory centre. Funeral Saturday January 26. Stalin." As he signed the message, Stalin realised that the time had come for a bitter and uncompromising struggle with Trotsky for the leadership. But little did Stalin suspect that, in overcoming Trotsky, he would never "get rid of him". Stalin himself was to assume precisely the command-bureaucracy style, violence and toughness advocated by Trotsky. Is not this one of the sources of the future tragedy? And what are the other sources? Here I can only make the following remark.

One of the reasons for the future tragedy was of a

private nature, as it were. After the 11th Party Congress* a Central Committee Plenary Meeting on April 3, 1922 established the post of General Secretary. At the time the post was not seen as being so important, otherwise Lenin would most likely have been elected to it. The General Secretary was instituted to control the daily affairs of the Secretariat. Lenin was already ill. Stalin, who had already shown inclinations to office work earlier, was appointed to this post on Kamenev's recommendation (and, evidently, with Lenin's approval). And less than a year after that appointment, on January 4, 1923 Lenin suggested to his Central Committee colleagues in his *Addition to the well-known Letter to the Congress* that they should "think about a way of removing Stalin from that post". It only took Lenin a few months to realise what kind of man the General Secretary was and see traits in him that could become dangerous in the future. Lenin's death stopped his wish from being fulfilled. And here another, special reason is revealed: the failure to fulfil Lenin's will. The members of the Central Committee and the Delegates to the 13th Party Congress** proved inconsistent on that issue. Later the Party would pay a dear price for the concession made to Stalin by his well-wishers (in those days!) Zinovyev and Kamenev, although Stalin, having learned about Lenin's letter, even tried to hand in his resignation. It should be pointed out that in 1924 Stalin was just one of **many** leaders and nobody saw in him a future demon.

However, the main reason for the future tragedies lay somewhere else. It stemmed from the failure of Lenin's successors to implement his directives. In his last letters Lenin repeatedly returned to the idea of democratising Party life and improving the Party apparatus, expanding Central Committee to include workers and peasants and systematically renewing its membership. Regrettably the democratic foundations had been laid down but were not developed. If Stalin's term of office had been limited by the

* The 11th Party Congress was held in March and April 1922.

** The 13th Party Congress was held in May 1924.

Party Rules, the ugly features of the cult could have been avoided. In Lenin's recommendation to the 12th Party Congress* "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection", one can trace the idea of introducing the mandatory renewal of the leading Party bodies and of distributing the functions between the Central Committee and the Soviet government. The first shoots of democracy were left untended. And gradually waves of dogmatism, bureaucracy, and administration by mere injunction snuffed those shoots out. The future cult of the "great leader" was no mere coincidence.

I have managed to get hold of eyewitness accounts from many persons who had either met Stalin or were involved in one way or another in the whirlwind of events brought about by his decisions. Even individual voices from the chorus of history are important. They make it possible to get a more keen sense of the historical retrospect, to hear the voices of the dead and to have a better understanding of the motives of the struggle of passions... The echoes of history... They live in us, in our destinies and memories, and sometimes in the new scanty data from the past, from that which has burned out and been hidden. Those echoes are like a few lines from the past which does not want to sink into obscurity forever, to become lost in the expanse of infinity. Perhaps we may even speak about the **unfinished** past. In other words, about that past, that phenomenon of time, for which there is no reliable, complete answer. For instance, subconsciously, the past is not over for me. Although I know that my father was a victim of the repressions in 1937, I do not know where he was buried or what his last words were... Most likely, I will never know, but the mind refuses to come to terms with this. The unfinished past may also exist for the people, who do not know in full the genuine history of their triumphs and tragedies.

If often happens in history that the triumph of one man becomes the tragedy of a whole nation. Nikita

* The 12th Party Congress was held in April 1923.

