

# THE SOVIET UNION

# PROPOSES

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The International  
Situation  
and  
Soviet Peace Initiatives

Vladlen KUZNETSOV

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Third revised edition

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## Peace Efforts

What would our world be like, what would it be worth and what would it have achieved without pioneers or discoverers? What would it be like if mankind were not guided by the spirit of enterprise, daring, courage and resourcefulness in the search for the unknown, unexplored and unexamined, by the insatiable desire for improvement and unquenchable thirst for progress? It would be a poor world indeed. Fortunately, it is not so.

The Latin word *initium* means a start, a beginning. An admirable idea, a fortunate thought, a discovery—eureka! A revelation from which everything begins. Initiative is at the source of everything. It is essential in every sphere of human activity. Lack of initiative means stagnation. Somebody has to display initiative, propose decisions and solutions and act as leader. That is the way it has always been and will always be.

The present booklet deals with initiatives in the sphere of international affairs and world politics, in the struggle for peace. For it is impossible to build a better world without creative initiative. The maintenance of world peace has always been a

task of paramount importance for all peoples and states ever since the earliest projects of an "eternal peace". Today this task has acquired even greater importance and urgency, for in the age of nuclear missiles war has become suicidal. It can jeopardise the future of mankind and life itself on Earth. Therefore, every step that can help save the world community from this mortal danger becomes increasingly important.

However, we must make one reservation from the outset, namely, that one initiative differs from another. The human brain does not always conceive noble, elevated ideas. It can produce schemes based on intentions that are far from being humane. Such intentions may be selfish, evil or simply cannibalistic. Certain quarters hatch intrigues aimed at opposing one part of mankind to another. There have been doctrines and conceptions fraught with war and acts of aggression; there have been designs posing a threat to human life, and such types of weapons and weapons systems, including the neutron bomb, which we call barbaric. There are quarters that are hammering together alliances, blocs and axes aimed at splitting the world.

These so-called initiatives have prevented the establishment of a universal, just and lasting peace on the planet. They have prevented the world acquiring a really humane character, so that its progress would not, in the words of Marx and Engels, "resemble that hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain".

Let us examine the motive forces behind the two opposite worlds—the socialist and the capitalist world, what has been and is being produced by their "brain centres", the impulses prompting them to action, and the contrasts between their political, social, and moral outlooks, between their world

views. People of one of these worlds have devised doctrines of "containment", "rolling back", "throwing back", "retaliation", and so on. People of the other world have opposed them with only one doctrine, that of peaceful coexistence. One group of people have invented the "cordon sanitaire", economic embargo and sanctions; in response the other group of people have proposed honest business-like cooperation based on principles of equality, mutual advantage, and non-infringement on one another's interests. The former launched "psychological warfare". In reply the latter said that there should be fair competition and that the ideology that will win over the majority of mankind shall be the victor and be regarded as the most powerful ideology.

The leaders of one group of countries started a cold war. The leaders of the other group started the process of detente. One group discovered for themselves "gunboat diplomacy"; the other group put forward the idea of true decolonisation to save the states of Asia, Africa and Latin America from all forms of dependence. One group started the military application of atomic energy (let us recall Hiroshima and Nagasaki); the other preferred to use atomic energy for peaceful, constructive purposes. Representatives of one group of countries proclaimed the conceptions of "local" or "peripheral" conflicts, "limited nuclear war", "one-and-a-half war" and many other similar projects. The representatives of the other group called for eliminating war altogether from the life of the world community and substantiated the conclusion about war being no longer inevitable. The former brought forth the conceptions of a "first" or "pre-emptive" attack; the latter proposed that the two sides exchange not blows, but mutual guarantees to renounce the use of force in solving political

problems and disputes, to refuse to be the first in using nuclear weapons and to sign a non-aggression pact. The former pioneered in the development of more and more new weapons systems, types and programmes; the latter advanced plans for general and complete disarmament.

This list of contrasts can be extended. But it is not our purpose here to settle accounts, but to emphasise the human significance, the value of initiatives that could save the planet from all wars, both "hot" and "cold", and that could pave the way for a future without weapons and military disasters.

Though this is a thorny path, the first steps have already been taken. The main, really epoch-making achievement, consists in that it has been possible to break up the tragically fatal cycle: war—a brief spell of peace—war. The last salvos of the Second World War were fired over 37 years ago. During all these years mankind has hoped that the Second World War will be the last in its long-suffering history. The continent which was the focus of two global disasters has become a cradle of detente and the most stable part of the world.

Here joint effort has put an end to the cold war, which could have grown over into a hot war. On this continent a series of treaties were signed between the Soviet Union and other socialist states, on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other, aimed at normalising their relations. As a result, the European frontiers which were a constant source of trouble and conflict have become immutable. A quadripartite agreement on West Berlin was signed which defused a time bomb that was ticking in the heart of Europe. A Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held here. Its main document—the Final Act—pro-

vides a sound political basis for the development of fruitful relations between Eastern and Western states in all spheres of human activity. Another basis for peaceful cooperation is the approximate military-strategic parity between the two opposite social systems. The Soviet Union and the United States have started the process of strategic arms limitation which is vital for international security. For the first time in history the world community has signed about 20 international treaties and agreements which to various extents curb the arms race in some of its directions. The UN General Assembly has held its first special session on disarmament which was followed by the second one. A series of confidence-building measures, such as notification of military exercises and invitation of observers to such events, have been introduced for the first time in European and world practice.

And now let us ask ourselves what would have happened to the world in which we live, if such efforts had not been made and such measures had not been taken, if there had been no such achievements in the 1970s—the first decade of detente? At best the cold war would still be going on and the world community would still be dangerously balancing on the brink of war (to use John Foster Dulles' expression). At worst there might have been a thermonuclear holocaust reducing the world to a heap of smouldering ruins.

There is another equally legitimate question: to whom is the world community above all indebted for peaceful coexistence and cooperation, for the positive balance in international relations, despite all changes in the world climate, changes that are sometimes sharp as at present? Without belittling anybody's role, a fair and unbiased observer will justly appraise the obvious and indisputable fact

that it was the Soviet Union's efforts that had made possible the convocation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the UN's first special forum on disarmament, conclusion of a series of international agreements on curbing the arms race, the drafting of a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin and the adoption of many other measures.

*Moscow worked for the convening of an all-European conference for about ten years.* It worked for this assiduously, despite the guarded, often icy, response of several great powers, despite the first failures. It worked perseveringly, overcoming numerous obstacles, and persuading the sceptics that such a forum was urgently needed. It would be appropriate to recall here what actually took place before the idea was eventually adopted and the Final Act ratified by all 35 participants in the Helsinki Conference. Way back in the 1930s, when the Hitler clique disunited its future opponents, setting them against one another, in an effort to pave the way for aggression, Moscow saw through its perfidious manoeuvres and its policy of "divide and rule". It then proposed that such manoeuvres be effectively neutralised by the establishment of a *collective security system in Europe*. Had this proposal been adopted, Hitler would hardly have dared attack single-handed the united front of peaceful powers. As you can see, the price the world had to pay for rejecting the Soviet initiative was very high, and the consequences of this step were tragic indeed. But more of that later.

The peace after the war has been a better and more stable one than before. But it is not by far a peace we could be satisfied with. To meet the peaceful interests of mankind more fully, it is necessary to carry out the peace initiatives already

advanced and to undertake further initiatives. To put forward such initiatives it is vital to feel the pulse of international life carefully and identify the affected areas in time, to make an accurate diagnosis and to prescribe the necessary treatment. This is precisely what the Soviet diplomats are doing.

A special place in world politics in the last quarter of the 20th century belongs to the set of initiatives proposed in February 1981 by the 26th CPSU Congress, which are known in the West as "Brezhnev's eight points". Here they are:

*Point One.* The Soviet Union is prepared to *extend confidence-building measures in the military field carried out by decision of the European Security Conference on the territory of European states, including Western regions of the USSR (advanced notification of military exercises of ground troops and the invitation to them of observers from other countries), to the entire European part of the USSR, provided the Western states, too, extend their confidence zone accordingly.*

*Point Two.* The Soviet Union would be prepared to *hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries.*

*Point Three.* The Soviet Union is prepared both to *participate in a separate settlement of the situation around Afghanistan and in a discussion of the international aspects of the Afghan problem together with the questions of the Persian Gulf security.*

*Point Four.* The Soviet Union is prepared to *continue without delay negotiations with the United States on limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, preserving all the positive elements that have so far been achieved in this area.*

*Point Five.* The Soviet Union is prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of new submarines—the “Ohio” type in the US and similar ones in the USSR—and to agree to banning the modernisation of existing and the development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines.

*Point Six.* The Soviet Union proposes reaching agreement that already now a moratorium be set on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile weapons of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, i.e., that the quantitative and qualitative level of these weapons, naturally including the US forward-based nuclear weapons in this region, be frozen.

*Point Seven.* A competent international committee should be set up, composed of the most eminent scientists of different countries to demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe.

*Point Eight.* A special session of the UN Security Council should be called attended by the top leaders of its member states and, if they wish, also by leaders of other states, in order to seek ways to improving the international situation, to preventing war.

What do Soviet foreign-policy initiatives signify? To whom are they addressed? Their range is wide. They cover all the cardinal problems bearing on world security, all spheres of inter-state relations: from the elimination of the existing hotbeds of war and prevention of clashes between states to the implementation of the principle of collective security; from measures designed to ensure military detente in regions of the more dangerous confrontation to prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction; from complete elimination of colonialism and racism to development of mutually ad-

vantageous cooperation of states in solving major large-scale economic, scientific and technical problems.

The Soviet Union pays special attention to achieving progress in curbing the arms race. The world community must concentrate maximum effort on eliminating the source of the main danger to universal peace. In searching for ways to remove the danger the community should display maximum perseverance and resourcefulness.

Europe is an object of special and constant concern for Moscow, because on that continent there is the most dangerous military confrontation, and even a small spark there may kindle a global conflagration. Nor should we overlook the hotbeds of war on the planet which can grow into worldwide conflicts. Soviet initiatives are invariably aimed at securing a peaceful political settlement of local crises, above all in Asia and the Middle East, in every area where there are smouldering coals and forces that may fan them. The Soviet Union proposed the convening of European congresses on environmental protection,\* energy supply and transport. The purpose of these steps was to advance business-like cooperation endorsed by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to promote the solution of outstanding ecological, energy and transport problems within the framework of the entire continent and for the benefit of all European countries. It was the Soviet Union and its partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) that proposed the establishment, on the basis of treaties, of mutually advantageous relations between CMEA and the European Economic Community.

\* A conference to discuss the question was held in 1980 in Geneva. — Ed.



The USSR's constructive proposals, including those advanced together with its allies, are addressed to the entire world community and its universal representative—the United Nations. They are forwarded to the governments of individual states and to the executive bodies of economic groupings (EEC) and military-political groupings (NATO).

In putting forward various proposals and projects aimed at strengthening international security Moscow invariably appeals both to the governments and the peoples. It proceeds from the belief that only the combined efforts of the peace-loving peoples and states can preserve and strengthen peace. Lenin said: "Peace cannot be concluded only from above. Peace must be won from below." This is confirmed by historical experience and by current international developments.

The international significance of the 26th CPSU Congress also stems from the fact that it has drawn public attention to the stark danger of a global holocaust and at the same time added to peoples' confidence in the possibility of overcoming the arms race and the danger of war, that it has inspired all the anti-war forces and roused them to an ever more resolute struggle against militarism. It is easier to fight a danger when one knows its scale and is well aware of its consequences. The nations should know the truth about the baneful consequences of a nuclear war for mankind.

Solly Zuckerman, former advisor to the former British Premier Harold Wilson, recalls in his memoirs that the scientific advisors of British Prime Ministers and US Presidents had from the fifties been telling their patrons that further armament was senseless.

The warning has been wasted, so senseless accu-

mulation of weapons is continuing to this day at a growing pace. As a result the danger of a nuclear catastrophe has grown much more formidable in the early eighties.

Why have those at the top in the West failed to this day to heed the voice of the scientists? Because they very much prefer to hear other voices, those of the generals. It is often said that war is far too important to entrust it to the generals, and yet this is precisely what is being done. Foreign policy is made to serve the purposes of militarist ambitions, and military strength is rated above political reason.

Military nuclear power is becoming ever more deeply-rooted, widespread and uncontrollable. It sows panic in the United States where incidents with nuclear weapons are frequent and are even known as "broken arrows" in Pentagon jargon. A total of up to 200 such incidents have been recorded to date, of which many could have sparked off a nuclear war "by mistake", by fatal accident.

The situation is made worse by the fact that the nuclear menace, the "broken arrows" are being exported. According to US data the Pentagon has sent nearly 25,000 nuclear weapons to many parts of the globe.

So the voice of top brass is being heard clearly in the White House. But does it heed the voice of US scientists who in the spring of 1981, symbolically near Washington, held the First Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War? \*

The participants sent an appeal to Leonid Brezhnev, Ronald Reagan and other heads of UN member states stating their expert view which does

\* The Second Congress was held in April 1982 in Cambridge, Great Britain. — Ed.

not differ from that of the "man in the street": the interests of present and all future generations demand that nuclear war be prevented. The stockpiling of immense stores of nuclear arms makes the world ever less secure. It is the imperative demand of our time that the very thought of employing nuclear weapons in any form and on any scale should be inadmissible.

This idea still seems beyond the grasp of some generals and politicians thinking in generals' terms. But the diehard "hawks" should have no illusion that the question of war and peace shall be left for them to decide. People in many countries favour the initiative of the 26th CPSU Congress to set up a competent international committee to demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Both physicians' congresses and other such forums showed once again that the idea of curing the world of nuclear fever is vitally necessary.

Circles inclining to a policy of confrontation have already felt the mounting power of public resistance and are beginning to be worried and to panic. The signal to start a campaign against the anti-militarist movement was sounded from the White House which rebuked Western Europe for its "pacifist" and "neutralist" trends meaning in fact its resistance to US plans for deploying more nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

Dr. Joseph Luns, NATO Secretary General, readily responded to the call from Washington. According to the Dutch newspaper *Het Vrije Volk*, he is extremely concerned over the growing protests against nuclear armament. In the view of the NATO Secretary General, it is precisely those who come out for nuclear disarmament that help to bring about war. Nuclear weapons in the hands

of NATO are in his view a "deterrent" factor, guaranteeing peace. Strange logic, to be sure!

One would find it really difficult to recall so brazen an attack on the splendid mass movement for nuclear disarmament.

The Pentagon and militarist NATO circles clearly fear that the mass movement will bar the way to Europe for US Pershings and Tomahawks. They fear that the Pentagon will not be able to force upon Western Europe the December 1979 NATO decision on missiles which is risky to the point of suicide and that the NATO militarists will fail to secure support in their countries. They fear that the peoples will not agree to the plans of total armament of the North Atlantic Bloc.

But it is not pacificism, the peaceful strivings of the masses, that should be feared. One should instead fear that agreement may not be reached to limit and restrict arms which are threatening to run out of control.

Soviet initiatives do not rule out proposals from the other side, broad discussions, thorough critical exchanges with account taken of various viewpoints. They are oriented towards decisions acceptable to all parties concerned and they leave room for compromise. They are by no means regarded as the last word or final truth. In advancing its proposals Moscow is chiefly guided by a desire to conduct joint discussions of outstanding international problems and bring about their joint solution for the sake of achieving an aim that should unite all—i.e., prevention of a new world war. In pursuit of this aim the Soviet Union is ready to consider any constructive proposal, regardless of who its author is.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, therefore, do not claim the exclusive right of blaz-

ing the trail of world development. Today, more than ever before, the contribution of every state, of every leader to peace is important, a peace subjected to severe trials. Two heads are better than one—this popular adage is quite applicable to big politics. International security is created through collective reason and collective effort. Proceeding from this, the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation proposed back in May 1980 *the convening of a meeting of the heads of state from all parts of the world to consider the key problems of world politics*. Among these the pivotal problems are elimination of hotbeds of tensions and prevention of war.

The historical experience acquired since the period of the anti-Hitler coalition has shown that all important decisions are usually adopted at the highest, the most authoritative level. There are many convincing examples showing how the most difficult international problems are solved through peaceful negotiations on the basis of agreement. Why should not state and government leaders sit down at a conference table and try to reach agreement on the cardinal issue, i.e., on preventing a further aggravation of the international situation and the outbreak of war? We all remember the historic results of the Helsinki Conference attended by leaders of 33 states of Europe, as well as the USA and Canada. All agreed that the Conference was a success. A world conference of such representatives could certainly become a worldwide event. The 26th CPSU Congress proposed *convening a special UN Security Council session attended by top leaders of the Council member countries and, if they wish, by other leaders of states in order jointly to seek ways of improving the international situation and preventing war*.

One would have thought that no objections could be raised to such an idea. The present period is a difficult one, and what reason could anyone have for abandoning the attempt to lessen the difficulties, if not to remove them altogether? It is true that the West has not raised any overt or categorical objections to this. But neither have the Western leaders so far agreed to such a meeting. They have resorted to the long-practised tactics of soft-peddalling a disagreeable idea and of foiling it with a conspiracy of silence.

While Western leaders are turning the idea over in their minds, the Soviet Union and its allies are not wasting any time. They are purposefully and constantly conducting a *vigorous political dialogue with the leaders of all groups of states, big and small, industrially developed and developing, members of various alliances, and non-aligned or neutral countries*. Its purpose is to launch a joint search for ways to stabilise the present unstable world situation, to strengthen international security both on a regional and a global scale. *Fruitful bilateral consultations with many states are paving the way to the proposed summit meeting of leaders of states from all over the world*. For world relations are made up of bilateral relations. Therefore, any initiative aimed at normalising or improving relations between states benefits the infrastructure of the entire world community.

The Soviet leaders had talks with the leaders of India, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, the Yemen Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and many other developing states. They are a symbol of co-operation between two influential forces of the present period—socialism and the national liberation movement—in the struggle for universal peace and progress. In this connection Leonid Brezhnev's vis-

it to India in December 1980 was a significant event.

A fruitful East-West political dialogue is also being carried on between East and West.

The participants in it agree on the main point, which is to work separately and jointly for stabilising the present unstable world situation. Thus, the Soviet-Finnish communique published in November 1980 reads in part:

"In view of the tension existing in the international situation, the sides emphasised that it was necessary for all the states of the world to show greater realism and a constructive approach to key international problems and to display a genuine interest in seeking their solution."

This and many other documents signed by Soviet leaders and their Western partners emphasise the paramount importance of securing tangible progress in curbing the arms race both in Europe and elsewhere.

*Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the Federal Republic of Germany in November 1981 was of special importance for the whole complex of East-West relations and the general trend of world politics.*

Despite the obvious slowing down of the process of detente and the new complications in the international arena, Soviet-West German relations continued to make progress. This progress was due largely to the Soviet-West German summit meetings and to Leonid Brezhnev's previous visits to West Germany—in May 1973 and May 1978. The process received a fresh impetus after the Soviet leader's third trip there.

Progress in Soviet-West German relations has been more conspicuous in the economic sphere, which constitutes the material basis of cooperation. West Germany has become the Soviet Union's chief

trading partner among capitalist states. Trade between the two countries has increased 10.5 times in the last ten years. Economic ties have grown both quantitatively and qualitatively, become of a long-term character, and have acquired a truly great scale. The agreement covering a period of 25 years signed in May 1978 and the long-term programme adopted on its basis in July 1980 have created a firm framework for continuing genuine economic cooperation in the 21st century.

A symbol of fruitful business-like cooperation has been the large-scale "gas-pipes" project, signed on the eve of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Bonn. The other participants in the project are France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Austria. During the next quarter of a century Western Europe will be receiving annually some 40,000 million cubic metres of natural gas from West Siberia, having agreed to supply large-diameter pipes, compressor stations and other equipment for the projected gas pipeline. The project will meet the growing energy needs of the West. The West has realised the importance to itself of this undertaking which has been called the "deal of the century". Washington has vainly tried to frustrate the conclusion of this contract.

In reply to Washington's ban on deliveries to the USSR of equipment manufactured under US licence for the trans-Siberian gas pipeline the French government was the first in Western Europe to make Dresser-France, the branch of a US company, fulfil its contract for deliveries of the equipment. French President Mitterand said his country rejected embargoes of any kind in relation to the Soviet Union.

The central topic of the talks in Bonn was this vital issue: how to ward off the threat hanging

over Europe in view of plans to deploy new types of US nuclear missiles in several West European countries, above all in the Federal Republic of Germany, and how to prevent the balance of forces being upset in favour of NATO?

