

**far
east**

Reporter

CHINA...

and INDIA?

and INDONESIA?

and BURMA?

by Maud Russell

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INTRODUCTION

China is today an independent, modern nation and an increasingly significant and powerful factor on the world scene. But she has inheritances from her past semi-colonial and semi-feudal status. One of these inheritances is the question of territorial borders; another is the status of Chinese living abroad—"overseas" Chinese; still another is the wounds and memories of colonial and imperialist aggressions which she shares with all her Southeast Asian neighbors. She also shares with these neighbors their post-independence need and effort to become modern industrialized nations. China also lives in a world where all nations are to some degree affected by the cold war.

To understand the current issues between China and her neighbors the background of preliberation inheritances, the now new but differing economic systems of these neighbors, and the cold war must be kept in focus.

The question of the status of Chinese nationals living abroad and the issue of territorial borders assume a new dimension now that China is an independent, powerful and self-respecting nation. China can now speak out in her own interest—no longer to be bullied into silent acceptance of impotence in international relations. This new articulateness of China is improperly labelled "aggression" by certain interested hostile elements; but when long established nations protect their borders and their citizens abroad the governments of these nations are characterized as only doing their patriotic "national duty."

The memory of historical wrongs inflicted by imperialism and colonialism creates a common emotional bond between China and her more and her less friendly neighbors. The common move toward modernizing their economies and their societies has a two-fold effect on China's neighbors; on the one hand, the Asian people feel a surge of hope and pride as China demonstrates the possibility of emerging from a feudal society into a modern society;

"It can be done," says the example of China to the Asian people. On the other hand, the contrast between China's speed in building a modern industrial society and the slow, tortuous pace of the non-socialist neighbors intensifies the internal conflicts—conflicts of interest—between rulers and people within these neighboring countries.

Some of China's neighbors, like China herself, have chosen socialism as their modern industrial goal: North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and North Vietnam; with these neighbors China is in mutually helpful relations. Some of China's neighbors have chosen to line up with the goals and policies of the so-called "free" world (the capitalist world)—Japan, The Philippines, South Vietnam, South Korea, Pakistan and Thailand. Some of China's neighbors have a declared policy of neutralism—Indonesia, India, Cambodia, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Malay, Singapore, Laos—but with varying degrees of relations with both the capitalist and the socialist nations.

China and her neighbors live in the larger world where competing social system exist. The "cold war" (in terms of possible military conflict) is giving way to economic competition—"competitive coexistence" (with economy and culture as the weapon); the Asian nations find themselves subject to the pressures of the power and policies of the major protagonists in the competing systems, capitalism and socialism; both protagonists aim to line up these Asian nations on their side; their methods vary, but the efforts of the two major protagonists are a part of the relationship between China and her neighbors.

The third party interest and impingement are obvious. Washington has a policy of taking advantage of (if not creating) opportunities to discredit China in the eyes of the neutralist nations—a policy of attempting to negate the influence of China's international status and of her domestic achievements in these ten short years since her liberation; this policy involves egging on and cooperating with reactionary Asian elements who would maximize and exploit the issues with China; and this policy involves misleading American public opinion by headlines, editorials, omissions and falsifications in the news and false interpretation of the nature, aim and method of so-called American "aid to backward

areas." Of the latter there has been some debunking documentation in recent months; and of the former—one has only to compare the flaming front page headlines with the petered-out news items a few weeks or months later—Laos, for example.

The third party interest and involvement are obvious in such international ("free world" international, that is) groupings and policies as are found in the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Colombo Plan. The former, SEATO, involves eight countries, five of them Western (U.S., Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia) and three Asian countries (The Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand)—this is a military pact to combat Communism, even Communism in the non-pact nations. The Colombo Plan involves twenty-one nations and colonies; fifteen of them are recipient countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Malaya, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, North Borneo, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sarawak, Singapore, Thailand, South Vietnam) and six are donor countries (Australia, Britain, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, U.S.). This Plan is aimed at aiding the non-socialist countries of Asia compete with China in providing a modern and decent economic system: an attempt to make capitalism more attractive to Asians than socialism. The Plan was organized in 1950 "to make the recipient nations less vulnerable to economic penetration from the Communist bloc" as the *New York Times* put it (10-26-59). The recipient nations have received five billion dollars in aid since the Plan's inception.

To sum up this introduction and background: the current issues between China and her neighbors, India, Indonesia and Burma have to be viewed and evaluated in terms of the long historical genesis of the issues (territorial and nationals abroad), of what's developing within each country, and of the interest and involvement of third party nations in the issues and relations involving China. The issues do not exist in a vacuum, nor are they one way or even just two way affairs.

THE OVERSEAS-CHINESE ISSUE

Tens of thousands of Chinese live in Chinese communities abroad. Many of them were born in these lands; few of them have

become citizens in the lands where they dwell. Now that there is an independent government in Peking able to speak in the interest of its nationals abroad, the question of the status of Chinese in Southeast Asian lands has become a subject of formal discussion between the governments concerned. The Chinese Government has agreed that these overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia should now definitely decide on their citizenship: they should become citizens of the land where they dwell; or, if they choose Chinese citizenship they should be subject to the laws governing non-citizens if they remain overseas; and of course, as Chinese citizens, they will at the same time have the usual protection a government affords to its citizens abroad.

Chinese communities abroad are known for their success in business. Their long experience and their established business and commercial success have never harmed the lands in which they live; but the Southeast Asian people's newly won independence from colonialism and their drive to modernize and run their economies has both intensified their nationalism and drawn envious attention to the established economic position of the Chinese resident in their midst. The presence of these Chinese communities becomes a handy tool for domestic chauvinistic political elements. Through no faults of their own—the Chinese abroad are famous for their law-abiding existence—these Chinese communities easily become victims and pawns of economic and political interests. Of course, the enhanced international status of China as a powerful and independent and progressive nation and the established economic position of the Chinese communities abroad does furnish an enlarged avenue for promoting the prestige and influence of the People's Republic of China in these Southeast Asian lands: Chinese banks, Chinese shops offering the amazing variety of new products from China, Chinese press and publication media, Chinese individuals visiting their home-land and bringing back information about development within China, Chinese diplomatic and consular officials stationed in these countries—all these serve as powerful propaganda factors; and it is easily understood how this irks the reactionary elements in Southeast Asia—and in turn makes the Chinese resident in their lands serve as political and economic scape-goats.

China and India

China and India have a long territorial border, some 2,500 miles. This border has never been delimited; but the two governments, India and China, now independent countries, have been discussing the subject for several years. An intriguing question arises: "Why has the 'subject' now become an 'issue'?"

The disputed areas consist of 1) 36,000 square miles at the northeastern end of the border—the so-called McMahon Line, 2) 15,000 square miles at the northwestern end of the line—the Ladak Area, and 3) a small and narrow Central Area.

The McMahon Line

The Indian Government bases its claim to territory in this area on the 1914 Simla Conference, attended by representatives of Britain, China and the Tibetan area of China. The Simla Treaty is one of those unequal treaties left over from colonial days, imposed on countries too weak to stand up for themselves. Not only does the present Government of China reject the terms of that treaty but the Chinese representatives at the time refused to sign the Convention and acting under instructions from Peking declared, at the Conference, on July 3rd, 1914, that the Chinese Government would not recognize any treaty or similar document that might be signed between Britain and the Tibetan local authorities. On July 3rd and 7th, 1914 similar declarations were delivered in formal notes to the British Government. All Chinese Governments since have persisted in this stand; the Chinese are puzzled why India, who like China has won her independence from imperialism, should insist on China recognizing an unequal treaty, and one which no Chinese government ever even signed. China claims that the McMahon Line was not even discussed

at the Simla Conference, but was the result of an exchange of secret letters at Dehli on March 24th, 1914, before the Simla Conference was held, between the British representatives and the representatives of the local Tibetan authorities. Sir Charles Bell, whose duty at the time of the Simla Conference was to get the Tibetan delegate to agree to the McMahon Line, described the Line as "desired by Sir Henry" McMahon; and in his book "Portrait of the Dalai Lama" reveals that the Dalai Lama was dissatisfied with his delegate's conduct of the negotiations, nor was he happy with the Simla treaty. Sir Eric Teichman, British Consul in Tibet, wrote in his book "Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet," that the Simla "conference finally broke up in the summer of 1914 without an agreement having been reached." And even if the Tibetan delegate did sign a secret letter with the British, this document had no status in international law since Tibet was not a sovereign state. Not only has there never been any acceptance of the British imposed McMahon Line by any Chinese government, but for a long time its existence was not publicly admitted by British and Indian governments. It was not on the official map "Tibet and Adjacent Countries" published by the Survey of India in 1938; nor was it on the map of India in the 6th edition of the Oxford Advanced Atlas of 1940, compiled by the Cartographer to the King of Britain, John Bartholomew. It did not appear on any Indian maps until 1942 when China was going through a most difficult period, the war with Japan; during this period, from 1943 on, the local Tibetan authorities were under the control of British Imperialism with consequent deterioration of their relations with the central government at Peking; and in spite of its preoccupation with the war with Japan, the Kuomintang Government four times protested to the British embassy representative in Peking; and after India became independent in 1948 the Kuomintang Government made formal repudiation of the Simla Convention to the new Indian Government.

In 1946 Nehru published "The Discovery of India"; in the 3rd edition published in English in 1951, a map entitled "India 1945" attached to this edition did not follow the McMahon Line for the eastern section of the border. On official maps of India, published by the Survey of India for 1950, 1951, and 1952 the so-called McMahon Line was drawn but marked "undemarcated."

Up to 1958 on the "Map of China West and Tibet" in the Times Atlas of the World, edited by John Bartholomew, the traditional Sino-Indian boundary and the McMahon Line were both drawn with the word "disputed area" marked between the lines. As a matter of fact, in the 1914 draft agreement neither the latitude nor the longitude of the McMahon line were mentioned.

The Ladak Area

The Northwestern end of the disputed line is the Ladak area, a sparsely inhabited mountainous area, bordering on the province of Indian-held Kashmir. In 1842 a treaty was made, following an armed clash, between China's Tibetan authorities and the Kashmir authorities, a treaty which mentions only in general terms that Ladak and Tibet would each abide by its borders, but made no specific provision or explanation regarding the location of this section of the boundary. In 1847 the British representative in Canton proposed to the Chinese Government a delimitation of this section; the Chinese answered that this was unnecessary, since there was a traditional boundary. In 1889 the British Government was still proposing to the Chinese Government a formal delimiting of this section of the boundary. Thus, it can be seen that for over a century Britain has recognized Chinese sovereignty in Tibet and the fact that no settled boundary existed. British and Indian sources have recognized a boundary line close to the traditional Chinese line which dates back a thousand years: as in the East India Company line drawn in 1854, the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1929, and Mr. Nehru in his book "Discovery of India" (1946). On August 28th 1959 Mr. Nehru stated "This was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan; nobody has marked it." In 1956-57 the Chinese built their famous road connecting Tibet and Sinkiang, a fact well known to the outside world; India made no protest at the time; Cyril Falls, Sometime Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford, writes in *The London Illustrated News* (12-5-59): "To the detached observer it would seem that the best time for a protest and negotiation was when the road began to develop. There may have been a private approach then, but we have been told that

Nehru was aware that the work was in progress . . . now the situation has changed in a way that must be called extraordinary, even allowing for the fact that the place is inaccessible and almost uninhabited. Mr. Nehru has stated that he does not know anything about events there." In fact no protest was made until after July 1959 when Tibetan aristocrats and landlords staged their revolt. Today India's maps claim 120 miles of Chinese territory in that area, beyond any previously issued maps; and Indian troops have made raids in the attempt to cut the Chinese highway.

The Central Area

Little prominence has been given to the central area in dispute. This small populated area lies between India's Punjab and China's Ari. Several decades ago Tibetan inhabitants there and the government in Lhasa repeatedly protested the British occupation of Sang and Tsungsha; not only is this thus an issue left over from the days of British India, but in 1951 newly independent India seized seven additional places (Parigan, Chuva, Shiki Pass, Puling-Sumdo, Sangsha and Pathal). The Chinese Government, while protesting to the Indian Government, did not make public announcement to the world about these seizures, feeling that India's policy of neutrality and the emergence of the Bandung Agreement were of prime importance.

