

Some Problems facing
the revolutionary
mass movement of
KHAMMAM AREA

Supplement

FOREWORD

We are herewith publishing the document on the Pagideru incident. The forward here is to the letter written to the concerned Comrade. We hope these facts will be helpful to the comrades.

EDITOR

This is the letter written by the Secretary of Andhra Pradesh State Committee to a member of the same committee who was in charge of an area consisting of forest regions of Khammam, Warangal and Karimnagar, where a revolutionary peasant movement was developing which was about to take the form of armed struggle. The entire movement was guided by the State Committee although i. e. before and after immediately after the State Convention, which was held in the second week of April, 1969. The violation of "immediate programme" which document was adopted in the said convention, kindled the fore of inner party struggle. And the violation took place within a week after the convention, with some armed actions (known as "Pagideru incidents") under the guidance of the said leader. The letter was addressed to him as soon as the Secretary came to know of the incidents, even before the State Committee meeting was held to discuss these developments.

The incidents were not only premature in nature but were also against the United Front policy in that they did not differentiate between enemies, neutrals and friends. The methods adopted in most cases were abominable. As a result our organisation was isolated from the people and there was no sign of revolutionary movements ever since.

The struggle that took place ever since was internal unlike that against Charu Majumdar's line, which was rather open. Therefore the documents and the related material had limited circulation till the split took place. The material published here was snatched away by the police when the State leadership was arrested at Madras in December 1969, and was produced in the Court. Therefore it could not reach our own ranks inside the organisation.

The background of this controversy is given in the pamphlet "Left-Trend in the Party" which is to be published in the next issue. Therefore we are not writing anything about it here. Suffice it to say that the leadership was vigilant against this trend and took up the challenge as soon as it had made its appearance. We carried on the struggle consistently and came out successfully. We could develop our line in the course of the struggle. The points of difference with this group were fundamental as subsequent documents show though it appeared that they were connected at that time of certain "actions". Our struggle against this form of opportunism led to the split with the group, which had merged subsequently in the CPI (M.L.) with which it had no basic differences.

We emphatically reject the view that we had no correct line from the beginning. We have it and we are developing it every passing day. The material we are publishing is a standing example. We are confident that Communist revolutionaries all over India understand it correctly and unite on the basis of this line.

25-11-79.

Cemradè Kumar,¹

We have been waiting for a report from you from a long time. We could know some developments because Com. P.R. was here at about the middle of May. At present, we could know some more through the report you have sent.

We have come to know from reliable sources that Comrades Battula² and another koya comrade³ who was with him were shot dead by the police; they were caught by homeguards and were handed over to the Armed police who tortured them severely before shooting them to death; the event took place in Gondigudem⁵. It is a sad and tragic incident. We have to believe this information as correct even though the Government has not come out with a statement. It is impossible to fillup the gap left by the death of Battula in the immediate future. It will continue for a longtime to come not only for local movement but also for State movement. At a time when the armed struggle has started and there is a shortage of leading cadre, the loss we incurred thus, is not an ordinary one. I hope that our movement will withstand this blow. Let us dedicate ourselves to achieve the objectives for which comrade Battula has laid down his life.

Our homage to comrades Battula, Baskar Rao⁴ and another comrade who have become martyrs.

We take this opportunity to send greetings to Comrades in general who are working against all odds, and to yourself and other comrades who had to face the Gondigudem incident⁵.

I was busy with comrades from the districts who were to go back as soon as possible. I had received your report in the midst of the meeting. Therefore I could not take some more time to study your report. I am putting down my opinions on important points.

You have already accepted that we could not get arms in other areas because we have started confiscating them in one centre, that too long before we thought of, yet I am of the opinion that you have completely failed to assess the mistake committed in this connection, and its consequences.

You know that seizure of enemy' fire arms means starting armed struggle. We have two Area Committees⁶ in this region with an organised movement. We have to start armed struggle in the entire region. Instead of it we have started it not even in one area but only in a small part of an area. That too, when all important comrades of State and district level were in the struggle areas. You are not giving thought to how this could happen. Besides

this the struggle has started not in the area where the movement is strong, but in an area where it is weak and which is small. It was started not because there was a huge people's upsurge, but because of the pressure from the cadre. Instead of expediting the implementation of the mass programme so as to bridge the gulf which has developed in the movement by removing the short comings, and then move towards armed struggle, you have by-passed that part and started the armed struggle. As a result, there will undoubtedly be some achievements on a local scale. But the question before us is, how far can the movement in this area withstand the police raids? You are ignoring it by underestimating it very much. If it so happens that there is a delay in police raids due to the monsoon, we have to utilise that opportunity. There can be no other opportunity. This is the limit to it. It is very small. You are not taking it into consideration.

This method applies to the entire region where the mass movement is weak. There was a lot of opportunity for comrades of this area, to overcome the weakness in the mass movement. But they failed to utilise it as they lacked correct perspective of armed struggle. They have become ready to go over finally, straight to armed struggle without utilising the little opportunity that is left for us. All comrades should realise that it is not a correct outlook for armed struggle.