Khrushchev, addressing the 20th Party Congress, made this point: "We cannot say that his actions were those of a crazy despot. He thought it was necessary to act that way in the interests of the Party and the working masses, in defence of the revolutionary gains. This is where the tragedy lies!" I do not, however, think that the emphasis was exactly right. As is stated in Mikhail Gorbachev's report of November 2, 1987, the documents available suggest that Stalin knew about the scale of the reprisals and their mass character. Yes, he knew and knew for sure. For instance, Ulrikh, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Court, together with Vyshinsky made regular reports to Stalin (more often than not to Molotov and Yezhov at the same time) about the trials and sentences. In 1937 Ulrikh submitted "summaries" of the total number of people convicted of "espionage, terrorism and sabotage activities". Stalin read all the summaries: about harvesting, coal output and, horrible as it may be, about the numbers of people put to death.

Stalin quickly grew accustomed to violence as an indispensable component of unlimited power. Most likely, although this is already from the realm of logical suppositions, the punitive machine Stalin threw into high gear captured the imagination not only of the functionaries in the lower echelon, but also of the leader himself. It is possible that the idea of violence as a universal tool evolved over various stages. First there was the struggle against real enemies, and they did exist; then came the liquidation of his opponents; later the terrible flywheel of violence gained momentum, and, finally, violence came to be regarded as an indication of loyalty and orthodoxy. For instance, even his closest associates, Molotov and Kaganovich, didn't even blink when they heard the news that the wife of one of them and the brother of the other had been arrested as "enemies of the people".

At times Stalin already viewed society as a human aquarium: everything was in his power... "Sabotage", the spy scare, the fight against the windmills of "double-dealing" became the shameful attributes of orthodoxy,

[2] blind faith and loyalty to the leader. How could one even imagine that six of the full and alternate members of the Politburo elected at the 14th Congress of the AUCP (B)* would turn out to be enemies?! Stalin destroyed "enemies", and the waves went farther and farther... That was the tragic triumph of the forces of evil. And who knows, perhaps, although it has never been established, Stalin, along with being cruel, was mentally ill? If he wasn't it is hard to explain why, having removed his rivals, he continued to "slaughter" the best people in the Party and government just before the severe trials of the war. Incidentally, many Communists in the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs realised earlier than others the danger stemming from the hysteria of reprisals and generic suspicion. In their midst alone more than 20,000 people fell victim to that orgy of lawlessness.

However, in the final analysis, no grimaces of history could ever deprive the people who created "the first socialist land" of their achievements, and despite the tragedy, we still uphold our ideals. The dialectics of triumph and tragedy itself harbours the infinite complexity of our existence in which so much depends, despite the decisive role the masses play (in the long run!), on historical personalities. As Hegel once put it, a man's destiny is not his own personal destiny, it represents the common moral tragic destiny. And its tragedy here lies precisely in the fact that at a certain stage millions of people saw Stalin as not a man in flesh and blood but as a symbol of socialism, as its personification. After all, a lie repeated many times may come to look like the truth. The deification of the leader assumed a higher meaning. In the eyes of the people it justified any bad consequences of the battle to weed out enemies, and on the other hand, all successes were attributed to the will and intellect of one person alone. Stalin liked to quote classics when adopting and announcing his decisions, especially at big forums. In doing so, he displayed a weakness common to the entire human race.

* The 14th Party Congress was held in December 1925.

People like being protected. Even such a powerful man as Stalin was not averse to taking shelter in the shadow of some authority in theoretical studies, in the shadow of ideological clichés or that of his great predecessor. Triumph and tragedy manifested themselves in the great patriotism and internationalism of the Soviet people and at the same time, in the dogmatism and bureaucracy of many institutions, in the genuine loyalty and self-sacrifice of millions of people, in the absolute power of the administrative staffs and in the spread of the "cogwheel" mentality.

It is most easy to say that every epoch has its own "Dark Ages". I am deeply convinced that if, after Lenin's death, democracy had not been lacking, the development of society along socialist lines could have gotten by without those deep dents in the shield of our Fatherland's history, dents which appeared contrary to the ideals of Marxism. The tragedy could have been prevented. Of course, it is easier now to speak of a possible alternative than it was to make the right choice in those distant years. It is easy to analyse a situation in retrospect. It is always much more difficult to promptly cope with a specific situation.