Walter Lippmann on the Border Issue

"The Chinese, and that includes the National Chinese on Formosa quite as much as the Communist Chinese on the mainland, do not recognize the legality of the McMahon Line as a frontier. They assert that this line, which the Indian Government now claims is the legal one, was imposed on Tibet by the British who dominated Tibet when China was helpless and in the throes of a revolution. The old frontier was bound to come into question when China was strong enough, as she is now, to reconquer. And it is true, I believe, that most of the disputed territory is inhabited by Tibetans or is geographically related to Tibet." He goes on to say that the road which the Chinese have built across territory which

India now claims "evidently is of no interest to India except as a point of honor; it has no strategic or political relevance to India and is in fact designed to connect two great Chinese territories which are vital to the control of Central Asia. There is no conceivable way in which the Indian army could recapture the road for there is no way that army could get there. The disputed territory is about as inaccessible from India as is the South Pole." (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 12/10/59.)

Secretary of State Christian Herter on the Border Issue

"The border issue, as you know, has been for many years pretty ill-defined. And I don't think we have any first hand knowledge, particularly from the viewpoint of the northwestern area, with respect to the definite border that could rightly be claimed by either side. From an objective point of view we have no basis to go on. We have only the word of a friend." (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 11/13/59)

Tillman Durdin, N. Y. Times Correspondent

"In fact China's position in rejecting the McMahon Line and other sections of the border as defined by India has considerable justification in tradition and documentary evidence of the past." (*N. Y. Times*, 12/22/59)

Sulzberger of the New York Times

"The United States has not taken a stand on India's China border. Since this was first delineated as the McMahon Line in 1914, its precise location has never been officially communicated to Washington. . . . We don't know where the boundary runs." (12/28/59)

WHERE THE ISSUE STANDS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

India after 1951 pushed north of the McMahon Line; the Chinese Government, while asserting its non-recognition of the

Line, explained to the Indian Government that, for the sake of Sino-Indian friendship and the maintenance of unity, Chinese troops would not cross the line; the Chinese Government repeatedly formally stated to the Indian Government that the Sino-Indian border was yet to be delineated by negotiations between these two newly independent nations. A memorandum delivered to the Indian Embassy in China by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 3rd 1958 reiterated that the reason why the Chinese were following the delineation of the old maps was because no survey had yet been undertaken of the boundary, and that the Chinese Government would not make any unilateral change.

After the early summer 1959 rebellion of the reactionary Tibetan elements in Tibet, Tibetan rebels crossed the Line into India; and Indian troops pressed northward, invading Longju and occupied Shatze, Khin and Tamaden in Chinese territory. Indian troops also carried out provocations against guard units dispatched by the Chinese Government to the north of the Line to prevent remnant armed Tibetan rebels from going back and forth across the border to carry on harrassing activities. The first instance of an armed clash between Indian and Chinese units along the border occurred August 25th 1959 when Indian troops which had intruded into Longju launched an unprovoked armed attack on these Chinese guard units; 3 Indian guards were killed; later Indian troops retreated south of the Line. A second armed clash occurred in Ladek in October, resulting in the death of 9 Indians with three wounded and ten detained by the Chinese, since returned.

After the second armed clash both governments ordered their frontier guards to stop patrolling. The Chinese Government proposed that the armed personnel of the two sides of the border respectively retire twelve miles or some appropriate distance; the Indian Government indicated to the Chinese Government that in any case neither side should resort to force except as a last resort in self-defense.

Notes were exchanged between the two governmmts. On September 8th 1959 China wrote India; Nehru replied on September 20th and the Indian Foreign Ministry on November 4th. These

notes expressed disagreement about the facts. China again wrote on December 26th, a lengthy document setting forth "various details so as to clarify the true picture of the historical situation and the views of the two sides." The introductory paragraph of "Question One" of Chou's letter sets forth the basis for the dispute between the two countries:

"The reason for the present existence of certain disputes over the Sino-Indian boundary is that the two countries have never formally delimited this boundary and that there is a divergence of views between the two countries regarding the boundary. According to the Indian maps, the boundary line in the Western sector cuts deep into Chinese territory, including in India an area of over 1,300 square kilometers. The boundary line of the Middle sector is relatively close to the delineation on the Chinese maps, but still a number of areas which have always belonged to China are included in India. In the Eastern sector the whole boundary line is pushed northward including in India an area of ninety thousand square kilometers which originally belonged to China.

"The Chinese Government therefore considers it necessary to conduct friendly negotiations to bring about a reasonable settlement. The Indian Government, however, holds that the greater part of the Sino-Indian boundary as shown on current Indian maps is defined by international agreements and therefore sees no reason to hold overall boundary negotiations. Thus the negotiations themselves have run up against difficulties and there is danger of the boundary disputes remaining deadlocked for a long time. The Chinese Government considers that to say that the greater part of the Sino-Indian boundary has been formally delimited is totally inconsistent with the facts."

On November 16th 1959 Nehru proposed that Chinese forces vacate Longju in the Northeast Frontier Agency whereupon India would agree not to send her own armed forces there; that in the Ladak area the Chinese should withdraw to the east beyond the border traditionally claimed by India and the Indians withdraw west beyond the border line the Chinese claim. Nehru considered

these as necessary preliminary steps before any negotiations could take place. On December 26th, Chou En-lai proposed meeting for negotiations, but did not accept Nehru's suggested preliminary steps.

In a letter dated February 5th, Mr. Nehru answered Chou En-lai's note of December 26th, suggesting that the two Prime Ministers meet; Mr. Nehru pointed out that on November 16th he had suggested certain preliminary steps which "unfortunately" Mr. Chou had not found himself able to accept; but "nevertheless . . . I think it might be helpful for us to meet . . . I would be glad if you could take the trouble to come to New Dehli . . . I would suggest some time in the second half of March . . . if it is convenient to you."

On February 26th Mr. Chou replied, accepting Nehru's invitation to confer on the border dispute, saying that he could go to New Dehli in April. His letter, cordial in tone, said, "The Chinese Government has consistently held that the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples is eternal and that it is necessary and entirely possible to settle the boundary issue between the two countries in a friendly, peaceful manner. The two countries must not waver in their common desire for a peaceful settlement of the boundary issue on account of temporary differences of opinion over certain unfortunate unexpected incidents"; he said he particularly hoped "to see the dark clouds hovering between our two countries dispersed through our joint efforts so that long-standing friendly relations between the two countries may be consolidated and developed."

A WORD ABOUT TIBET: A CHINESE AREA ON THE INDIAN BORDER

Tibet has long been historically and diplomatically recognized as a part of China. "From the latter part of the 7th century until the abdication of the Manchus in 1912, Tibet regularly paid tribute to Imperial China, without any clearly defined definition of the relationship between the two countries. Tibet's position has been

like that of a rather wayward foster child in a great patriarchal family, who has sometimes been obstreperous and defiant, but who always came home to pay his respects." (Rodney Gilbert, *N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 10/1/59.) In the 13th century Kublai Khan, as emperor of China, selected the sovereign of the Tibetans; and when the Chinese Empire gave way to the Republic of China under Sun Yat-sen one of the five bars of the new flag of the Republic represented Tibet, as integral a part of China as Manchuria, also represented by its bar. The fact that during the centuries Tibet never had diplomatic representatives accredited to other governments only underlines its position as an integral part of China.

Even Great Britain, which again and again attempted to separate Tibet from China, has through the years reaffirmed China's sovereignty over Tibet. In 1861 the strategic border of Sikkim (then a province of Tibet adjoining India) was compelled to sign a treaty with Great Britain under which the conduct of Sikkim's foreign affairs was taken over by Great Britain and her military forces placed at the disposal of Great Britain; *but the treaty reaffirmed China's sovereignty*. On January 8th 1903 Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, proposed to the British Government an attack on Tibet since "the military power of the Tibetans is very low and would not involve serious resistance"; accordingly, in August 1904 a British expedition of 3,000 troops invaded Tibet and compelled the local authorities to exempt British imports into Tibet from any duty, and required these authorities to pay over 500,000 pounds sterling as "indemnities for the expenses incurred by the dispatch of British troops." *This indemnity was paid by the Chinese Government*. Then, by an agreement made August 31st 1907 England again pledged herself, together with Russia, to recognize China's sovereignty over Tibet. In the fall of 1913 England again recognized China's sovereignty in the attempted Simla Agreement which sought unsuccessfully to sever part of Tibet from China by providing for an "inner" Tibet to remain under China's control and an "Outer" Tibet to become "autonomous." It was at this same Simla Conference that a clandestine attempt was made to establish a British dictated boundary—the now controversial "McMahon Line."

Britain did however for the hundred years before the inde-

pendence of India, exercise a dominant influence over Tibet, Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, though paying an annual tribute to China, was geographically remote from Peking; and its trade route with the outer world lay through the more accessible territory of India. After Indian independence, this trade relation continued, with India maintaining telegraph and postal stations in Tibet and military guards along the trade route to and in Tibet; these privileges were, by agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China, abrogated in 1954; and *Tibet was then, by India this time, formally recognized as a part of China*. U.S. Secretary of State, Christian Herter, replying in a letter on February 20th 1960 to a letter from the Dalai Lama said, "It has been the historical positon of the United States to consider Tibet as an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China" (*N. Y. Times*, 3/1/60)

Not a single country, not even the United States nor Great Britain, raised any question about Tibet as a part of China until after 1949; then, as the Chinese People's Liberation Army advanced into Tibet—as they had into all the provinces and regions of China, with the reactionary elements, like Chiang Kai-shek, fleeing before them or like some giving in to the people's armies—then, reactionary elements abroad, chiefly those of the United States, began branding the People's Republic of China as "aggressor."

Hostile foreign elements have long recognized the strategic importance of Tibet. "Tibet is strategically the keystone of Central Asia," wrote Walter Lippman (12/10/59). And he goes on to say "Intrigue to establish a mid-Asian base in Tibet did not cease when India became independent." Americans, for whom the Lowell Thomases, Senior and Junior, write glamorously about the "God-King" and his feudal-clerical setup, should be acquainted with a letter written in May 1950 by Lowell Thomas, Jr., to the "Foreign Affairs Bureau" of the then local feudal authorities in Lhasa, a letter linking the American State Department and President Truman to the already started plots of the Tibetan reactionaries:

"Hannersley Hill
Pawling, N. Y.
May 10, 1950

"Your Excellencies:

About the first of November it was my privilege to call on Mr. Truman, our President, and to present to him the message from your government. The President asked many questions about your country; he particularly was anxious to know as much as possible about the Panchen Lama because he had just heard that one of the young candidates for that office had been captured by the Chinese Communists; and President Truman wondered what significance his capture would have. The President told me it was his hope to organize the moral forces of the world against the immoral, and that he had communicated with His Holiness the Dalai Lama about this. The President realizes the tremendous moral force of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and of Buddhism.

"I made a particular point of telling President Truman what you had told us in your Foreign Office last summer about the threat to Tibet's independence and explained your urgent need for assistance. I asked him if America could supply your army with modern weapons and sufficient advisors to instruct your soldiers in their proper use. But President Truman did not commit himself to either an affirmative or a negative answer. However, he is sympathetic with your country's problems. There is no doubt about this.

"While in Washington I also talked with some of the heads of the State Department and told them all that you had told us, both about Tibetan independence from China since 1912 and about the present danger from the Communist Chinese. What action of assistance they may have taken I do not know. "In this connection, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, recently told my father that he feels there is a need for more information about your country before a definite program of support can be worked out.

"The Secretary implied that if by any chance I should be granted permission to make another trip to Lhasa this coming summer, he would like to send along an American govern-

ment representative who would be qualified to discuss matters fully with your government. The Secretary suggested that this special representative would be a man who had no apparent connection with our government and so would not attract attention as being an American official. This person might be one who had worked for the State Department but no longer does so. He would enter Tibet merely as another traveler.