The comrades belonging to Srikakulam group are asking questions: What is the difference between you and ourselves in view of these actions? Is it not that you too have resorted to attacks without any training to the squads and without preparing the mass movement? Is it not that there is a difference between the attitude you adopted in the document and your practice? What is our answer? The attitude you have adopted in these actions is totally different from that of the document.⁵

In the same way, you have written that you are still of the opinion that we should have seized arms about three months back. If it were so, why should it not happen six months before? Is it not because we were not able to prepare the mass movement for it that we have not seized arms then? Seizure of arms can take place at any time. But then we should know that the

armed struggle starts from the day that they are seized. Were there conditions required for armed struggle, in the two areas about three months ago? Is it not that we have waited exactly because of their absence? We could have got only a small number of them, if we had implemented your proposal at that time. Seizure of arms one by one, from beat police, forest guards and landlords who come to the forests for hunting: this was your proposal. By this every one would have escaped with their arms so that we could get none. Therefore your understanding was wrong and its results also would have been harmful.

I think you will admit now that we have lost the opportunities of seizing the arms in the rest of the areas simply because we did it in one area. We have lost them when we could get about 50—60 of them. You do not seem to understand, how much harmful it was to the entire armed struggle in such a situation.

To seize arms in one area and not to do the same in other parts, that too in an area where the mass movement is weak, is not the only mistake you have committed; the principles of organisation which you have adopted are also wrong. There is no state committee decision for this purpose. Nor was there a decision of the two area committees to this effect. Finally you have not even held the meeting of the zonal committee of the area where the arms were seized. I came to know that the whole thing was done without the knowledge of the comrade who is responsible for this zone.

Is it not impermissible to take these steps by by-passing Area committees, even though you area member of the Secretariat and com. Ravi is a member of the state committee. Are not the decisions of the State committee inviolable? We have taken some decisions regarding "immediate programme" in the convention. We have to activate Area Committees to implement them. You have had their meeting held also. The programme was not discussed in it. The meeting of the "important" comrades, however important they may be, cannot be the meetings of the committees. The decisions of the important comrades cannot be the decisions of the committees

Thus you have arranged to implement such an important decision (Seizure of arms), individually though there were some to support you without any reference to the committees.

The issue here is not one of the mandate: had the committee discussed taken decisions, comrades, would have accepted them once they were explained so as to convince them. It is not correct to compare this with the experiences of Srikakulam. Those comrades had not accepted the principles of Democratic Centralism, when such a problem arose between them and ourselves. We did not implement them because our relations were one of 'coordination'. The situation at present is different. We all have accepted the principles of Democratic Centralism. But, when the need of the hour was their implementation, we are adopting the principles of 'coordination':

This is how you have taken the decision. This is how you have implemented it.

You write, that you have given up the mass programme and adopted this programme because there was an information to the effect that police is going to raid (the place). Have not many such raids taken place earlier? Does it happen that there will be no fire arms left with landlords simply because the police raids the village. Earlier, whenever there was lack of will to implement mass programme, it was renounced under the slightest pretext. The same thing has happened now.

The defect in your understanding will be much more clear, if we analyse the incident at Gondigudem together with what we said above. To my knowledge, comrades of Palavancha taluk (tahasil) have conducted raids on landlords after forming one or two squads even before you started on your journey. They took place in an area where mass struggles are taking place against landlords. I also came to know that comrades of this area (Palavancha) were sending reports to you. It was wrong on your part to start for that place thinking that situation was getting out of control. All those who were going there were important comrades. You did not realise what would happen to the leadership of

the movement if you had to face a danger. Instead of travelling with the help of a guide from Palavancha after duely informing the comrades, you set out with a guide who had half-knowledge of the track. You know the danger yet you allowed yourself to be entrapped. While the clash was going on, there was no firing at homeguards, because you have not viewed it with a military ipoint of view. Instead, you attempted for a change of heart on their part. All this happened because even after starting armed struggle you have not developed the outlook of armed struggle, because of a situation where in you could not function as a squad even after a squad was formed.

In view of our failure in siezing arms in the entire struggle area which should have been siezed, loss of important comrades in the Gondigudem incident, our loses are more than gains. Your assesment in this respect is totally wrong. Our gains are local and partial. You have not understood this.

Under conditions of armed struggle wherein the centralisation and coordination of activities of various regions is necessary more than ever, you have lost contact with Mulugu area temporarily. Comrades of that area have not accepted the way you have taken the decisions and implimented them. They are trying to sieze as many firearms as possible through raids by utilising the little oppurtunity left for them. Even then they are getting them in minimum number. Think over what an impediment to the advance of their armed struggle (PR has written a note on the subject; I will hand it over to you when you come here). Thus the shortcomings i.e. absence of will in implimenting mass programme, not observing the discipline of the organisation, not to realise the need for armed resistance in face of enemy attacks, are not the result of lack of experience alone. It is the result of wrong outlook and wrong understanding towards concerned problems, though lack of experience is one aspect. You should take note and correct it.

In the same way, the understanding that the losses are less and gains are more is also wrong.

Contrary is the reality. The losses are more and gains are of a local nature.

In view of this situation, there is a need to set right the Khamman Area Committee. The problem of who should be the secretary is to be resolved. If any reorganisation of squads is necessary, it should be carried out. Mass programme has to be implimented with determination.