Expounding the Soviet view on this issue, the Soviet head of state emphasised that the situation was a critical one. NATO plans presented an unprecedentedly formidable danger to the whole continent. Drawing attention to the danger of the deployment of new US medium-range nuclear systems and neutron weapons and to the adventurism of those who preach "limited" nuclear war, Leonid Brezhnev spoke with pain and bitterness of the fate the Transatlantic strategists envisage for Europe. "It turns out," he said, "that the possibility to use nuclear weapons in the 'European theatre of war' is being elevated to the status of a military doctrine. As if Europe, where hundreds of millions of people live, were already doomed to becoming a theatre of war. As if Europe were a box of little tin figures which do not deserve a better fate than being melted in the flames of nuclear explosions."

These words were highly appreciated by West Germans and all Europeans, by all people of good will. They reflected the anxiety and apprehensions of those who, after NATO's infamous decision of December 12, 1979, to deploy US medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, attended mass rallies and demonstrations of protest in Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Amsterdam and other cities.

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Bonn far transcended Soviet-West German relations in another respect too: it enhanced the hopes of those who, despite the extremely alarming situation, refuse to believe that a new war is inevitable and that man cannot

avert such a catastrophe. While showing due vigilance, we must not overdramatise the situation. There is no reason to believe that the world is irrevocably heading for a nuclear disaster.

The Bonn talks have proved that detente is not "dead" as its opponents assert, that it has a past as well as a sufficiently secure political future. It is still alive and is showing its benefits in the political dialogue between East and West, in the conclusion of large-scale economic agreements like the "gas-pipes" contract, and in the joint search for ways of curbing the arms race. The 1970s—the "decade of detente"—have not passed without trace; they have left a deep imprint in the minds and consciousness of nations. Detente has demonstrated that peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation is feasible. Moreover, it is an imperative necessity.

Countering the concepts of a "trial of strength" and of military confrontation, Leonid Brezhnev put forward the idea of the common destiny of all states and nations, of their common security. "Whatever may divide us," he emphasised, "Europe is our common home. Common fate has linked us through centuries, and it links us today, too." The common fate of the two parts of Europe—socialist and capitalist—is an objective factor that any realistic policy has to reckon with.

In the course of the visit attention was drawn to the fact that the search for a common language, and a common approach to settling controversial issues should take priority over differences, which should be relegated to the background. The differences between East and West on many international issues, primarily on matters of security, are considerable. But in tackling the principal issue of war and peace we must proceed from what brings

us and must bring us closer together, and not from what divides us. This is the only approach that can be truly constructive, fruitful and promising. Differences in points of view and in assessing particular phenomena or events are quite compatible with the common concern for peace. However great ideological and political differences may be, they must not rule out agreement on the chief issue—the safeguarding of world peace. That is the starting point for furthering East-West relations.

*This approach, which disregards dissimilar political notions and lays emphasis on what should bring nations together, which tries not to deepen gaps but to build bridges across them, constitutes the essence of the Soviet Union's policy of initiatives aimed at uninterrupted continuation of the process of detente and political dialogue between East and West.*

In the present tense situation the USSR continues to search for a common language with the United States of America. In the development of the general international situation much depends on the steps the US administration will take in response to Soviet initiatives. Moscow, as in the early 1970s, is calling on the other side to revive the fruitful dialogue in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples and universal peace.

It is not the Soviet Union that has caused a worsening of Soviet-US relations. As in the past the USSR believes (and Leonid Brezhnev made this point clear to US Senator Charles Percy when he met and talked with him in the Kremlin in late November 1980) that there is no reason why the two countries cannot cooperate with one another as equal partners. They can cooperate constructively, taking into account one another's legitimate

interests and observing the principle of equality and equal security. It is time to prevent a further worsening of Soviet-US relations. It is time to put to use all that is positive that has been achieved through joint efforts. It is time that the other side abandoned its futile attempts to attain military superiority over the USSR. It is time to stop dragging one's feet in the matter of limiting strategic arms on a reciprocal basis, bearing in mind that the fate of international security largely depends on success in this undertaking.

In view of the state of relations between the USSR and the US at present and the acuteness of the outstanding international issues the Soviet Union has from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress stated its readiness to join an active dialogue at any level. "Experience shows," says the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Party Congress, "that the crucial factor here is a meeting at summit level. This was true yesterday, and is still true today."

According to certain officials there is a serious obstacle to the holding of a Soviet-American summit meeting. They say "too many differences" exist between the two powers. Yes, there is no doubt about that, but the differences will not diminish if the parties altogether stop talking for a long time. They will not wither away by themselves. On the contrary, given Washington's current hardness these differences can only grow greater and deeper, they can fossilise. To avoid this we should sit at the negotiating table and try to remove and settle some contradictions, smooth over others as much as possible and create conditions for gradually overcoming the gravest difficulties. To be sure, we do not seek to include here each and every difference as that would not be realistic. But we can and

must narrow down and defuse those differences which may lead to a confrontation.

It took the White House more than a year to return to the idea of a summit meeting proposed by Moscow. The truth of the matter is that the proposal had won many supporters not only in those parts of the world that were troubled by international tension and the stagnation in Soviet-American relations, but in America as well. A poll conducted in the United States in November 1981 showed that the vast majority of Americans considered an American-Soviet summit meeting would be useful.

In early April 1982 Ronald Reagan told journalists of the possibility of holding a meeting with the Soviet leader in New York in June or July, when the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament was to take place. This was not a well considered idea, but an impromptu statement inspired by a correspondent's question.

Did he have in mind short unofficial meetings during intervals between sittings? This is not what the Soviet Union has in mind. From Leonid Brezhnev's reply to a *Pravda* correspondent we know that *Moscow proposes organising a true summit meeting*. The meeting should correspond to the immense responsibility the two states bear for the fate of world peace and it should justify the great hopes placed on it. Otherwise it will be fruitless.

It is hardly a normal state of affairs when the leaders of the world's two greatest powers fail to meet personally, and exchange opinion on the international situation, on ways of overcoming present tensions and preventing another cold war and a nuclear catastrophe. The world knows who is to blame for the failure to hold such a meeting under

invented pretexts and for the loss of valuable time. True, in one respect Washington made good use of this time: it embarked on implementation of 44 super-armament programmes, on the production of another large batch (17,000) of nuclear warheads. The time lost for strengthening peace was used for material preparations for war.

The Soviet Union is convinced of the benefit of summit political dialogue. The tense situation prevailing in the world calls for a responsible approach, for energetic measures and competent decisions—decisions that would help the international community as a whole to curb the alarming course of events and protect detente from the avalanche of armaments.

The Soviet-American summit meetings of the early 1970s not only improved the political atmosphere. They made it possible to start limiting strategic nuclear armaments. They helped to bring about better regulated and more reliable peaceful coexistence and more stable international security, and they promoted more intensive business-like and mutually beneficial cooperation and a more fruitful political dialogue between the East and the West directed towards resolving conflict and crisis situations and outstanding international problems.

What was achieved in the 1970s proves that the possibilities of finding peaceful, mutually acceptable solutions have by no means been exhausted. The political dialogue of the 1970s between Moscow and Washington needs to be continued in the 1980s. All the objective requisites for this exist. There is a large package of Soviet-American agreements concluded in the period of detente. The international community has given a clear mandate for the holding of a Soviet-American summit meeting, for the promotion of a far-reaching political

dialogue between the East and the West. The USSR is always willing to resolve by peaceful means the controversial problems that divide the world; this willingness is unquestionable. Even a meeting place is already available: Finland and Switzerland have expressed readiness to receive the leaders of the two mightiest powers so that they may hold a dialogue.

It is far better to meet at a summit conference than on the brink of war, President Kennedy said in his day. These words are even more meaningful today. They resound as a summons to the present US Administration to change its mind and stop sharpening its nuclear sword while it is not too late. It would be better still if the United States and the Soviet Union hammered their swords into ploughshares—this is what the Soviet Union has long been willing to do and has long been calling for. In a radio speech on April 17, 1982, the US President advocated such relations with the Soviet Union as would not depend on the existence of nuclear means of containment. Well, Washington has the opportunity of promoting such relations, if only it had the desire to do so, the desire to come to an understanding, to take into consideration the security interests of the other side and to conduct an honest dialogue truly between partners.

## **Working for Peace in the United Nations**

The Soviet delegation submitted new peace proposals at every one of the almost 40 UN General Assembly sessions.

The United Nations is a rostrum for states and governments. It is a centre at which world public opinion is moulded. It is a brain trust that seeks ways of solving numerous problems.

The Soviet Union believes in the United Nations and values it highly. And this is reflected in the fact that its delegation never enters the skyscraper on the East River in New York empty-handed.

Today the international situation has become dangerously tense. Apparently it would be no exaggeration to say that the peace effort will have to be as great as the effort normally required in war. It will be equally important to muster the wisdom and sense of responsibility of governments and states, of their leaders to prevent war. Mankind needs strategists of peace, detente and international security, and not strategists of war (even if "limited" war), tensions or confrontation.

When one hears the speeches delivered by some



US politicians and diplomats from the UN rostrum, one is under the impression that they have been delivered by generals. They do not think or speak in terms of peace. They translate everything into the language of military force. They constantly pour forth figures characterising military expenditure and put forward new militarist programmes. The outcome of this is not surprising: the group of countries turning out the largest quantities of arms, namely the USA and other NATO countries, have not advanced many proposals for curtailing material preparations for war. Those who are staking on a long-term arms race, on thwarting disarmament talks, upsetting the military balance that has taken shape in the world, rejecting the principles of equality and equal security, have very little room left for peace initiatives. Those who come every year to the UN headquarters with few or no peace proposals cannot have a high opinion of UN's role and possibilities. For instance, in recent years official Washington has not submitted any significant proposals to this forum for consideration.

Wherein lies the greatest danger today? The answer is: in that the munitions production lines may develop such a speed that it will be impossible to stop them; in that the arms race in some fields is assuming such proportions that soon it will be impossible to curb the race effectively with the help of agreements based on mutual control; in that the process of escalation may turn the threat of war into actual war. Many today feel like former Finnish President Urho Kaleva Kekkonen who was "oppressed by the thought that in the context of the present crisis of confidence decisions may be taken which may for many years tie the world to the arms race". One such decision has already

been taken. It is White House Directive 59\* proclaiming a "new nuclear strategy" and a doctrine of "limited war". The term "limited" can hardly be of real comfort to anybody. How does one "limit" a typhoon, an earthquake or the eruption of a volcano?

What is the way out? How can we prevent, how can we insure ourselves against such a disaster as a global thermonuclear conflict?

The best, most reliable and radical way is to ban war, to reach agreement on eliminating war from the life of human society, to conclude an inter-state agreement on total renunciation of the use of force in international relations. The production of all forms and types of nuclear weapons should be discontinued. The available stockpiles of nuclear weapons should gradually be reduced and ultimately destroyed altogether.

*Back in 1946 Moscow proposed the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition for all time of the production and use of atomic weapons. Later, in 1975, Moscow submitted a proposal to the UN on preventing the development of new types of weapons and weapon systems of mass destruction which might prove even more lethal than nuclear weapons. In 1976 Moscow further called for the drafting and conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.*

We can cite a dozen and more examples to show that after the war many opportunities for solving problems of disarmament and international security were lost because Moscow's proposals were rejected. It should be mentioned that these prob-

\* This official document outlining Washington's new nuclear strategy allowing for "limited" nuclear conflict was issued in August 1980.—Ed.

lems have given rise to anxiety both in the East and in the West.

Apparently these proposals are not totally unacceptable to those to whom they are directly addressed. When US President Carter took office in 1976, he started off by saying that it was possible to eliminate nuclear weapons. What did he end with? White House Directive 59.

Stopping the further growth of strategic potentials and subsequent quantitative reduction and qualitative limitation of strategic nuclear weapon systems could play a decisive role in decreasing the threat of nuclear war. In the beginning it seemed the US was inclined towards participating in this undertaking together with the USSR. What did it do in the end? It adopted a decision on the deployment of nuclear missile systems in Western Europe. It "froze" the Soviet-US Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2). It got ready to launch the manufacture of new types of weapons and weapon systems of mass destruction.

It is sad, but the fact is that the US, as are its closest allies in NATO, is not prepared to undertake big and radical steps to curb the arms race.

Well, then, we are ready to smaller steps. The USSR sees no merit in the rigid formula of "all or nothing at all", which can only serve the purpose of those opposed to ending the arms race. The Soviet Union believes that in the matter of defending peace and removing the war danger one cannot afford to overlook even the smallest possibilities. After all, big things are made up of small things. If it is impossible to accomplish a big task at one go, it may be wise to work towards it step by step, to try to settle separate, specific issues, as long as such a course gradually leads to the final goal. In

fact this approach has been tried over the last few years and has proved fruitful.

In an effort to ease present tensions, to decrease the danger of war, the USSR had, in the autumn of 1980, come out with another constructive initiative at the United Nations. Andrei Gromyko has put forward *several urgently needed measures to lessen the danger of war*. The Soviet initiative is set forth in a four-point programme:

*Point One. Agreement not to expand the existing military-political groupings or to set up new ones.*

*Point Two. Agreement by states not to further increase their armed forces and conventional armaments as a first step towards their subsequent reduction.*

*Point Three. In addition to an international convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states, examination of other possible solutions of this question, provided all the nuclear powers are duly prepared for this.*

*Point Four. The earliest possible conclusion of an international treaty on general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, and before that—declaration by all nuclear powers of a year-long moratorium on all nuclear explosions.*

The reaching of an agreement on the proposed urgent measures would help improve the international climate and mobilise the efforts of all states on the main directions of struggle for promoting detente and lasting peace.

*All these measures have been proposed as initial steps towards more radical moves first to curb and then to end the arms race.* This would be the minimum the Eastern and Western states could do without agonising deliberation and protracted exhausting talks. They should be able to do this with-

out delay. But even small steps could be more effective politically, morally and psychologically. Implementation of the proposed measures would demonstrate the readiness of both the East and the West to reduce the threat of war.

The Soviet Union also presented a *comprehensive programme of measures aimed at ending the arms race and achieving disarmament in the 1980s*, which the UN General Assembly has proclaimed the second decade of disarmament. This programme was set forth in a letter addressed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the then UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in April 1980. Another Soviet document was a systematic collection of business-like proposals and initiatives submitted to the 35th UN General Assembly Session, *the memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security"*.

Two analytical documents, each containing about 30 points, were submitted to the international community for consideration. They actually list all the urgent measures which, if implemented, would end the arms race. Among them are such measures as: *stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons of all types and gradual reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles, leading to their complete elimination;*

*further quantitative and qualitative limitation and reduction of strategic arms;*

*conclusion of a treaty on general and complete banning of nuclear weapon tests;*

*reduction of military spending;*

*limitation of sales and deliveries of conventional arms;*

*convocation of a world conference on disarmament and a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe.*

The Soviet Union is convinced that fulfilment of the proposed measures would give meaning to the second decade of disarmament. This would be of historic significance for the struggle for universal peace and international security. The important thing is to make this decade a decade of real disarmament, and not a decade of an accelerated arms race.

Anyone who reads the history of UN activities can see that since the appearance of the first atom bombs after the Second World War the Soviet Union has been persistently seeking ways to put an end to the nuclear arms race. In the 1940s it was incomparably easier than now to ban atomic weapons, when huge amounts of these weapons have been stockpiled. But even now, as Moscow believes, this problem *can be solved*.

It is for this purpose exceptionally important to impede the development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons. In particular, such an impediment is the banning of test explosions in all media and for all time which all states, with a few exceptions, demand.

The USSR stated at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly in October 1982 that, as a nuclear power, it was ready for this; it proposed that the question of the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapons tests be included in the agenda of the session.

Specifically it proposed that *the drafting and signing of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests be speeded up and that the talks on this issue at the Committee on Disarmament turn to practical issues*. The Soviet Union outlined what could be *the main provisions* of such a treaty. They took into account the agreement reached during the discussion of

this problem, as well as the ideas and wishes of many states, including the question of verification.

At the same time the Soviet Union drew the attention of the world community to another question which would make it possible to intensify efforts aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war and also to ensure the safe development of nuclear power engineering. It proposed that the General Assembly *declare the destruction of peaceful nuclear facilities by conventional weapons to be tantamount to nuclear attack*. The Soviet delegate proposed that *this action be equated with those which are regarded as the gravest crimes against humanity in UN resolutions*.

Who can doubt the urgency and advisability of these measures when we recall the recent Israeli air attack on the Iraqi nuclear energy research centre?

The Soviet documents give a clear idea of what has been and what has not been accomplished in the postwar period in the sphere of disarmament. They set forth Moscow's ideas and conceptions of the ways and means of ensuring reliable international security. They sum up both the positive and negative experience of the first decade of disarmament. They show the real causes of soaring military expenditure and growing arsenals; they focus attention on factors obstructing progress in the field of curbing the arms race. These papers identify the areas in which mankind can achieve success in its historic attempt to create a world without weapons and wars.

The Soviet memorandum *For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security* reads in part:

"There are no insurmountable objective barriers to durable, guaranteed peace. The chief obstacle

is the lack of political will on the part of certain states. This obstacle must be removed."

Though there are no objective obstacles, there are subjective ones, such as false fears, lack of political will, lack of daring, distrust and lack of faith.

### Three Viewpoints on Disarmament

If one listens to statements by Eastern and Western representatives in the United Nations, one may be led to believe that they contain all that is necessary for an amicable solution of the disarmament problem. All the starting points and all the components are there: an awareness of the danger arising from the arms race; statements regarding the excessive armament of states; an understanding of the fact that further stockpiling of weapons, far from preserving international security, will undermine it; clear awareness of the fact that the arms race is decreasing mankind's chances of solving such problems as elimination of backwardness, poverty and disease, preservation of the natural environment, and provision of adequate energy and raw material resources; and a desire to stop the insane race to the fatal line which may spell the tragic end of human civilisation.

The course of action seems clear enough. But quite often instead of doing something, the West starts discussing the general question of whether it is at all possible to curb the arms race. Instead of inspiring people with confidence in success (with-

out confidence it is hard to strive for success), it starts doubting more and more whether it is possible to stem the landslide of armaments.

So far we have not succeeded in stopping the arms race. This is a fact. But would it be right to say, as *The New York Times* has done, that mankind has already lost the battle for ending the worldwide arms race? *Rheinische Post* of West Germany says that it is almost impossible to stop the nuclear arms race between the East and the West, and that NATO is inclined to accept this conclusion. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is not. But if one of the two partners sits down at the negotiation table without faith in success, without hope for success, if he sits down merely to "put in an appearance", as it were, and then leaves without achieving anything, the chances for progress may be undermined.

Another opinion that has gained currency in the West is:

The nuclear arms race has long been compelling the United States and the USSR to accumulate more and more weapons simply to maintain a parity. This opinion has been supported by Kenneth Bacon of *The Wall Street Journal*. This would mean that we are faced with a spontaneous, uncontrollable process, a supernatural, demonic force subjugating peoples, governments and states. It follows that curbing the arms race is a hopeless undertaking. The arms race is thus fate itself, a law of nature.

Such an approach can only help to disarm man, deprive him of will power and energy. It is difficult to undertake a task with a sense of blind resignation, hopelessness and doom. A sense of impotence, depression paralyses energy and enterprise in man. Unless we break down moral and psycho-

logical barriers inhibiting vigorous struggle for a limitation and reduction of armaments, the suicidal arms race will continue to mount. Unless we vanquish the paralysing fear, the kind of fear which a rabbit experiences when faced with a boa constrictor, we shall not be able to terminate the arms race. True, in the West they call it "balance of fear".

*Wherein lies the secret of Moscow's energetic, forward-looking approach to the problem of disarmament? It lies not only in its traditional love of peace and the nature of the social system it represents, but also in a faith that man's age-old dream about a world without war will be realised sooner or later.*

It is not ill fate that accounts for growing military spending. Nor is it responsible for the development and production of new types of weapons and weapon systems. We all know who does all these things. Stopping the arms race or allowing it to continue wholly depends on the political will of the peoples, states and governments.

Was it not their political will that has made possible the conclusion so far of nearly twenty international agreements curbing the arms race in a number of spheres, agreements which constitute a notable achievement of the first decade of disarmament? Nuclear weapon tests have been prohibited in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is in force. Many states have pledged not to put weapons of mass destruction into orbit, on celestial bodies, on the seabed and ocean floor. Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons have been banned. Military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques is prohibited. The first steps have been taken to

curb the arms race in the most dangerous field: the USSR and the US have concluded agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

It should be mentioned that it was the Soviet Union that initiated these measures. They would not have been adopted at all if it were not for the USSR.

Even when detente was on the upsurge the task of curbing the arms race called for extreme effort. What can we say about periods of tensions? During such periods many are reluctant to reduce the rate of growth of armaments. But nevertheless work in pursuit of this goal is carried on even after 1980, despite a serious aggravation of the international situation.