"The disguised government representative might be like the gentleman my father and I told you about last year, Mr. Max Thornburg, with whom I worked for two summers in Turkey and Iran. He has been an advisor to the U.S. State Department for a number of years and heads a group of American industrial and economic consultants to the Iranian Government.

"Mr. Thornburg, an American elder statesman, 57 or 58 years old, is an extremely able and wise man. He has been working hard to keep Communism out of the Middle East and I think the chances are good he can come to Lhasa this summer representing our Government, provided I can let him know in time to make preparations; we have been advised by our State Department that Mr. Thornburg would be most suitable for this assignment.

"May I say again, Your Excellencies, that I hope the threat to your country's independence is growing less and less, and that the strength of your army and the difficulty of terrain will continue to keep the Chinese behind their frontiers, also that I hope Your Excellencies are enjoying good health, as my father and I are in America.

(signed) LOWELL THOMAS, JR."

India too has reactionary elements who, trained under the long British imperial rule, easily inherit the attitudes of their former military tutors and now easily collaborate with the policies of the current cold-war plotters and strategists. An aristocratic officer class with the Indian Army units on the northern borders feels sympathy with the Tibetan nobles, aristocrats, landlords and exploiters just across their borders; and the presence of the Dalai Lama and his entourage in exile presents the possibility of a holy

war to establish bases on Tibetan soil or at least to harass the Chinese government. These officers would welcome military action in Tibet which would help implement their desire for a military alliance with the United States and its Southeast Asian "allies." It is noticeable that the Indian General Staff have attacked the socialist-minded Krishna Menon and demanded his dismissal as Minister of Defense; and they have attacked Nehru for his weakness in refusing to get into military action against China.

That China is strengthening her defenses in her Tibet region is natural; it is especially understandable in the light of the modern continued attempts of third-party nations to establish bases in Tibet. The *N. Y. Times* reported (12/25/59) that "heavy concentration of Chinese Communist troops were reported along much of India's 2,500 mile northern frontier. The Chinese were reliably reported to have established heavily fortified positions well equipped to withstand the sub-zero temperatures and blizzards that distinguish Himalaya winters. . . . Heavily armed units are said to have moved in recent months into the Chumbi Valley. Tibetans recently escaped to India said the Chinese had completed a new airfield at Kampa Dzong, about 40 miles north of Sikkim, an Indian protectorate. They say another airfield had been established near Tingri, about 50 miles north of Mount Everest which is on the Nepalese-Tibetan frontier. A major headquarters post of the Chinese Army and Air Force was reported at Nagchuka in Central Tibet about 100 miles north of Lhasa." (Hanson Baldwin, *N. Y. Times*, 12/22/59) "The Chinese are in possession of the high ground. They can operate from the relatively level Tibetan plateau to support their troops in the disputed area. Their supply line extends back hundreds of miles. . . . The Communists are reported to have built one or more main roads into Tibet, one of them a lateral road paralleling the Indian frontier. They have completed or are working on several roads that lead toward Ladakh and other areas of the disputed frontier." And a railway project into Tibet is already underway. The days when China was unable to protect not only her outlying borders and territories but not even her very coastal and interior provinces are over. No more foreign gunboats on the Yangtze and no more foreign troops stationed in China; and now, in far away Tibet, third party nations

are being made to think twice—if not furiously!—before going ahead in the attempt to use Sino-Indian border questions as an excuse to implement their cold-war strategy in China's part of Central Asia.

ATTEMPTS TO BRAND CHINA AS "AGGRESSOR"

While there is hesitation on the part of outsiders to get into active military operations against China on the Sino-Indian border—historical facts and China's military potential being rather obvious hurdles—the attempt to lay the foundation for such possible action goes on in terms of labelling China as "aggressor."

In December 1959, for example, there was a spate of headlines in the New York press picturing China as aggressor in Nepal. "Threat to Nepal Cited: Chinese Agents Are Reported Active Near Tibet Border" (*N. Y. Times*, 12/6/59). "Nepal Paper Says Chinese Cross Border" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 12/22/59). "Red Chinese Troops Said to Raid Nepal" (*N. Y. Times*, 12/22/59). "Say Chinese Reds Build Nepal Road as Tibet Link" (*N. Y. Tribune*, 12/26/59).

The news items under these headlines, the fine print, contain charges of Chinese intrusion and denials by Nepalese. The December 6th item: "The deputy chief whip of the ruling Nepali Congress Parliamentary Party disagreed today with the Prime Minister B. P. Koirala's statement what there was no longer danger to Nepal from any course." The chief whip had reported that "disguised Chinese agents were active propagandists" in a Nepal town near the Tibetan border. The items on December 22nd: "The newspaper of the ruling Nepali party said today Chinese Communist troops have penetrated into Nepalese territory 'in large numbers' at two points. An 'important' political leader was quoted as saying the Chinese forces crossed the border at Doti and Dadelhura, in Western Nepal, in a remote and mountainous area . . . cutting timber in a Nepalese forest . . . to construct barracks and other military buildings." "Nepalese Defense Minister M. B. Gurung charged last Monday that Chinese Communist troops are encamped in Tibet 'within a few days march' of the northern border of Nepal. Unofficial reports to Katmandu, the capital of Nepal, said 100,000 Red Chinese troops are involved." How

"encamped in Tibet" "within a few days march of the northern border of Nepal" is twisted to mean "crossing the border" passes understanding!

An AP dispatch (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 12/25/59), headlined "Say China Reds Build Nepal Road as Tibet Link," quoted "a high Nepali official" as saying that the Chinese were constructing a road fifty miles inside the extreme northwestern end of Nepal." Six days later the same newspaper headlined an AP dispatch "Nepal Reported Clear of Chinese" and reported "The Home Minister Surya Prasad Ubadhyaya denied reports that Communist Army units are inside Nepal's territory" but continued to imply invasion by adding "His denial left open the possibility that Chinese troops entered the Himalayan kingdom and then withdrew." The *New York Times*, (2/23/59) likewise admitting "Nepal has not confirmed any of the reports, nor has India" went on to comment, "However, the possibility of Chinese infiltration in some outlying area is not entirely ruled out by Nepalese and Indian sources."

Thus, for example, is American public opinion conditioned to think of China as "aggressor" and conditioned to favor military alliances and aid to Asian governments.

NEPAL OFFICIALS SPEAK

The Chinese press on January 4th 1960 gave a fuller account of the statement of the Nepalese Minister of Home Affairs, Law and Justice Upadhyaya; he told the press the Nepal Government was well informed on the border situation and said, "To the best of our knowledge our borders, both in the south and the north, are safe; and we do not fear any aggression from either side. We are sure of our best friendship with our great neighbors. . . . We have full faith in our neighbors." In a press interview with a Nepal newspaper on December 29th, denying rumors of Chinese troops inside Nepal territory, he added, "It goes against the national interests to create non-existent fears in the general public" and regretted efforts to create suspicion and dissention among the people by resorting to unfounded criticism of Nepal's friendly neighbors. The British Daily Telegraph on December 8th reported that Nepal's Prime Minister Koirala told its special correspondent in Katmandu, "I think China has no real intention of invading

us or India; it is my genuine feeling that we are in no danger of aggression from China." Nepal's Deputy Prime Minister Shamsher, in Calcutta, on November 6th, also denied that there was any violation of Nepal's frontier by Chinese troops; he said, "The Bandung spirit is very dear to every heart in Asia and Africa and it is the concern of these countries to preserve it." Nepal's Minister of Village Development Tulshi Giri on October 22nd, said he was convinced that China was upholding the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

On January 22nd 1960 Nepal's Home Minister, speaking in Calcutta, India, said Chinese troops had not come to Nepal's border nor had they crossed into Nepal at any known point. On January 19th Nepal's Prime Minister Koirala, arriving at Patna, India, for a twelve day visit in that country, said there was no need for any joint Indian-Nepali defense pact; asked whether Nepal would mediate between India and China on the border dispute he said it was for both parties to arrive at a solution; and on leaving India on January 31st, after the twelve days visit, at a press conference said, "No incursion has taken place on the Nepal border. . . . We do not know what is happening across the border. . . . Nepal does not apprehend any danger from China." He said he could not imagine a war between India and China and that he did not envisage a joint defense between India and Nepal as military alliances are "worse than useless" and that joint defense between India and Nepal was absolutely unnecessary. Asked if he thought China had committed "aggression" he said, "I do not know; there are differences between the two countries about certain areas, but they are of a minor nature."

BHUTAN TOO SPEAKS ABOUT CHINA

On December 23rd 1959 the Prime Minister of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji, said in Calcutta, that the situation on the Bhutan-China border was "absolutely normal and peaceful" and that there was no truth in reports of China massing troops on Bhutan frontiers.

SIKKIM NOT THREATENED BY CHINA

On September 6th the *N. Y. Times* reported that "there were unconfirmed reports early last week of Chinese incursions into

Sikkim." But the Maharajo Kumar, the heir apparent to the throne said his country had not fear of Chinese attack from Tibet. He told a news conference in Calcutta, "The Chinese are not that stupid. . . . So far as we are aware the Chinese have not crossed our border. Our frontiers are well defined and they have been accepted for years. They are not like the Northeast Frontier Agency (McMahon Line—Ed.) and Ladak, where the borders are just lines drawn on maps." (*N. Y. Times*, 9/6/59)

PAKISTAN SPEAKS

The *New York Times* (10/22/59) presented a map captioned "Maps issued by Communist China claim territory that is considered Pakistani . . ." But the news item, in fine print, said "the Pakistan Foreign Minister Manzoor Qadir cautioned that the Chinese Government has not so far made any reference in any official communications to any map or any territory of Pakistan to which they might lay claim." He said there were no Chinese patrols in the Gilgit area "as far as we know." There has been no positive identification of foreign planes reported to have violated the Pakistani air space in recent month. He appeared to go out of his way to assert that Pakistan, unlike India, had no border dispute with Communist China now."

In a letter to the United Nations on December 3rd 1959 regarding its interest in this part of Kashmir (over which India and Pakistan dispute) the Pakistan delegation said it is not in a position to determine the veracity of the reports of Communist China's aggression "or to determine the actual extent of the encroachment, if any." (*N. Y. Times*, 12/4/59)

What China Herself Says About "Aggression"

"Although the Chinese people have begun to score some achievements, China is still very backward economically and culturally and it will still take the Chinese people decades or even over a hundred years of arduous effort to overcome such backwardness. But at no time in the future will China become a threat to its neighboring countries, just as China does not

believe that India, after it has grown as strong as China fervently hopes, would become a threat to China.

"To say that the growth of China's population and industry would constitute a threat to its neighbors is utterly incomprehensible to the Chinese people. China's social system is a socialist one under which the political and economic powers are in the hands of the working people, and the people and government of socialist China have not, nor should they have, any intention of threatening others.

"Moreover, the following facts must be taken note of: firstly, although China's population has increased at a higher rate since liberation, yet the average annual rate of increase is only 2%, while the average annual rate of increase in China's grain output has reached 9.8%... In the future the per unit area grain output and agricultural labor productivity in China will still be greatly raised.

"Apart from that, China has a vast territory, more than half of which is sparsely populated and will take great efforts to develop. Therefore the Chinese people absolutely do not need to seize the territory of other countries to feed themselves. Secondly, although China's industry has undergone some development, it still by far cannot satisfy the needs of the people at home. China is rich in natural resources and has a huge domestic market; its industry neither needs to grab raw materials from abroad nor needs to dump its products in foreign countries. Thirdly, the development of China's industry and agriculture has led to a shortage, not a surplus, of labor power in China. Therefore, China has no surplus population to send abroad. In order to attain their great goals in peaceful construction, the Chinese people are in urgent need of a long-term peaceful international environment."

CHINA AND INDIA: WHY THE BOUNDARY "SUBJECT" BECAME AN "ISSUE" IN 1959

Not only must the historic background be taken into account if we are to understand the question about boundary between

India and China; but *the current issue can be fully understood only, and perhaps mainly, by taking into account what is happening today in India itself.* Not only are alien cold war interests attempting to use the Sino-Indian problem for their own strategic objectives, but entrenched interests within India itself have likewise seized upon this border dispute to implement and further their objectives. Even Mr. Nehru, losing his temper in the lower house of Parliament as he defended his invitation to Premier Chou En-lai, charged that there are in India "certain vested interests opposed to any settlement between China and India" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 2/23/60)

Mr. Nehru after listening intently to hours of speeches on the dispute with China in both houses of Parliament declared that behind the border trouble lay far more significant things. The real problem of India is not some mainly inaccessible mountainous boundary line but basic economic, social and political problems which so far those who now rule India have been unable to solve. A flag-waving dispute is a convenient diversion.