Today, as we look back, it seems that after the death of Lenin, who was revered even by the opposition inside the Party, it was either Trotsky or Bukharin who had a real chance of taking over leadership. Today there is every reason to say that if Trotsky had taken up the leadership of the Party it would have gone through even more severe trials and the gains made by socialism would have probably been lost. All the more so because Trotsky had no clearcut scientific programme for building socialism in the USSR. Bukharin, however, did have such a programme, he had his own vision of Party objectives. However, for all the attractive features of his personality, his high intellect, gentleness, and humaneness, Bukharin for a long time failed to understand the historical necessity for a sharp dash ahead in building up the country's economic might.

Of course, there were also Rudzutak, Frunze and Rykov... However, it appears that from the time of Lenin's death almost until the 1930s Stalin was by far the most

strong-willed of the revolutionary leaders in defending the Party course to consolidate the first socialist state and assert its right to existence in the world. Of course, he lacked Lenin's qualities to be his successor. But then so did all the others. Of course, Stalin did not possess Lenin's brilliant spiritual power, the depth of Plekhanov's theoretical knowledge, or Lunacharsky's culture. He was neither a leading theoretician, nor an orator, nor an attractive personality. He was inferior to many both morally and intellectually. But he became the leader. A leader's sense of purpose and political willpower were crucial as the new system fought to survive. And after Lenin there were probably no equals to Stalin in this. To quote Hamlet, besides the burden of his imperfections, Stalin also possessed something which others did not have. Stalin's ability to muster the Party apparatus towards his goals played a role of no small importance here. Also, many of those who remained with Stalin after Lenin's death did not prove equal to the task. In those conditions there was little chance of other leaders coming to the fore.

However, in the final analysis, it is not the personalities that matter. What matters is the fact that the democratic potential Lenin had begun to build was not preserved. That is the whole point. If democratic guarantees of social defence against setbacks had been created, whether the leader was outstanding or not quite outstanding would not have been of decisive importance. Otherwise the country becomes too heavily dependent on the choice of history—who will stand at the helm? Stalin, who did a great deal in asserting socialism in our country and who did not give in to any opposition, nevertheless failed to pass the test by power, first of all, from the point of view of his attitude towards human moral values. Stalin was not merely ruthless to his political opponents. He believed that any point of view other than his own was opportunistic. Anyone not with him was regarded as an enemy. In Stalin's mind the idea of duty, which he understood as unqualified obedience, prevailed over the idea of human rights.

* * *

Few people are destined to outlive their time. Stalin is one of them. But his immortality is a troubled one. Arguments about his role in Soviet history accompanied by epithets tainted by worship, hatred, bitterness, and everlasting bewilderment, are sure to continue unabated for a long time. Be that as it may, Stalin's fate shows us once again that in the long run the power of great ideas proves stronger than the power of individual people. The tragic succession of Stalin's abuses could not, of course, undermine the enormous attraction of the ideals put forward by the classics of Marxism.

The judgement of people can be illusory. The judgement of history is everlasting.

ORGANISATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE USSR

The All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences—the scientific research centre of the USSR in the field of agriculture, forest and water reserves. Founded in Moscow in 1929.

The Supreme Economic Council—the highest central body in the Soviet state in the management of the economy from 1917 to 1932. Dealt primarily with industry.

The All-Russia Central Executive Committee—the highest legislative, administrative and controlling body of state authority in the Russian Federation from 1917 to 1936.

The State Defence Committee—the highest extraordinary government body during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Formed on June 30, 1941 and abolished on September 4, 1945, it enjoyed full state power.