Sd-
Secretary
17-6-69

NOTES

1. Kumar : Code name of the member of secretariat of state committee, who was incharge of the struggle areas.
2. P. R. Full name : P. Ram Naransayya: He was a member of the state committee and the secretary of the Mulugu Area committee at that time.
3. Battula : Full name Battula Venkateswara Rao. He was the secretary of Khammam area committee. He was caught by Home guards, and was handed over to police who killed him in their custody.
4. Koya comrade : It was not actually the Koya comrade who was killed. (Koya is the name of the tribe) The comrade who was killed is Surya Narayana, who belongs to... village of Divi area in Krishna District.
5. The documents mentioned here is immediate programme" Gondigudem. A village in Khammam district. Where a clash took place between Home guards and a squad of communist revolutionaries.
6. The document mentioned here, is "immediate programme".

Some problems facing the revolutionary mass movement of Khammam area

Within a few days after the State Convention of the Communist Revolutionaries in the month of April 1969 our squads had carried out some actions in the forest areas of Khammam District. Shortly after these actions our squads in Mulugu area had also carried out some actions. The armed struggle was thus started in these areas. How far the understanding of the leading comrades of these areas, especially of the representatives of the State Committee about the armed struggle thus launched is correct? What are the results? What should be our future task? All these questions are to be examined. Only when we rectify the incorrect understanding as and when it arises, would we be able to correctly and successfully lead the armed struggle.

1. MAIN POINTS OF THE "IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME"

Calling upon the Party to get prepared for the armed struggle, the State Convention had adopted the 'Immediate Programme'. The programme laid down in it for the implementation in the forest areas is explained as under:

"Besides the distribution of banjar lands under the occupation of the Government as well as the landlords among the poor peasants and the agricultural labour, we should in these areas carry on a struggle for the fertile dry lands as well as for the irrigated lands under the personal cultivation of the landlords and distribute them. The cattle available in thousands should be distributed. For this we should make preparations from now on. Ploughing should commence as soon as the monsoon starts".

"In the coming months, the contractors would employ the people as coolies to move out the forest produce. We should

therefore intensify the struggles on the question of coolie rates. Thus intensifying the mass activities, we should, by the end of April advance the movement to the higher stage. In this period considerable work has been done to organise and mobilise the girijans in the Agency area of East Godavari District. The "MUTHADARI" system the worst kind of a feudal exploitation is in practice in this area. The remnants of this system are also found in the agency area of Visakhapatnam. The people themselves should go in for revolutionary actions in order to abolish this system"

"We should not, in the implementation of this programme, allow the girijan and non-girijan discrimination. Rallying all the non-girijans, including the poor middle peasants, a united front with the girijans should be formed and the struggle carried on. The division on the basis of the girijans and non-girijans would only prove useful to the enemy. This applies equally to different tribes among the girijans themselves"

"The periodical extortions (Mamullu), forced labour (Vetti) and bribes to the forest officials and the employees have ceased by now. We should not permit them to continue in any form or to any extent."

"We should in all the villages of the forest areas where we are working, mobilise the people to boycott the elections. In the villages where the elections are thus boycotted, the question of how to manage the affairs of the village would arise. Then all the people- the adults of the village should and elect the peoples committee. These committees would assist the people in all the problems connected with the life of the village".

"Against the feudal system and elections, the village Soviets and the Peoples committees would be united front committees to launch and successfully conclude the agrarian revolution. In these committees led by the Communist revolutionaries can also be given representation."

"These committees would have a clear cut, class and political outlook. We should educate them in the understanding of the path of the peoples war and develop their political consciousness. We should not permit opportunists, carrierists as well as the representatives of the rich classes hailing from poorer sections to infiltrate into these committees."

Similarly it has laid down a comprehensive programme for the building of Volunteer Squads, Local Squads, Mass Organisation and called upon the party to intensify the mass activities as under :

"We should, in coming month, intensify our activities in the forest areas as well as in the plain areas.....For this we should from now on get prepared both politically and organisationally".

It has explained all this programme. It has in order to get prepared for the armed struggle, clearly laid down that :

"It is our opinion that we should speedily complete the political propaganda, mass mobilisation and the above tasks in the organisational field and be prepared for the armed struggle by the coming monsoon....."Comrades should bear in mind and march forward."

Thus the 'Immediate Programme' has laid down a comprehensive programme for the purpose of preparing the people for armed struggle. In this the programme of land distributions and the building of village soviets peoples, committees, revolutionary mass organisation local squads and the volunteer squads are crucial. The sum and substance of this is that without the above not only the necessary mass base for the armed struggle

could not be secured but also it would prove to be an exercise in the void.

But our comrades had directly gone in for the higher form of struggle without implementing any of this programme.

Here it should be noted that "We should get prepared for the armed struggle by the coming rainy season." does not however mean that we should launch the armed struggle even though we fail to implement the programme. The sum and substance of this is that with the implementation of this programme, the revolutionary movement would reach the higher stage and that we should at this stage adopt the armed struggle, the corresponding form of struggle. If it gets delayed for the revolutionary movement to reach the high stage, launching of the armed struggle should also be delayed. But it would be wrong to launch the armed struggle at the 'time fixed' without the revolutionary movement reaching the corresponding level. Instead if the situation becomes ripe and if the revolutionary movement reaches higher stage before the 'time fixed', we should then launch the armed struggle without waiting for the 'time fixed' to come. We should realise the fact that the level of the revolutionary movement should remain the main factor at all times.

2. THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE IN COURSE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Our programme in Pagideru area of Khammam district was to mobilise the people on the problems of food and forest labour that face them seriously during the month of April and May (1969) and to take up the programme of land distribution with the beginning of the rainy season. The same is the programme for the entire forest area as well. The state leaders those are working in this area had also decided to implement this programme. But actually when they had gone to the area to implement this programme, they had by-passed it. Instead they went in for offensive actions which were totally unrelated to the level of the mass movement.

The sum and substance of the arguments of these comrades is this: Since the police are going to launch the attacks against us we should have the arms in order to counter these attacks. In order to get the arms we should carryout actions against our class enemies or their armed forces, the armed police.

These argumants and this programme would be correct when the people in the respective areas are showing their preparedness to put up resistance against the enemy and to confiscate the arms. But neither these arguments nor this programme is correct when the revolutionary mass movement has not yet reached that stage. The programme which is in accordance with the revolutionary movement alone would be needed.

In some form or the other and to some degree or the other the police attacks have been and will be going on ever since we started our revolutionary activities. But we have not from the very beginning gone in for the armed resistance because of this. We would not go in for it. In the beginning we had co-ordinated the mass mobilisation with the legal forms of struggle. (Even today we are utilising the courts etc.) This is mainly for the reason that the people are not eager for the armed resistance. The people would in the beginning join the struggles with the confidence that they could active their demands through their organised strength. Reeling through their own experience the fact that their organised strength would not by itself be sufficient in the face of the enemy's armed might, they would come forward to adopt the form of armed struggle. This process may be completed rapidly in some areas while it may take some time in other areas. The revolutionaries should workout their tactics in accordance with the growing consciousness of the people.

Should the revolutionaries suffer the attacks of the landlords, goondas, and the armed police when the people are not prepared for resistance against the attacks of the enemy? This question would naturally arise. If the enemy launched attacks on the people we should prepare them for resistance. We should for this

purpose organise the people into volunteer squads and train them in the methods of resisting the enemy. When enemy does not touch the people, but concentrates on the revolutionaries, the revolutionaries should adopt the tactics such as evading the enemy, taking necessary measures for self-defence when confronted by the enemy. Depending upon the local conditions and the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves, we should decide as to how and when these measures should be adopted.

At a certain stage of the development of the revolutionary mass movement, the people would come forward to resist the landlords. But they can't come forward to resist the police. Often the question arises as to what tactics should the revolutionaries adopt at such a time. Even at such a times our tactics should be in accordance with the given stage. The revolutionaries should concentrate on the landlords and break thier direct resistance. The main programme should be the distribution of thier movable and immovable properties (land and food-grains etc.) among the people. We cannot break the resistance of the landlords until and unless we implement this programme.

The armed forces of the landlords government would not remain mere passive spectators while the revolutionary masses are distributing the landlords land and food grains among themselves. The armed forces would then launch attacks against us and the masses. At such a time the revolutionaries should on the one hand prepare masses to defend their own gains land, grains etc. and on the other hand they should themselves get prepared for self defence. When the people are prepared for self-defence as well as for an offensive against the enemy, the revolutionaries should go in for an offensive against the enemy. When the second stage of the armed struggle begins. At this stage we should formulate our tactics in accordance with the principles of guerilla warfare. It is at this stage that we should take up the programme of confiscation of arms from the enemy. Even this programme should be based on the consciousness of the masses but not on the physical needs of the revolutionaries. Upto this stage the revolutionaries should secure arms needed for the self-defence by other means.

Failing to grasp the significance of the revolutionary mass programme laid down in the "Immediate Programme" as well as the level of consciousness of the people, the local leadership of these areas and the cadres are not trying to implement this programme. In case they try, they are not facing obstacles that are arising in the course of its implementation. Therefore it is imperative that we should implement the programme and raise the consciousness of the people. Our revolutionary programme would not be implemented until and unless the consciousness of the people grows. The armed struggle would not triumph. If we launch the offensive actions before the people are politically and organisationally prepared, we would have to spend all our time and energies in facing the counter-offensive of the enemy. We would not have any opportunity for the mobilisation of the masses. As the level of consciousness and the level of organisation of the masses has not reached the higher stage, the masses would not be in a position to participate in our resistance programme. They could at best be sympathetic spectators.

The resistance should be for safeguarding the revolutionary movement and not unrelated to it. With the resistance unrelated to the revolutionary movement, the revolutionary movement would not advance. What is more, unable to withstand the enemy attacks even the existing movement would either fizzle out or get disorganised.

Viewed from this angle, the self-criticism of Peddanna (the representative of state committee that "when once we had decided to launch the resistance programme in the month of June, we should have utilised the intervening period and whatever the little time available for the purpose of mobilising the masses and preparing them organisationally and should have under no circumstances gone in for Pagidery type actions", is neither comprehensive nor does it exhibit a correct outlook.