India lives with a terrifying economic problem: how to feed her population and how to secure enough funds to carry out the modernization of her economy. "The basic problem is how to raise food production to the point where the country will be able to feed itself. . . . This problem has baffled Indian planners since independence and before. Although crop yields are improving slowly, they are still among the lowest per acre in the world. The country has been importing food grains at the rate of more than three million tons a year, and experts predict that the shortage will reach 28,000,000 tons annually by 1965 unless drastic measures are taken; experts estimate that it would cost in the neighborhood of one billion, five hundred million dollars (\$1,500,000,000) in capital outlay to raise India's food production to adequate levels during the next six years. . . . About a billion dollars of this total would have to be paid for with foreign exchange much of which India presumably would hope to obtain from the United States. The only alternatives are chronic food shortages, inflation, possible political unrest and increasing dependence on the United States and other countries. . . . The backwardness of India's rural hinter-

land is illustrated by the fact that in the whole of India there are 10,000,000 bullock carts and 400,000 automobiles." (*Steele, N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 12/8/59)

Reports the *New York Times* (1/28/59): "In the vital state of West Bengal there are perennial food shortages, massive unemployment, difficulties in resettling refugees from Pakistan and labor and student unrest. . . . To many observers, dissatisfaction with the present and blind hope for the future are bitter facts of life in Calcutta. The border dispute with China appears far from being settled, but Calcutta's economic ills seem even further from solution. The Government says it is doing its best. But a major question is whether it can move fast enough to block a growing demand for a change."

There are 3,160,000 Hindu refugees from East Pakistan; though many have been resettled in townships set up for them, hordes of others remain in temporary camps. At the Dealdah railroad station hundreds of refugees have existed for years in hovels of jute and boards erected in a waiting room and in the cobblestone courtyard outside; there is virtually no sanitation and the air is often choked with railroad soot. (*N. Y. Times*, 2/27/59) Dr. Herbert Stroup, Dean of Brooklyn College, who headed a team surveying refugee conditions in India, in an interview described these refugees as "probably the largest and most miserable population on the face of the earth"; he said many of the refugees lived in transit camps, theoretically temporary abodes, that have been in existence for thirteen years. Others have been settled in 563 colonies that vary in size from a few dozen families to more than a thousand. He said that once a refugee has been settled in a colony he technically loses his status as a refugee, but that unfortunately there is little to distinguish between the plight of the dwellers in the colonies and in the camps. All of them have lost their sense of confidence and are convinced "the gods as well as their fellow men have turned against them." (*N. Y. Times*, 2/5/60)

Another important problem is the job frustration of the educated. . . . Last year the University of Calcutta has a record enrollment of 125,000; many of the students are hoping for jobs in a government that could never employ even a small fraction of them, and the outlook for most youths is black. The result is that Cal-

cutta has a Communist organization that continues strong despite severe set-backs because of India's border dispute with China. The *New York Times* adds that there is great interest in the rest of the world; some feel however that this interest serves chiefly as a sort of sedative to help Calcutta live with itself.

Have not India's ruling conservatives, unable to solve their basic economic and social problems, used the border "issue" as a spice, a substitute for the real food that Indians need?

Nehru realizes that India's fundamental need is to get on with the modernization of her economy. To do this India needs as Mr. Nehru put it "blood, sweat and tears"; and, under her present leadership, also huge sums of help from outside nations, A. T. Steele, writing from India, said, "The need of India for American financial and economic aid is greater today than at any time since independence was attained in 1947." (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 12/9/59) The issue with China is now being used to stimulate both the Indian populace and American aid. Stressing the idea of China as "enemy" courts the favor of the United States Government and having an external "enemy" helps mobilize the Indian people, distracting and using their energies in the interest of the ruling class. Said Mr. Nehru, "Conceding obvious physical limitations on India's capacity to develop her economy, every big effort put in now helps us go ahead faster . . . when you add our present border troubles and the possible consequences it becomes all the more important. The vital element in planning is the popular reaction to bearing burdens—hard work." And Mr. Nehru went on to say that the reaction was likely to be greater when people "have a sense of dangers ahead which they have to face." (*N. Y. Times*, 12/4/59)

It may be noted, writes A. T. Steele (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 2/9/60) that "India's border troubles are bringing some benefits along with difficulties to this country. Certainly the frontier friction has made Western governments more sympathetic to India than they might otherwise have been and hence more disposed to extend economic assistance in satisfactorily large quantities. Another beneficial result of the border tension has been to stimulate India's production effort by providing a patriotic cause worth producing for; it is partly because of the Sino-Indian dispute that the Indian

Government has been able to justify higher targets than originally contemplated for the Third Five Year Plan."

It will take more than blowing up a really insignificant border issue which could have easily been settled by negotiations to solve the problems which now face India. Its current leaders know they have problems. The head of the Indian Commission on Economic and Commercial Affairs, speaking to the Overseas Press Club in Washington, said that India's present rate of economic progress was not enough to keep Indian society politically and socially stable. (*N. Y. Times*, 12/23/59) Krishnamachari, Chief Deputy Chairman of India's Planning Commission, told Senator Gore on his recent trip to India "Our population seems to be growing faster than our plans." Are these leaders capable to solving these problems?

INDIA'S CURRENT RULERS

Walter Lippman (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 12/11/59) points out that plans for the meeting of India's economic needs—the feeding of its people and the development of an independent Indian economy—are being made by the men of the generation of the founding fathers; but that these current leaders, the old guard, are not grooming their successors who must carry out the plans, nor are the old guard making known to the public who these successors are to be. Lippman writes, "I asked myself whether the gigantic economic revolution—the revolutionary change in the traditional way of life of the Indian masses in their villages—can be carried out by parliamentary politicians and civil servants without the dynamism and the discipline of an organized mass movement. . . . I would suppose it would require the organized pressures of a popular movement under government leadership so dynamic and so purposeful that it can inspire the people to do voluntarily the things done in Communist China"—"by compulsion," Mr. Lippman adds. (Be that as it may!)

The current ruling group in India is the Congress Party and the dominant elements in this party are the industrialists and feudal landowners. "A sizeable segment" of this party (*N. Y. Times*, 1/16/60) oppose Nehru's policy of neutralism; a real out-and-out

struggle with China might furnish them an opportunity to dilute if not end this neutralist policy which has kept India outside military alliances. These Indian rulers feel more at home with American investors than with the socialist world; their interests, as contrasted with the interests of the Indian people, would be bulwarked by formal alliance of their country with the West. Also, these ruling elements are faced with the steady growth of Communism. Necessary social change comes hard enough to reactionaries, but when that necessary change includes the possibility of being Communist frenzy mounts. Nehru's Congress Party crushed the peasant uprising in Telengana (in Andrah Pradesh) in 1949; they suppressed the Communist led government in the province of Kerala in 1959; they elected a staunch anti-Communist Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, as chairman of the Congress Party in January 1960; and they combined with opposition parties to defeat the Communists in the Kerala elections of February 1st 1960.

COMMUNISM IN INDIA

The Indian Communist Party is the strongest Communist Party in any of the non-Communist nations of Asia. Their presence and strength have already frightened the ruling elements of India. In 1945 the Congress Party purged itself of all Communists and since then this governing party has arbitrarily suppressed and negated popularly initiated Communist gains.

The conditions in India favor the growth of a Communist Party. The basic change needed in India—land reform—has yet to be implemented—but how could it be when the land reform program (to which the pre-liberation Congress Party was pledged) is from the top down and the “top” are the landowning-class officials? The meeting of the basic need—food—is also in the hands of the same landowning and industrial class who are depending, not on the Indian people's initiative, but on foreign aid—and aid specifically granted as an anti-Communist measure! And a government that can find no work for its hundreds of thousands of college graduates is only adding to the dissatisfactions that make people seek an alternative to what they now have.

The Communist Party has had political successes in India. In

1954 the Congress Party lost the control of a state government, Travancore-Cochin, to a leftist coalition of Communists and Socialists. In 1953 in a bitterly contested election campaign in the state of Andra the Congress Party had to rush in its national leaders, including Nehru, to save the situation with tactics that were widely criticised even by some Congress Party leaders. In 1954 a coalition including Communists won a landslide victory over a Congress backed candidate in the Sikh community of the East Punjab. In March 1957 the state of Kerala elected a Communist Government. In the 1958 by-election in Devinculorn, in Kerela State, a woman Communist candidate, won a majority of the votes. All these Communist successes have been negated—at least politically—by the Congress Party Government.

In the 1957 election the Communist Party won 60 of their 126 seats in the Assembly and having the support of the five non-party independents became the Government of the State of Kerala.

In June 1959 opposition parties (Congress Party, People's Socialist Party, the Muslim League) together with reactionary forces campaigned to overthrow this Communist Government of Kerala; these parties and forces were alarmed by the Communist Government program for land and educational reforms and the continuing evidence of popular electoral support of the Communist Party in Kerala. Success in these reforms, of benefit to the people, would have repercussions in other parts of India. On July 31st the Central Government took drastic action: President Prasad dismissed the Communist Government, ousting this popularly elected government and placed the administration of the state under a governor appointed by the President. The *Manchester Guardian*, (2/3/60), characterized this ouster as "a severe wound to the democratic Indian Constitution itself." According to the Constitution this centrally appointed governor's rule should last a maximum of six months. Accordingly, on February 1st 1960, elections were held; the main contestants were the Triple Alliance (the three opposition parties) supported by the Catholic Church and the Communist Party supported by non-party independents.


Even Nehru traveled to Kerala to campaign for the Triple Alliance. What was the result? The three party coalition (Triple Alliance) won 94 of the 126 votes and the Communists and the

independents they supported won 29 seats; broken down the votes were as follows: Congress Party, 63; Communist Party, 27; Praja Socialists, 20; Muslims, 11; Independents supported by Communist Party, 2; and splinter parties 3. The total vote was almost 7,000,000 —over a million more voters than in 1957; the Communist vote was 2,890,000 which was 700,000 more than they received in 1957. In 1957 the Communist Party and the independents it supported received 40% of the total vote; in 1960 this same coalition received 42.5% of the total vote. "It would seem that those in Kerala who voted for the Communist Party in 1957 have lost none of their enthusiasm," wrote the *New York Times*, (2/4/60). "Despite the resounding rebuff (?—Ed.) suffered by the Communists in the Kerala elections, their hard-core strength remains formidable. . . . Indications are that the Communist vote will prove substantially larger both quantitatively and percentage wise than in previous elections. . . . The fact that the Communists have been able to increase their voting strength in the face of the Sino-Indian tension, the anti-Communist agitation of last summer, and the dissolution of their regime by Presidential decree is a disturbing thought to the triumphant alliance of non-Communist Parties," writes the *New York Herald Tribune*, (2/4/60).

The *New York Times*, (2/4/60): "The Communist Party is also strong in West Bengal and there is a possibility that the Kerala story may be played out again there in 1962."

Editorially the *New York Times* says, "There is little reason for jubilance. In the popular vote the Communist show an absolute gain." The *New York Herald Tribune* editorial, (2/4/60), wrote: "The results of the Kerala election must be interpreted as a serious defeat." Earlier, (12/28/59), the *Times* had written, "A lot of life remains in the Communist Party here in Calcutta. The Communists are sharply criticized for their fuzzy wavering on the border issue . . . but their economic doctrine continues to have strong appeal. In the capital at New Dehli one gets the impression that the Communist Party is nearly dead: in November when the Party's National Council met at Meerut, near New Dehli, public functions were abruptly cancelled because of mass anti-Communism; in Calcutta, however, the Party can still draw ten thousand staunch supporters to a public meeting in the Maidan,

SKETCH MAP: SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION



a huge public park in the center of town. There at Maidan Communist leaders spoke from a pedestal of the 165 foot pillar built in memory of Sir David Ochterlony, a British governor. They exhorted a cheering audience to campaign for a peaceful settlement of the border dispute and continued Indian-Chinese friendship. Students wearing large hammer-and-sickle buttons patrolled the fringes of the crowd. Book sellers offered the writings of the Mao Tze-tung and Lenin . . ." At this gathering two youths who exploded two large fire-crackers were pursued by fifty Communist youths who pummeled and kicked them until the police arrived and arrested the two. One of the Communist youths who a few minutes before had been kicking and punching the captured couple identified himself as a college student and said he did not know what he would do after graduation, but he voiced confidence that the Communists would make it a better world for him.

