


The Chinese Speak Out for Justice

New China

Spring 1979
\$1.25

Chen Yong-gui on the Red Guards
Puerto Ricans in Peking
A Shopper's Guide to China



Fly to China all the way on JAL.



Now you can book your entire flight to Peking and Shanghai on one airline.

Japan Air Lines has convenient daily flights from New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles—plus three flights a week from Vancouver—to Tokyo.

And all the way, you'll enjoy the hospitality that has made JAL famous throughout the Orient. You'll sip fragrant green tea. You'll watch first-run films. And you'll be pampered with small courtesies like steaming hot towels.

For reservations and more information, see your travel agent or call Japan Air Lines.

	Mon Flt. #785 DC-8	Mon Flt. #786 DC-8	Wed Flt. #781 DC-8	Wed Flt. #782 DC-8	Fri Flt. #783 DC-8	Fri Flt. #784 DC-8	Sun Flt. #787 DC-8	Sun Flt. #788 DC-8
Tokyo LV	09:10		08:50		10:10		10:10	
AR		21:30		21:35		21:25		19:50
Osaka LV	10:15			20:30				18:45
AR				19:50				18:05
LV	10:55			16:40				14:55
Shanghai LV	12:45			15:50				
AR				14:05				
LV	13:35							
Peking LV		16:35				16:30		
AR	15:25		12:55		15:20		13:45	

JAPAN AIR LINES



New China

Published quarterly by the US-China Peoples Friendship Association

Spring 1979

Volume 5, Number 1

Kan Chong-Keong



Editorial Committee
Margaret M. Bald
Dell Bisdorf
Hugh Deane
Helen Gerson
Frank Kehl
Karen Kerpen
Stanley Marcus
Edith K. Vogel

Contributing Editors
James T. Caldwell
Tom Grunfeld
Vicki Garvin
Peter Perl
Fritz Silber
Ronni Sandroff
Susan Warren
UN Correspondent

Staff
Peggy Seeger
General Manager
Peter Schmidt
Business Manager
Ruth Misheloff
Copy Editor
Marc Jahr
Photo Editor
Kim Glover-Valdes
Subscriptions
Jack Berk
Distribution

Magazine Committee
Judith Arfer-Lang
Ed Bell
Kathy Chamberlain
Chairperson
Gladys Chan
Peter Chau
Helen Gee
Faye Glasser
Harold Glasser
Dorothy Loo Kehl
James Nesi
Ruth Nesi
Helen Rosen

National Publications Committee
Christy Cannon
Co-chairperson
Arthur Dana
Junella Haynes
Samuel Lazerow
Flora Ling
Kalamu ya Salaam
Mark Sheldon
Jan Ting
Co-chairperson
Dottie Uhl

Acknowledgments
Charles Coe
Rose Coe
Mary Heathcote
William Hinton
Marvin Hoshino
Sam Rosen
Randi Schmidt
Roma Simon

Hsinhua

Hsinhua

**The Best New Year's Resolution:
Full Diplomatic Relations** 4

A Shopper's Guide to China 7
How not to buy like a tourist by Jeffrey Berger

Watercolors and Oil 10
Reviews of current books

Detroit Youth in High Gear for China Trip 13
U.S. Report : Inner-City Youth Tour and San Francisco mural

Turning Point at Tian An Men 15
*William Hinton discusses how the people changed
the course of justice*

Modernization: Which Road Will China Take? 21
Bonuses, Red Banners, and Politics in Command
*Fredric M. Kaplan looks at moral encouragement and
material rewards*

The Struggle for Socialist Management
N. Patrick Peritore on ivages and Revolutionary Committees
Ambitious Plans and Careful Steps
Joan Robinson rebuts a critic of China

From East Harlem to China 30
An interview with Boricuas del Barrio

**The Red Guards: Making Revolution
and Making Mistakes** 34
*William Hinton talks with Chen Yong-gui about the lessons
of the Cultural Revolution*

Lu Hsun 41
Stanley Marcus on China's most important modern writer

USCPFA Addresses 47

© 1979 by the US-China Peoples Friendship Association. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Articles may not be reprinted or reproduced without permission. Published quarterly. Yearly subscription rates - domestic, \$4; foreign, \$5; institutional, \$8. NEW CHINA, 41 Union Square West, Room 721, New York, N.Y. 10003. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and at additional mailing offices. The opinions expressed in the signed articles are not necessarily those of NEW CHINA or the US-China Peoples Friendship Association.