The People's Commissariat—the central body of state administration in a particular sphere of activity or sector of the national economy in the Soviet State from 1917 to 1946. In 1946 the People's Commissariats were transformed into Ministries.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which became the Revolutionary Military Council of the

USSR in 1923, was a collective body of supreme military authority from 1918 to 1934. The Council was in charge of the build-up of the Soviet Armed Forces and was chaired by the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs.

The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection—a People's Commissariat and a body of state control from 1920 to 1934. Starting in 1923 it operated in conjunction with the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B) as a joint Party and government department. Its main tasks were: to supervise every sphere of the economy and state administration; to fight bureaucracy and red tape; to supervise the implementation of Soviet laws and to ensure the timely consideration of petitions and complaints in various institutions.

The Council of People's Commissars—from 1917 to 1946 this was the name of the highest executive and administrative bodies of state authority of the USSR and of the Union and Autonomous Republics. In March 1946 they were transformed into Councils of Ministers.

The Economic Council—from 1957 to 1965 was the local body of industrial management (including the building industry until 1962) in economic-administrative regions.

The Council of Labour and Defence—the state body in charge of economic development and defence. The USSR Council of Labour and Defence functioned from 1923 to 1936. Its members were appointed by the Council of People's Commissars.

The Central Control Commission of the AUCP (B)—the Party's supreme control body from 1920 to 1934; was elected at Party Congresses. Starting in 1934 it was called the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the AUCP (B).

SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

STALIN (Dzhugashvili) Joseph (1879-1953), one of the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. From 1917 to 1922 he was People's Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities, at the same time holding the posts of People's Commissar for State Control from 1919 and People's Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection from 1920. Starting in 1922 he held the post of the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee. Starting in 1941 he was also Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (the USSR Council of Ministers) from 1946 to 1953. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 he was Chairman of the State Defence Committee and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces. He held the rank of Generalissimo of the USSR. He became a member of the Party Central Committee in 1917, of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee in 1919, and was a member of the Executive Council of the Communist International from 1925 to 1943.

AKSELROD Pavel (1850-1928), a participant in the Russian revolutionary movement. He took a hostile attitude towards the 1917 Socialist Revolution. He emigrated and called for armed intervention against Soviet Russia. One of the leaders of the Mensheviks*.

ANGELINA Praskovya (1913-1959), the organiser of the first women's team of tractor operators in the USSR in 1933.

BERIA Lavrenty (1899-1953) held leading posts in Soviet intelligence bodies in Transcaucasia in 1921-1931. In 1931 he became First Secretary of the Central Committee

* Menshevism (from the Russian word "minority"), the main opportunistic, reformist and petty-bourgeois faction among the Russian Social Democrats. It was formed at the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP in 1903 after the opponents of the Leninist principles of building a new type of the party found themselves in the minority after the elections to the Party central bodies.

of the CP(B) of Georgia and in 1932 he became First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Territorial Party Committee. In 1938 he became the People's Commissar of Home Affairs of the USSR and starting in 1941 at the same time served as Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. He played a sinister role in the life of the Party and the state, actively participating in the mass reprisals that took place against Soviet citizens during the years of the Stalin personality cult. At a Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in 1953 he was expelled from the Central Committee as well as from the CPSU of which he had been a member since 1917. He was executed on December 23, 1953 in keeping with the sentence passed by the Supreme Court of the USSR.

BREZHNEV Leonid (1906-1982), a member of the CPSU from 1931, he was First Secretary of the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committees of the CP(B) of the Ukraine from 1946 to 1950. In 1950-1952 he was First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Moldavia. In 1953 he became Deputy Chief of the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy. In 1954-1956 he was Second and then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Kazakhstan. In 1960-1964 he was Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In 1952-1953, 1956-1960 and 1963-1964 he was Secretary, and in 1964-1966 First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1966 he became General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and, starting in 1977, he simultaneously held the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Chairman of the Defence Council. He became a member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1952 and a member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee in 1957 (he was an alternate member in 1952-1953 and in 1956-1957).

BUSYGIN Alexander (1907-1985), a blacksmith at the

motor works in the city of Gorky who started a mass-scale movement of innovators in the automotive industry.