On December 1st, in Assam State, the Communist candidate Phani Bora won a seat in the state legislature, polling more votes than his total opposition; this was the first by-election for a state legislature since the beginning of the Sino-Indian border dispute.
(*N. Y. Times*, 12/1/59)

COMMUNISM ABROAD ALSO SPEAKS TO THE INDIAN PEOPLE

It is not only the Communist movement within India, politically active, that challenges the role of the current ruling elements and offers an alternative to their failure to meet the needs of the people; Indian rulers are faced not only with the economic ills of their country, and the base there ills furnish to the Communist appeal to the people, but they are under equally great pressure to compete with Communist China's social and industrial achievements.

China, after decades of internal (war-lord) wars, world war and civil war—with fifty million people uprooted during the forties—today has no refugee conditions nor population: all her people are engaged in the constructive work of building and modernizing their country and all are enjoying an already enhanced standard of living. In China hundreds of thousands of students graduate from colleges, universities and technical schools every year—and yet are too few

to meet the demands of the growing economy. These are facts pressuring the harassed reactionaries of India.

Nehru, on December 22nd 1959 called for a rapid increase in India's industrial potential so that India could negotiate from strength for a solution of her border quarrel with China.

U. S. Congressman Hale Boggs of Louisiana, after a visit to India, said: "The impact in India of Communist propaganda is so big because the Communists are doing a tremendous job there. For instance, the people are flooded with slick propaganda not only from Russia and Red China but from each of the satellite countries. It is very clever stuff—it is all about how these nations have made the 'great leap forward.'" But, is this just wordy "propaganda"? Is not the "great leap forward" a fact? A fact increasingly impressive to the people of India who, still living in miserable conditions, have a government that still must look to the outside, exploiting, capitalist world for economic viability? There have been over ten years of independence and still "the need of India for American financial and economic assistance is greater today than at any time since independence was attained in 1947." The *New York Times*, (12/8/59), reported that the major preoccupation at a conference in Hongkong of U.S. aid officials in Asia was "the growing economic potential of China. . . . Conference sources expressed the view today that China's economic power had replaced the threat of aggression and political subversion as the chief problem in U.S. relations with most countries of south and southwest Asia. 'Even if you eliminate exaggeration in China's production claims,' said one official, 'you must still accept the possibility that Communist China is going to have big productive capacity in ten to fifteen years. This will mean greater influence in other Asian countries, not only through the Chinese example of one way to achieve economic growth, but also through trade and technical channels.' The *Times* account went on, "Ways of using aid to help Asian countries deal with prospective Chinese Communist economic power are an important part of the conference which brought together directors of aid programs in eleven countries." A U.S. Senate resolution passed in September 1959 asked the President to explore with other friendly democratic nations "the feasibility of establishing an international mission" to consult with the free countries of South Asia on their long range economic

requirements. Wrote the *New York Herald Tribune*, (12/11/59), about this resolution: "At its core is the fear that Communist China will advance more rapidly than democratic India in economic development. China might thereby become the example for all the underdeveloped countries of South Asia, with possibly drastic repercussions both in India and on the world balance of power." Walter Lippmann (2/18/60) put it bluntly: "The 4.1 billion dollars . . . for foreign aid . . . programs have a common purpose. It is to prevent the expansion of Communism. . . . The Soviet Union has developed a high rate of economic growth which acts as a very powerful example and magnet in the underdeveloped countries. . . . The threat and possibility of overt military aggression by the S.U. has declined almost to the vanishing point. . . . In the underdeveloped countries it is armies that make and unmake governments. . . . What is described as military aid and defense support in our appropriations is in a very considerable degree a subsidy to keep the army on the side of government. . . . Economic aid is not to be scattered about but it is to be focused and directed upon key countries, particularly India, Pakistan and Taiwan."

On February 3rd it was announced that Washington had decided to increase aid to India by at least 50%, and probably more. A *New York Times* editorial (2/7/60) said, "It has become an axiom in international politics that . . . the fate of democracy in Asia will be determined by the outcome of the economic development race now under way between democratic India and Communist China. . . . It is in recognition of this fact that the Administration has decided to increase our economic aid to India . . . from between \$150 million and \$170 million a year to \$250 million and even \$300 million. In addition President Eisenhower proposes to ask Congress to endorse the Indus River development project worked out by the World Bank." In an editorial on "The Indus River Project" on March 3rd the *New York Times* says this is "A billion dollar enterprise that would . . . help India and Pakistan . . . in the face of the Communist menace." "India, the test of democracy in Asia" is the reiterated slogan of the American interests who urged aid to and investments in India. This only sloganizes the fact that Communist appeal is a pressing problem for India's rulers.

China's economic progress is a major element in the friction

between the Governments of India and China. One can easily see why the ruling elements in India feel a hostility toward China. The "issue" of an inaccessible border line fades into insignificance along side the internal problems caused by China's demonstration of what a people, newly independent and modern, can do for themselves. Of course it is not the actual economic strength of China—already established industrial nations have greater strength—but the fact that China, ten years ago poorer and weaker than India, has shown a new path to national advance. This is not lost on India's populace. And what a convenient issue in the border quarrel to hasten and increase anti-China Washington's assistance just at this terrifying stage in India's economic planning! How neatly the anti-Communist Washington and the anti-Communist element in New Dehli meet over this border quarrel!

Of course it is ironic that in spite of all the eager assistance of the West in maintaining India as a non-Communist country, India has had to call on and/or accept the aid of a socialist power, the USSR. Three steel plants have been built for the Indian Government by outside interests. There is a British built plant at Durgapur in West Bengal, a West German-built plant at Rourkela in the State of Orissa, and a Soviet-built plant at Bhilai in the State of Madhya-Pradesh. Each is to produce one million tons of steel ingots annually. The costs of these plants are, respectively, British, \$289,000,000, German, \$357,000,000, and Soviet Union, \$275,000,000. All have gone into partial production but the Bhilai (SU) plant began producing finished steel in November 1959. A. T. Steele commented (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 12/30/59): "As it looks now, the Bhilai plant will be fully operating with all its ancillary enterprises by the end of 1960. . . . Some Americans connected with the United States aid program in India believe the program would carry more impact if it included a few projects of the spectacular type. They point to the Soviet success in making propaganda capital of the Bhilai plant, which has come to symbolize the Soviet aid program in many Indian minds. The Russians have been helped by the fact that the Bhilai project has gone ahead more smoothly than the West German and British efforts at Rourkela and Durgapur. . . . It is no secret the Indian Government would like to obtain American cooperation in financing and

erecting a new steel plant of large capacity and there have even been some tentative but inconclusive conversation on the subject."

In February 1960, a few months after Mr. Eisenhower's copiously reported visit to India, Mr. Khrushchev visited India; American newspapers compared the visit in terms of the crowds that turned out to greet each of these leaders. But far more significant, in fact and in the eyes of the Indian populace, is the comparison in terms of the concrete results. On February 12th, India and the Soviet-Union signed an agreement whereby the SU built Bhilai steel plant, is to be expanded so that it can produce 2,500,000 tons a year, an increase of 1,500,000; the agreement also includes expansion of a heavy machinery plant at Ranchi in the State of Bihar; a mining machine plant at Durgapur in West Bengal; completion of an oil refinery at Barauni, Bihar; the manufacture of electrical equipment and precision instruments; exploration, development and production of oil and gas, expansion of a power plant in Madras and a thermal power station in Madhya Pradesh and another one at Singrauli, Utter Pradesh; also, it was reliably reported, Indian officials announced on March 7 that India has accepted a Soviet Union offer to build a nuclear power station.

So, within India itself, at the essential centers of an industrial economy, the Indian people have a going demonstration of socialist capacity, socialist lower costs, socialist results—aid to the Indian people, not to American investors.

WILL THERE BE WAR OVER THE BORDER QUESTION?

Although American headlines played up the possibility of armed conflict between India and China developments in these two countries gave little basis for war between them. China and India continued to trade. An Associated Press report (12/30/59) dispatch said that although the trade agreement between India and China signed October 14th 1954 expires on December 31st 1959, "the failure to renew the pact will not result in any stoppage of Indian trade with China in the new year." The trade in the first nine months of 1959 amounted to \$17,829,000; India

sent to China tobacco, raw cotton, shellac, sandalwood, oil and jute products and bought Chinese newsprint, chemicals, steel, cassia and raw silk. A nation that exports chemicals and steel certainly does not consider that customer a potential enemy!

And while the border dispute was filling the press China was a major participant in the great World Agricultural Fair held in New Dehli during December 1959-January 1960; the Chinese exhibit was visited daily by tens of thousands of visitors (900,000 up to January 11th). India's vice-president, Radakrishnan, visiting the Chinese pavilion, expressed his interest in seeing every part of the pavilion, made inquiries about Chinese rice and corn production, her farming implements and irrigation projects and was much interested in the development of the Chinese people's communes. K. C. Reddy, Indian Minister of Works, Housing and Supply, along with the Minister of State to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Mr. N. Kanugo and a group of members of Parliament also visited the Chinese exhibit, and expressed high appreciation of China's agricultural achievements and the hope for an exchange of experiences in agricultural production. The populace of India was not anti-Chinese; most of the anti-Chinese demonstrations reported in the American press were initiated by opposition parties, using the border quarrel as a political weapon against the ruling Congress Party.

India continues to press for China's admission to the United Nations. On January 17th, Krhrisna Menon said that India's continuing plea for this admission is just.

The meeting of the Indian Congress Party at its annual Conference in January 1960, revealed how far from war was both the popular sentiment and the considered attitude of the officials. Nehru, leader of the Congress Party, forcefully maintained his neutralist policy; on January 15th, his "wrath exploded" when he "angrily rejected any suggestion that India's policy of no-military-alliances be changed. 'Whatever the consequences, we will not have foreign armies on our soil.' " (*N. Y. Times*, 1/16/60) Attacking the Southern Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (formerly the Bagdad Pact), he asserted, "I have not seen anywhere where they strengthened the member countries; they got arms, but arms do not always strengthen, and

they could have got them in other ways too." He went on to say that the spread of military alliances to Asia had not added to any one's security but had hampered economic progress. "To be realistic, no country in the wide world can help us at the frontier." He defended at length his policy of non-alignment with power blocs. He said the new countries of Asia and Africa rejected the idea of "being told what to do and what not to do. The future of the world will not be decided by one or two great power blocs."

The *New York Times* on January 10th, reported that at this current annual session of the Congress Party, it was expected that a major matter for discussion would be India's border dispute with China. But the Convention revealed the apathy of the populace. "Arrangements had been made for a turnout of 100,000, but barely 5,000 appeared. Some persons appeared disappointed that a firm stand had not been taken to oust the Chinese Communist troops from India's Northeast Frontier Agency and Ladak." (*N. Y. Times*, 1/18/60)

In the sessions of the Convention "a sizeable segment of the Congress Party members who favor military alliances, particularly with the United States, declined to speak out for fear of incurring Mr. Nehru's wrath"—the wrath that did explode on the 15th. Krishna Menon, Minister of Defense, insisted that if India had been aligned with a power bloc when China attacked her northern border, other countries would have been drawn in. "No greater catastrophe could have resulted," he said; "the day we become part of a military bloc is the end of our independence."