In September-October 1980 a UN Conference was held in Geneva on the prohibition or restriction of the use of certain types of conventional weapons that may be regarded as excessively cruel or nonselective. Sceptics predicted that the conference would be a failure. And what was the result? Delegations from 80 countries drafted and adopted four basic documents: a convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons; a protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices; a protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons; and a protocol on prohibiting weapons whose fragments cannot be detected by X-ray.

In this connection a Reuter correspondent reported from Geneva that the international community had acquired its first document imposing limitations on non-nuclear weapons after 1925 when the Geneva protocol prohibiting the use of poison gas used in the First World War was adopted. Thus, given political goodwill, it is possible to

undertake steps to limit arms even in times which are not too favourable for such measures. This again confirmed that the Soviet viewpoint was valid. The USSR is convinced that disarmament is not a dream, but a realistic goal.

Of course, not everyone in the West believes that the arms race is inevitable, that it cannot be controlled. There are people in the West who readily point to the need to control the arms race and to regulate the competition in armaments. At first this idea seems attractive. To establish control, to regulate... But despite all talk about control of the arms race in the last few years, world military spending has soared to 500,000 million dollars a year. Experts have calculated that if the arms race goes on at the current rate, military spending will double by the beginning of the 21st century. Despite all attempts to control the arms race, so far it has proved impossible to prevent the development of increasingly destructive and lethal types of weapons and weapons systems.

People who merely talk about control usually do nothing more than noting the continuously mounting production of armaments. Of course, the arms build-up can be marked with little flags, but this can hardly prevent a disaster.

As for those who want regulation of the arms race, they maintain that the race will go on infinitely. This would mean that the whole idea is to organise the arms race correctly, and no more. But the arms race is not a stream of cars in a street subject to traffic control. What will happen if one day someone drives through a red light? Can we guarantee that this does not take place?

If the arms race continues to grow, as it does now, when the US continues to announce false nuclear alert signals, there can be no guarantee

against such an eventuality. The final document adopted by the UN Special General Assembly Session on Disarmament on June 30, 1978, reads in part:

"Today, as never before, mankind faces the threat of self-destruction through a continued contest in accumulation in tremendous proportions of the most destructive weapons ever produced."

True, in his address to the session former US Vice-President Walter Mondale tried to reassure the audience by saying that the arms race was not controlled by madmen...

We agree that in the Pentagon and NATO there are sober-minded people among those who control the arms race. These people are fully aware of the suicidal character of a global nuclear conflict. However, it is hardly normal to try to gain military superiority in the present nuclear age when there are already sufficient quantities of weapons in the world to destroy life on earth many times over.

Continuing the arms race is surely no way to stop it. And it will not be possible to end it if it is regarded as an inevitable and irremediable evil, if brute force is placed above everything else, above human reason and will, if one is guided by the postulate: let us continue to arm, but under control. But controlled armament will not save mankind from the threat of a new destructive war. Only controlled disarmament can do this.

*The Soviet Union has pointed out that a rational and reasonable approach to the problem is not to regulate the arms race, but to abandon it altogether, not to control the arms race which is still going on at a mounting rate, but to curb it and then end it altogether.*

There is no alternative to such an approach; there is no other way out. The present grave, even

dangerous situation does not favour further armament, but calls for disarmament. A true sense of security, which is what the overwhelming majority of the people both in the East and the West want, will not grow out of a nuclear arsenal. One should also realise that every new round of the arms race only increases mistrust between states belonging to different social systems and reduces the possibility of success in a political dialogue.

Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of the FRG, has stated quite clearly, if somewhat too categorically:

"Further detente with the Soviet Union is impossible unless we curb the arms race." It is high time one realises that the very fate of East-West political relations depends on whether it will be possible to stop the militarist drive, the lethal production lines. The future of peace, the very existence of our civilisation depend on this. One should understand before it is too late that the solution of many, if not all, of the world's problems—political, economic, energy, raw material, food supply and other problems—pivots on the implementation of military detente. These problems cannot be solved unless military detente is secured.

The present world situation demands bold initiatives and resolute action. They are necessary to prevent a further development of dangerous confrontation and the threat of war. The Soviet Union has come out with initiatives on the key problems of disarmament, initiatives which provide for the most radical measures.

The Soviet Union has put forward proposals at the United Nations at a time when people begin to be oppressed by a sense of impending danger. But though people talk much about this danger, it will not subside or disappear by itself. To deal

with it, resolute measures must be taken. The governments, states and peoples—all who are opposed to turning the planet into a radioactive wilderness—must act jointly. The danger is not too far off. Mankind has already felt the scorching breath of this wilderness.

The scars of Nagasaki and Hiroshima on the face of the earth will never be removed. The tombstones of the victims of the first and, let us hope, the last atomic bombardment, which was totally unjustified from the military point of view, will remain forever.

The face of the earth will forever retain the scars of the "dirty war" in Indochina. The aggressors were guided by the principle which called for burning, destroying and devastating everything. In a speech at the United Nations the representative of Vietnam said that 14.5 million bombs and shells, 100,000 tons of toxic chemicals, and napalm were used against the Vietnamese people.

How did the country and its people, its land, its nature, survive the ordeal? Yes, Vietnam did indeed hold out, though there are regions there which resemble a lifeless moonscape. Some of the plant and wild life species have totally disappeared. Nearly half the farmland, mango plantations (it will probably take a whole century to restore these), much of the jungle, forests and fields have suffered severe damages. The ecological equilibrium and water cycle have been upset, and the climate has changed for the worse. . .

The face of the earth will bear the scars inflicted on the coral island of Bikini in the Pacific Ocean, which the Pentagon turned into a testing ground for nuclear weapons. The inhabitants of the atoll were initially evacuated. But later they were permitted to return to the island. What did



they find on the island? Fifty mushroom clouds had risen over it, contaminating the water, fruit and fish. . .

The tragedies of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam and Bikini should serve as a warning, as alarm signals to mankind, to this and future generations. We cannot have peace of mind while parts of our planet are being turned into wilderness that is a hazard to life. Existing means of destruction are already a threat to civilisation. But the threat is mounting because weapons of ever newer designs are being developed, weapons far surpassing the hydrogen bomb.

To avoid that cannot be repaired afterwards, urgent measures are needed. To this end the USSR submitted to the 35th UN General Assembly Session a proposal *On Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature for Present and Future Generations*. Addressing the session the USSR Foreign Minister said:

"It is the direct duty of the United Nations to draw the attention of all states to their historical responsibility for preserving the Earth's nature as an essential condition for the life of the present and future generations and to promote international cooperation in this sphere."

The General Assembly endorsed the Soviet proposal. It recognised that the planet's environment could be preserved only through the efforts of all states, through the implementation of large-scale global and regional programmes. *The essence of Moscow's approach is that protection of the environment is not merely an ecological problem, but also a political problem. Its solution hinges on ending the arms race, abolition of colonialism which plunders the natural resources of other countries,*

*on broad international cooperation and on the fight for economic and social progress.*

The arms race is diverting material and intellectual resources from the urgent tasks of preserving the planet's usefulness and beauty for future generations. Weapon tests, nuclear weapon tests above all, have a disastrous effect on plant and animal life. They pollute air and water. The development of new types of weapons and weapon systems of mass destruction may have even more perilous consequences for nature. Implementation of the Soviet initiative would halt dangerous developments, thereby precluding new tragedies in the age of nuclear missiles.

## The Vital Problem of the Nuclear Age

The choice is between peace and a nuclear war. The issue of war and peace has probably never been as acute as at the present time. This is due primarily to such actions by the US Administration as its decision to start large-scale production of neutron weapons, the development of new strategic systems, preparations for the nuclear-missile rearmament of NATO, the propounding of the doctrines of both a "limited" and a "protracted" war, and the launching of a propaganda campaign declaring nuclear war to be acceptable and permissible.

Ronald Reagan began to show a fondness for the neutron bomb long before he became master of the White House. He even praised the bomb. In a radio speech in 1978 he said it was nothing but the death ray science fiction writers dreamed of, killing the enemy but not destroying the environment. It was a deterrent weapon, that was much cheaper... a moral advance.

To President Reagan it was all very simple, cheap and moral. Without hesitation he ordered production of the neutron bomb to start. That was

in August 1981, on the day when the whole civilised world was honouring the memory of the victims of Hiroshima, the victims of the first atom bomb, and wondering how to prevent a repetition of the horrors of modern warfare.

Why does Washington need the neutron bomb?

It is the brain child of the US military circles with their doctrine of "limited" nuclear war. In August 1980 Presidential Directive 59 finally elevated this doctrine to the level of government policy, which the present US Administration has adopted.

The prospect of creating weapons that are never used has never attracted Pentagon generals. They believe weapons are not meant to lie rusting in depots. But even the most hot-headed hawks among them realise that in the event of a world nuclear war they themselves could end up in a radioactive graveyard. They are willing to risk this, but not to the extent of committing suicide. So they want to try their luck in a small, local, "limited" war.

The neutron bomb is designed above all for the European theatre, like the Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and the Tomahawk cruise missiles. These weapons are needed for implementing the doctrine and strategy of "limited" nuclear war in Europe. Medium-range nuclear missiles and the neutron bomb are the "wonder weapons" for a future "wonder war" which, so the US strategists hope, will not singe the American eagle's wings.

Washington's assurance that neutron weapons will be stockpiled on US soil does not lessen the danger. Neutron weapons are being mass-produced. These sinister products can appear on the European continent at any moment and within a matter of hours. Already based in Europe are US Lance missiles and M-110-AG howitzers that can

be equipped with neutron warheads and are just waiting to carry new lethal charges. So far there is no threat of the neutron weapons of the Pentagon being *immediately* stationed in Europe. But there is every likelihood of their appearing there within the next few years on the pretext of a crisis situation which the American hawks themselves might create. The US military are still keen on implementing their plans—of siting a missile-neutron base close to the border of the socialist community so as to create a first-strike potential. What particular components of this complex appear first in Europe is not so important. What is important is that the infrastructure is already being laid for both types of mass destruction weapon. Washington has been waiting for the opportunity to site new nuclear-missile systems, as well as neutron weapons, at West European bases. Twice—in 1977-1978 and 1981—Washington tried to add neutron weapons to its West European arsenals but both attempts failed. But this does not mean we must not expect a third attempt, which in certain circumstances could be successful.

For quite some time the Soviet Union has been aware of the Pentagon's neutron plans and manoeuvres. As early as in 1961 it warned the United States of the danger of a neutron round in the arms race. The Soviet statement on the issue said: "Plans are being discussed in the United States for the production of the neutron bomb, a bomb that kills everything living, but does not destroy material property. Only aggressors longing for conquest and subjugation of alien lands and acquisition of alien property can direct the efforts of scientists to create such a weapon."

How at that time did Washington receive the Soviet proposal that it should refrain from adding

the new weapon to its arsenals? It decided to secure for itself a monopoly of the neutron bomb. The Washington strategists forget that they had previously failed to take seriously the USSR's ability to make atom and hydrogen bombs. What can be said on this score? To attempt to base policy and strategy on such a shaky foundation as the short-term monopoly of a mass destruction weapon cannot be regarded as a serious venture.

When the Soviet Union—which from the outset knew the United States was working on producing neutron weapons and was not taken unawares by the "legitimation" of these weapons in the summer of 1977—immediately proposed mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb, Washington and its NATO partners should have borne in mind that the proposal sprang not from "fear" but from sober reasoning. From the outset the Soviet Union made it clear it would be better for all concerned if the Soviet Union were not forced to take retaliatory measures. It was in 1977, when the neutron plans of the United States began to be implemented, that Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev warned that the USSR was firmly against production of the neutron bomb, but if it were made in the West the USSR would not remain a passive observer and would meet the challenge. This declaration was repeated at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1981: *The USSR will not start the production of neutron weapons provided other states do likewise, and is willing to conclude an agreement banning these weapons once and for all.*

The Soviet Union is not in the habit of brandishing weapons. But the neutron-obsessed leaders of certain states are inclined to regard Soviet peaceableness as a sign of weakness. They unscrupu-

lously resort to intimidation with new types of lethal weapons. The West should make a point of remembering this: the Soviet economy, Soviet science and technology are capable of manufacturing any weapon on which Western politicians try to pin their hopes. But, although it has the potential for producing sophisticated military hardware, the Soviet Union does not wish to compete in the sphere of military technology. Such competition is fraught with grave danger. The USSR has always adhered to a policy not of achieving military superiority, but of reducing armaments, of disarmament and lessening military confrontation.

The Pentagon's "wonder bomb" can add a new neutron spiral to the arms race, thereby sharply aggravating rivalry in the sphere of military technology. As postwar developments have shown, a law of equilibrium operates in the international arena. When some states violate the equilibrium, others restore it. President Reagan's decision to produce the neutron bomb may result in the establishment of a nuclear balance between the United States and the USSR at a higher, and consequently more dangerous and expensive, level.

It should be borne in mind that neutron weapons present a threat not just to Europe. The Pentagon does not rule out the possibility of deploying such weapons in the Middle East, as well as the Far East. It may also give this bomb to its "rapid deployment force"—an interventionist force to be thrown into battle wherever Washington thinks its own "vital interests" are being encroached on. So neutron weapons present a threat to all mankind.

To thwart this threat the Soviet Union and other socialist countries *as early as in March 1978 submitted a Draft Convention on the Prohibition of*

*Nuclear Neutron Weapon to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.* But the Western powers have kept the draft on the shelf up till now. After the US President's decision to start full-scale production of neutron weapons, the US representative on the Geneva Committee described the Soviet draft as "unworthy of serious consideration". From this we may draw the obvious conclusion that Washington actually wishes to whip up, not curb, the arms race.

The world public knows that in the past period the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed reaching agreement on the mutual renunciation of the production of neutron weapons and on the banning of such weapons. As a TASS statement in August 1981 pointed out, Soviet leaders still firmly believe that such a solution would best promote peace and would be in the interests of all states and peoples.

At the same time no one should have any doubt that the Soviet Union will make the appropriate assessment of the situation created by the new US moves and take the necessary measures to safeguard its own security and that of its friends and allies.

On October 2, 1981, the US President announced an ambitious and ominous programme envisaging the speedier buildup of strategic nuclear forces, thereby proving that Washington does not intend to confine itself to militarist statements. The programme embraces the three types of these forces: ground-launched missiles, sea-launched missiles and strategic bombers. It contains provisions for:

— completing construction of the new and more powerful MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, the first hundred of which will begin to be deployed in underground silos in place of Minuteman and

Titan missiles. How they will subsequently be based will be decided by 1984;

— building one new Trident submarine a year and equipping it with an improved ballistic missile, as well as deploying nuclear cruise missiles on existing submarines; and

— developing and producing B-1 strategic bombers (which President Carter rejected in favour of cruise missiles in 1977). At the same time, B-52 and B-1 strategic bombers will be equipped with 3,000 cruise missiles. Apart from this, the “invisible” stealth bomber which, according to the Pentagon, can penetrate radar screens will continue to be improved.

This White House and Pentagon programme, estimated in America to be the largest buildup of US strategic forces in recent decades, will cost taxpayers 180,000 million dollars over the next five years alone. It is with this super-programme of nuclear armament that the United States intends to complete the 20th and enter the 21st century. Washington is also extending the nuclear arms race to space, as testified by its programme of flights for orbital Shuttle craft with a secret Pentagon cargo on board.

All these measures of the US Administration are by no means conducive to the resumption and success of the process of limiting US and Soviet strategic armaments. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the National Broadcasting Corporation and Associated Press, seven in every ten Americans want a new US-Soviet treaty limiting nuclear armaments.

The Soviet Union stands for returning to and carrying forward that process.

The problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments was described as paramount in Leonid

Brezhnev's Report to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union because the fate of world peace largely depends on its solution. It is *paramount* because SALT-2 has not only been shelved in the United States but calls are being made there for non-observance of SALT-1, which is in force. It is *paramount* because besides the USSR and the United States, all other nuclear powers—Great Britain, France and the People's Republic of China—must participate in future talks on limiting and reducing strategic armaments.

*The Soviet Union is willing without delay to continue negotiations with the United States on limiting and reducing strategic armaments, retaining everything positive that has so far been achieved in that field.*

Let us recall that Soviet-US talks on limiting strategic armaments began back in 1970. They led to the signing of important documents: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1972) and SALT-2 (1979). By signing these treaties the USSR and the United States—the two strongest nuclear powers—embarked on the path of curbing the arms race in its most dangerous trend. All peace-loving nations welcomed these efforts, hoping they would be continued. After signing SALT-2 in Vienna in June 1979, the Carter Administration blocked its ratification only a few months later on the pretext of events in Afghanistan. The Reagan Administration went even further by declaring it “dead”.

Of course nobody, including the Soviet Union, considers SALT-2 to be perfect. But is it sensible to cancel the results of seven years' negotiations, during which a scrupulous balance of the security

interests of both sides was achieved, and start from scratch? Addressing the 19th Congress of the Soviet Young Communist League in Moscow on May 18, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev emphasised in connection with the new round of talks: "After all, the talks will not start from scratch; a great deal of by no means irrelevant work has already been done. This should not be forgotten."

One and a half years—almost half the US President's full term of office—passed before Reagan in a speech on May 9, 1982, agreed to continue strategic arms talks with the USSR. Having put SALT-2 into storage, the White House now proclaimed it would propose something better and far-reaching. But it was a step backwards rather than forward. Washington virtually swept everything back almost to the initial stage.

The fact of the matter is that the White House is guided not by the principle of equal security but by the principle of unilateral advantage. It wants to eliminate the USSR's advantages in certain aspects, while leaving its own intact. The US wants to deprive the USSR of the backbone of its strategic forces, of its defence capability—intercontinental missiles—and to retain everything of its own that constitutes the greatest threat to the USSR, namely, bombers, cruise missiles and other types of strike weapons.

While agreeing to continue the arms limitation talks, the US Administration went along to them with its old useless baggage. The very premise determining the whole attitude of the White House is a false one: it insists that the United States is "lagging behind" the USSR. Yet the Pentagon's official report for the 1982 fiscal year states unambiguously that the United States and the USSR are approximately equal in nuclear strength. Many

competent specialists and leaders of former US Administrations are convinced of the strategic parity of the two powers and they have authoritatively confirmed this. They believe the United States and the USSR possess equal nuclear potentials, notwithstanding all the differences in their structure and the particular advantages each side has in some components of the potential. This fact enabled Senator Edward Kennedy to ask his famous rhetorical question, which stunned those who claim that the US nuclear potential is nowhere near that of the Soviet Union. Would any high-ranking American army officer, he asked, agree to exchange nuclear forces with the Soviet Union? The answer would be "No!", the senator said.

Wishing to get the talks going, give them an impetus and ensure good results, *the Soviet Union proposed the freezing of US and Soviet strategic weapons simultaneously with resumption of the dialogue*. Both a quantitative freeze and a qualitative freeze were proposed.

Whether or not agreement is reached on limiting and reducing strategic armaments will largely determine the fate of war and peace. Thus the USSR and the United States bear a truly historic responsibility. Moscow is willing to go its half of the way to a mutually acceptable agreement. It has also demonstrated its profound awareness of the full measure of this responsibility and clear understanding of the present alarming situation, which requires immediate and resolute action.

Washington is giving its blessing not only to the nuclear arms race, but increasingly to a nuclear war as well. It is openly talking of the "admissibility" and "acceptability" of a nuclear war, of the feasibility of delivering a first strike and achieving victory in such a conflict. One Pentagon arm-

chair strategist, Professor Herman Kahn, of the Hudson Institute, has said the United States must be ready to conduct a real nuclear war and win it. What is this if not a call for legalising the use of nuclear weapons, if not inculcation of the view that a global nuclear conflict, which could destroy all life on earth, is permissible and even inevitable? Was not this why in the summer of 1982 the US President announced his refusal to continue talks with the Soviet Union and Britain on drafting a treaty on the complete and universal prohibition of nuclear weapons tests?

Perhaps some people in the West think the Soviet Union is overdramatising the situation. Definitely not. Time and again American experts assert that any alarm could lead the United States to strike a blow with the nuclear weapons which are always in combat readiness and aimed at targets in the Soviet Union. This might be thought to be the opinion of irresponsible people. So let us look at the opinion of responsible politicians then. President Reagan says the United States has enough strength to gain the upper hand if need be. US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger says the United States pins its hopes of victory mainly on its new systems of nuclear-missile weapons.

So they want to win a war in which there can be no victor. Constant thoughts of victory, counting on victory can lead to risking a war. Such obsession is a dangerous thing!

On October 17, 1981, the US President made what world opinion and many newspapers regarded as one of the most sinister statements in postwar history. He confirmed what is causing peaceloving nations and governments grave apprehension about the American doctrine of a "limited" nuclear war in Europe by saying: "... A situation could arise,

in which there would be an exchange of strikes with both sides using tactical weapons against military contingents in the battlefield without any of the great powers pressing the button."