Here the main thing is not the fixation of time for the month of June. The main thing is the preparedness of the revolutionary mass movement. For this we should, if need be,

wait as long as necessary. In the areas where the necessary preliminary steps are not taken for the building of mass movement it would take much longer time to prepare the masses. In Peddanna's line of thinking there is no significance for preparing the masses politically and organisationally. The understanding that this itself constitutes the pre-requisite for launching of armed struggle is absent. Thus his self-criticism is therefore based on the understanding that making use of "time available" alone we should mobilise the people to the extent possible and launch the armed struggle regardless of whether the main points of "Immediate Programme" are implemented or not and whether the masses are politically and organisationally prepared or not. This is incorrect. This line of thinking is different from the guidance contained in the "Immediate Programme" that we should "complete the political propaganda mass mobilisation and the above tasks in the organisational field and be prepared for the armed struggle by the coming monsoon". It is clear from the above passage of the "Immediate Programme" that preparing the masses politically and organisationally is alone important.

Peddanna had in his self-criticism admitted the losses that we suffered due to the Pagidery actions as under :

"(a) In so far as Pagidery is concerned our contact with the masses is cut off. This is mainly due to the comrades that can re-establish the contacts having left the field. It has become clear as to how wrong it is to launch such actions with the understanding that we could rectify the organisational weaknesses after the actions, even after realising existence of such weakness before the actions.

(b) We have, in other areas had the opportunities present to mobilise the masses on issues and to overcome the organisational weaknesses to the extent possible.

(c) These actions have come in the way of getting arms in the other areas, which we would have otherwise got in the beginning. "

"The comrades that can re-establish the contacts,

having left the field" is not the only main reason for the breakdown of contacts with the Pagideru area. Their leaving the area also points to our organisational weakness. Hence the contacts with the Pagideru area have broken down not because of this or that comrades, but because of our launching of armed struggle without preparing the masses politically and organisationally. Thus it would only amount to the shifting of responsibility on to the local comrades for launching the prematured armed struggle.

We do not "in other areas mobilise the masses only to the extent possible". We do not overcome the weaknesses to that extent. In order to prepare the masses politically and organisationally we would mobilise the masses and strengthen the organisation to the extent necessary. Therefore this understanding is also incorrect.

These actions have not just "come in the way of getting arms in other areas." They have resulted in liquidating the possibilities of starting armed struggle in a vast area. "Getting arms" is a part of it only.

At the same time, this comrade has also referred to the action that occurred in Manthena taluka prior to April. When an American, with his subordinates came for hunting, our comrades had confiscated the arms from them. Without deciding whether this is correct or incorrect, the Area Committee decided that such actions should not occur in future. It means that such actions are incorrect in the opinion of the Area Committee. This was not a pre-planned action. It was decided and carried out there and then.

It is correct to say that we should acquire the arms from the enemy. But if we seize the arms individually from the enemy before the launching of the armed struggle, the people would not be in a position to withstand the repression that would follow it. We would not be able to get the number of arms which we should otherwise get. Therefore we should confiscate arms from the enemy only as a part of launching the armed struggle.

Another part of Peddanna's self-criticism read that "inspite of all this there is still left in me the understanding that these actions are correct. When this happens to be correct, my proposals for its extention would also be correct." It means, it is clear that he is still of the opinion that the Pagideru actions should have begun with the Manthena actions itself. We have already discussed the harmful results that would follow the launching of armed struggle before the people are politically and organisationally prepared. He has even admitted it to some extent. Yet when he says this, it is clear that the understanding that led to Pagideru actions still continues in him.

Similarly the decisions to carry out the actions in Palvancha for money was a decision taken in order to safeguard the physical existence of our cadres in an extraordinary situation without as far as possible causing any harm to the base of the mass movement. It would be wrong to counter-pose this general policy.

Like-wise the decision "to launch action for food grains in Pagideru was correct. The decision was that we should distribute the food grains if the people are prepared. The implementation of this decision would have only strengthened and not weakened the consciousness and organisational strength of the people. The decision was therefore correct.

It is true that a comprehensive discussion about the Manthena action was not conducted at P. C. level. But a comprehensive discussion was however held taking advantage of opportunities offered on other occasions. The fact of the matter is that inspite of acceptance of the "Immediate Programme" this comrade has not adopted the understanding of the "Immediate Programme". It is for this reason that he is unable to see his mistakes with a selfcritical outlook even after such a comprehensive discussion on the Pegide y actions.

Shortly after the Pagideru actions the comrades of Murugu area had also launched the armed struggle. Had they also not committed the same mistakes? Thus this comrade has raised another question. In order to come

to a correct understanding about this, we should review the mass-movement of that area, and have a correct assessment of the political and organisational preparedness of the masses. The Pagideru actions occurred at a time when the Mulugu area comrades were engaged in mobilising the masses on the demands. Thinking that it would not be good to delay after these actions they, too had launched. However this criticism as well applies to the comrades of Mulugu as far as the political and organisational preparedness of the people.

The reports indicate that after the Pagideru actions the Khammam area comrades are going to the villages, establishing contact with the masses and striving to mobilise them on demands and against the landlords and officials. So far all this is correct. But the tendency to once again go in for offensive action is again reappearing.