Convention action did not reveal any attempt to foment enmity toward China. "The discussion of a resolution on the peaceful settlement of disputes, which included a warning of peril along the frontier with Communist China, had been expected to be a high point of the Convention; although some speeches were fiery they appeared anti-climactic after Mr. Nehru's outburst against military pacts." (*N. Y. Times*, 1/16/60). "While there was talk about the peaceful settlement of disputes and the building of Indian strength to resist further aggression, the Party leaders avoided the subject of possible action against the Chinese aggression of last year." (*N. Y. Times*, 1/17/60)

On the eve of Mr. Eisenhower's visit, Mr. Nehru speaking

in the Indian Parliament Upper House, set the tone against military blocs, military assistance, and a military solution of the border dispute with China. He reiterated his belief in a policy of non-alignment, saying that this policy is meeting with a large measure of success in important capitals today. "Broadly speaking, the world is moving toward an attempt to put an end to the cold-war and even to those military blocs ultimately." He specifically regretted that in the present world context, India should be confronted with a situation that threatened military conflict and war. He said that the border crisis is long-term, not short-term, because India and China are neighbors bordering on each other for thousands of miles. "We have to think in long-distance terms; our stress is on peace and will continue to be on peace; and India will continue to be friendly with all countries, including China." He said India cannot forget the basic requirements for defense: "to strengthen India for defense—a major effort is needed, not just for enrolling people for the farms, but in building up the technological and industrial development of the country." Rejecting proposals that India use armed force to remove Chinese troops from the border he told the Parliament that such a move would lead to war with China and in that case it would become "an indefinite war—we will not give in and China will never give in and throughout our lives we will be warring. As far as my Government is concerned we will negotiate and negotiate and negotiate to the bitter end."

Mr. Nehru kept emphasizing, before and during Mr. Eisenhower's visit, that Mr. Eisenhower was "a messenger of peace." "Tomorrow we will be welcoming President Eisenhower, a great leader of a great nation. Fundamentally our welcome is because he is a messenger of peace in the world today. The heart of our country which is for peace goes out to him." There were pressures on Nehru to use the Eisenhower visit to seek military aid. Members of the Congress Party called on him to accept foreign aid in case of an attack from China; but he steadfastly rejected this policy. American correspondents in India at the time of the visit promoted this idea directly with Mr. Nehru; in a broadcast interview, later shown in the United States, Mr. Nehru was asked, "Will you accept American mediation in your dispute with China?"

Mr. Nehru replied, "This is an issue China and India will settle themselves." Asked if he would accept American military aid to fight China, Mr. Nehru replied, that "We are not going to fight China." Asked, if India did get into a war with China would she seek military equipment and aid from the United States, Mr. Nehru replied that in case of war, India would secure arms wherever she could. In an interview with four American correspondents on December 19th, the Prime Minister said he was not sure that the Chinese were deliberately trying to put pressure on India as an end in itself; that he noted the affected border had been in dispute for some time and that recent developments might have simply spurred the Communists' intention to lay claim to them. Nehru said he thought there was a desire among the Chinese to negotiate the issue on peaceful terms. "I must accept Mr. Chou En-lai's word; he says he wants to do so and he has offered to meet me." Nehru went on to say that he thought Peking's policies in the border argument were traditional and historical, more Chinese than Communist. (*N. Y. Times*, 12/21/59)

WHY HAVE MR. NEHRU AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT PULLED AWAY FROM WAR WITH CHINA?

Both Mr. Nehru and Mr. Eisenhower—but in differing degree—have each taken a stand for peace; both are the leaders of a political party and each is a representative of a national government that does not carry out domestic policies that furnish a basis for peaceful international relationships. Both governments in their domestic policies give weight (India less than the U.S.) to the pro-capitalist sector of the world; and both are forced by worldwide developments into accepting increasing coexistence with the socialist sector of the world. War for Mr. Nehru and for Mr. Eisenhower and for their nations would be disastrous.

India has special reasons for avoiding war. Mr. Nehru knows that the border issue will not be settled by military conflict with China. For one thing—as Walter Lippman pointed out (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, 12/10/59), "The Indian economy is so desperately deficit that if it had to shoulder the burden of a big mobilization

and an arms program the burden would be crushing and the consequence might be catastrophic. I use the word catastrophic advisedly; the Indian standard of life is almost unsupportedly low and if it does not become better but worse no one can be sure that the Central Government can maintain the unity of India against its variety of languages and races and of local nationalisms and against the deep historical tendencies toward separateness. What threatens India if internal development fails is not a general lapse into communism. It is the break up into separate states, some of which would no doubt be communist, others would be right-wing Hindu and no one knows what else."

Paul Grimes writes in the *New York Times* (12/25/59) of the laborers on tea estates, in orange groves and on vegetable farms —how "Communist propaganda exploits the dissatisfactions between the hill people and the people of the plains who exploit them." "Many hill people who are largely of Nepalese stock, contend that Calcutta, the state capital of Bengal, has neglected their welfare. They feel that the hill people do not hold a just share of the Government jobs. . . . Many people doubt that the dissatisfaction of the hill people can be ended unless economic conditions improve. That could take a long time . . ." He points out that if conflict did break out in the Chumbi valley the hill people would have little will to resist the Chinese; he says observers "fear disorder unless the Indian army is prepared to deal firmly with any attack." The *New York Times*, in an editorial (12/26/59), admits the weakening conditions within—"the hostility between different linguistic and religious groups within India's variegated population . . . the economic distress and discontent which exist among the poorest groups of India's population . . . a military adventure that could so demoralize and disintegrate Indian political life that the Indian part of the sub-continent would vanish as an integrated nation and be replaced by a Balkanized congeries of small squabbling states. . . ."

"WHAT IS MR. NEHRU'S ROLE?"

What is Mr. Nehru's role? While rejoicing in his reiterated

rejection of military alliances it puzzles many people that for months Nehru had steadily evaded the negotiations which China has offered. He insists the issue must be settled by negotiations, but rejected, even with bellicose statements, concrete opportunities to talk the issue over with China. What role does he play today? Does his current stand on the border issue throw light on his true role? Is he being forced to line up India with the United States—being forced by the pressures from India's still ruling and anti-Communist elements who feel their kinship with the capitalist world? Is he playing for time as he talks socialism and accepts aid from both sides—the United States and its western allies and the Soviet Union? Is he a frustrated leader, worn out by the unsuccessful attempt of India to solve its basic economic and social problems? His pre-liberation martyr role under the British, his post-liberation status as a world figure, and his eloquent insistence as a national leader that India is to take the socialist road have made him the beloved leader of the Indian people, a leadership bulwarked by his role as Ghandi's disciple; but in today's India and in today's world is Nehru the man who will lead the Indian people to solve their problems and build the India they want?


The question of Nehru's role goes deeper than the issue with China. He may well negotiate and he and China may well settle this relatively minor border dispute. But what role will Nehru play in the direction that his country takes in the oncoming years?—capitulation to the anti-popular forces? or true leader of and participant with the people in the struggle for a genuinely independent and prosperous India?

China and Indonesia

Indonesia is another newly independent Asian nation with which China is in the process of working out a problem inherited from colonial days. This is not a border dispute, but a problem whose genesis occurred centuries ago. Fifteen hundred years ago there were Chinese in Indonesia but the major migration began when in the 17th century the Dutch imported Chinese laborers into their colonial Indonesia. Just as they had when imported into the United States in the late 19th century, thousands of imported Chinese laborers remained in Indonesia to become permanent residents; some of their descendants became citizens in the course of the years; most retained their status as Chinese; almost all, whether citizens or not, looked to China as "home," a home only a few have ever visited.

These early laborers and their descendants contributed much to the economic build-up of Indonesia, living in friendly relations with the Indonesians over the centuries. Indonesia occupies first place in the world in the production of pepper; it was the Chinese who helped boost the pepper crop by introducing the method of allowing the pepper vine to twine around the pole, making close planting possible; this method increased the plants per hectare from 1,200 to 2,500. Chinese introduced tea planting into Indonesia, and today Indonesia ranks fourth as a tea-producing country. The Java sugar industry was introduced by the Chinese; they began to build sugar mills in the 17th century, using Chinese refining mills and water power to turn the mills. It was a Chinese, Pan Min Ngam, who opened a canal for transporting firewood from the suburbs into the city of Jakarta (formerly Batavia) now the capital. A distillery using syrup as raw material was also developed by Chinese in Djakarta. The fishing area in Bagan Siapi-api, one of the biggest in the world, was first developed by

WHERE THE OVERSEAS CHINESE ARE CONCENTRATED



Chinese who also developed the saw milling and charcoal industries in Riau.

When the Dutch came two-thirds of the Indonesian people were concentrated on the island of Java while the other islands including Sumatra, Celebes and West Borneo, rich in minerals and forests were sparsely populated. Dutch colonizers induced Chinese from China's coastal provinces to go to work on these outlying islands, clearing the land for plantations. The Chinese workers in Indonesia shared with the Indonesian people the hardships and difficulties of Dutch colonial rule; though some have become capitalists like some native Indonesians, all have been sharers in the economic life of the country; to now try to present these Chinese as "enemy" is sheer misrepresentation fostered by interested foreign elements and local reactionaries.

Since 1949 the Indonesian people have been completely free of colonial rule (Dutch to 1942, Japanese to 1945, fighting the Dutch 1945-1949). Since then they have been going through the process of establishing themselves as an independent and modern nation. From 1952 to 1958 the economy was badly disrupted by revolts led by dissident groups dissatisfied with the government's fiscal policy, with their political representation and with Communist influence in the government. And 1959 was a year of economic upheaval, the worst since Indonesia won independence. There was widespread deterioration and rampant pessimism; government measures had caused disastrous inflation and undermined confidence in the money unit, the rupiah; industrial output dropped, import of raw material was cut back, foreign private investment was frightened away; and there was a budget deficit of 22,000,000,000 rupiahs (about \$491,000,000) out of a total expenditure of 46,000,000,000 rupiahs. In August the government took drastic steps to meet this upheaval; it devaluated the rupiah, it froze large bank accounts, it reduced the amount of money in circulation, it abolished the export certificate system, it imposed a tax on imports and on export proceeds. Earlier, in July 1959, it had passed a decree, to go into effect on January 1st 1960, paving the way for Indonesian cooperatives to take over the rural retail trade; this too was a part of the effort to stabilize and strengthen Indonesia's economy. This July decree hit the Chinese in In-

donesia very hard, for most of the rural retail trade was in their hands. But the Government of the People's Republic of China in Peking made no protest against this decree—it was an internal affair of the Indonesian Government.

In October 1959 Indonesia's Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio was in Peking and a Joint Communiqué was signed on October 11th by the foreign ministers of the two countries. Only one of the eight paragraphs of the Communiqué touched on the subject of Chinese nationals living in Indonesia and their relation to Indonesia's economy:

"Both the Foreign Ministers take cognizance of the fact that in the process towards economic development and stability in Indonesia, the economic position of the Chinese nationals residing there may be affected in some way. Both the Foreign Ministers consider that an appropriate way should be sought for the solution of this question so that it will be in the interest of the economic development of Indonesia and that the proper rights and interests of the Chinese nationals will be respected. Both the Foreign Ministers agree that the economic resources of the Chinese nationals will play a useful role in the economic development of Indonesia."

Thus, there was no question raised on the part of the Chinese authorities of the right of the Indonesian Government to initiate economic measures they deemed necessary for the stabilization of the Indonesian economy; there was recognition that Chinese nationals in Indonesia would be affected, but assumptions by both governments that the rights and interests of the resident Chinese would be respected, and that the Chinese resources in Indonesia would be used to further Indonesian economy.

Dr. Subandrio on his return to Djakarta from Peking said that China was making efforts to approach existing problems in a friendly and peaceful way, and that he had reached a basic understanding with the Chinese Communist leaders, but that there were still "practical difficulties," one of which was the decree coming into effect on January 1st banning alien traders from doing business in Indonesia's rural areas. Why then did friction arise over the question of Chinese national's in Indonesia?

WHY DID FRICTION ARISE?