Under these circumstances mankind must do its utmost to prevent a nuclear war, to remove the war danger menacing the world, to defend life itself. Tackling this task, the Soviet Union has for many years been insisting on taking political and legal as well as practical measures to eliminate the danger of a nuclear conflict. To the programme of nuclear armament which brings a world catastrophe nearer it counterposes a programme of nuclear disarmament that would prevent nuclear holocaust. For this purpose the USSR again proposes:

*-- reaching agreement on ending the production of nuclear weapons of all kinds and gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they are completely eliminated;*

*— on a mutual basis renouncing the production of nuclear-neutron weapons;*

*— bringing to a successful conclusion the Soviet-US talks on limiting and reducing strategic armaments;*

*— reaching a mutually acceptable agreement at the talks on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe;*

*— concluding a non-aggression pact under which the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would undertake not to be the first to use nuclear and conventional weapons;*

*— resuming and bringing to a conclusion the tripartite talks between the USSR, the United States and Great Britain on banning nuclear weapons tests;*

*— creating nuclear-free zones in Northern Europe and in the Balkans, and in other parts of the world;*

— concluding an international convention obliging the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against nations which do not possess such weapons and do not have them on their territory;

— concluding an international agreement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where there are no such weapons at the present time.

This is a far from complete list of proposals the Soviet Union has put before the nuclear powers and the world community in an attempt to remove the danger of a destructive global conflict.

In the autumn of 1981 the Soviet Union submitted two special new proposals to the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly. One of them envisaged the adoption of a declaration on preventing a nuclear catastrophe and the other—refraining from extending the nuclear arms race to space. It can be rightfully affirmed that both proposals reflected the aspirations of present as well as future generations, because it was a case of preventing the destruction of civilisation and Earth from turning into an uninhabited radioactive desert.

There is no more important and urgent task. The Soviet Union once again appeals to a sense of responsibility in international affairs, to reason and conscience. Finally, it appeals to the elementary instinct of self-preservation in those who seem incapable of nobler feelings, to those in whom reason is clouded by hostility and hatred for other nations and states.

What will happen if a war is unleashed on land or in space with the use of the most destructive nuclear weapons of annihilation? Man will no longer be able to curse those who brandished the nuclear club at him. He simply will have no time to do so. The nuclear maniacs must be checked now,

while it is not too late. *The Soviet Union has proposed that the United Nations should make the following declaration: States and statesmen who first resort to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the most heinous crime against mankind. There will never be any excuse or reward for leaders who decide to use nuclear weapons first. All doctrines which permit a first nuclear strike and all actions that push the world to catastrophe are incompatible with the laws of human morality and with the high ideals of the United Nations.*

In the USSR's opinion the minimum that the United Nations could do without delay to prevent international developments from taking a dangerous turn is to declare itself resolutely and explicitly opposed to a first nuclear strike, designating it as the most heinous crime against mankind.

The USSR has proposed condemning all doctrines and all actions that can lead to a global catastrophe. There can be no justification for being the first to use nuclear weapons. The resolve of the whole world community to ban nuclear war and eliminate this danger can serve as a serious warning to the advocates of such a war.

The Soviet proposal met with broad support at the United Nations. Even those who usually vote against such initiatives only because they come from the Soviet Union did not risk opposing the proposal openly. One question arises: why are such proposals supported by all the nations of the world except the United States? Because the latter possesses nuclear chains and does not intend to give them up. At the very moment when the Soviet proposal to curb the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, was being welcomed at the United Nations and elsewhere, the US President endorsed the



US programme for a buildup of strategic forces, thereby challenging the whole world.

At its 36th Session the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Prevention of a Nuclear Catastrophe and approved the proposal on the conclusion of a treaty on prohibiting the emplacement of all kinds of weapons in space. It also adopted a resolution banning nuclear neutron weapons, proposed earlier by the USSR and other socialist countries.

The Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1982 was marked by a truly historic initiative on the part of the USSR. The session became a major international event of the late 20th century because it saw a new Soviet move paving the way to a safer world in which nuclear weapons will never be used.

In a message to the participants in the Special Session Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev informed the UN General Assembly that the Soviet Union pledges itself NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. *This commitment came into force as soon as it was promulgated from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly. This exceptionally important step was taken by the Soviet Union unilaterally. It is a momentous move because the present critical situation in the world, fraught with the threat of a nuclear war, requires energetic, resolute measures to bring about a marked improvement in international relations; it calls for a magnificent example for other nations to follow.*

The delegates to the Second Special Session on Disarmament, and the whole world with them, were waiting for the response from the United States. The leaders of that country had been talking so much about their aspiration for peace it was ex-

pected that the positive step of the other side would be met with reciprocity.

But when President Reagan addressed the UN General Assembly he failed to respond to the Soviet initiative. He thus ignored not only the good example set by the USSR but the will of the American people too. For, as a public opinion poll conducted in 1982 by *The New York Times* jointly with CBS television showed, Americans remained opposed to using nuclear weapons first. But when it came to giving a serious answer to the Soviet initiative, the US leaders dodged it. It was far simpler to adopt dramatic poses that were in no way binding and went no further than rhetorical declarations about peace, than to answer the Soviet proposals in a business-like manner. Such a negative stand can only lead us to believe that the whole strategy of the Pentagon and NATO is aimed at a first strike and at enhancing the surprise factor in attack.

By contrast, the Soviet Union's UN initiative aims at increasing the degree of confidence in interstate relations. Without such trust there can be no coping with the other task—the transition to practical measures for real disarmament, to the dismantling of the material basis for waging war, to the elimination of weapons, to general and complete disarmament.

The ways and means of attaining that goal were outlined in Leonid Brezhnev's message to the Second Special Session and to the UN General Assembly, in the Soviet memorandum submitted to it, entitled *Averting the Growing Nuclear Threat and Curbing the Arms Race*. The Soviet Union has submitted another important proposal to the UN, namely, *Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and*

## *Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.*

These documents formulate a new comprehensive idea of *drafting, adopting and implementing stage by stage a programme of nuclear disarmament*. Such a programme in the view of the Soviet Union could include:

- ceasing to develop new systems of nuclear weapons;
- ceasing to produce fissionable materials for creating various types of nuclear weapons;
- ceasing to produce all types of nuclear munitions and delivery vehicles for them;
- gradually reducing the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including delivery vehicles;
- totally abolishing nuclear weapons.

*The Soviet Union has again proposed that the international community tackle in earnest the matter of nuclear disarmament and curb the nuclear arms race both qualitatively and quantitatively.* When discussing the ways and means of solving this problem, politicians and public figures in many countries have of late been referring to the idea of freezing, i.e. stopping the further build-up of nuclear arsenals. This idea is particularly popular in the United States, where it has become the banner of the growing mass anti-nuclear movement. Many wonder about the Soviet stand on this issue. Leonid Brezhnev explained in his message: "The idea of a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and, eventually, complete elimination is close to the Soviet point of view."

As regards nuclear disarmament the USSR, as it indicated in the memorandum submitted to the United Nations, is willing to reach agreement with all nuclear powers on the complete elimination of

all nuclear arms—strategic, medium-range and tactical.

The road leading to the final goal—general and complete disarmament—is a long and thorny one. It is all the more important not to trip at the beginning of the road: the first steps should pave the way for achieving the ultimate aim. One such step was the USSR's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If the other nuclear powers were to undertake a similar obligation, this would in practice be tantamount to a general ban on the use of nuclear weapons. The USSR and other peace-loving nations expect the other nuclear powers to follow the Soviet example.

The new commitment of the Soviet Union is a result of the policy it has pursued throughout the postwar years. *As early as in 1949 the USSR proposed the conclusion of a peace pact between the five great powers. In 1958 it proposed a declaration on measures to prevent a surprise attack. And in 1962 it submitted to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament a draft declaration on prohibiting war propaganda. In 1969 the Soviet delegation at the United Nations tabled a draft resolution defining armed aggression as a crime against mankind (this definition of aggression was subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly). In 1972 the governments of the USSR and the United States reached agreement on preventing incidents on and over the sea. In the same year on the basis of a Soviet proposal the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution On Non-Use of Force in International Relations and a Permanent Ban on the Use of Nuclear Weapons. In 1973 the USSR and the United States concluded an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. In the 1970s the USSR signed agreements with France and Britain on the prevention of*

*a nuclear war breaking out by accident. Several years ago the USSR drew the attention of the United Nations to the question of concluding a World Treaty on Non-Use of Force in International Relations. After the all-European Conference in Helsinki the Soviet Union proposed that its participants should agree not to be the first to use nuclear as well as conventional weapons.*

Thus the USSR has been pursuing a consistent policy of reliably preventing accidental as well as deliberate war. This policy has the support of the majority of the world's population, who stand for the prohibition of nuclear war.

## **Military Detente for Europe**

To strengthen peace throughout the world, on all continents, in all areas, and not only in regions of war tension, peace initiatives are essentially needed. And they are most needed in Europe, especially if we consider its past and present. In the past it experienced two world wars. At present the continent is characterised by the greatest concentration of troops and armaments. Two of the world's most powerful military-political groupings confront each other there. Europe, the cradle of detente, has already been called by some "Euroshima" as a reminder of Hiroshima's tragic destiny. Even if this is an exaggeration, the Old World already has more than enough nuclear arms.

Since the time when Europe was first mentioned by Homer it has seen more bloody wars and conflicts than any other continent. Many generations of Europeans regarded these disasters practically as a natural condition, as an inevitable evil. During the millennial history of the continent it would be difficult to find another such prolonged period of peace as the present one—three and a half decades without war.

The decades varied. The 1950s witnessed the cold war; the 1960s—a thaw, and the 1970s—detente. Perhaps it would be no exaggeration to say that the 1970s marked a change for the better in the torment-filled history of the Old World, that they ushered in a long-awaited period of stability and security, and that they inspired people with the hope that peace is not an empty, pacifistic dream, that peace can be preserved and strengthened and perhaps permanently established, and that Europe would perhaps become a place where the hatchet of war could be buried forever.

However, this aim can be achieved only through the joint efforts of the East and the West, through their political cooperation, through the establishment of mutual trust and understanding replacing fear, suspicion and hostility. The historic Conference on Security and Cooperation held in Helsinki in 1975 showed that the East and the West had embarked on such a path, having removed the “combustible material” that had accumulated since the Second World War. And having cleared the ground the Eastern and Western states started to erect the building of European security according to a detente blueprint approved by the Helsinki Conference.

Thanks to its economic, scientific and technological potential, Europe has been called the “workshop of the world”. It has also become the world’s workshop of detente. It is engaged in painstaking and labour-consuming effort, or, what amounts to the same thing, an intensive struggle whose significance will be fully comprehended by future generations rather than our contemporaries. It is trying to mould peaceful and constructive inter-state relations, the type of relations which should be established all over the world.

But that is not all. Europe will perhaps become the first workbench for the gradual dismantling of armaments. Even a small reduction of armaments (we are referring to the progress achieved in the talks in Vienna) would enable the Europeans to heave a sigh of relief and feel more secure. People living outside Europe would feel relieved too.

Compared to the world situation as a whole, the present situation in Europe is better. It is not in a “feverish” state. Nor does it inspire alarm as some explosive regions of the world do. The European states have collectively laid a foundation for post-war settlement and security, which can stand heavy loads and even overloads.

But does this mean that we need not worry about the fate of Europe, that peace has been permanently ensured here?

The achievements of detente should not conceal from us the contradictory, or rather the paradoxical, character of the European situation. On the one hand, in the eyes of mankind Europe has pioneered the policy of detente and has become its core. On the other hand, the great concentration of troops and armaments on the continent is inconsistent both with peacetime conditions and with the current level of East-West political relations. Although Europe has done much towards achieving reliable security, there is still much to be done. It is vital to span the dangerous gap between political and military detente. The latter is far behind the former. It is important to keep out of the Old World the latest nuclear missile systems, the neutron bomb and new chemical weapons. In contributing peace initiatives to European politics Moscow proceeds precisely from these considerations.

Postwar experience has shown that states find it far more difficult to carry out measures of mil-

itary detente than measures to promote political detente. But Europe has no other way of ensuring its security than through disarmament, if a nuclear disaster is to be averted effectively, or of easing the burden of armaments, which is a feasible task already today.

What could we begin with? We could begin with the implementation of the first concrete agreement reached at the Vienna talks on the reduction of arms and armed forces in Central Europe: with reciprocal curtailment of military activities by the member states of both the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO; with limiting the scale of military exercises; with the conclusion by the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of a treaty pledging not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another; and with an agreement on new measures to strengthen mutual trust.

These measures are feasible, given the will to implement them. Without military detente, without lowering the level of concentration of forces by both sides in Central Europe, it will be impossible to follow up the achievements of the Helsinki Conference.

*As soon as the Final Act of the Conference was signed, the Soviet Union started putting forward one peace proposal after another. Together they form a universal, comprehensive and constructive programme of military detente. It provides for a whole range of important practical measures—from mere “freezing” of the present level of troops and armaments in Central Europe to their considerable reduction in stages; from reciprocal curtailment of military activities by the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO to com-*

*plete disbandment of their military organisations; from new measures to strengthen mutual trust to practical steps ensuring disarmament; from a treaty pledging not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another to the convocation of a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe; from a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments to decreasing the quantity of nuclear weapons deployed on European soil up to their complete elimination.*

And what was the response of the West to the Soviet peace initiatives? Does it recognise the need for military detente on the continent? It does, but only in words. Willy Brandt, Chairman of the SDPG, believes that the main threat to Europe stems from the failure so far to find at least one reasonable starting point for supplementing political detente with components of military detente. But haven't the USSR and the other member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation put forward many proposals concerning just such components and starting points? The real difficulty lies elsewhere: the West, NATO above all, is not ready politically to adopt and implement measures to promote military detente. Referring to Europe Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister of the FRG, said:

“We must develop models of military security which would not only ensure stability here, but would also extend the influence of this stability to other regions of the world.”

How does this work out in practice? Certain quarters are destabilising the situation on the European continent by agreeing to the deployment of US Pershing and Tomahawk missiles in their countries. They are also destabilising the situation

in regions lying outside NATO's geographical zone—in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East—where military units of some West European NATO member countries are included with US units in the “multinational forces” in Sinai. Thus, far from developing military security models they are developing models of war threat and irresponsibility, if not of downright war gambling.

The Final Act signed in Helsinki stipulates that follow-up meetings such as the one in Madrid should be devoted to a purposeful exchange of opinion on how best to carry out the provisions of that document, further improve inter-state relations, promote security and cooperation in Europe, and advance the cause of detente in the future. However, this recommendation was ignored at the meeting in Belgrade in 1977-1978. It was ignored by those who were unwilling seriously to discuss the problems of military detente. Instead they plunged the forum into a futile propaganda wrangle on human rights.

At the follow-up meeting in Madrid of member countries of the European Security Conference Washington and some of its supporters repeated their Belgrade performance. They introduced into the debate two irrelevant items, namely, the “Afghan question” and the “Polish question”. This was not merely a matter of hagling over procedural points or of trying to avoid discussion of a distasteful subject. The fact is that NATO's practical activities show not the slightest sign of its being ready for military detente. Certain quarters are determined that Western Europe should have the “benefit” of US medium-range missiles. NATO is constantly staging noisy military demonstrations. Luxemburg has been forced to make its territory available for

the construction of two US military bases there. Yielding to outside pressure Norway has permitted the storing of the Pentagon's military hardware on its soil. Greece has again been dragged into NATO's military organisation and Spain has been made another new member. A “Greek card” is being played against Turkey and a “Turkish card” against Greece, all for the purpose of making both countries follow the “rules of the game” as laid down by the Pentagon and NATO. Attempts are made to impose on Cyprus a settlement on NATO's terms. NATO is also trying to lasso in Portugal.

On its West European partners in NATO the Pentagon is imposing agreements providing for “crisis situation”. These countries are to become staging posts for transporting US rapid deployment forces to “hot spots”.

These actions do not fit into the post-Helsinki pattern of Europe. The same can be said about the obstructionistic tactics the Western powers have resorted to at the Vienna talks in response to the realistic compromise proposals put forward by the socialist states. Many people are beginning to wonder whether the Western powers want to reduce their troops and armaments at all or whether they are content to have the talks on reduction drag on indefinitely. If the Western powers really wish to supplement political detente with military detente, as they constantly say they do, they can make a start in Europe by working for progress at the Vienna talks and at the Soviet-US talks in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, and by agreeing to the convocation of a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe which, in our opinion, should have been the main subject of discussion at the meeting in Madrid last autumn.

The key issue in European politics at the moment

is the setting up of a security system, the implementation of the programme for military detente advanced by the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The Western powers have not submitted a programme of this kind and apparently have not got one. Their efforts so far have been concentrated on flatly rejecting every peace proposal put forth by the socialist states.

But despite this, the negative attitude of the Western powers towards military detente has not disheartened the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The West needs detente as much as the East does. This is an objective factor, and it is bound to prevail in the end. Being convinced of this, the USSR and its allies *presented new important proposals in July and November 1980 in an effort to break the stalemate over both the difficult and controversial issue of medium-range nuclear missiles and the Vienna talks.* To show its readiness to ease military confrontation and lessen the concentration of troops in Central Europe, Moscow undertook what some Western leaders and politicians have described as an unprecedented goodwill move. The USSR *decided to decrease unilaterally the strength of its troops and armaments in Central Europe by 20,000 officers and men and 1,000 tanks.* Despite a worsening of the international situation, this move has been carried out.

Limitation of armaments, much less their reduction and ending, is out of the question without at least minimum confidence. Being aware of this the Soviet Union stated at the 26th CPSU Congress that it is prepared to *expand confidence-building measures in the military field to all the European part of the USSR provided, of course, that the Western states respond in the same way, i.e. expand*

*the confidence-building zone on their territory.* The Soviet Union proposed to make still more trusting the confidence-building measures already being practised (such as prior notification about exercises of ground forces, the invitation of observers from other countries to such exercises), *also to make prior notifications of naval and airforce exercises and of major movements of troops.* In the opinion of many politicians, the proposal to broaden the zone of confidence-building measures improved the prospect of coming to terms at the Madrid meeting on convening a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe.

Special attention should be given to a question that has proved to be a stumbling block to military detente, a question that has given rise to violent dispute and discord as perhaps no other question has done. It is about the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, which is now a subject of special negotiations. Of course, this is due above all to the very nature of the subject itself, for no continent can afford to be drawn into a nuclear conflict, Europe least of all. In purely hypothetical terms one can perhaps speak of a nuclear conflict being localised and limited, if it should break out somewhere in the "periphery" (one may recall that the term "peripheral war" was put into circulation some time ago in the West). In Europe, which is a zone of military confrontation of two different social systems and a nerve centre of world politics, a nuclear spark would instantly precipitate a global conflagration. Mankind may have to pay a prohibitive price, both in the direct and figurative sense, for delays in talks on the limitation of nuclear stockpiles on the continent. While the negotiations have bogged down, the arms race proceeds apace. It is costing more and more money,

and the danger arising from the stockpiling of these lethal weapons is steadily increasing.

Several years ago NATO began to consider the need to expand its nuclear missile potential allegedly because of Soviet superiority in medium-range missiles, the SS-20 (NATO's classification). However, nobody was able to prove that the USSR enjoyed such a superiority. On the contrary, it was admitted until recently that an East-West strategic parity had been established both in Europe and in the world as a whole. One can quote dozens, if not hundreds, of statements by NATO's most authoritative spokesmen to this effect.

Former US President Carter said that between the United States and the USSR there was great stability with respect to strategic weapons and balance of non-nuclear forces in the European theatre.

British ex-Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington admitted that nuclear parity between the East and the West did exist.

FRG ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said he had no doubt that equilibrium continued to exist.

If so, then why should the existing parity be questioned? The USSR could not possibly have upset this equilibrium by rearming overnight. What's the point of causing panic or creating a problem which has become Europe's headache? Who will really believe that the NATO experts, who have carefully counted every Soviet soldier to the last army cook and every Soviet rifle (as is obvious from the Vienna talks), have overlooked such a "minor thing" as an "overwhelming missile superiority"?

There is no Soviet superiority. There is only a pretext, though hardly a convincing one, for turn-

ing Western Europe into the Pentagon's nuclear missile arsenal and proving ground.

Moscow did not strike a pose; nor did it respond to challenge with challenge. Instead, it tried to understand and assess the apprehensions voiced by the other side, although it thought them unfounded. In a speech in Berlin on October 6, 1979, Leonid Brezhnev offered a compromise. He said:

*"We are prepared to reduce the quantity of medium-range nuclear weapons, as compared to the present level, that are deployed in the Western regions of the Soviet Union, but only if no additional medium-range nuclear weapons are deployed in Western Europe."*

NATO rejected this proposal. On December 12, 1979, it adopted a decision on the deployment of an additional 572 US-made Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles in several NATO countries by 1983. Thus, the West destroyed a fair, mutually acceptable and constructive basis for negotiations. A truly historic opportunity was missed to halt the suicidal arms race, to embark at last on the road of practical disarmament, and to combine political detente with military detente. As a result, the question of medium-range nuclear missiles was shelved. And who knows how long it would have remained shelved if the USSR had not come out with another initiative? It declared that it was ready to discuss the question of medium-range nuclear missiles.