BUKHARIN Nikolai (1888-1938) was a member of the Communist Party from 1906 to 1937. In December 1917 he became editor of the newspaper *Pravda* and, later, of the *Izvestiya* daily. He was a member of the Party Central Committee in 1917-1934 (an alternate member in 1934-1937) and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee in 1924-1929 (an alternate member in 1919-1924). He was also a member of the Executive Council of the Communist International. A victim of the repressions during the Stalin personality cult, he was rehabilitated at the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court of the USSR on February 4, 1988.

VOROSHILOV Kliment (1881-1969), a member of the CPSU from 1903. One of the organisers and leaders of the Red Army, he became a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1935. In 1925 he was made People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In 1934 he became People's Commissar of Defence of the USSR, and in 1940 he became Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Starting in 1946 he was Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and from 1953 to 1960 he was Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He was a member of the CPSU Central Committee from 1921 to 1961, and again became a member in 1966. He was also a member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee in 1926-1960.

VYSHINSKY Andrei (1883-1954) became a member of the CPSU in 1920 after having been a Menshevik from 1903 to 1920. In 1933-1939 he was Deputy Procurator General and then Procurator General of the USSR. He took part in the political trials of the 1930s as a State Prosecutor. From 1940 to 1953 he held leading posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. He became a member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1939.

YEZHOV Nikolai (1895-1940) served with the Red Army until 1921 as a military commissar of a number of formations. He became a member of the CPSU in 1917, and between 1922 and 1929 he did Party work in various provinces. In 1929-1930 he was Deputy People's Commissar of Agriculture. In 1930-1934 he was chief of several departments of the Central Committee of the AUCP (B). In 1935 he became Secretary of the AUCP (B) Central Committee and later became People's Commissar of Home Affairs and People's Commissar of Water Transport. He took an active part in the mass reprisals against Soviet citizens during the Stalin personality cult. In 1939 he was arrested and on April 1, 1940 he was executed, in keeping with the sentence passed by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

ZINOVYEV (Radomyslsky) Grigori (1883-1936) was a member of the Communist Party in 1901-1927, 1928-1932, 1933-1934. He was also a member of the Party Central Committee in 1907-1927 and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee in 1921-1926 (an alternate member in 1919-1921). In December 1917 he became Chairman of the Petrograd (now Leningrad) City Soviet. From 1919 to 1926 he was Chairman of the Executive Council of the Communist International. In 1925 he was one of the leaders of the "new opposition" and later of the Trotskyite-Zinovyevite anti-Party bloc. He was a victim of the repressions during the Stalin personality cult.

IVAN the Terrible (1530-1584), Grand Duke of "All Russia" (from 1533) and the first Russian tsar (from 1547).

KAGANOVICH Lazar (b. 1893) became a member of the Party in 1911. In 1924 he became a member of the Party Central Committee (he was an alternate member in 1923), and was a member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee from 1930 to 1957 (an alternate member from 1926). In 1924 he became Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (B), First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B) of the Ukraine, First

Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, and Chairman of the Party Control Commission at the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). In 1935-1944 he was People's Commissar of Railways and was also in charge of several industrial ministries. Starting in 1938 he was also Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In 1947 he became a Vice-Chairman and in 1953-1957 First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

KAMENEV (Rosenfeld) Lev (1883-1936), a member of the Communist Party in 1901-1927, 1928-1932, and 1933-1934, a member of the Party Central Committee from 1917 to 1927, and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee from 1919 to 1926. In 1925 he became one of the leaders of the "new opposition" and later of the Trotskyite-Zinovyevite anti-Party bloc. In 1917-1926 he was Chairman of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, Chairman of the Moscow City Council, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence, and Director of the Lenin Institute. In 1934 he became Director of the Maxim Gorky Institute of World Literature. He was a victim of the repressions during the Stalin personality cult.