Giving details and stating that the mass movement is at the preliminary stage, they wrote in the report as under:

"But the movement is confined to some partial demands. It is not however connected with the Landlords land. Mobilisation of the masses on the issues, occupation of the landlords land, police repression from this situation the peoples discontentment against the government and the police is likely to turn into hatred. When the hatred develops among the people, the people would be prepared for resistance against the police."

But the Area Committee and the P. C. representatives are unable to stand by this understanding. See at the following passage:

"Now the police parties are moving freely. They are confident that our squads would not launch actions against them. On the other hand we seriously doubt that the peoples confidence in our squads may weaken if we allow the police to move freely."

The people would not think any thing if we do not launch actions; when they are not themselves politically and organisationally prepared. It is wrong to think that the squads can carryout actions against the police and achieve gains without the strength of the

masses. The peoples confidence would not weaken, them. On the contrary if we carryout actions, the people would not be in a position to withstand the resultant repression and would get disorganised. We should understand that this would cause serious damage to the revolutionary movement which we have begun to build.

They are advancing another problem in the report: "we have written in the last convention report itself that we should conduct surprise raids on the police parties. However, we decided to rely on village volunteers, to do this. Now we have to do the same by relying on our squads. Thus there is a little difference between this situation and what we wrote (in the report) at the time of the Convention"

It is good they realise that there is a difference between the opinions of the convention and their opinions. Volunteer squads are formed only when people move on their issues in a revolutionary manner. If no such volunteer squads were formed in our villages, it is obvious that we did not move the people intensely on their issues. We have shunned our responsibilities of organising volunteer squads and instead are forced to rely on central squads themselves. We should clearly realise that this is our weakness in organising the revolutionary movement.

We can gain nothing if we hide these weaknesses instead of overcoming them and carrying on the armed struggle on the correct lines. Our principles is to prepare the people both politically and organisationally. It is one of organisational tasks to build volunteer squads locally. When the volunteer squads are thus organised, responsibilities can be fixed depending upon who can carry out which of the tasks. Sometimes it would be necessary to carry out these tasks through mutual co-ordination. Therefore we should complete the task of building the volunteer squads.

They have brought the actual question in the following manner :

"We are directly faced with the following problem. Should we, upto December concentrate on the mass mobilisation, carry out

actions against the class enemies, elude police attacks and try to secure arms through other sources or should we launch surprise attacks on the police patrols making use of the arms we have at the present and carry on mass mobilisation to the extent possible? This is the question before us."

The former would be our task in the present conditions.

But it is not necessary to set the time "upto December," we can launch the struggle as the situation ripens and as the revolutionary movement reaches higher stage. At all times the level of the revolutionary mass movement would remain the main aspect. The later would be wrong. The decision of the Area Committee that "after carrying out one or two actions we wanted to, depending upon the results that follow, decide whether we should continue them or not, is incorrect. It should be understood that the consequences of this would be far more serious than the Pagideru actions. Any decision unconnected with the level of the consciousness of the people would not yield any good results. They would harm the movement. In short our understanding and our tasks should be as under:

1) We have launched armed struggle without implementing the main tasks laid down in the "Immediate Programme" and before the people are politically and organisationally prepared. The attacks of the landlords goondas and the police that follow it would naturally be severe. It is wrong to think that we have no alternative but to go in for offensive since we have any how launched the armed struggle. We have people spread out on a wide area. Even if the police set up a number of camps, it would be possible for us to work among the people in the the villages beyond the reach of the police camps, mobilise and prepare them politically and organisationally. We should utilise these opportunities exhaustively and fulfil the tasks.

2) We should take all the necessary steps for self-defence against the attacks of landlords and the goondas. We should review the actions we are carrying against them and rectify the short comings.

3) We should resort to the self-defence against the police attacks. It is important to see that our whereabouts are not revealed to the police. For this we should not for a long time camp at the same place. We should be frequently shifting our camps. In spite of all this if there is any attack, we should defend ourselves. We should not do any thing that would prove harmful to us. Self-presentation should be our task at all times.

4) We should implement the revolutionary programme with determination. The problem of forest coolies would come to force in the coming months. We should mobilise the people on this problem. For the cultivation of land needed by the people in the coming year, we should from now on make arrangements to clear the forest lands at an opportune time. Based upon the "Immediate Programme" we should, taking the local situation into account, workout and implement a mass programme.

5) We should pay attention to the building peoples committees and volunteer squads. Unless the organisational set up is secured, the necessary organisational foundations for the armed struggle would not be secured.

6) We should recruit the cadres and the squad members from the families that can withstand the repression. They would work not only with determination but also with consciousness.

7) We should develop the necessary by means of which we can always be kept informed of the activities of the informants and also about the conspiracies of the landlords.

8) We should always continuously carry on the political propaganda among the people. We should always explain to the people, the need for the armed struggle

We have criticised the Srikulam comrades for having launched the armed struggle unrelated to the mobilisation of masses and the organisational preparations. Yet we have committed the same mistakes, means we have failed to take lessons from the experiences.

All the comrades should firmly grasp the fact that the peoples war carried on in accord-

ance with Mao's Thought, should be carried on fully relying upon the consciousness and the organisational strength of the masses and not unrelated to it.