Did this mean that the USSR was reconciled to NATO's decision on increasing armaments? Not at all. Rescinding this decision or suspending its implementation, in other words, a return to the state that existed before it was adopted, remains the best way out of the present impasse. But since NATO has flatly turned down this proposal Moscow is pre-



pared to consider another version. The main task is to span the chasm resulting from NATO's decision.

What is the best way to do this? On July 5, 1980, Moscow advanced a new proposal: *to discuss simultaneously and in organic connection questions concerning both the medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the US forward-based nuclear missiles.* In other words, the USSR proposed a new basis for the search of an agreement in place of the one torpedoed by the NATO decision. The question of medium-range nuclear missiles should not be considered apart from the question of the US forward-based systems (comprising both nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles) which are a threat to the USSR's security. The USSR believes both these questions should be examined *simultaneously and in organic connection with one another.*

Several Western policy experts tried to pass off Moscow's gesture of goodwill as a forced concession. They said that NATO had managed to "extract" it from the "unyielding" Soviet Union by being "firm". This is nothing but wishful thinking. As Moscow sees it, firmness is not thickheadedness, obduracy or dogmatism. The USSR will not permit a situation in which its security is threatened. Could anyone reproach it for this? But it is prepared to be maximally patient and flexible in the search for mutually acceptable decisions and compromises which alone could save the continent from being turned into an arena of nuclear contests.

What did Moscow proceed from when putting forward a new initiative?

From an assumption that somebody has to take the first step in getting out of a maze, to set an example of judiciousness and good sense.

From an awareness that the European public is uneasy over the lack of progress in achieving mil-

itary detente and over the growth of stockpiles of "combustible materials" on the continent.

From a belief that the peaceful future and security of Europe come first.

From a belief that a readiness to break the deadlock over a pivotal issue of European and hence also international security may serve as a starting point for stabilising the present unbalanced relations between the East and the West.

NATO is still congratulating itself for its wisdom in taking the "dual decision": simultaneously to expand its nuclear missile potential and to engage in talks aimed at their reduction. There is little doubt that NATO will try hard to implement the first part of its two-fold formula. One is less certain as regards its readiness to fulfill the second part. The roar of bulldozers and scrapers clearing the ground for US missile launching pads in Western Europe hardly inspires confidence in what has now become routine statements on a readiness to solve the problem at the negotiation table.

What is the news from the NATO headquarters in Brussels?

In the autumn of 1980 a Reuter correspondent reported on what plans the NATO leaders were elaborating. He said, while improving plans for nuclear war the ministers expressed hope that talks on nuclear disarmament would be held... So on the same table at NATO there were plans for nuclear war and an olive branch—emblem of peace talks... What sinister intentions and what cynicism!

After a visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels a correspondent of *Die Welt* (a paper published in Bonn) got the impression that in the current decade NATO and the Warsaw Pact would live on the edge of a military precipice. This is precisely

what the Pentagon and NATO have in mind for Europe.

What danger does the appearance of another nuclear complex in the Western part of the continent present? We hear that new US medium-range missiles can reach Moscow in 4-5 minutes, that these missiles carry the potential of a first strike. This adds to the danger of accidental conflict, or, as it is called, "war by misunderstanding", "war by accident", while diminishing the possibilities, few as they are, of preventing it at the last moment. The Soviet Union cannot but draw appropriate conclusions from this development.

However, Soviet initiatives have opened before Europe prospects of a different kind—a relaxation of the armed confrontation, military detente and reliable security. Here success will largely depend on whether the *Soviet-US talks on the limitation of nuclear missiles potentials in Europe, which were started in Geneva in the autumn of 1980 thanks to the USSR's efforts*, are constructive and fruitful. Though Moscow has entered these negotiations without illusions, it was not entirely without hope. Moscow has a keen sense of responsibility for the peaceful future of the long-suffering continent of Europe, which certainly deserves something better than existence on the edge of a military precipice.

Surely, those in Brussels who are hatching plans for increasing NATO armaments are not likely to be eager to reach agreement on their reduction in Vienna and Geneva.

Talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe have been going on for nine years in the Austrian capital. Nine years! Much can be accomplished in nine years, that is, if the parties concerned want it. But that is just what the Western spokesmen in Hofburg Palace

do not want. They have been consistently postponing replying to all the initiatives advanced by the socialist states. If they put forward a proposal of their own, it is for the purpose of gaining a unilateral advantage.

On July 10, 1980, the socialist countries submitted a proposal which took into consideration the Western powers' position and laid a practicable basis for working out a first agreement. *Taking into account the actual numerical strength of the Soviet and US forces in Central Europe* they proposed a *reduction at the first stage of Soviet and US troops by 20,000 and 13,000 officers and men respectively* (and at the second stage—that of the forces of other direct participants). It should be noted that the Soviet Union did not intend to include in the agreement the 20,000 officers and men it has already unilaterally withdrawn from the GDR. Thus, the USA is to reduce its forces by 13,000 and the USSR—actually by 40,000 officers and men. This step is to be taken in conditions of an approximate equality of strength.

A year passed but the Western spokesmen did not do anything more definite than "complimenting" in a perfunctory way the compromise proposals. But the socialist countries have no intention of playing a game of silence. Nor are they inclined to take an indulgent view of their partners' constant foot-dragging over a long period.

On November 13, 1980, the Warsaw Treaty countries submitted new proposals which further developed their initiative of July 10. The Western states were unwilling to impose individual limitations on the numerical strength of the forces belonging to the direct participants in the talks. Very well, in this case *the socialist countries would be prepared to accept, within the framework of the*

*first agreement, collective "freezing" of the numerical strength of forces belonging to the direct participants in the talks other than the USSR and the US, in the period between two reduction stages.*

The proposal on another point of the future agreement is also imbued with a spirit of compromise. It calls for the conclusion of the agreement for a three-year period, which is sufficient for carrying out a reduction of Soviet and US troops at the first stage and for the subsequent transition to the second stage when the number of troops of the other direct participants in the talks will be reduced.

As on many previous occasions, the Western spokesmen said they were "interested" in the proposals and promised "to study" them. They even said they would respond with their own suggestions. But where are the results?

Addressing the 79th Labour Party Conference in Blackpool in the autumn of 1980, James Callaghan said he regarded it as a disgrace that the Western countries should be setting a bad example in intensifying the arms race. Calling it a bad example is to put the matter mildly. In actual fact it is dangerous, senseless and suicidal.

They say that a bad example is catching. It is, regrettably. It is therefore particularly important to set a good example, one that would offset the bad example. The lesser of two evils is usually preferable as the better of two possible solutions. The best solution was and continues to be the one Moscow proposed in October 1979, namely, *rescinding NATO's decision on nuclear-missile complete armament in exchange for a reduction of Soviet missile strength.* Now, three years later, the merits of the Soviet proposal and the faults of the NATO decision are even more evident.

It is not surprising that people in Western Europe have often referred to that particular Soviet initiative because it offers a reasonable way out of a worrisome situation without hurting anybody's prestige. Though certain quarters have been eager to "bury" the Soviet initiative, it is still very much alive in the social and political consciousness of people in Europe, urging them to think afresh about the situation and the hasty decisions taken, and to seek an honourable compromise and work out a sound solution. Herein lies the strength and advantage of constructive ideas.

Since NATO is not prepared to give up its complete armament the Soviet Union has proposed from the rostrum of the 26th Party Congress, *as the first measure, to draw the line under what has already been achieved, that is, to stop further deployment of new and the replacement of available medium-range nuclear missiles in the European zone belonging to the USSR and the NATO countries. Moscow believes that there is every possibility at present of freezing quantitatively and qualitatively the existing level of such weapons, including, of course, forward-based US nuclear facilities which are an inalienable component of the European balance of nuclear forces.* The Soviet Union's proposal of a moratorium is not a precondition for entering talks but has been made to improve the conditions for such negotiations.

NATO declared, however, that the Soviet proposal on a moratorium was unacceptable, it was resolutely rejected as not open to discussion since it would allegedly consolidate the superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons. But where is this superiority, what does it consist in? It was after the CPSU Congress that US State Secretary Haig shared the opinion of many experts who agree that

the East and the West are at a point of approximate parity and equivalence. This ought to be a weighty utterance for the ex-NATO Supreme Commander in Europe should know what he is talking about.

Ruling NATO circles refused to appreciate the value and novelty of the Soviet proposal on a moratorium, or they would not keep repeating: there is nothing new here. *New is the fact that the Soviet Union is proposing to refuse to raise the qualitative level of a weapon which is highly dangerous as it is, in fact, to stop its further improvement.* Is this proposal to the disadvantage of the West, does it put the West in a position of inequality, does it consolidate the Soviet Union's superiority which, we must repeat, has not been proved, in medium-range nuclear weapons? Military engineering is now experiencing rapid and profound changes. Qualitatively new types of weapons are being developed, above all, weapons of mass destruction, such types as can make their control and, consequently, their coordinated limitation very difficult and at times impossible. It stands to reason that the Soviet Union will not remain indifferent while launching sites are being built near its borders and those of its allies for the latest Pentagon nuclear-missile systems. This should be remembered by those who do not or refuse to see anything new in the Soviet proposal on a quantitative and qualitative moratorium on new medium-range nuclear weapons.

*This moratorium could enter into force as soon as negotiations on this question begin and remain effective until a permanent treaty has been concluded on limiting, or even better, reducing such nuclear weapons in Europe. Moreover, the Soviet Union is looking forward to very considerable re-*

*ductions of such systems which could be agreed upon in the course of talks on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.*

There is no more important cause in Europe today than to put an end to the growth of nuclear potentials on its soil. We must work for this cause. We must encourage the Soviet-US talks in Geneva on limiting nuclear armaments at which progress has been far too slow. The Soviet Union has been giving such encouragement by the most effective means—this is how the Soviet Union's new decisions and new proposals on nuclear disarmament in Europe, which were announced by Leonid Brezhnev on May 18, 1982, addressing a Congress of the Soviet Young Communist League have been assessed on that continent and elsewhere.

*The Soviet Union has unilaterally stopped the further deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of its territory. It has also announced its decision to reduce its arsenal of such missiles. Our country keeps its promises. We are already effecting a large reduction of our medium-range missiles, the Soviet leader has said. These are peaceable actions, moreover, undertaken unilaterally, and not just ideas or projects.*

Unfortunately, the West is not following the Soviet example. Instead, it is sparing no effort to discredit the Soviet measures in the eyes of European and world opinion. Western propagandists argue that the Soviet Union's stopping the deployment of missiles in the European part of its territory is no more than a cunning manoeuvre, that the missiles will be taken to a place beyond the Urals from where all the same they can reach West European countries. They have concocted stories about an "unlimited nuclear arms race beyond the Urals". These political tricksters will now have to hold

their tongues. *The Soviet Union has made it absolutely clear that no medium-range missiles will be additionally deployed in places from where they can reach targets in Western Europe.*

It was also claimed that the USSR, having announced a freeze on the deployment of its missiles, is continuing to prepare for their deployment and to build launching pads for them. This claim was countered by the official explanation that the unilateral freezing also covers all preparations for the deployment of missiles, including the building of launching pads.

Answering questions put to him by a TASS correspondent in August 1982 USSR Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov described with exhaustive clarity the Soviet position at the Geneva talks. The Soviet Union has submitted proposals which envisage *the creation of an extensive European zone of nuclear arms reduction and limitation extending from the Arctic Ocean to Africa, from the mid-Atlantic to the Urals. In this zone it is contemplated to reduce the existing medium-range nuclear weapons (of a range of 1,000 kilometres or more, but not intercontinental missiles) in such a way that within five years after agreement there should remain no more than 300 weapons of this class on the side of the USSR and of NATO.*

*All types of medium-range nuclear weapons—both missiles and aircraft—would be subject to reduction. It would be forbidden to deploy in the zone nuclear weapons of new types including, of course, American missiles like the Pershing-2, as well as cruise missiles.*

The Soviet proposals do not envisage any obligations whatsoever for third countries. But in the summary level of 300 medium-range weapons the missiles and aircraft of Britain and France are

taken into account along with those of the United States. The Soviet Union cannot ignore the fact that these weapons are an inseparable component of the medium-range nuclear arms of the member-countries of NATO. They are directed against the USSR and its allies.

*The Soviet proposals envisage the implementation in Europe of accompanying measures also to limit nuclear weapons of a range of less than 1,000 kilometres. Such limitations of numerous weapons would undoubtedly be in the interests of all the states of Europe. The USSR has also proposed that beyond the confines of the European zone of their reduction and limitation medium-range nuclear weapons should be deployed in such a way that they cannot reach targets of the other side in this zone.*

Thus the Soviet stand is a realistic and constructive one; it is imbued with goodwill and readiness to come to an understanding; it is backed by practical steps, including unilateral measures.

There are other weighty positive factors which offer hope of a relaxation of the nuclear confrontation in Europe. These are primarily the specific peaceful actions and constructive initiatives of the USSR, which speaks for the socialist community as a whole. The Soviet moves are becoming an increasingly tangible material force and gaining growing support from all advocates of a peaceful and nuclear-free Europe. On both sides of the Atlantic there has been growing awareness of the logic and fairness of the Soviet stand with regard to the alignment of forces in Europe and the ways of preserving the military parity and of reducing the military strength of both sides as far as possible. Many prominent leaders in the NATO countries, including Danish Premier Jørgensen and Greek

Premier Papandreou, have spoken in support of the Soviet initiatives, in particular, of the proposal for a moratorium. The Soviet proposal for a moratorium "must be one of the elements leading to negotiations", said the Danish Premier.

At the same time there has been growing awareness in Western Europe of the full magnitude of the threat posed by the nuclear plans of the Transatlantic strategists. Many in Western Europe today believe that the main threat to peace comes from the United States itself and not from the Soviet Union. In this connection Washington's "zero option" has been increasingly criticised. This pseudo-radical and pseudo-peaceful project is seen by the public as an obstacle to reaching agreement in Geneva. Describing these new moods, the West German newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau* wrote: "From the propaganda point of view Ronald Reagan's proposal is highly successful and even alluring. The only thing is that nobody can seriously imagine the Soviet side accepting it. To the USSR Reagan's proposal seems hypocritical if only because it demands that the USSR dismantle its most efficient weapons while allowing the Americans, the French and the British to keep all of their atomic bombs. . ." *The New York Times* warned the White House that unless the United States changed its stand it would be sure to feel the dissatisfaction of Europeans once again.

This dissatisfaction has compelled the White House to manoeuvre. Without abandoning its "cold war-mongering", it is increasingly resorting to the vocabulary of peace. But rhetoric will not help Washington evade growing criticism from all sides. The mass anti-nuclear movement, which has not yet had its final say, demands action, not phrase-mongering. It demands that Washington

should heed the will of the peoples, respond to the USSR's readiness to conclude a mutually acceptable agreement on the issue vital to the fate of Europe and the whole world.

We must not let Europe be turned into a "Euroshima". We must not let it be turned into a chessboard for the Transatlantic strategists to play their gambit of a "limited" nuclear war.

## The Far East: the Way to Trust

We do not call Europe a hot spot yet. But it gradually may become one if ways are not found to stop its further nuclear-missile build-up. It is probably early to call the Far East a hot spot. But in politics one should be able to see both tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, to identify dangerous trends in time and to lose no time taking preventive measures.

Ours is an interdependent world, where distances between the most remote regions have been made much shorter by the development of technology, including military technology. Although we are accustomed to speaking of European or Asian security, we must never forget that these are interconnected parts of the whole, which is general, world security. Once infringed in one place, a fire leaps to another, as if carried by a fuse.

Proceeding from the principle of the indivisibility of world peace the Soviet Union at the 26th CPSU Congress proposed *conducting specific negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries*. Such confidence-building measures in the military field have proved

their worth in Europe and now the task is to make them more substantial and extensive. Why not apply the positive experience already gained in other parts of the planet where it seems necessary and where conditions are ripe (which is not yet true, for example, of the Middle East, where aggression and hostilities have first to be stopped)? The Far East, where the Soviet Union neighbours on China, Japan and the US, is such an area suitable for working out and implementing confidence-building measures.

Bloody wars and conflicts, Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima and Nagasaki remind us of the past of this area. Nor is its present altogether bright. Dark clouds are gathering, strong winds are rising and creating turbulences, the forerunners of typhoons which bring so much suffering because of their suddenness and treachery. And we must not close our eyes to the possibility of a nuclear typhoon in the Far East.

The US is turning Japan into a stronghold of thermonuclear strategy in the Far East. "Components" of nuclear weapons are to be found at some of the nearly 140 US military bases on Japanese territory. Such weapons are sited in South Korea.

What about Japan itself? Although Tokyo still refers to its "three nuclear-free principles"—not to produce, not to acquire and not to deploy nuclear weapons—experts still think it possible that Japan will have them by the end of the century. After all, the Japanese Cabinet of Ministers has stated that the possession of nuclear arms is not at variance with Japan's Constitution.

In June 1982 Japanese Premier Suzuki spoke in favour of the use of nuclear weapons as a "deterrent" and did not deny the possibility of their future use for "preventive purposes". Things are

reaching a point when the US-Japanese "non-aggression pact" threatens to become an instrument of the Pentagon's nuclear strategy, with Japan as the potential theatre of a "limited" nuclear war in the Far East.

The US military presence, Japan's rearmament, the militarisation of South Korea and Washington's attempts to draw China into its strategic plans are all factors constituting a real military danger in the Far East. The situation is made even worse by the insistent attempts to push this area onto the path of military blocs and groupings. In the Pentagon they dream of something like a military axis consisting of the US, Japan, South Korea and China. Ways are being sought to attach Japan to NATO. To begin with, the intention is to make Tokyo take part in Persian Gulf operations. Plans are being hatched for setting up a "Pacific community" (Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the ASEAN grouping—Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) as a form of economic and political cooperation to be followed by military collaboration. In supporting the idea of a "Pacific community" Washington plans to make the US bilateral alliances with Tokyo and Seoul links in the common chain of NATO, ANZUS (the military and political alliance of Australia, New Zealand and the United States) and ANZUK (the military grouping of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and Great Britain) and at the same time to make the ASEAN states collaborators in these strategic designs.

In other words, a potential of imperialist aggression is being accumulated in the Far East. This causes concern to many peaceful states. We may refer to the opinion of Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi who has stated that the build-up of

arms in Asia by the USA and Japan would only intensify confrontation and tension leading to war.

This can be avoided by beginning negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East. Although this Soviet proposal is of a novel nature, it follows from the traditional Soviet policy. *Back in the 1930s* the Soviet Union, being simultaneously a European, Asian and Pacific power and striving to save the world from war, *proposed the conclusion of a regional Pacific pact of non-aggression to be signed by the USSR, the US, China, Japan and other countries.*

After the Second World War the USSR remained true to the policy of the collective defence of peace on a regional and global basis. In the 1960s the USSR proposed *collective measures to strengthen Asian security.* As regards Japan, the USSR has been and remains an advocate of providing a firm treaty basis for Soviet-Japanese relations. The blame for this lies at the door of those who have postponed the conclusion of a peace treaty and are demanding as a preliminary condition the settlement of a "territorial issue" which in fact does not exist. To pave the way for a final settlement of past problems, the Soviet Union *has proposed to Tokyo the conclusion of a treaty on good-neighbourly relations and cooperation.* The proposal still stands.

Speaking in Tashkent just over a year after the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev paid special attention to the situation in Asia as a whole as well as in the Far East. He called for the holding of *talks on specific measures for building confidence in the Far East.* Referring to Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-Japanese relations, the Soviet leader emphasised the USSR's desire to conduct a constructive dia-



logue aimed at achieving mutual understanding, and to promote mutually advantageous cooperation which would enhance confidence.

A few months later, in September 1982, Leonid Brezhnev spoke of the unswerving desire of the Soviet Union for detente, a removal of the threat of war and expansion in worldwide cooperation; he proposed that the *leading bodies of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries make a formal commitment not to extend their sphere of influence to Asia, Africa and Latin America.*

The USSR's peacemaking initiative can serve well the cause of peace and security in the Far East. It would be in the interests of the peoples living there, as well as in Europe and other continents, because world peace is indivisible.

### **Asia: a Zone of Peace or Confrontation?**

Asia constitutes one-third of the world's land surface and is inhabited by more than half the world's population. For more than thirty years after the end of the Second World War this continent has not known peace. It is constantly being harassed by large and small wars and armed conflicts.