The staff and volunteers wish to thank Paula Holland for her service as Subscriptions Coordinator

The Best New Year's Resolution: Full Diplomatic Relations

The normalization of U.S.-China relations is a stunning diplomatic maneuver. One would almost think that Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai were still directing the drama from backstage.

The negotiations were conducted in strictest secrecy, and the announcement was a total surprise. The diplomatic timetable is extraordinary: 17 days to actual normalization and roughly 100 days until full-scale embassies are established. And once again we saw personalized diplomacy when China's strongest leader, Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, came to Washington on January 29.

But what's behind the dramatic diplomacy? What are the payoffs for each side? It appears that both Washington and Peking see three kinds of payoffs: end of a historic headache, new levels of bilateral contact, and greater strategic leverage in Asia.

In historic terms, normalization means the end of a 30-year period in which the U.S. continued to back the losing side in the Chinese Civil War. It means that the U.S. fully acknowledges the Communist victory and the Nationalist defeat, withdraws its formal support for the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, and recognizes Peking as the only government for all of China. It represents a victory for Peking on its "three principles" for normalization - end of the U.S. embassy in Taipei, withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Taiwan, and termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Security Treaty, which will now lapse in December 1979.

Clearly it is a historic victory for China, but it should not be seen as a historic defeat for the U.S. Remarkably, Washington has managed to maintain the substance of its ties with Taiwan, while cutting itself loose from the fiction that Taipei represented the government of China.

U.S.-Taiwan trade, over \$5 billion in 1978, will continue after normalization, and will probably continue to grow in the years ahead. Other exchanges - cultural, scientific, academic, and athletic - will persist between the U.S. and the island of Taiwan.

Most important, it appears that Taiwan can defend itself against any foreseeable

military threat, and most observers think it very unlikely that mainland China would launch such an attack in any case. In short, Taiwan will retain its de facto independence and the U.S. will continue to enjoy multi-level contacts with the island.

Turning to bilateral contacts between the U.S. and China, the payoffs of normalization seem substantial for both sides. In the two years since Chairman Mao's death, China has committed itself to a program of rapid modernization and the new leadership looks to the developed countries for advance technology.

Now that the impediment of normalization has been removed, the Chinese will be moving to develop their U.S. connections in earnest - rapidly increasing trade in high-technology items, joint ventures with American corporations, loans from American banks, large numbers of Chinese students in American universities, and Chinese scientists at American research institutions.

From an American point of view, normalization will probably mean a growth in U.S.-China trade from the 1978 total of roughly \$1 billion to several billions a year in the 1980s. That trade, while we must be careful not to overplay the "China market," will probably be quite significant for the computer, electronics, oil drilling, construction, steel mill, and chemical industries.

Normalization will also mean a greater awareness of what is happening in China - as American press bureaus open in Peking, as larger numbers of students and academics reside in China, and as tourists by the tens of thousands take the China trip.

On a strategic level, we can also see substantial benefits for both Peking and Washington in the newly normalized relationship. Ever since the late 1960s, and especially since Mao's death, Chinese foreign policy has been focused on containing the Soviet Union. The Soviet "polar bear" is seen as China's No. 1 enemy.

Thus the Chinese take great pride in their successful 1978 diplomatic ventures, which they see as anti-Soviet: Chairman Hua Guo-feng's trip to Romania and

Yugoslavia, the signing of the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty, and, now, Sino-American diplomatic relations. From a Chinese point of view, a new anti-Soviet triangle has now emerged that links Peking, Washington, and Tokyo.

Washington also sees strategic benefits in Sino-American relations, but those benefits are not identical to the Chinese perception of them. Normalization closes the Cold War in our dealings with Asia, especially with China. It completes the process begun with ping-pong diplomacy and makes it unlikely that the U.S. and China will slip back into belligerent postures.