3. ORGANISATIONAL PROBLEMS

We have, for some time discussed and formulated a policy for armed struggle. This is explained mainly in the "IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME" and the document on Srikakulam. Various aspects of armed struggle are discussed in the convention report. We should go among the masses and implement them. We should take experiences in the course of its implementation. We should make necessary changes in our policy and march forward on a correct path. But Com. Peddanna and the comrades of Khammam area have not followed this method. Their activities have been different from the line of the party. Comrades should take note of the following from the letter of self-criticism of Com. Peddanna.

"I should make one thing clear in this respect. I haven't initiated the Pagideru actions. I am for carrying out actions for food grains as we had planned in Vijaywada. It is a fact that I had not resisted it when the zonal committee members and Ravi who met there had in advance decided to confiscate the arms that might have come to me with that decision when it became impossible to convince Ravi I should have attended the Z. C. meeting and explained the P. C. line. I accept that it was totally wrong on my part to have hesitated to do so thinking that it would lead to dispute. I should have told Ravi that since they were going against the decisions of the State Convention it is necessary that the P.C. should meet and take a final decision on this question and the action should therefore be stopped till such time. I admit that it is wrong on my part not to have done so."

Here the question before us is not whether the Pagideru actions were carried out with the initiative of the P.C. representative or not. The question before us is why the P. C. representative had not stopped them when the Area comrades had, against the decisions of the state convention had taken the decision for Pagideru actions and wanted to implement them? Had this comrade

tried in the least to convince the Area comrades, those comrades would have implemented the P.C. decisions earnestly. The form and character of the revolutionary movement of this area would have been altogether different today. Not only this comrade had got back with the folded hands when the comrades were going against the decisions of the P.C., but also he had in actual practice assisted in the implementation of their decisions. Here we should bear in mind that this comrade had been of the opinion that the Manthana actions were on the correct lines and that they should have been extended. Therefore he assisted in the implementation of the decisions of the Khammam area comrades feeling that these decisions were or at least they might be correct.

Here it should be made clear that this comrade had never said either in the P. C. or in the convention or in front of the important comrades that the armed struggle should be launched immediately. Immediately after going back to the area from the convention, this comrade had set aside the P. C. decision and assisted in launching armed struggle. Thus this comrade had failed to observe minimum discipline.

The report sent earlier reads as under :

"... under the circumstances the comrades had not changed their opinion inspite of my warning that they were going against the Vijaywada decision, they would not have stopped unless a mandate was given. The determination of local comrades, Ravi's line of thinking, our experiences in Srikakulam keeping all these things in view I came to the conclusion that it was not correct to stop them by giving a mandate. I wanted to leave the responsibility for the decision to them and the lessons from the results." (12.6.1969)

All the important comrades of the area had attended the convention, participated in the discussions and voted for the collective decision. Had the importance of the decisions of the state convention been explained to them, all of them would have admitted that their decisions were wrong and that it was indiscipline to implement them. Under the circumstances the implementation of their decisions could have been stopped without the need of a mandate. Had the comrades still insisted they should have been stopped with a mandate. It is correct to give a mandate that way. But the P.C. representative had not adopted such a correct method.

Instead he tried to apply the experiences we had with the Srikakulam comrades. But the situation with Srikakulam was different. That

committee had agreed to have only co-ordination relations with us. It rejected totally the principles of democratic centralism. They made it clear that they would implement the P. C. decisions to the extent they were agreeable to them and they would adopt their own independent decisions wherever the P. C. decisions were not agreeable to them. On this basis they would, instead of following the P. C. decisions, adopt their own decisions and take lessons from the experiences. These were only co-ordination relations.

In this way the P. C. representative has changed the relations of the State Committee and the Area Committee from the relations based on the principles of democratic centralism to co-ordination relations. In a situation when the democratic centralism should be strengthened, it is needless to say as to how seriously would this damage our organisation especially the organisation of armed struggle.

Here it is clearly evident not only from the saying that "we would take lessons from the results" but also from what they have done that in case of pagideru actions, happen to yield good results they had, by this tried to prove that the P. C. line is incorrect and the line implemented by the Area Committee comrades including himself is correct. Immediately after these actions in his report, he had, contrary to actual situation, furnished details saying that "the gains we have achieved are more than the losses we suffered." The fact is that we got disastrous results. In the Pagideru area our organisation got disrupted and our contacts with the people broken down, we have lost important comrades. Adopting decisions in violation of the decision of the State Convention to which they were also a party and deciding correctness of either of them by way of implementation is nothing but establishing an alternate centre in the Party. This is not only changing the Party's organisational line in this way.

This explanation makes it clear as to how disruptive are the organisational principles pursued by the P. C. representative. Some more instances can be found to show these methods are still being practised. Within three months from these actions and the resultant losses, they decided that in case if the guidance was not received by "1st October", they should carry out one or two actions and should on the basis of the results decide whether they should be continued or not. This is nothing but leaving Pagideru actions there and once again trying for the lessons anew. The P. C. had discussed all the aspects connected with it and come to some decisions. We should adopt decisions in accor-

dance with them and march forward. Since the P. C. centre is far removed from the Area, the Area Committee can take decisions within the confines of General line. But this is not what these comrades are doing now. To fix a date which is often not possible at times of repression and to say that they would go ahead with the implementation of their own decision in case if the guidance sought for is not received with the fixed date is nothing but making it clear that they have no need for the decisions of the State Committee.