Tension is a permanent feature of every region in Asia—the Near and Middle East, the Far East, South-West and South-East Asia, and the Indian Ocean area. In each region forces of confrontation are active, inspired more often than not from outside. New hotbeds of conflict are being added to the old ones.

If a world public opinion poll were to take place on the question of which region is the greatest source of anxiety at the moment, the answer would undoubtedly be: the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The sparks being struck there may spread far and wide.

The most probable region where such a conflict may flare up is the Middle East—the Persian Gulf—the Indian Ocean. This is precisely what US General Bernard Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said when he talked with

newsmen about the probability of the outbreak of a new world war. And he should know what he is talking about. Virtually overnight, before the eyes of the whole world, his bosses in Washington have managed to turn the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area into one of the most explosive regions in the world. The region of dangerous tension was created in Asia, a continent which has seen probably more military conflicts in the postwar period than any other continent. They included the US intervention in Korea and the US aggression against Indochina; four wars in the Middle East and the fifth one—the Israeli aggression against Lebanon; two wars on the Hindustan subcontinent; China's armed conflicts with India and Vietnam; and the conflict between Iran and Iraq. The danger that the chain reaction of conflicts may continue became real especially after Israel's predatory attack against Lebanon.

It is precisely in regions of dangerous tension, in areas where international security is threatened that the levers of stabilisation and peaceful political settlement should be applied. The Soviet head of state, Leonid Brezhnev, did this on December 10, 1980, during his visit to India. Addressing the Indian Parliament on that day he advanced a number of proposals which the press of various countries and continents has referred to as a *Peace Plan for the Persian Gulf*. The Plan consists of five points:

*Not to set up foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf area and on the adjacent islands; not to deploy nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction there;*

*Not to use or threaten to use force against the countries of the Persian Gulf area, and not to interfere in their internal affairs;*

*To respect the status of non-alignment chosen by the states of the Persian Gulf area; not to draw them into military groupings with the participation of nuclear powers;*

*To respect the sovereign right of the states of that area to their natural resources;*

*Not to raise any obstacles or pose threats to normal trade exchanges and to the use of sea lanes linking the states of that area with other countries of the world.*

This proposal for ensuring peace and security is addressed to the countries of the area, i.e., to over 40 littoral, continental and island states of the Indian Ocean basin, which have about one-third of the world's population. It is addressed to the US and other Western powers, to Japan, China and all other states interested in an agreement that would ensure peace and security in the Persian Gulf area.

The Soviet Union has proposed a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering all its main aspects—political, international law, military and economic. This approach safeguards both the legitimate interests of all parties concerned and the common interests in ensuring peace, international stability and the well-being of nations, which in this case largely depends on normal trade and unobstructed functioning of sea lanes. This could pave the way for resolving the present crisis and for reaching a durable settlement acceptable to all parties.

One can easily see that the USSR proceeds from the principle of collective responsibility of states for the fate of international security, for the fate of peace in one of the world's most dangerous spots. It would hardly be advisable to entrust the settlement of the crisis to a power that is not in-

clined to consider the interests of other states, that ignores everything but its own "vital interests".

The Soviet proposal, if implemented, would help extend detente to an area which probably needs it more than any other area. And if those in the West are sincere in calling for making detente universal, for extending it to all aspects of world politics, then Moscow's proposal adequately meets their wishes.

All those who want to see a relaxation of the tense situation in that explosive area have expressed a high opinion of the Soviet five-point plan. Its merits are appreciated by all who do not wish to see confrontation in the area, who have no intention of seizing foreign lands in order to set up military bases there, and who do not covet the mineral wealth of other countries, in particular their vast reserves of oil (70 per cent of the world's proved reserves outside those of the socialist states), uranium, gold, diamonds and tin.

However, amidst widespread support for the Soviet plan there are also dissenting voices. Some people are anxious lest the Soviet plan should prevent the carrying out of another plan. Judging by statements of US leaders and the US press they call for control over the Persian Gulf, seizure of the oil fields there by force and conduct of military operations in that part of the world. On the Reagan Administration's list of "military priorities" safeguarding the "vital interests" (political and strategic) of the United States comes immediately after the defense of North America and the NATO countries. This is attested by the military observer of *The Washington Post*.

It is interesting to note that the authors of these plans have started to accuse Moscow of "ulterior motives". They forget that the USSR has no mili-

tary bases in that region and has no intention of setting up such bases there. They totally ignore the fact that the Soviet Union has no oil interests in the region; that it has never sought, nor does it seek now, "to establish control" over this part of the world or its sea routes, or to turn it into a sphere of "vital interests" as Washington intends to do. Moscow's only "motive" is to establish peace, security and cooperation in a region that lies in immediate proximity to its frontiers (which is not the case as regards the US). This motive would seem natural and understandable. It should be mentioned that the only ice-free waterway connecting the European and Far Eastern ports of the Soviet Union passes through the Indian Ocean. And the USSR, like all other nations, has the right to navigation on the high seas.

The creation of a large zone of peace and good-neighbourly cooperation to the South of the Soviet frontiers would be in the interest of the USSR's security, which does not in the least conflict with the proposal of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean to turn the area into a peace zone. It may be noted that this proposal has been endorsed in a number of UN decisions.

Incidentally, certain Western quarters are now saying that in putting forward its programme for the normalisation of the situation in South-West Asia the Soviet Union is seeking to re-establish its influence in the Middle East, to return there after many years of absence.

The Soviet Union never "came" to the Middle East, nor did it ever "leave" that area. And so it does not need to return there. The Soviet Union is a great world power. This makes it a constant magnitude in world politics, and in the Middle East

as well. Any realistic-minded statesman has to reckon with this.

The Middle East and the adjacent areas have not forgotten the role the USSR played in putting an end to the conflicts and bloodshed there in 1956, 1967 and 1973. This is a fact that cannot be deleted from history or from contemporary politics. The USSR is on the side of the victims of the Israeli aggression. It maintains that captured territories should be returned to their rightful owners, that all peoples should have a homeland. The frontiers should be made secure; they should be proclaimed inviolable and immutable. All peoples should enjoy reliable security and be safeguarded against encroachments from outside. Within the framework of a comprehensive and just settlement Israel will not have to worry about its destiny or security. Having returned what it had seized from others, it will gain peace.

The Soviet Union's Middle East policy is aimed at removing the causes of tensions in the region, now and in the future, and at achieving a sound settlement. Such a policy is bound to win support and influence world public opinion. A number of Arab countries already support it, and what is more, it has found support outside the Middle East area. The Soviet position is a permanently operating factor in the Middle East, a factor contributing to the conclusion of a really comprehensive, not a separate peace treaty, to a just and not a discriminatory settlement of the crisis, to the establishment of a genuine and not a predatory or annexational peace treaty that would legalise the fruits of aggression.

Immediately after Israel's invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, the Soviet Union resolutely condemned the aggression and branded its initiators and

sponsors, demanded that the invader's troops be withdrawn to Israel and insisted on urgent measures to stop the aggression as required by the special resolutions of the UN Security Council. In one of his personal messages to the US President Leonid Brezhnev stressed that Lebanon's tragedy would lie heavily on the conscience of those who could stop the aggression but did not do so.

Regrettably, this warning went unheeded. The Israeli military were allowed to capture West Beirut after the withdrawal of the PLO fighters and carry out a terrible massacre which shocked the whole world. The Soviet Union condemned this act of genocide and proposed that *the Security Council make full use of its power under the UN Charter to curb the aggressor, including the dispatch of a UN force and the application of sanctions.* Moreover, the Soviet Union raised the question of the continuance of Israel as a member of the United Nations in view of its repeated violations of the UN Charter.

Had it not been for these carefully considered and resolute moves by the USSR for the ending of the criminal Israeli act of aggression and for a political settlement of the crisis, the situation in the Middle East would undoubtedly have been even more critical and dangerous. The USSR's firm stand was conducive to the ever clearer realisation in the world that there is not, nor can there be, any reliable and just settlement in the Middle East if the aggressor is given overt and covert help, if separate deals are concluded and machinations resorted to.

After Israel's aggression against Lebanon it is especially clear how wise and far-reaching was the Soviet Union's proposal to go back to collective quests for a comprehensive settlement of the con-

*flict on a just and reliable basis.* This could be done, as was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, *within the framework of a special international conference on the Middle East.* This idea was given worldwide support.

The Soviet proposal could not have been more timely. Had it been accepted at once, it would most probably have been possible to defuse the Middle East bomb, which threatens to blow up world peace at any moment.

No peaceful settlement had been achieved despite the promises of the makers of the Camp David deal. Instead there was further aggravation of the situation in the region. The separatist collusion between Israel and Egypt under the US aegis could not be considered the best model of a peaceful settlement. It proved impossible to force it on other peoples, to make it into a broader capitulatory agreement. Instead it became a blind alley, and a Middle East settlement was retarded. The Camp David agreement and Washington's strategic collaboration with Tel Aviv ended up in Israel's bloody act of gangsterism in Lebanon, in genocide of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples.

What is the way out of this acute situation? The most sensible thing would be to scrap the rusty Camp David model and put into action the mechanism of a collective settlement, of an international conference.

It is believed in Moscow that a just and stable peace in the Middle East can and must be based on the following six principles. These principles, as Leonid Brezhnev expounded them in September 1982, correspond to both the general norms of international law and the concrete decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly relating to this problem.

*First*, there must be enforcement of the principle whereby no country is allowed to seize foreign territory by aggression, and this entitles the Arabs to the return of all the Israel-occupied lands. The borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours must be declared inviolable.

*Second*, the inalienable right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination, to their own independent state on Palestinian territory freed from Israeli occupation must be ensured. The Palestinian refugees must be enabled to return to their home or be paid full compensation for the property belonging to them there.

*Third*, the eastern section of Jerusalem with one of the principal Moslem shrines must be restored to the Arabs and become an inalienable part of the Palestinian State. Freedom of access to the holy places by worshippers of the three religions must be ensured throughout Jerusalem.

*Fourth*, all the countries of the region must have the undisputed right to secure an independent existence and development on the basis of reciprocity, for security cannot be assured for some states, and not for others.

*Fifth*, the state of war must be discontinued and peace between the Arab states and Israel must be restored, with all the parties in the conflict committing themselves to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the others, and to resolve their disputes by peaceful means, by negotiation.

*Sixth*, efforts must be made to work out and adopt international guarantees for this peaceful settlement. In the opinion of the Soviet Union the guarantor states should be the permanent members of the Security Council or the Security Council as a whole.

This is the way to achieve settlement as envisaged in the Soviet proposal to convene an international conference on the Middle East, with the mandatory participation of the PLO, the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine. The opinion has been raised, however, that the conditions are not yet ripe for such a forum, that the moment has not yet come, that such a conference can even "bring more harm than good".

Is that really so? What greater harm can be done to a Middle East settlement than that caused by the Camp David deal? This is increasingly recognised in Western Europe or else the EEC countries would not have come out with their Middle East initiative. True, the West European leaders declare they do not wish "to interfere with the Camp David process" so as not to irritate Washington, but the process has not brought, nor could it bring, any good. It only brought Israel's aggression against Lebanon. The facts are there for everyone to see. The natural way out is to step over Camp David and take the road of a genuinely collective international settlement.

But Washington is currently taking another path which it wants its allies to follow. This path leads to a permanent US presence in the Middle East. To begin with, a US military contingent was sent to the Sinai Peninsula, to form the core of "international armed forces", including military units of NATO allies.

So Washington is inviting its North Atlantic partners to a minefield which is very likely to explode.

It will not do to use the US yardstick of "military presence" to appraise the influence of Soviet policy. It is possible to exercise effective influence

without sending armadas to foreign shores, without taking recourse to "gunboat diplomacy". Moscow maintains that the Persian Gulf area, like any other part of the world, is a sphere of vital interests to the states situated in the area, and not to any other states.

Some US leaders feign surprise and wonder why should Moscow, an outsider, offer a plan for the Persian Gulf. "What has Moscow got to do with it?" they ask. Confronted with such questions, one might think that it is the US, and not the USSR, that borders on Iran. But it is Washington's position, and not Moscow's, that should evoke surprise. It is Washington that is trying to shut its eyes to an absurdity which is obvious to all. The Soviet Union, which is situated only 500 kilometres from the Persian Gulf, is presented as an "outsider" while the US, which is separated from the Gulf by a distance twenty times greater, is not!

But reckless gamblers who are prepared to place the international community on the brink of disaster in order to gratify their insatiable desire for oil and strategic advantages will hardly be guided by reason and logic. Although US hostages already returned from Iran long ago, US warships are plying the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. US military experts say that the Pentagon's armada in the North-Western part of the Indian Ocean is superior to all the military forces of all the countries of that region taken together. Washington has set up or is setting up military bases along the entire coast of the region—in Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and in Diego Garcia, not to mention the Sinai Peninsula. A special 200,000-strong "rapid deployment force" has been alerted and is ready for action. Its purpose is to seize the main oil-bearing regions in South-West Asia and to hold

them till the arrival of regular military formations. White House Memorandum 51 makes it clear that, if the conventional forces fail to accomplish their mission, provision has been made for the use of nuclear weapons.

Thus, a third strategic zone, a zone with a permanent US military presence (in addition to Western Europe and the Far East), is being formed in the region. Warships assigned to this zone carry missiles with nuclear warheads capable of reaching Soviet territory. This may be a zone of possible confrontation, nuclear confrontation perhaps.

So who is pursuing selfish aims, who is stirring up trouble in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf? The answer is clear enough. There is nothing very surprising in this. In the past the Indian Ocean area was coveted by colonial powers. In their attempt to gain supremacy in the area they repeatedly clashed with one another. It is still an object of expansionist ambitions. Though the colonial system collapsed in the middle of the 20th century and a whole number of independent states have emerged in the area, the neo-colonialists have been trying hard to preserve their old privileges, strategic and economic positions and access to sources of raw materials in short supply. The old aims have not been abandoned, and "gunboat diplomacy" is still being practised, though in an updated version, that is, with the help of atom-powered aircraft carriers and cruisers equipped with nuclear missiles.

Is it not clear why in 1978 the White House broke off talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation and subsequent curtailment of military activity in the Indian Ocean? That came at the moment when the talks entered the practical phase and a draft agreement was being drawn up. Washington

did not want to have its hands tied once it had decided to carry out massive militarisation of the Indian Ocean.

Is it not clear why Washington has rejected the latest Soviet *peace plan for the Persian Gulf*? The plan is seen as an obstacle to the realisation of the USA's expansionist intentions, to the world gendarme's most favoured divide-and-rule policy.

An entirely different approach to the problems of this region in South-West Asia has been demonstrated by the Soviet Union. The United Nations has sponsored an international conference on the Indian Ocean due to be held early in 1983. To ensure its success the Soviet Union has called upon all countries whose ships used the waters of this ocean to refrain, pending the convocation of the conference, from any steps that might further complicate the situation in this region. This proposal made by Leonid Brezhnev also in September 1982, puts forward the following actions as those that should be refrained from:

*the dispatchment of large naval contingents to the area;*

*the holding of naval exercises;*

*the expansion and modernisation of military bases by the littoral states which have such bases in the Indian ocean.*

The Soviet Union has in addition voiced its readiness to resume at any time the bilateral talks, which the American side has broken off, on limiting and scaling down military activities in this part of the world, as we said earlier on.

Washington is trying to turn *the Mediterranean* into one of the "zones of vital interests to the USA", into an "American lake". In the present plans of the Pentagon the Mediterranean is regarded as NATO's "extended hand" into the East, as a link

between NATO and the other military bloc—USA-Israel-Egypt, as a joining of the Southern flank of NATO with the centre of US militaristic activity that has been created in the Indian Ocean. The NATO member countries situated in the Mediterranean are being asked to offer their air space and airport facilities for possible transport of US invasion forces to the Near and Middle East.

In these conditions it becomes necessary to undertake effective counter-measures. The Soviet Union's position is that *the Mediterranean must and can be turned from a zone of military and political confrontation into a zone of durable peace and cooperation*. From Moscow's point of view, achievement of this objective may be facilitated by an international agreement on the following matters:

— *extension to the Mediterranean of military confidence-building measures that have already been proved effective in international practice;*

— *negotiated reduction of troops in this region;*

— *withdrawal from the Mediterranean Sea of vessels carrying nuclear weapons;*

— *agreement not to station nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries;*

— *commitment by nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against any of the Mediterranean countries that do not permit the deployment of such weapons on their territory.*

In proposing these measures the Soviet Union at the same time expresses its readiness to consider, together with all interested states, any other proposal and idea that hold promise of reducing tension in the Mediterranean.

After the Second World War no less than 200 military conflicts have broken out in developing countries. Is the West aware of this? Do people in

the West remember this? It seems that they do. Are they drawing the necessary conclusions from this? It seems that they are. But this has not changed the attitude of some Western powers which regard the Third World countries as sources of much needed strategic raw materials and as convenient areas for setting up military bases and strongpoints. Militarisation of the Third World, involvement of its regions in intrigues of global confrontation, interference in its internal affairs, and splitting of the Third World into rivalling groupings or pairs in keeping with the traditional divide-and-rule policy pose a constant threat of regional, and probably not only regional, cataclysms.

It is sometimes said in the West in connection with the Soviet Union's proposals on the Persian Gulf that they should be considered together with the stay of the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has carefully weighed this argument. *It is prepared to discuss the Persian Gulf issue as a separate matter and is equally prepared to make a separate issue of the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. It is also prepared, as was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress, to discuss a third possibility: to consider the questions connected with Afghanistan, i.e., the international aspects of the problem (and not intra-Afghan matters which are the sole prerogative of Kabul) together with the questions of Persian Gulf security.*

Thus the Soviet Union, acting in response to the world public's concern over the situation around Afghanistan, has once again demonstrated its goodwill for a peaceful political settlement. What is the reaction in the West, above all, in Washington?

Secret US operations with the participation of Pakistan and some other states began right after



the April 1978 Revolution. The escalation of this outside interference finally forced Kabul to ask Moscow for military help. The Carter Administration carefully concealed and denied its complicity in the "undeclared war". The official authorities would not admit their direct participation in the training and arming of mercenaries sent to Afghan territory. Now the Reagan Administration has discarded all camouflage.

William Dyess, State Department spokesman, stated in early March 1981 that the White House would have no objection to a coup d'etat in Afghanistan. After that Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger referred to the secret despatch of arms to Afghan counter-revolutionaries as quite useful. The US President himself openly confirmed the fact of US arms supplies to the rebels.

In an interview with NBC shortly before his death Egyptian President Anwar Sadat blurted out that Washington was paying for the military supplies Egypt was sending to the Afghan interventionists terrorising the people of Afghanistan. These supplies were being delivered by American planes. In a programme presented by ABC, well-known American journalist Carl Bernstein disclosed that the secret supply of arms to the rebels was more extensive and complex than Sadat had said. It was being coordinated by the US Central Intelligence Agency.

So the secret is out. How should we now interpret White House declarations to the effect that it is seeking a political settlement in Afghanistan and is seeking above all the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country? In point of fact, while continuing to support Afghan counter-revolution both materially and morally, Washington is doing everything for the threat to Kabul from outside to remain

and the Soviet military contingent also to remain as a means of forestalling that threat. The plans for escalating the US interference are hindering Afghanistan's development of proper relations with its neighbours, above all with Pakistan, which is being used as a springboard for despatching mercenaries, and hindering the search for a peaceful solution of the situation around Afghanistan.

Washington's behaviour makes one doubt whether it really wants the Soviet troops to be withdrawn. The Afghan events have served as a most convenient pretext for the US to step up the arms drive and to build up its military presence in the Middle East as an excuse for interfering in the affairs of the developing countries' zone. Speaking about the events in Afghanistan, Indira Gandhi said: "I think the Soviets would like to get out of Afghanistan. But I don't think that the United States and Pakistan want them to get out."

The way to reduce tension in South-West Asia is not to step up the armed intervention in Afghanistan, but to conduct a peaceful and constructive dialogue. That is the approach of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, as outlined in its proposals of May 14, 1980, and August 24, 1981. Kabul considers—and Moscow shares this point of view—that the so-called "Afghan question" can be resolved by means of direct talks between the parties concerned. The main requisites are: reliable guarantees of a complete end to aggression from outside and the inadmissibility of all forms of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. In the summer of 1982 representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan met in Geneva and, with the participation of the UN Secretary General's personal representative, D. Cordóves, discussed the main problems and reached agreement

on matters connected with the procedure of further talks.

Has a start been made towards a political settlement of the Afghanistan issue? It is difficult to say although a little progress has been made. But one thing is perfectly clear: those who continue to plot against Afghanistan must realise at last that the former Afghanistan does not exist and will not return. What we have is a new Afghanistan—a democratic republic and an independent non-aligned state.