But most American policy-makers do not see normalization as an anti-Soviet gesture. Instead, they are looking to a new and more peaceful era in Asia, an era of improving relations among all the major powers in the region - China, Japan, the U.S., and the USSR. As such, the Washington strategists are hoping to move on parallel tracks in the months ahead: completing normalization with China, while reaching a successful SALT II agreement with the Soviets.

These payoffs - historic, bilateral, strategic - ought to be kept in mind as we watch the diplomacy of normalization in the months ahead. These are deep-seated factors that have drawn together the world's most populous nation and the world's most powerful nation.

Robert B. Oxnam, Director
China Council
Asia Society

Just a dozen years ago, when pressed to explain why the executive branch had failed to take significant initiatives toward a new China policy, a high State Department official apologized: "You've got to remember that it's only since the Fulbright hearings of last April [1966] that the public has shown any sign of receptivity." In response I said: "you seem to imply that it is the function of the Congress to lead public opinion in foreign policy and the function of the President to follow it." Jimmy Carter had to make up his mind whether he was a leader or a follower on China policy. He chose to lead.

For years it has been apparent that any American president courageous enough to recognize that Peking rather than Taipei is the capital of China would have a good

chance to normalize relations with the People's Republic. Some commentators claimed that there was no formula for resolving the diplomatic dilemma to the

satisfaction of both Washington and Peking. Yet, once Carter proved ready to break with the government that claimed to represent China from Taiwan, a delicately balanced formula was worked out, one that meets the conditions of each side.

Peking has won belated recognition as the only legitimate government of China and Washington has obtained its long awaited equal footing in China while still assuring the people of Taiwan of continuing American interest in their security.

We do not yet know all the nuances of the historic agreement, and subsequent developments often give meaning to understandings that seem less than crystal-clear. From this vantage point, however, it seems safe to say that, in completing the difficult task that Richard Nixon bequeathed to his successors, the President has demonstrated statesmanship of a high order. One can only hope that the Congress will now follow the President's lead and assure the fruits of his initiative.

Jerome Alan Cohen, Director
East Asian Legal Studies
Harvard Law School



Taiwanese students marched in the parade under a bright red banner. (Photo: P. Chau)



Over 2,000 people paraded in New York's Chinatown on January 1 to celebrate the beginning of full diplomatic relations. (Photo: P. Chau)

Normalization of relations between our two countries is certainly a step in the right direction for everyone concerned. For the United States government it is a very big step, but further steps remain to be taken. Thirty years have passed since the Revolution and these have been 30 years of American intervention in the internal affairs of China. We have now recognized these facts. We must continue to correct our previous mistakes. Normalization is the beginning of this correction.


Our loyalty to Taiwan remains unchanged because we state we will continue to sell arms. Chairman Hua Guo-feng said there should be no more arms sales to Taiwan and voiced objections to American insistence on continuing these sales. Our government must be careful not to oversell to Taiwan. Any arms sales should be for stability only and certainly should not include offensive weapons. Otherwise we will be continuing to interfere in Chinese affairs.

We are now in a position to remain neutral in China's domestic affairs. Only a small group in Congress opposes this; those who want to continue fighting the Cold War will seek all possibilities to do so. The issue is closed.

We can continue our relations with Taiwan socially, economically, and culturally. We will expand our business relations with Taiwan. Taiwan is still secure; it has nothing to worry about.

The unification of Taiwan and the mainland is still for the two sides to work out. If they don't want to get together, they

Invited
to visit
the People's Republic
of China?



China Education Tours
specializes in all types
of travel to China. Call
us if we can be of help to
you or your organization.

Travel arrangements by
Fresh Pond Travel, Inc.
179 West Central St.
Natick, MA 01760
(617) 655-6800 or
(800) 225-4897

won't. The people of Taiwan should be pleased. They have been at war officially for 30 years but now the chances of any real fighting have been greatly diminished.

John K. Fairbank
Francis Lee Higginson Professor
Emeritus of History
Harvard University

Normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China achieves a goal long desired by many Americans.

Even before 1949, the year of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, academic authorities and others placed full-page ads in the newspapers appealing for understanding of the Chinese people's struggle for independence and modern development. And before President Nixon's 1972 visit to China a good number of Americans, defying McCarthyism and the State Department regulations barring travel to China, saw new China for themselves and returned to spread knowledge about China in talks and articles.