We should also take note of another instance where in his activities were quite contrary to the decisions of the State Committee.

The State Committee, in its meeting of July (1969) had, due to certain specific reasons decided that a female comrade, who was working till then in the Area should not be sent back to the Area. This decision was adopted when Com Peddanna was himself present in the meeting. This comrade had gone to this area after the P. C. meeting. The Area Committee, had, in his presence, adopted a resolution asking the PC to send her back to the Area. Supporting the resolution of the A.C. he had written a letter 5.9.69 to the effect that "the A.C., had discussed about her work.

It is their desire that she be allotted to their area".

The text of the resolution runs as under:

"... After consideration, the A.C. in view of the present position of the movement permits that she may work in our area. It feels that this is essential in view of the need of the movement. In accordance with the decision of the P. S., we would be able to take work from them" (we have removed the concerned names because they are not so relevant for the subject.)

Only this resolution and the above letter were received in the P. C. center. It is clear that this comrade had not explained the P. C. decision when this resolution was moved in the A.C. This is not all. He had further tried to take her to the Area against the P. C. decision. In one of his letters to a Secretariat member he writes as under:

"We discussed her problem in the A.C. when I was coming from there. At present we are intensively propagating our programme among the masses. The A.C. has adopted a resolution to the effect that we would be able to intensify our propaganda among the woman if she is there, that we should make maximum use of the opportunities available upto October and that she should therefore be allotted the Khammam area. It is requested that the Secretariat should be persuaded to agree to it. It has also

resolved that in case IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONTACT THE SECRETARIAT, WE SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE TAKE HER BACK AND PUT TO WORK IN THE AREA FOREST AND OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE SECRETARIAT AFTERWARDS." (9-8-1969) (Emphasis ours).

We had, for certain reasons, decided that she should be sent back to the Area. Without explaining the reasons for it and without giving its explanation, it is wrong for the A.C. to adopt a resolution that she should be sent back to the Area. It is wrong for this comrade to sit back folded hands while the A.C. was adopting such a resolution. It is wrong to try to take her back to the Area without the concern of the State Committee. The decision to the effect that the Secretariat should be persuaded to this is nothing but a nominal decision. The comrade is fully aware of the fact that the Secretariat would not send her back to the area without the decision of the State Committee. Yet such a resolution was adopted. This is nothing but implementing his own decision under the guise of A.C. resolutions with utter disregard to the decisions of the State Committee.

The fact that he mentioned about taking her to the area in his letter to the Secretariat member alone and not in the A.C. resolution as well as in his letter sent to the P.C. centre should be taken note of.

It is clear that from the month of April to this day this comrade has not made any efforts to implement the main points of the "immediate programme" as well as the important decisions of the State Committee. When, contrary to this, the A.C. has adopted a programme different from it, he had not, as the representative of the State Committee given them the correct guidance to the effect that their programme was against the General line of the Party. He simply sat back without guiding them to adopt correct decisions. In the name of taking lessons from the results, he had actually been assisting them in the implementation of the decisions which were against the Party Line.

Owing to this, our line concerning the armed struggle has not been properly implemented. We had, in the past suffered losses. Serious organisational problems have cropped up now. Implementations of independent decisions with utter disregard to the P.C. decisions is important among them. The State Committee has to immediately decide upon them.

4. CONCLUSION

It is but natural that we faced a number of problems in the course of the revolutionary mass movement. But when instead of working in accordance with the decided policy, if we work

against it we would have to face a number of additional political and organisational problems. In this respect the actions of Khammam Area should be a lesson for us.

We had, in Khammam area launched the armed struggle before, the people were politically and organisationally prepared. We had to, owing to this, launch the armed struggle in the Warangal district also. As a result of this the role of the people in the armed struggle got reduced. The struggle weakens. This is exactly the experiences of a number of struggles.

We are functioning in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism. Only when we carryout the decisions adopted on the basis of collective discussion, would there be discipline within the party. But the actions of the Khammam area are such that they are against the decisions of the State Committee and also and such that they water down them. Owing to this a number of organisational problems have cropped up and caused serious damage to the advancement of the movement as well as to the unity of the Party.

The above explanation makes it clear that wrong time of thinking, the wrong practice of Com. Peddanna is solely responsible for the whole of this situation.

We are working in accordance with Marxism-Leninism-Thought of Mao-Tse-Tung. We are carrying out our work by applying this scientific theory to the conditions of our country. We should especially grasp the Mao's mass line, applying it to our conditions and successfully march forward. We would advance to the extent we succeed in this endeavour.

We are working in accordance with the revolutionary moral code.

We are working in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism. We would advance to the extent we succeed in the endeavour.

Comrades,

We hope that all the comrades would grasp these problems, take lessons from the experiences and march forward.

Let us march forward to victory.

1-10-1969.

'Victory is Ours'

State Committee,
Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist
Committee