Friction did not arise over the decree, but over the method of carrying it out. As the January 1st date approached the Indonesian Government pushed ahead with the implementation of the July 1959 decree (banning small and retail activities of an alien nature in rural areas outside the capitals of autonomous districts of first and second rank and residencies). This ban affected 300,000 Chinese who dominate Indonesia's rural economy. On November 16th the Chinese Embassy in Djarka issued a bulletin implying that the Indonesian authorities were pressing an anti-Chinese movement and charging that Chinese had been beaten in West Java and protesting anti-Chinese articles in some of the Indonesian newspapers. Chinese Embassy officials who went to West Java to advise Chinese nationals on the implementation of the decree were accused of meddling in Indonesia's internal affairs; and on November 18th, all of China's diplomats were temporarily banned from visiting West Java and all embassy personnel except the Ambassador and his counsellor were forbidden to leave Djakarta. There was official Indonesian accusation that "Chinese Embassy officials were ranging over the West Java hinterlands advising aliens to ignore the ban." But an official Indonesian statement quoted the Chinese Embassy personnel as telling a group in West Java, "If the fundamental human rights and personal property of the overseas Chinese are confiscated, then the Chinese Government will protect the Chinese with all its power. So in this regard it is expected that the overseas Chinese should not feel disturbed and should remain in their respective places, because the Chinese Government will try to solve the problem with the Indonesian Government in a friendly way." (*N. Y. Times*, 11/19/59) Rather than opposing the Indonesian Government's right to pass the decree and rather than interfering in Indonesian internal affairs this would indicate that the Chinese were both carrying out a policy of attempting to meet the situation by friendly negotiation and at the same time acting to protect the rights of its citizens in Indonesia.

As Dr. Subrandio had said on his return from China, "there are still practical difficulties," and one was the question of evacuat-

ing retail traders from rural areas. This evacuation measure had not been included in the decree of July 1959; it was a supplementary regulation issued on November 19th, empowering regional and local military officials to order aliens out of rural areas on the basis of local security conditions and at their own discretion; the West Java Commander, whose province had been plagued for a decade by armed insurgent activity (Indonesian, not Chinese) had ordered all aliens out. In November, Chinese in West Java, were being evacuated to designated cities; 165 had been arrested for defying the order to move; some had been beaten.

On December 9th 1959, China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi took official notice of the developing situation in Indonesia. He charged that certain forces in Indonesia were making use of the decree to sabotage the friendship between China and Indonesia, that in forcing evacuation they were going beyond the decree thereby impairing the rights of the Chinese and infringing on their personal safety; that great numbers had lost their means of livelihood and had become homeless; that in the process of compulsory evacuation force had been resorted to, causing bloodshed. He also charged that certain Indonesian newspapers were carrying statements hostile to China. He then proposed "in order to safeguard the friendly relations between our two countries and to leave no room for the forces hostile to the friendship between our two countries" that "the two countries should immediately adopt measures to bring about an overall settlement of the overseas Chinese question. His proposals were:

"1. The Chinese Government has always considered that it is unreasonable for the overseas Chinese to hold dual nationality. Many overseas Chinese have lived in Indonesia for generations, they have merged with the Indonesian people in social and economic life. The Chinese Government would like to see these overseas Chinese choose Indonesian nationality in accordance with their own will. Once they have acquired Indonesian nationality, they will naturally pay allegiance to Indonesia, and at the same time be automatically entitled to the civil rights of Indonesia without any discrimination. The adoption of the nationality of the country of residence by

overseas Chinese is in the interests both of themselves and of the country of residence. Therefore, the Chinese Government has always hoped that the Treaty Concerning the Question of Dual Nationality concluded between our two countries can come into force and be implemented at an early date. As far back as December 30, 1957, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China already decided to ratify this Treaty. The Chinese Government now proposes that the Governments of the two countries immediately exchange the instruments of ratification of the "Treaty Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Question of Dual Nationality," and at the same time appoint delegates to form the joint committee in accordance with the notes exchanged between the two Prime Ministers on June 3, 1955, to discuss and lay down the methods of implementing this Treaty.

"2. Among the overseas Chinese residing in Indonesia, there will be some who want, of their own will, to retain Chinese nationality, and others whose choice of Indonesian nationality is not approved. The Chinese Government hopes that the Indonesian Government will, in accordance with Article 11 of the Treaty on the Question of Dual Nationality concluded between the two countries and the Joint Communique of the two Foreign Ministers, truly protect the proper rights and interests of these overseas Chinese, and check any discrimination against and persecution of them. The Chinese Government will continue to encourage these overseas Chinese to respect the laws and decrees of the Indonesian Government, to refrain from participating in local political activities, to contribute energetically to the economic and cultural development of Indonesia, and to live amicably with the Indonesian people. The Chinese Government, of course, hopes that the laws and decrees of the Indonesian Government will be impartial to all foreign nationals without discriminating against those of a friendly country or even being used as tools to persecute the overseas Chinese.

"3. Regarding those overseas Chinese who have become

homeless and lost their means of livelihood, or who do not wish to remain in Indonesia, the Chinese Government is prepared, in accordance with their desire to return to China, to make arrangements for their livelihood in China and provide them with opportunity to take part in the socialist construction of their motherland. The Chinese Government hopes that the Indonesian Government, in sending these overseas Chinese back to China, will also respect their own will without resorting to measures of compulsion, allow them to sell their properties and bring back the money they have acquired, and ensure their safety on their way home. In order to facilitate an orderly resettlement of these returned overseas Chinese by the Chinese Government, it is also hoped that the Indonesian Government will adopt measures to send them back to China by stages and in groups.

"The above proposals clearly show that the Chinese Government is willing to achieve a thorough settlement of the overseas Chinese question existing between our two countries and to do its best to prevent friendly relations between our two countries from being undermined. The Chinese Government proposes that the two governments immediately appoint representatives to hold consultations on the above proposals of the Chinese Government and any proposals the Indonesian Government may put forward for the same purpose."

That the Chinese Foreign Office had a basis in fact for its concern was documented in a report appearing early in January 1960 when twenty local and foreign correspondents accompanied Dr. Subrandio on a government-sponsored tour of West Java; the foreign correspondents "though not free to choose the place to visit were completely free to ask questions. The replies that emerged added up to a bitter indictment of Indonesia. The authorities were accused by these aliens of badly mistreating them, of evacuating them from their villages at rifle point, of failing to provide sufficient food, of forcing them to live in crowded quarters and of wholesale lack of official interest in their fate. The most glaring example that the reporters saw of cramped

housing was in Sukabui where seven Chinese families totalling fifty-one persons were jammed in a one family house. Dr. Subrandio promptly instructed the local military to make two additional houses available for the evacuees. All the charges by the aliens were denied by the Indonesian authorities. Officials conceded that 'a few excesses' had taken place but blamed the aliens for provoking them by refusing to obey instructions. 'We have no hope any more in Indonesia,' said Tan Hong Chen, one of the Chinese aliens. 'There is no future here for us. And we have no money left.' Mr. Tan, a baker, about fifty years old said he had been living in Indonesia for about thirty-six years. His village was Chitarum, but when the ban went into effect he, his wife and their eight children had been relocated in a small room in the city of Bogor. His Chitarum shop, worth about 50,000 rupiahs (about \$1,100) had been shut down by the authorities and has not yet been sold, Mr. Tan said. (*Kalb, N. Y. Times*, 1/28/60). Earlier (1/7/60) the *New York Times* had reported "Tens of thousands of Chinese residents in Indonesia have lost their homes and former means of livelihood as a result of the Indonesian action."

The *Manchester Guardian* (2/28/59) wrote: "No self-respecting government could be expected to stand quietly by while its nationals were treated as the Indonesians propose to treat the Chinese trading among them. The Indonesian Government denies that its measures are racial, and says they apply to all foreigners. But the language used is sadly reminiscent of the language used to stir up racial prejudice. Some of the charges made against the overseas Chinese may be true, and the Indonesian authorities could no doubt claim that popular feeling is running strongly against them. But this is all the more reason why it should not be given the slightest encouragement by the government."

On December 24th, 1959 the Chinese Foreign Minister sent another note to the Indonesian Foreign Minister. He pointed out that "The overwhelming majority of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia are working people. For generations they have lived amicably with the Indonesian people and played their part in the economic development of Indonesia; they differ fundamentally from colonialists backed by gunboats and intent on oppressing and plundering another country." He admitted, "It is true a very small number

among the overseas Chinese do not behave well, but it would be unfair, merely on account of this, to describe the entire overseas Chinese community as a monopoly group." He also granted that "How to adjust the economic position of the overseas Chinese in the course of the development of Indonesia's national economy is a complicated question." He hinted that the current situation was being used: "Unfortunately the regulation on the prohibition of alien small and retail trade in rural areas has been utilized to make a concentrated attack on overseas Chinese . . . at present the imperialists are taking advantage of the situation to sabotage relations between our two countries and divert the people of the Asian countries from the goals of their struggles."

A letter to the editor in the *New York Times* (12/26/59) points out that of course there has existed some anti-Chinese feeling in Indonesia, "not primarily political or racial, but economic; the Chinese are the largest and most successful merchants within Indonesia upon whom the rural Indonesian majority has depended for the sale of produce and for agricultural credit. The impact of inflation, population pressure and economic disorder impinges visibly on the farmer in the guise of unfavorable prices which it is the misfortune of the Chinese merchant to have to quote. Tension follows. The Chinese have not caused the economic deterioration of the country." Americans are not unfamiliar with hostility toward certain minority groups, hostility based on their economic status; we too have had our anti-Chinese days, our anti-Japanese days, our anti-Mexican days. In Indonesia this hostility has been intensified by the failure of the Government's attempt to provide lower cost trading and credit alternatives for their farmers. "Indeed, the present 'need' to remove the Chinese merchants by law is testimony to the failure of the Government's efforts to compete with the Chinese" to quote from the above letter.

The Chinese Foreign Minister, in his note of December 9th, charged that certain newspapers in Indonesia were carrying statements hostile to China. A member of the Indonesian Parliament reported to the Indonesian Government that he had received reports that many important Indonesian figures had recently received copies of four newspapers to which, in fact, they were not subscribers, and that investigation showed that copies of these papers

were sent them by the Information Service of the United States Embassy in Djakarta. This member of Parliament then raised the following questions with the government: "whether or not the Information Service of the United States Embassy was subsidizing certain papers through large subscriptions? Whether their action meant that foreign forces were interfering in the reports of certain papers? Whether it could be believed that as a result of such subsidy these papers had recently been very active in attempting to change the active and independent foreign policy of Indonesia and in undermining friendly relations among Asian and African countries?"

Of course there are internal elements in Indonesia that are terrified over the growth of Communism in Asia; and they see in overseas Chinese resident in their land a potential fifth column in that many of the Chinese do claim allegiance to the Peking Government and some do display Communist propaganda and placards in their homes. However, "It would be misleading to say all of Indonesia's 2,500,000 Chinese are pro-Peking but a large number are" (*N. Y. Times*, 1/29/60). "Some Indonesian officials say privately that the unspoken political motivation behind Djakarta's current ban on aliens engaging in retail trade in the rural areas is this allegiance to mainland China."

The current dispute over the treatment of the Chinese caught in this vast economic upheaval offers opportunity to these terrified Indonesian reactionaries to create a problem for Communist China, a problem of a possible break in relations between the two countries and to further discredit and fear of China among the other Asian neutralist nations. At the same time, their taking advantage of this dispute to further their own antagonism to what China represents serves to cement their ties with outside anti-China elements and secure capitalist backing for their own position in Indonesia. It might be noted here that the United States Export Import Bank announced on January 28th a loan of \$15,300,000 for an electric power plant in Surabaya; that city is now a Communist stronghold; and also a loan of \$33,200,000 for a fertilizer plant in Palembang, Sumatra, where the anti-Djakarta rebellion took place in 1958. At the time there was open and constant charge made of United States sympathy with the insurgents, the right wing opponents of Sukarno's pro-socialist government. In this current

situation the Chinese in Indonesia are not only the unfortunate victims of Indonesia's lawful and understandable economic measures but they have become pawns in the world-wide attempt of reactionary elements to strike at the socialist world.