LUNACHARSKY Anatoli (1875-1933) became a member of the Party in 1895. A writer and a critic, he was a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In 1917 he assumed the post of People's Commissar of Education.

MALENKOV Georgi (1902-1988) became a member of the CPSU in 1920 and a member of the Party Central Committee in 1939. In 1946-1957 he was a member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee (he was an alternate member from 1941). Starting in 1939 he was Secretary of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) and at the same time Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers

of the USSR. In 1953-1955 he was Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

MARTOV L. (Tsederbaum Yuli) (1873-1923), a participant in the Russian revolutionary movement. In 1903 he became one of the leaders of the Mensheviks. Starting in 1917 he was the leader of their "Left Wing". In 1920 he emigrated.

MOLOTOV (Skryabin) Vyacheslav (1890-1986) became a member of the CPSU in 1906. A member of the Party Central Committee from 1921 to 1957 (an alternate member in 1920), he was also a member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee from 1926 to 1957 (an alternate member from 1921). He became Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B) of the Ukraine and Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) in 1920. In 1930-1941 he was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In 1941-1957 he was First Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR while holding the posts of Vice-Chairman of the State Defence Committee in 1941-1945 and of People's Commissar and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1939-1949 and in 1953-1956.

ORDZHONIKIDZE Sergo (Grigory) (1886-1937) became a member of the CPSU in 1903. In 1918-1920 he was one of the political leaders of the Red Army. In 1926-1930 he held the posts of Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the AUCP(B), of People's Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence of the USSR. In 1930 he became Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council and in 1932 he was appointed People's Commissar of Heavy Industry. In 1921-1926 and from 1930 he was a member of the Party Central Committee. Starting in 1930 he was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee (an alternate member from 1926). Committed suicide in 1937.

PAPANIN Ivan (1894-1986), an Arctic explorer, D.Sc., (Geography), Rear Admiral. He headed the first Soviet drifting scientific research station, the North Pole-1, in 1937-1938.

PETER the Great (1672-1725), Russian tsar from 1682 (ruled from 1689) and the first Russian Emperor (from 1721).

PLEKHANOV Georgi (1856-1918) was a prominent figure in the Social Democratic movement in Russia and abroad, a philosopher and a populariser of Marxism. He was one of the founders of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. After the Second Congress of the RSDLP (1903) he became one of the Menshevik leaders. Although he took a negative view of the 1917 Socialist Revolution, he did not support the counterrevolution.

RADEK Karl (1885-1939), a member of the Communist Party in 1917-1927 and in 1930-1936. From 1919 to 1924 he was a member of the Presidium and Secretary of the Communist International. He became a member of the Party Central Committee in 1924, and was also a member of the editorial board of the *Izvestiya* newspaper. He was a victim of the repressions during the Stalin personality cult.

RUDZUTAK Yan (1887-1938) became a member of the Party in 1905. He was Chairman of the Moscow Economic Council in 1917-1920 and Chairman of the Central Committee of the Textile Industry. In 1924-1930 he was People's Commissar of Railways. In 1926 he became Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars as well as Vice-Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence of the USSR. Starting in 1932 he was Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the AUCP (B) and People's Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the USSR. He became a member of the Party Central Committee in 1920 and was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee from 1927 to 1932 (an alternate member in 1923-1924 and after 1934). A victim of the repressions during the Stalin personality cult,

he was rehabilitated after the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956).

RYKOV Alexei (1881-1938) was a member of the Communist Party from 1899 to 1937. Following the 1917 Socialist Revolution he held the posts of People's Commissar of Home Affairs and Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. From 1924 to 1930 he was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and from 1924 to 1929 he was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation. In 1931-1936 he held the post of People's Commissar of Communications. He was a member of the Party Central Committee in 1905-1907 and in 1917-1934 (an alternate member in 1907-1912 and in 1934-1937) and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee in 1923-1934. A victim of the repressions during the Stalin personality cult, he was rehabilitated by the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court of the USSR on February 4, 1988.