Conflicts in the Middle East are a warning signal. They point to flaws in the present structure of international relations which still permits war as a means for resolving inter-state disputes; to faults in the mechanism which the international community could use to stop wars as soon as they start, if it is impossible to prevent them; and to the dangerous lack of a joint security system. There is still another lesson to be learned or conclusion to be drawn: if there is an explosive region or crisis area in the world, it should not be allowed to smoulder over a period of many years or even decades. A peaceful political settlement must be found. And this is particularly true of an area like the Middle East over which the smell of gunpowder has hung all these years.

Two hundred conflicts in developing countries have not kindled a world conflagration. But is there any guarantee that another local conflict might not get out of control? While there is a threat of intervention by a third party in a dispute between two sides, there can be no such guarantee.

Such is the situation with the conflict between Iran and Iraq. First of all let us not forget that the conflict did not arise out of nothing. It could only erupt out of a lot of combustible material.

The colonialists had left behind them a good deal of old combustible material from the time when they were masters there, when they recarved the maps of states as they saw fit. And there is also quite a good deal of combustible material of more recent origin, such as increasing US military presence, militarisation of Israel and now of Egypt, and confrontation between Washington and post-Shah Teheran. There is a danger of intervention on the part of those who are eager to gain complete control over the oil resources of the Middle East, to smash the anti-Israeli and anti-US front of the Arab peoples, to put Iran back under their influence, to bleed other nations white in internecine wars and to intimidate them so that they would accept "Sadatisation" without a murmur.

As the *Daily Telegraph* of London has noted, the conflict between Iraq and Iran is perhaps to the advantage of the West. An armed clash between two big petroleum-producing countries has seriously disrupted normal trade in a vital strategic material. Countries that are far more dependent than the United States on oil imports from the Middle East should not forget this. The US gets from the Persian Gulf area only 14 per cent of the oil it consumes, whereas the figure for the European NATO member states is 54 per cent. Is it not clear who may get burnt the worst from an involvement in a new "hot spot" Washington is kindling? And Washington is drawing its allies into this risky gamble.

There has been much talk to the effect that NATO should not concern itself with regions lying outside its geographical zone. There have been many statements denying reports that a combined NATO fleet is being formed to reinforce the US armada stationed off the shores of South-West Asia. And in

the meantime warships of the United States' NATO allies have been steaming towards the conflict zone.

Most of NATO's European members would probably have preferred to pay off Washington, as former British Prime Minister Edward Heath has put it, by relieving it of the burden of military concern in Europe and thus freeing US forces now stationed in Europe for action elsewhere. Washington, of course, would accept this. But it would want more than that. It would want to shift the "burden of military concern" in the Middle East onto the shoulders of its NATO allies. Though the mere mention of any risky venture makes some of them (though not all) nervous, the Pentagon is already busy planning to involve its European allies in its operations in the Middle East. And Europe has sensed this danger. For instance, the Spanish Foreign Minister has made a special statement in Parliament that his country will not allow the United States to use its bases in Spain as intermediate airfields for arms delivery to the zone of military operations in the Persian Gulf. But Washington may not even ask Spain and its other NATO allies. . . Some people in Western Europe seem to have forgotten that their countries were actually used as transshipment bases during the intervention in Indochina and in previous conflicts in the Middle East.

One point where the *Daily Telegraph* is right is that the Iranian-Iraqi conflict is definitely to the advantage of some Western countries, above all, the US. Washington has not forgiven Iran or Iraq for the collapse of CENTO (the Bagdad Pact). The internecine war between Iran and Iraq, their mutual weakening and exhaustion play into the hands of those who are trying to break down Arab oppo-

sition to the collusion at Camp David. Washington now hopes that Teheran, having been bled white in the war with Iraq, will fall at the feet of the United States like a ripe fruit. Then Washington could offer Iran a Middle Eastern version of the Marshall Plan and dictate its terms.

Washington took advantage of the Iran-Iraq conflict to gain a foothold in Saudi Arabia on the pretext of defending the petroleum-producing countries (not to mention the turning of Egypt into a US military base) and to make its military presence in the Persian Gulf zone permanent. The aim here is to establish absolute US domination over a strategically and economically vital region. Washington's aim is to strike at the national liberation movement, with the help of its Israeli emissary to drown in blood the Palestinian resistance movement—the militant vanguard of four million Palestinians.

Another state that is eager to profit from this conflict is Israel which is interested in splitting the anti-imperialist forces. For both Iran and Iraq are out of the active struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and Zionism in the Middle East. Israel took advantage of the disunity of the Muslim world to attack Lebanon.

In Washington there is much talk about neutrality, about non-interference in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict. But there is very little substance in the proclaimed US policy of impartiality and neutrality with regard to the said conflict. In listening to Washington's assurances of neutrality and non-interference one cannot help recalling a remark made by the sardonic Talleyrand. When asked what non-interference meant, he replied that he did not exactly know, but thought it meant the same thing as interference.

As in the West in general, in the US there may be people who sincerely believe that the safety of certain vital sea routes, including the Strait of Hormuz, is threatened. But should their safety be ensured with the help of "gunboat diplomacy"? There is a far more reliable and effective method. It was proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies in May 1980, that is, long before the situation deteriorated in the Persian Gulf area. The proposal called for an agreement on *lowering the level of military presence and military activity in the area to ensure the safe and unobstructed use of vital international routes*. The timeliness of this proposal is particularly clear today. Had it been considered as it deserved to be, it could have rendered the cause of universal peace a good service and saved the peoples of the world much anxiety. The idea underlying the proposal has been developed in Leonid Brezhnev's five-point peace plan which compares the Persian Gulf zone to a minefield where one must display redoubled caution.

The Soviet peace plan urges prudence. The doctrine of aggression and dictation has been opposed by a doctrine of peace and security. And neo-colonialist plunder (with Arab oil being regarded virtually as the property of US oil companies) is opposed by a call to protect the natural resources of nations to whom they rightly belong.

It is sometimes said and written in the West that the Soviet proposal is earning the USSR propaganda advantages. But Moscow is not after propaganda effect at all. It is concerned with the substance of the matter, which is to bring about demilitarisation, and not militarisation, of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Washington had hoped that its negative response

to the Soviet initiative would dampen broad interest in it. But Washington miscalculated. The Soviet initiative is in line with the objective proclaimed by the United Nations, namely, to turn the Indian Ocean into a peace zone and to neutralise the demolition mine in the Middle East. It meets the peaceful aspirations of all the states of the Persian Gulf area. It is in accord with the interests of those who are dependent on regular oil supplies from the area. That is precisely why time is on the side of the Soviet doctrine, and not on the side of "gunboat diplomacy" or the doctrine of "vital interests".

Peaceful and safe seas and oceans... Current events are bringing fresh evidence of the vitality of the Soviet idea. One proof was the "punitive" raid carried out by the British Navy against Argentina.

But the champions of "gunboat diplomacy" draw their own conclusions from the conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Applauding the "victory of British arms", they anticipate new blitzkriegs, new "limited" wars with the use of Marines and paratroops. "Naval war" has become a subject in which the Pentagon and NATO strategists are keenly interested. They are obsessed with a mania for naval superiority. The US Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, boasted that the United States is capable of landing its troops on 70 per cent or more of the world's coasts.

We now know the kind of threat that can hang over a nation which has an outlet to the sea and dares to exasperate the American "ruler of the seas". Seventy per cent of the world's coasts—this means dozens of countries can become victims of Pentagon operations of the Falkland type.

So it is clear that there is another necessity—

to demilitarise the seas and oceans in the interests of all mankind.

It is this point of view that the Soviet Union supports. As Leonid Brezhnev announced in March 1982 at the Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, the Soviet Union is willing *to negotiate a reciprocal limitation of naval actions. In particular, we could agree to the withdrawal of the missile-carrying submarines of both sides from the vast expanses they are now patrolling and to a restriction of their navigation to specified limits.*

The Soviet Union would also be ready *to discuss the question of extending confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, especially to areas adjoining the busier sea lanes.* It is the desire of the USSR to turn as much of the World Ocean as possible into a peace zone as speedily as possible.

Historical experience has shown that if a large group of states unite to achieve positive goals and to carry out constructive projects, their position, their political and diplomatic actions come to acquire the nature of a material force. Having put on the agenda of world politics the question of weaving a strong fabric of peace in places where it has grown thin, the Soviet Union has every reason to believe that its idea is taking firm root and will ultimately be crowned by a peaceful settlement.

## **Price of Peace, Value of Initiatives**

If one considers all the useful steps that have been taken in the world arena to strengthen international peace, one will see that they bear the imprint of Soviet initiatives.

If one were to ask what major constructive proposals the Western governments have advanced recently in the field of disarmament and improvement of the international situation, one would have to strain one's memory. They are few indeed. Finland has put forward an important proposal on creating a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. France, Sweden and again Finland presented disarmament proposals at the talks in Madrid. There was a time when the US showed willingness to discuss such questions as curtailment of military activity in the Indian Ocean and limitation of the arms trade. But it was Washington that broke off consultations on both questions.

It is not our intention to belittle the contribution of the West to solving the most outstanding problem of our time. Far from it. If it were not for this contribution, the agreements on curbing the arms race to some extent in a number of directions

could not have been concluded. However, this contribution could have been much greater. There is little one can do if many of the NATO member countries are reluctant to discuss major issues bearing on disarmament and international security. Where is the spirit of enterprise which is considered to be one of the main virtues of the countries of the "free world"? As to enterprise in the sphere of "market economy", in business, it exists, even though it cannot cope with mass unemployment, galloping inflation and general disorder in the financial system. But does not the West exhibit rather too little enterprise in foreign policy matters and in the work for peace?

The munitions manufacturers are on the alert as soon as they smell a war contract. They shed their lethargy and indifference immediately and begin to display their spirit of enterprise. The long-term armaments programme alone, which was approved by the Washington session of the NATO Council in 1978, incorporates nearly 100 ideas. A comparison of this figure with another figure—*the more than 100 proposals on disarmament, advanced by the USSR after the war*—is almost inevitable.

The two figures are two service records, two approaches to disarmament. One is inert and passive, the other is vigorous and dynamic. They reflect two policies: one destructive and the other constructive. The followers of one policy concentrate all energy on creating a false concept of security, which, if it can be called security at all, is ensured solely by nuclear stockpiles. The proponents of the other policy have put all efforts into persuading their Western partners that security can only be ensured by a process of gradual mutual reduction of explosive material, and not by its accumulation, a process leading to the abolition of stockpiles, to

complete and general disarmament. If the NATO member countries lead in the arms race, the Soviet Union prefers to lead in other spheres. *It has held and continues to hold the initiative in calling attention to cardinal problems of international security and disarmament and in seeking ways to solve them.*

At this point it becomes possible to explain why some people put forward proposals on disarmament and others do not; why one diplomacy is rich in political content, and another barren with respect to peace initiatives.

With people, as with social systems under which they live, much depends on their fundamental nature, on their inborn, and not only acquired, qualities and features. Socialism is a peaceful system by its very nature. An active peace policy is an inherent feature of a socialist state. Peaceableness is an inborn feature of a society in which there are no classes, social strata or professional groups profiting from the manufacture or delivery of arms, in which there are no persons interested in the arms race or in war as a source of wealth or as a lucrative business. War provides food and drink for those who do not do the fighting themselves, but send others to the battlefield and generously supply them with combat equipment. The more equipment is consumed in the flames of war, the wealthier the munitions manufacturers become. Let us recall how the rich in the United States became richer during the Second World War. They grew so rich that they could afford to throw war-ravaged Europe a bone in the form of the Marshall Plan, and to make profit out of it, too, when Europe got back on its feet.

War ripens in the depths of a society where militarism becomes a hereditary feature. Socialism,

by heredity, is a peaceloving society. This is the wellspring of the peace initiatives which the Soviet Union has consistently set forth before the international community.

Therefore, it is not by chance that the Soviet Union's peace actions in the foreign-policy field started as soon as the Soviet state was born. Lenin's *Decree on Peace*\* was the socialist state's first practical peace initiative that pointed the way to the establishment of a lasting, universal and just peace and reliable international security. It was then that the Soviet Republic launched its peace offensive which has been so widely discussed in the last few years.

Some people in the West say that both the US and the USSR are equally responsible for the arms race. Moscow cannot accept this reproach. The USSR has been reducing its military spending with every passing year. And it has done this despite the sharp increase in military appropriations in the US and other NATO member countries and despite the present aggravation of the world situation. The USSR has been proposing one measure after another to lessen the danger of war, measures that can lead to a curbing of the arms race. They are now being discussed at the United Nations, in Geneva and in Vienna. More than that, to set an example to others the USSR has in a number of instances undertaken unilateral steps in reducing its armaments. It was the USSR that has proclaimed its readiness to limit, reduce or ban any type of weapon.

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\* One of the first laws of the Soviet Republic, it was adopted on Lenin's initiative on November 8, 1917. It formulated the principles of peace and friendship between peoples.

To work for peace for all nations, to work for a world without armaments, a world without wars. This is an ideal, a slogan and a programme of action the Soviet Union has been implementing in the international arena.

As far as the central issue of war and peace is concerned, the USSR's conscience is clear before the peaceloving public. It does not have to prove its peaceloving intentions as Western politicians often do. And it is understandable why they envy the USSR's established reputation as a peaceloving nation. One cannot fail to see that to gain international prestige today, in the context of detente, a state has to work for peace and conduct a constructive policy. It cannot be gained by "gun-boat diplomacy", by setting up a "rapid deployment force", or by taking on the role of a "world policeman".

"The Russians declaim a lot about disarmament. Hardly a year goes by without their firing off some elaborate declaration or peace proposal. They realise, it is an obvious point, that this is a fertile field for propaganda," said former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in an elaborate speech in the Royal Commonwealth Society to mark the 35th anniversary of the United Nations and Disarmament Week. A week before—what perfect timing!—in a speech at the Women's National Democratic Club in Washington, Edmund Muskie, ex-US Secretary of State, expressed a similar view. He said:

"For the United States to be seen as the opponent of arms control would be a propaganda coup of enormous value to our adversaries." Further on, the ex-Secretary of State admitted that trust in the US and its position in the world as a peaceful country depended on the fate of the SALT-2 Treaty.

Displaying concern about a country's reputation and good name is the duty of its statesmen. It is equally obvious that they cannot ignore world public opinion. Very few can afford to appear before it as avowed advocates of the arms race.

World public opinion can hardly hold it against the USSR for constantly calling attention to the need for real disarmament. Those who prefer to keep silent on this score are willy-nilly playing into the hands of the trigger-happy warmongers. Persistent calls for disarmament are obviously annoying those who are arming themselves and those who are trying to justify this.

Can a statesman hope to win international respect if he says one thing one day and another thing the next, if he poses as a peacemaker today after trying to revive the cold war only the day before?

The Soviet Union has been pursuing a consistent policy. It has been using the same diplomatic vocabulary. Both the policy and the vocabulary proceed from peaceful aims and are in complete harmony. Its deeds accord with its statements, and vice versa.

A movement against NATO's programme for nuclear missile armament is unfolding in Britain. There the biggest anti-war demonstrations in the last 25 years were held. The American people are known for their peaceful aspirations. But the candidates in the 1979-1980 presidential election campaign underestimated the peaceful sentiments of the people. At the eleventh hour they hastened to assure the voters of their peaceful intentions. Anti-militaristic sentiments are a real, potent factor both in home and foreign policy, a factor which politicians may do well not to forget. But while some of them recognise it and are earnestly pre-

pared to take account of it in their activity, others only pay lip service to it.

Facing censure on the international front and resistance at home the US "hawks" have felt worried. They have not slowed down munitions production. They have not proposed that excessive military spending be cut. They have not abandoned "gunboat diplomacy" or withdrawn their armada from the Persian Gulf. They have not cancelled Presidential Directive 59 which increases the risk of nuclear war. They have not returned to the SALT-2 Treaty which they had shelved.

No, what they have done is what they always did as soon as they were threatened by isolation at home and in the international arena. They began to tone down the bellicose element in their statements and more often resort to the vocabulary of peace.

Ronald Reagan said:

"I want to make certain that the entire world understands that peace is our first priority." The world has yet to understand this—if the words are backed up by deeds. The former resident of the White House had failed in this. As far as the USSR is concerned, it does not need to convince anybody that it wants peace more than anything else, that its words and deeds are never at variance. Its actions are always in keeping with its intentions.

This shows why it has been impossible to set up a joint East-West "initiative bank", why socialism has had to pioneer in the search for ways to build a world without weapons and without wars. Socialism is prepared to shoulder this burden, to carry out this historic mission, if only the other side would not interfere, if only it would refrain from putting spokes in the wheels. Those who do



not bring forth their own initiatives often dislike others who do. The West has made it a rule to spend years over every Soviet proposal. It has tried to dismiss them as "sheer propaganda" or even to leave them unanswered.

What's wrong with promoting peace and detente? It would not occur to anybody to reproach NATO member countries for doing the same. But NATO prefers to engage in a different sort of propaganda campaigns, namely militaristic campaigns. They frequently refer to proposals put forward by socialist states as "propaganda". It follows that they would like to see them transformed into practical policy. However, strange as it may seem, NATO has missed every opportunity to take the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation at their word and urge them to live up to what they say.

There are many constructive Soviet proposals lying on diplomatic shelves in the West. Among them are:

*World treaty on the non-use of force in international relations;*

*Proposal on simultaneous disbanding of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (or at least mutual curtailment of their military activities);*

*Proposal on the conclusion by all countries represented at the European Security Conference in Helsinki of a treaty pledging not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another;*

*Proposal on measures prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons and weapon systems of mass destruction;*

*Proposal for the termination of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles all the way to their complete liquidation.*

We can cite many instances of excellent opportunities lost after the war, opportunities offered by Moscow for solving various problems in such fields as disarmament, international security, etc.—problems which cause concern both in the East and the West.

Take, for instance, the recent events in Asia which show that peace there, shaky as it is, is being put to a severe trial. But in 1969 the USSR called for collective efforts to strengthen security in Asia. Certain powers took a cool attitude to the idea. It is now clear that in putting forward this proposal the Soviet Union showed great foresight. If it had been possible at the time to lay the foundation for collective security in Asia, as was done in Europe, the Asian continent and, indeed, the whole world could have been spared the present complications in connection with Afghanistan, the armed fist in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and the dangerous tensions in Indochina.

Countries on both sides of the Atlantic are arguing about the level of military spending. It seems that even the rather powerful West German "locomotive" is slipping, obviously incapable of hauling the overloaded militaristic train. Replying to Washington's reproof the drivers of this locomotive remarked with some resentment that the FRG was not "a hen that laid golden eggs". Yet, long ago the Soviet Union proposed in the United Nations that *the permanent members of the UN Security Council and other militarily powerful countries reduce their military budgets by absolute sums or by a certain percentage.* This would create better conditions for the growth of the civilian economy, curb the arms race and strengthen mutual trust, and make it possible to increase aid to developing countries. This was an appeal to reason, but the

other side refused to heed it. And now we hear complaints about the heavy burden of military spending, about declining production of the capitalist "hen laying golden eggs". Meanwhile the rate of the arms race is mounting, and international security is being correspondingly endangered.

In short, the US Administration under Reagan virtually frustrated many negotiations in one way or another related to curbing the arms race. The world is entitled to call Washington to account for breaking off or suspending negotiations on:

- a complete cessation of nuclear tests,
- the prohibition of chemical weapons,
- a reduction of arms sales,
- the banning of anti-satellite systems,
- the reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean area.

Add to this list Washington's refusal to accept the plan for creating a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe.

As difficult as world affairs experts have found it to discover anything comparable to the aversion to talks evinced by Washington, one analogue has nevertheless been found—by a West German journalist who observed that "there is something Wilhelmian about the United States today". Columbia University Professor Fritz Stern deciphers it thus: "Wilhelmian is shorthand for that disastrous period of increasing German strength and political ineptitude that helped precipitate the world war and Germany's first downfall."

The far from intellectual German Kaiser was most of all afraid of being considered weak; so he began to arm to the teeth in order to secure military superiority over other nations. Some people in Washington too are suffering from an inferiority complex. Their motto is: "Conduct talks

only from a position of strength." They argue that to enter into negotiations now, when the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon are vying with one another in lamenting the United States "lagging behind" the USSR in all military respects, would be like going naked into the conference hall. Perhaps Washington would like to enter this hall astride a supermissile?

What conclusion can we draw from this? It is that the world stands to gain when Soviet initiatives are treated as starting-points for joint East-West action, and that it stands to lose when Soviet initiatives aimed at strengthening security and reducing the burden of military spending are undervalued or ignored. Of course, the West loses a lot, though certain quarters there—a very small minority—profit from the material preparation for war. What the military-industrial complexes, NATO generals and political "hawks" dread most is that someone should interfere in their business, plaguing them with peace initiatives and stirring up public opinion which invariably welcomes every reasonable proposal designed to ease the danger of military confrontation and check the arms race. But the Soviet Union is not about to satisfy the military-industrial complexes or their political super-structure. It will not stop knocking at the door just because somebody behind it feigns deafness.