Another measure to meet its economic problems was taken by the Indonesian Government on January 1, 1960—this was to raise the taxes on many every-day items including kerosene, gasoline and electricity. This action coincided with a stampede of buying occasioned by two other factors—one, the plunge of the black market exchange rate from 45 to 500 per American dollar; and the other, the purchasing by Chinese who were frantically converting their Indonesian rupiahs into any kind of goods; many of the Chinese planning to return to China want to take along as much of the value of their money as possible. Writes the *New York Times* (1/24/60) : "It would be inaccurate to lay the entire blame for the rocketing prices on the overseas Chinese. It is felt here (in Djakarta) that the government helped push up the cost of living by increasing prices and taxes this month. This fact coupled with the government's dumping of millions of rupiahs into circulation to finance its deficit spending, has contributed to the price increases." The British newspaper *The Scotsman* (2/24/60) writing about Indonesia's "ramshackle economy" and "chaos" and "notoriously unstable currency" says "The Chinese are probably being used as scapegoats for the chaotic state of Indonesia's economy." How easily interested elements can blame and use the Chinese as scapegoats in Indonesia's economic upheaval!

However, both governments indicated their intention to maintain friendly and improved relations. At the official New Year's Day reception in Djakarta attended by President Sukarno and leaders of the government and of the armed forces and Parliament and members of the diplomatic corps, the Chinese Ambassador, as dean of the diplomatic corps, conveyed the diplomatic greetings to President Sukarno. In China intense criticism of Indonesia ceased. In Indonesian Borneo the army administrator there deferred the January first deadline to March 31st in about a dozen rural areas. About the middle of January Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio undertook a five-day trip to West Java to check on the implementation of the ban, taking with him 20 local and foreign cor-

respondents. In Djakarta the Indonesia-China Friendship Association, which has 46 branches, celebrated its fifth anniversary on January 14th; the cultural counsellor of the Chinese Embassy there spoke; the Indonesian Vice-Minister of Culture and Education sent a written statement to the meeting; and the Djakarta Garrison Commander delivered a speech; the Chinese Ambassador, members of the Indonesian Parliament and the Supreme Advisory Council also attended.

On January 13th, as reported by Reuters (*N. Y. Times*, 1/15/60), Foreign Minister Subandrio said "Relations between Indonesia and Communist China are now almost normal, though indeed in the past there has been some division. I admit we made some errors but I am fully confident that in carrying out the regulation we did not have any hatred or wildness in us." Earlier an Indonesian press agency quoted him as saying that the two countries had achieved a deeper understanding on the Chinese problem here.

In his note of December 24th the Chinese Foreign Minister had welcomed the Indonesian Foreign Minister's readiness to exchange ratifications of the Treaty on the Question of Dual Nationality which the two governments had signed on April 22nd, 1955; and China specifically proposed an immediate setting up in Djakarta of a Joint Committee for this purpose, and added that the Chinese Government had appointed its Ambassador at Djakarta, Huang Chen, as the senior delegate on the Chinese side of the Joint Committee.

On January 11th Subandrio announced that on January 20th instruments of ratification of the five-year-old treaty dealing with dual nationality would be exchanged.

The proposals presented by China for ending the dispute were described by Subandrio as constructive; he told newsmen the proposals could be used to find a way out of the bitter dispute.

The exchange of instruments of ratification took place in Peking on January 20th, 1960. The signers were China's Foreign Minister and the Indonesian Ambassador, Sukardojo Wirjopranoto. The treaty, on dual nationality, became effective on the same date. Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister, speaking at the signing ceremony, said:

"Every one knows that the question of dual nationality of the overseas Chinese who have settled in Indonesia is one inherited from the development of history over a long period of time. The Chinese Government has always been of the opinion that the holding of dual nationality by overseas Chinese is irrational, because this not only runs counter to the vital interests of the overseas Chinese, but this may be made use of by forces hostile to the friendship between our two countries to sow discord and carry out disruptive activities. Therefore the Chinese Government has always taken a positive attitude in striving to bring about a reasonable settlement of this question through consultations with the Indonesian Government. . . .

"We hope that the negotiations between the two sides will be successful, so that those who choose Indonesian nationality in accordance with their own will, will smoothly acquire Indonesian nationality and become citizens of Indonesia; so that those overseas Chinese who want, of their own will, to retain Chinese nationality and will remain in Indonesia, can stay on in peace of mind and continue to live amicably with the Indonesian people; and so that those who have lost the means of livelihood or who do not wish to continue to remain in Indonesia can return to China without difficulty."

Ambassador Sukardjo, in his speech at the signing ceremony, said:

"The treaty concerning the question of dual nationality between the Republic of Indonesia and the People's Republic of China is not only a concrete manifestation of the spirit and principles of the Bandung Conference, but it is also a pattern for the East Asian countries to follow in solving the problem of the overseas Chinese in the best possible way." He also expressed the hope "that the implementation of this Treaty on Dual Nationality will promote the solution of the problems existing between our two countries, so that the friendship between Indonesia and China will be further consolidated for the sake of friendship and peace in Asia and in the world."

On January 26th the Joint Committee of eight was formed. Its task is to implement the Treaty which will require Chinese in Indonesia to choose between Indonesian and Chinese citizenship. The Joint Committee held its first meeting on the 27th., presided over by the Indonesian senior delegate, Susanto. Chinese and Indonesian senior delegates are to be alternate chairmen, with the committee meeting weekly, or oftener if necessary.

So far China's proposal that a joint committee be set up to conduct negotiations on the rights and interests of Chinese ousted from trade in Indonesia has not been accepted by Indonesia. But the Indonesian authorities have assured the Chinese that "those affected by the ban on trading in rural areas may enter the field of production and industry"; for individuals recently farmers and small traders this will be no easy transition for those Chinese who choose to remain in Indonesia; there may be continuing uncertainty, discomfort, hardship and disputes. And there will be elements who will seek to magnify disagreements and use them to foster hostility, domestic elements who will play a catspaw role for hostile outside interests.

China and Indonesia are still in the early stages of the process of working out their new relations as now independent nations, a process complicated by the pressures of the cold war.

China and Burma

Burma is one of China's smaller neighbors, a neighbor with which China has had an unsettled question; this has been the border question, left over from the days of colonialism. Burma was long under British influence and control; from about 1612 to 1885 she was under the East India Company; and then from 1885 to 1937 she was administered as a part of British India. In 1937 she was detached from British India and made a self-governing unit of the British Commonwealth. On January 4th, 1948 Burma became an independent nation, completely outside the British Commonwealth.

One of the tasks of the newly independent countries Burma (1948) and China (1949) was the delimiting of the boundary line, sections of which had been determined by Sino-British agreements in pre-liberation days when China had a semi-colonial status and subsequently disputed when these two countries became independent. In November 1956 China and Burma reached a temporary agreement, with their respective troops withdrawing from two disputed areas; compliance with this agreement by both sides provided the favorable conditions for concluding a more permanent agreement. On Janunary 28th, 1960, during a visit to Peking by Burma's then Premier, Ne Win, an agreement on principles for setting the bounary was arrived at, and provision made for a Joint Committee to discuss and work out solutions on the concrete questions on sections of the bounary, to conduct surveys of the boundary and set up boundary markers, and to draft the final Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty.

Tney agreed that the northern section of the boundary would be, with the exception of three villages (named below), the traditional boundary, but that the Joint Committee would determine the specific alignment and set up boundary markers.

Burma agreed to hand over three villages, Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang, about 200 square miles of territory at the northernmost tip of Burma, villages which China had long disputed with Britain and which Burma had subsequently claimed; these villages are important as they command major passes leading to China. The exact extent of the area is to be determined by the Joint Committee in accordance with proposals put forward and mapped on maps by the governments of Burma and China on February 4th and July 26th, 1957.

China agreed to turn over to Burma Namwam (Mengmao), a triangular area of about 100 square miles, at the junction of the Namwam and Shweli Rivers. Britain had held this area as a "perpetual lease," granted by China in 1897. This area is about 250 miles southwest of the three villages area and is important to Burma as through it runs the highway linking the Shan and Kashin States and it is important as the highway from the north Burma city of Lashio.

Burma agreed to turn over to China the Wa area, areas under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes, about 80 square miles. Here again the exact area will be determined by the Joint Committee.

The *Manchester Guardian* (2/6/60) points out that "there are ample opportunities in the agreement itself for a continuation of the dispute if either side feels inclined." The January 28th agreement itself specifically recognizes that there are "existing issues" and that part of the task of the Joint Committee they set up is the "working out" of these still unsettled issues. And of course there will be outside elements that may try to take advantage of these still "existing issues" to sow dissension and bitterness between China and Burma. An editorial in the Indonesian newspaper *Harian Fadjar* (2/5/60) pointed out that Asian and African peoples were very much exhilarated at the conclusion of this Treaty while some people felt disappointed; "these were those who wished to see disputes or even war between Asian-African countries so as to enable them to practice policies of 'divide and rule' and 'Let Asians fight Asians.'" The Ceylon weekly, *The Tribune*, commented: "That the Sino-Burmese agreement on the boundary question constitutes a landmark on the Asian political scene: in 1949 the Chinese People's Re-

public inherited from the old regime the legacy of unsolved problems including boundary questions with India and Burma. In the last ten years international and Indian and Burmese domestic reaction tried to make use of these problems to disturb the friendly relations between Asian countries and smash the spirit of Asian fraternity that arose after Bandung and the enunciation of the five principles of coexistence" (2/5/60). An Israeli commentator wrote that this treaty "dealt a blow to the anti-Chinese slanderers who tried to present this great Asian socialist power as 'aggressor' "; and he went on, "Who now is foolish enough to believe the story that China is carrying out a provocative line against India?" and he emphasized that the Sino-Burmese boundary agreement proved that even complicated border issues could be solved in accordance with the principle of coexistence. (Berl Balti in *Kol Haam*, 2/5/60).

In Japan two major and conservative newspapers stressed the significance of the Sino-Burmese treaty. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* commented: "It is noteworthy that the treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression is imbued with the spirit of the Five Principles; the following two points are worthy of even greater attention: one, the two parties undertake to settle all disputes between them by peaceful negotiation and force will not be used; second, each contracting party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression against the other and not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other." (2/1/60) The *Mainichi Shimbun* said that the Sino-Burmese Treaty and Agreement would have "an epoch-making significance," adding "It will create a new situation in the Himalayas which has seen a period of unrest since the Sino-Indian border dispute" (1/30/60). "This was the first time for China to sign a non-aggression treaty with a foreign country and was a diplomatic step worthy of note" (2/1/60).

Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet celebrating the signing of the treaty gives something of the spirit and significance of this agreement:

"China and Burma are at once ancient and young states. Both of us have won independence not long ago, and both our peoples wholeheartedly want to build up their own countries. We have every reason to maintain mutual friendship and co-

operation and no reason whatsoever to antagonize or to encroach on each other. . . . Indeed, there are certain issues between our two countries inherited from history. The question of the boundary between our two countries is one left behind by imperialism. This is the common understanding of the leaders of the two countries. In the past few years our two governments have made unremitting endeavors to achieve a fair and reasonable solution of this question. Now we have finally reached an agreement on the principles for the settlement of the Sino-Burmese boundary question and thus paved the way for its overall settlement. . . . The signing is furthermore strong support for the conviction that Asian and African countries should and can unite together and live in friendship. . . .”

CONCLUSION: CHINA AND HER ASIAN NEIGHBORS

Slowly but steadily the newly independent nations of Asia will eliminate the inheritances of colonial days and will work out their relationships on the basis of national dignity and mutual respect. There has been, there is, and there will be interference in this process by the reactionaries, domestic and alien, who see their entrenched privileges now threatened by increasingly aware populaces and by the example of China; they fear and resist the influence of this once colonial people now a nation in a position to stand up for its rights and already proving to all colonial and newly independent nations that an Asian people can build a modern society free from the pressures of Asia's ancient exploiters, feudal, colonial and current. The workings out of the inherited and now current issues are but the growing pains of true independence.

Genuine independence will enable these peoples of Asia to end the diabolical economic and strategic plots of those who now seek to preserve their profit-taking privileges in the underdeveloped areas. Genuine independence will add an overwhelming force to the peace-seeking peoples of the world, for, as Chou En-lai points out: “We have every reason to maintain mutual friendship and cooperation and no reason whatsoever to antagonize or encroach on each other.”

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