STAKHANOV Alexei (1906-1977), a worker who started the innovation movement in industry. He worked as a miner and in 1935 set a record in coal output.

TEVOSYAN Ivan (1902-1958) became a member of the Party in 1918, and in 1939 became a People's Commissar. Later he was in charge of a number of Ministries. In 1949-1953 and 1954-1956 he was Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, from 1950-1953 he simultaneously held the post of Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy. A member of the Central Control Commission from 1930 to 1934, in 1939 he became a member of the AUCP Central Committee and was an alternate member of the Central Committee Presidium in 1952-1953.

TOMSKY Mikhail (1880-1936), a Party member from 1904, a member of the Party Central Committee from 1919 and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee from 1922. After the 1917 Socialist Revolution he became Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, a member of the Presidium of

the Supreme Economic Council and Chief of the Association of State Book and Magazine Publishing Houses. Committed suicide.

TROTSKY (Bronstein) Lev (1879-1940) was a member of the Communist Party from 1917 to 1927. After the 1917 Socialist Revolution he became People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. In 1918-1924 he was People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Starting in 1923 he led the opposition against the Party's general line. A member of the Party Central Committee in 1917-1927, he was also a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee in 1919-1926. In 1926 he became the leader of the Trotskyite-Zinovyevite anti-Party bloc. Expelled from the USSR for his anti-Soviet activities in 1929, he was stripped of his Soviet citizenship in 1932.

ULRIKH Vasili (1889-1950) became a member of the Party in 1910. While serving as Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in 1926-1948, starting in 1935 he also held the post of Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR. He supervised political trials during the years of the Stalin personality cult and signed sentences passed at those trials.

FRUNZE Mikhail (1885-1925) became a member of the CPSU in 1904. In 1919-1920 he was in charge of a number of armies and fronts. In 1921-1924 he commanded the armed forces of the Ukraine and the Crimea and was Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine. In 1924 he became Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, Vice-Chairman of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, and Chief of Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In 1925 he served as Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR. In 1921 he became a member of the Central Committee and in 1924 he became an alternate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (B).

KHRUSHCHEV Nikita (1894-1971) became a member of the Party in 1918. In 1935 he became First Secretary of the Moscow Region and City Party Committees and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (B) of the Ukraine, while from 1944-1947 he also served as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1949 he became Secretary of the Central Committee and First Secretary of the Moscow Region Committee of the AUCP (B). In 1953-1964 he was First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and starting in 1958 he also held the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. A member of the AUCP Central Committee from 1934, he was also a member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee from 1939 to 1964 (an alternate member in 1938).

TSERETELI Irakli (1881-1959), one of the leaders of the Mensheviks. He adopted a hostile attitude towards the 1917 Socialist Revolution and emigrated in 1921.

CHKALOV Valeri (1904-1938), a test pilot. In 1936-1937 he performed a non-stop flight from Moscow to Udd Island (in the Soviet Far East) and a transpolar flight from Moscow to Vancouver (the USA). The other members of his crew were Georgy Baidukov and Alexander Belyakov. He was killed in an air crash in 1938.

YAROSLAVSKY Yemelyan (Gubelman Minei) (1878-1943) joined the Party in 1898 and became a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1939. After the 1917 Revolution he became Commissar of the Moscow Military District. In 1921 he became Secretary of the Party Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, and engaged in journalistic and scientific work. In 1921-1922 he was a member of the Central Committee (an alternate member in 1919-1921), and became a member again in 1939. In 1923-1934 he was a member of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the AUCP (B).



THE STALIN *Phenomenon*

JOSEPH STALIN LED THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS (STARTING IN 1922). THAT PERIOD WAS MARKED BY MAJOR GAINS OF SOCIALISM, GROSS POLITICAL MISTAKES AND ARBITRARY RULE FOR WHICH THE SOVIET PEOPLE PAID A DEAR PRICE AND WHICH HAD GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LIFE OF SOCIETY.



Novosti Press Agency Publishing House