There is a Russian saying: water does not flow under a lying stone ("no pains, no gains"). However, if the stone is attacked by powerful streams from all sides, it could be made to start rolling.

Constructive peace initiatives are always useful, regardless of the international weather. But their value increases especially when inter-state talks run into an impasse, when difficulties arise in the way of a political settlement of disputes or at dis-

armament negotiations. In such cases they can play the role of Ariadne's thread helping the parties to the talks to find the way out of the labyrinth. Soviet initiatives are being advanced at a time when the world community has no more important task than that of preventing present tensions from growing into something worse. They aim at focussing the attention of peoples and governments on the crucial problem of averting a thermonuclear war and ending the disastrous arms race. That is why proposals opening new prospects for detente and disarmament should be heard, win support and be implemented.

"It took five years for detente to assert itself in Europe and only two or three months to undermine the process," said President Rudolph Kirchschräger of Austria. It is easy to understand why a leader of a country that has played no small part in the establishment of detente should sound bitter and frustrated.

Let us look into this. We are now witnessing the effects of a destructive diplomacy which can cause much harm in very little time. It can inject discord into the East-West political dialogue, clog up the channels of cooperation in the economic, cultural, humanitarian and sports fields, and create an atmosphere of hostility, suspicion and intractability. Obviously mankind needs diplomacy of a different kind—a constructive diplomacy capable of overcoming negative tendencies and changes in the international situation, stagnation and inertia, of paving the way to new frontiers in detente, disarmament and cooperation for the whole of the international community.

The price of peace is high in our time. It is especially high when it is threatened. At such moments the value of constructive peace initiatives,

initiatives that can stem the dangerous tide of events, ease the war threat and relax tensions, increases correspondingly. The world's nations do not want their governments to indulge in abstract condemnation of war and the arms race, to give them sedatives and comforting assurances, to assume a sceptical attitude that paralyses the will to act, or to make grim predictions, which is easy to do in moments of difficulty. What they want is a clear answer to the question: what should be done now to avoid the worst? They want initiative and action.

Leonid Brezhnev said:

*"We strongly favour putting into action all the mechanisms for a peaceful and just settlement of international issues."*

This comprehensive formula contains a colossal force vigorously promoting detente and at the same time checking the arms race. The USSR has set in motion the mechanisms of a constructive and dynamic policy in the United Nations, at the disarmament talks in Vienna and Geneva and at the Madrid meeting of the participants in the European Security Conference, and also in regions where peace is being endangered.

*The Soviet Union is doing its utmost to introduce an element of stability in the present unstable international situation, an element which is an inherent feature of Soviet foreign policy.*

To be effective in today's quickly changing world a foreign policy must be dynamic, responsive, flexible and adaptable. But though Soviet foreign policy is flexible, it is also consistent; in one respect it is unchangeable, namely, in its fidelity to the ideals of universal peace and disarmament. It has known no zigzags and maintains continuity on the road to these goals.

The policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy of detente is a principled and continuous long-term course pursued by the Soviet Communist Party in the sphere of international relations. It is not affected by any ad-hoc considerations and is free from diplomatic manoeuvres. The continuity of this course was confirmed by the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses. But despite this, on the eve of the 26th CPSU Congress Western politicians again raised the crucial question: is there any possibility of changes in the Soviet Union's attitude towards the policy of detente? Even people well-informed about Soviet foreign policy wanted to know if Moscow will play tough in response to toughness, if it will resort to the "blow for blow" method.

But this question has already been answered. A great power which has proved its devotion to peace over a period of more than half a century is not going to aggravate the situation or incite antagonism. It does not seek confrontation; nor does it intend to be a "fighting cock". According to the US press, this is the posture of some of the Washington leaders. Nor will the USSR allow itself to be infected by the fever of militarisation or belligerence, to get into fits of anger or pathological hostility.

Moscow does "declaim a lot about disarmament", to use Lord Carrington's expression. For unless you do, guns may start speaking. But Moscow is not "declaiming" about disarmament; it is also taking practical steps towards it.

Despite the aggravation of the international situation, despite the threat of ever greater US military presence on the European continent, *Moscow has kept its word by unilaterally withdrawing 20,000 Soviet servicemen, one thousand tanks and a cer-*

*tain quantity of other military equipment from Central Europe.* Though the US and other NATO member countries have sharply increased their military appropriations, Moscow has not "paid back in kind" by increasing its defence budget. In fact, *Soviet defence spending has not been increased in the last few years.* This is a sign of restraint and composure, an indication of Moscow's belief in the potential power of detente which is not easy to destroy, as some people seem to think. Moscow is confident that the resources for stabilising the present unstable situation have not been exhausted. At the same time this is also a signal for the other side to exercise moderation and restraint and to take action and display initiative in response to the Soviet stand.

Europe and the whole world have grown accustomed to Soviet initiatives, one might say. They are taken for granted. But interest in them remains keen especially since there is no other source of peace initiatives. Are there many capitalist countries that can honestly say that they have contributed constructive ideas to European and world politics?

The world public knows that talks on all aspects of strengthening international security and curbing the arms race would have been successfully completed long ago if the matter depended on the USSR alone. All the same, the fate of disarmament, of war and peace, is still in the hands of the peace-loving forces and not of those that are forging the swords of aggression. As in the past, the USSR will do its utmost to curb the arms race, to bring about the transition to practical disarmament and to exclude all violence and arbitrary acts from the sphere of international relations.

At present we hear about rather grim assessments

of the international situation. The forecasts do not inspire much hope either. Scepticism, nihilism and pessimism are political twins of passivity and apathy. Only constructive peace initiatives can promote political and military detente, preserve universal peace and strengthen its structure. *The Soviet Union calls on other states to contribute more actively to the peace effort. The greater the number of states vigorously contributing to this effort, the greater the chances of success in ensuring international security. The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate with all countries in pursuit of this goal. If Soviet initiatives are supported by goodwill from the other side and if they are translated into practical politics, peace will be ensured.*

## **The Voice of Statesmanly Wisdom**

Moscow is out to protect detente, which is being viciously attacked by its enemies. It has been stated from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress that the main goal of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies is to defend detente and impart to it an energetic rhythm, a second wind. This attitude is welcomed by all progressive mankind. The peoples of the world are glad to know that a new constructive, life-asserting, optimistic note has been struck in world politics. Only those who have run out into the street to welcome another cold war are unhappy.

How often does the West lament the lack of mutual trust! *Implementation of the new proposals advanced by the Soviet Union would make it possible to build up the necessary confidence step by step.* It is necessary in order to solve ever more complex problems of ever greater scope, the most complex and greatest in scope being the curbing and ending of the arms race.

This problem cannot be solved if West and East are at loggerheads. It can be solved only by mutual efforts. But the US position during the Carter Ad-

ministration, still more under Reagan's Administration, has been to tire the other side and bleed it white by an arms race or to make it drive itself to death, to use the language of the "hawks".

Though the Soviet Union does not plan to conquer the US or NATO in the arms drive it has no intention of being vanquished in it. What is vitally necessary is to get rid of the feeling of fatal inevitability of competition in arms production, of the illusory hopes that one can win in this competition. One must realise at last that the arms drive is a mortal danger to all involved, that it does not threaten the Soviet Union and the East generally more than it threatens the US and the West as a whole.

*The danger of war stemming from the arms race is looming all over the world and it should be forestalled by joint efforts.* We say that our world today is interdependent and this interdependence is felt most keenly in the face of the threat of a thermonuclear conflict. The nuclear jinni released from the bottle won't spare anyone. In his blind fury he will strike right and left until every living thing is reduced to ashes.

*The Soviet Union has called on the United States, the European nations and all other countries to fight the common danger jointly, hand in hand. We should strive not to outdo one another in the arms race but together to conquer that race.*

To relieve the peoples from the threat of a nuclear war is a task which the Soviet Union says should be given absolute priority.

While advancing its peaceful proposals the Soviet Union has not accepted the bellicose challenge thrown down from across the ocean. Yet some people definitely hoped that Moscow would respond to Washington's toughness by taking an irreconcil-

able, uncompromising stand. This is what the "hawks" in the West, who are prevented by detente from sharpening their claws and beaks and unfolding their militarist wings so eagerly expected. World public opinion gave Moscow its due, noting that it was concentrating on peace, not confrontation, preferring the tone of detente to that of the cold war, and refusing to aggravate the international situation, a course to which many would like to provoke the USSR.

The 26th CPSU Congress in spring 1981 clarified not only the substance of the matter, not only the nature of relations between states in the East and the West but also the tone of these relations, the atmosphere that should be cultivated in the international arena. This atmosphere is suffering from intransigence, a highly-strung tone, quick tempers and useless polemics. It benefits from self-control, steadiness and discretion. A tough approach and an icy tone are ineffectual and have no future, they close the road to evening out interests, to compromise and conciliation, which are so important in the present tense and nervous situation.

The world public has had a good opportunity to compare the courses followed by the two most powerful countries on decisive issue of world politics. Many observers have noted that this comparison is not to the advantage of the US. Viewed against the background of constructive Soviet foreign policy, the tough line of the White House, which some began to shower with premature praise, is devoid of a future and barren. *The New York Times* pointed out that the Soviet Union had put up obstacles in the way of the US Administration's original strategy aimed at winning support for tougher line towards Moscow. Here it is ap-

appropriate to note that it is mostly Washington that is busy putting up obstacles in its own way.

According to a Presidential adviser, Edwin Meese, President Reagan would like his adversaries each night to go to bed guessing what his next move will be.

Moscow is not against skilful tactics, well-thought out manoeuvring and subtle diplomatic moves, which promote a successful outcome of negotiations on a mutually acceptable basis, the bridging of differences and the rapprochement of sides on matters of substance, in a word, if they serve peaceful purposes and better understanding. But Moscow does not at all want others to cudgel their brains guessing its next move in an atmosphere of oppressive uncertainty. Its policy is clear and unambiguous, it is predictable and straightforward. It meets the wishes of those quite numerous politicians in the West who want to have a definite and well-based idea of the aims, intentions and motives of the other side. This is the only true basis for mutual trust and reliability in international relations.

This is how ultimately clear in their invariable peaceful substance the foreign-policy activities of the Soviet Union are. Those to whom the Soviet proposals are directed may sleep quietly so as to wake up with a fresh head receptive to peaceful ideas and actions. In general, may the world live and sleep in peace, without the apocalyptic nightmares of a nuclear war.

By and large the Soviet Union has every reason to be satisfied with the way world public opinion has received the peaceful Soviet initiatives. Of course, until they have been accepted and implemented they have not brought about the crucial change which all of us have been so eagerly await-

ing. But they are paving the way to such a change, creating an atmosphere in which it will be easier to begin negotiations. These initiatives are a ray of hope in our life, which is darkened by tension in international relations.

It is not a matter of Moscow reaping a bumper propaganda harvest, as some observers believe. The point is that the soil is ready for sowing, ready to receive seeds to grow good crops, the crops of future accords, settled conflicts and problems.

The main task now is to continue and facilitate the solution of outstanding issues. There is no search without talks, and there will be no solution without a search. We must talk, not keep silent. How else can we find the common language which is essential, especially in such troubled times as ours?

The tension in the world may easily be seen with the naked eye, as it were. It is seen both in the East and in the West, though each reacts differently and has different approaches to it. It is true that calls to overcome the existing difficulties through negotiations are also being heard in the West, but they are drowned by other calls—for an arms build-up, for stepping up more and more militarisation programmes and activating the US and European “rapid deployment forces”. It’s a pity that certain diplomatic services are not agile enough, that their forces are not employed for rapid reaction to the peaceful moves of the other side, to its signals and invitations to talks.

The proposals advanced by the Soviet Union are brought to the notice of other countries’ governments through two channels: the mass media and Leonid Brezhnev’s messages. Moscow does not claim to be the sole source of statesmanly wisdom. Nor does it consider itself the supreme oracle of

truth. It realises that there can be other notions, views and approaches to problems ripe for solution. And it is certainly prepared to consider everything reasonable that can be proposed by the other side, but there is hardly anything reasonable to be seen there.

The trouble is that the study of the Soviet proposals in the West has become a very protracted process—and it is not the first time this has happened. And the more the West studies them, the more it forgets. . .

The forgetful need to be reminded of certain things, as Leonid Brezhnev did in his speech in Prague on April 7, 1981. Since no proposals are being advanced in the West we should discuss what is available, what has already been proposed by the Soviet Union. Leonid Brezhnev once again urged his colleagues in the West to conduct businesslike, constructive talks on urgent international problems at all levels, without any preliminary conditions.

*The Soviet Union proposes to concentrate the entire intellectual power, goodwill and energy of peoples, states and governments in the decisive direction of attaining peace and disarmament. The USSR has raised in their full importance the questions of mutual trust between the East and the West, of their collective responsibility for the destinies of the world, of their partnership in the field of detente and disarmament. Moscow proposes to take up in earnest the painstaking job of jointly building the edifice of lasting peace, the foundation for which was laid in the 1970s, above all, on the construction site of the European Security Conference.*

Such an appeal was contained in the message of the USSR Supreme Soviet *To the Parliaments and*

*Peoples of the World* adopted on June 23, 1981. It says that there is now no other sensible method of solving disputed problems, no matter how acute or complex they may be, except negotiations. Not a single opportunity that exists must be missed. There is no time to lose! Each day lost for negotiations increases the risk of a nuclear conflict.

This is the grim truth and all must know about it, all those who take part in moulding top-level politics. It should be clear that the way to preventing a new round in the nuclear missile armaments and a new world war, lies through dialogue and negotiations, through the joint efforts and co-operation of nations, states, parliaments and governments for the sake of ridding the world of the mortal danger that hangs over it.

The USSR Supreme Soviet solemnly proclaimed that the Soviet Union is not threatening anyone, it does not seek confrontation with any state West or East. If other states, above all, the United States take this stand the world will be rid of the arms race, enmity and the danger of military clashes.

This voice of statesmanly wisdom was heard with close attention. Everywhere people understood and appreciated the main thing—that the aim of the USSR's proposals is to preserve all the positive achievements of detente, to stabilise the present unstable situation and provide conditions for transition to a new fruitful stage in the development of international relations.

People all over the world appreciated the calm and optimistic tone of the call from Moscow. Positive emotions are needed and are important in top-level politics as well. World politics is receiving a positive impetus from Moscow. But for this impetus to activate the machinery of negotiations and



bring a peaceful settlement of crisis situations the West must also respond.

One may hold different views on this or that act or aspect of Soviet foreign policy, but one cannot help seeing its patently anti-war trend, its devotion to the cause of world peace, its decisive contribution to securing a peaceful future for mankind. This contribution is acknowledged by all objective observers.

In the 1950s and 1960s the USSR did everything in its power to prevent the cold war from turning into a hot war. It withstood the atomic blackmail of those who counted on their monopoly of the "absolute" weapon of those days. It initiated the policy of detente, which in the past decade revealed the colossal potentialities and advantages of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among states.

Today, at this testing time, the Soviet Union is once again equal to the situation; once again it is aware of its historic responsibility. It is doing everything possible to prevent a new cold war and a nuclear confrontation. It is raising a barrier to Transatlantic atomic militarism. Maintaining restraint and self-control, the USSR is not yielding to provocation, is not meeting challenge with challenge and is avoiding aggravation of the situation. Blocking the bellicose and disorganising activities of extremist forces in the world arena, containing their activities, the Soviet Union and its socialist allies are creating conditions for stabilising and normalising international relations. Moreover, this practical peacemaking is already laying the foundation for continuing the policy of detente on a more fruitful basis.

By its policy, by all its actions the Soviet Union is proving that the constructive potentialities of a peaceful policy are truly inexhaustible. The for-

eign-policy ideas of the Soviet Peace Programme are paving the way for productive negotiations, for solving the cardinal problems of today, for eliminating the "hot spots" on our planet. This is the essence and meaning of that programme.

The starting point of the Soviet Union in all its initiatives and actions undertaken in the world arena is the axiom that *a new world war is by no means inevitable, that it can be averted, that peace can be maintained and strengthened*. This can be achieved by combining efforts "from below" and "from above"—those of the anti-militarist, anti-nuclear movements and those of peaceloving states and governments.

This fundamental conclusion is organically bound up with another: *mankind is quite capable of changing for the better the present unfavourable course of international events, of isolating and confining aggressive circles, of forcing them to reckon with the peoples' aspirations for peace*.

The third major postulate of Soviet foreign policy from the very first day it took shape is: *The Soviet Union has never maintained that lasting peace can be achieved only by military force and the "power politics". Peace can be safeguarded only by reason and goodwill, by unswerving adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence and equitable international cooperation*.

However difficult, confused and brain-racking the problems confronting the world today may be, they can all be settled by peaceful means, by means of honest talks aimed at reaching mutually acceptable agreements and heeding the interests of all states. There is a way of solving every situation and conflict. Politicians and diplomats are there to overcome conflicts, and not to be overwhelmed by them.

Underlying the Soviet Peace Programme are the ideas of the indivisibility of the world, of the common destiny shared by all states and nations, of their common security, collective wisdom and responsibility for the future of human civilisation. The Peace Programme invites all countries—big, small or medium-sized, members of alliances or non-aligned, neutral—to a dialogue to seek ways of consolidating security on a regional and global scale. There should be no monopoly in participation in international affairs, in solving problems affecting the fate of mankind, in resolving the question of war and peace. The Soviet Peace Programme is open to all. The Soviet Union will consider all constructive proposals made in the name of peace.

The Soviet Peace Programme is imbued with the conviction that notwithstanding all dissimilarities between states and nations, notwithstanding all the differences in their internal systems, in their interests and views, in their beliefs, they have at least one common interest. They are all interested in preserving mankind itself, in saving it from a doomsday that nuclear weapons could bring about.

The Soviet Union does not consider that its vital interests are diametrically opposed to those of the United States or any other country; by interests we mean, of course, primarily the security and prosperity of nations. If we look at the path traversed by mankind in history, we can easily see that the attempt of one state to ensure its own security and prosperity at the expense of other states never ultimately led to the desired results and ended in fatal consequences for all concerned. Such attempts are particularly criminal in our nuclear-missile age, when all countries and peoples are for the first time confronted by the threat of universal annihilation,

when the security of one depends on that of another.

However complicated and dangerous the international situation may be, there are highly significant factors that enable us to face the future with hope and confidence.

The aggressive circles have failed to change the alignment of world forces in their favour. The international scene is dominated by the strategy of detente and not by that of the cold war. The East-West political dialogue has been maintained, though Washington would like to break it off. There is business cooperation between the East and the West, despite attempts to dislocate it.

For the past sixty years the Soviet Union has not regarded its prosperity and security in isolation from that of other nations. Only such interdependence can cement world peace and make it truly stable, reliable and unshakable. For this reason the USSR is shaping its foreign policy in such a way that it may serve not only the Soviet Union, but the interests of all peaceloving mankind. Continuity and constancy in devotion to world peace—herein lie the essence and dynamics of Soviet foreign policy, a policy that can be trusted and relied on.

To the programme of nuclear insanity and nuclear death the Soviet Union counterposes a life-asserting programme of reason and goodwill. It is a programme of talks aimed at progressing from political to military detente, to practical disarmament, to a world devoid of nuclear and other weapons, a programme capable of ensuring a road of progressive development, without fear of war, for present and future generations. The basic premise of the Soviet Union is that world peace can be preserved and war averted. It is convinced that *along*

*the road of history mankind is making logical progress—from the inevitability of wars in the past to the possibility of preventing them in the present and to the complete removal of war from the life of nations in the future.* The Soviet Union is doing its utmost to keep this road clear, to see that reason triumph over insanity, war give way to peace and social progress, so all who cherish peace may face the future without fear.

**Вл. Кузнецов**  
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# THE SOVIET UNION

## PROPOSES

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Vladlen KUZNETSOV (b.1931) is a well-known Soviet journalist and writer on current affairs. Upon graduating from Moscow University in 1954 he joined the staff of the newspaper **Pravda**. From 1960 to 1966 he was **Pravda** correspondent in the German Democratic Republic and West Berlin, then a **Pravda** special correspondent and commentator. In 1970-71 he was correspondent in West Germany for the daily newspaper **Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya**. From 1971 to 1982 he was a member of the editorial board and head of a department of the popular weekly journal **New Times**. He actively participates in the work of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and regularly contributes articles on current questions of European politics and East-West relations to the Soviet and foreign press. His published books include "Lenin's Polemical Skill", "Detente through Soviet Eyes" and "NATO: in Conflict with the Times".

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