The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy in the 1940s and the publication of *Far East Reporter* in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s both strove to bring facts to the American public to counter myths, misinterpretations, lies, and distortions about what was happening in China - facts which demonstrated that

there was a stable base for American friendship, trade, and diplomatic relations with the new China.

The visits of the American ping-pong team and President Nixon and his party increased popular interest in China, and in subsequent years tens of thousands of Americans went to see China for themselves.

President Carter's good news on December 15 was thus supported, if not caused by, the long and growing interest, concern, and pressure of many Americans.

The way is now open for progress in the building of many-sided, lasting relations between our two countries. Each of the peoples of the two countries has something to teach the other. The chief editor of the *Arizona Daily Star*, reporting on his October 1978 visit to China, quoted an American in China:

"There is medicine in China to heal the moral crisis in the United States and medicine in the United States to heal the technological crisis here."

Increasing numbers of Americans going to China will learn a lot about how to build a decent society. More and more Chinese coming to the U.S. will be studying techniques for the modernization of their society. This exchange will help solidify relations between our countries and peoples.

Maud Russell
Editor, *Far East Reporter*

We salute those people whose work over more than 30 years has enhanced understanding and friendly feelings toward the Chinese people. We heartily endorse the implementation by our government and the government of China of the Shanghai Communique signed by Mr. Nixon and the late Premier Chou En-lai in 1972. We look forward to a more stable world, a world where peace will bring greater morality and social justice to all people, a world where all children will walk hand in hand, free of fear, free of hunger, free of oppression. For those of us who have had this dream since the 1930s, this declaration of President Carter and Premier Hua Guo-feng is a momentous and joyous occasion. The year 1979 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Chinese Revolution and the coming of age of America. Long live the friendship between the American and Chinese people.

Dr. Sam and Helen Rosen
New York City

The members of the US-China Peoples Friendship Association rejoice in the realization of our goal of normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Now with this handicap removed our two countries are free to develop a full program of cultural, artistic, scientific, technological, trade, and

student exchange. Some specific areas under consideration are delegations in the fields of agriculture, seismic science, architecture and construction, medicine, oil, and technology.

We hope to see an expansion of trade which will benefit both the U.S. and China. China has vast reserves of oil which can benefit the world and the U.S. has advanced technology which can benefit the process of modernization of China.

The USCPFA will continue its task of bringing information about China to the American people in fulfillment of our primary objective of expanding friendship between our two peoples. Toward this end we have sponsored the visits of more than 5,000 Americans to China since 1972. In 1979 we will send approximately 3,000 more visitors.

We agree with President Carter that the U.S. has been isolated too long from a country with which we have had an extensive history of friendship. The achievement of normalization is an historic step in establishing peace and friendship not only between our two peoples and countries but for the whole world.

Frank Pestana
Unita Z. Blackwell
Co-chairpersons
US-China Peoples
Friendship Association

1979 China Tours



- 16- and 20-day tours
- Monthly departures
- Smaller groups (usually groups of 25)
- Bilingual escorts
- Professional tours
- Tours for special interest groups
- China National Day Tours (Sept. 21-Oct. 10)

Kuo Feng Corporation

30 Market Street, NYC 10002
(212) 431-7323

A Shopper's Guide to China

Shopping is one of the fringe benefits of visiting China. Many unique, attractive, and durable items are produced both for export and for use by the average Chinese. There are two types of places to shop, Friendship stores and Chinese shopping districts and department stores. The Friendship stores are reserved for foreign guests and sell many of the luxury items that either don't appeal to current Chinese tastes, like jewelry, or are out of the price range of the average citizen.

In Friendship stores you can buy intricate jade carvings, jewelry, silk fabric, clothing, paintings, scrolls, embroidery, and oriental rugs. None of these are cheap, but prices in China are lower than elsewhere and you are sure to get what you pay for. If you don't find what you want in these stores, or don't have enough time to browse, you can shop at the Yu Hua department stores and the Chinese Arts and Crafts stores in Hongkong. They carry products exclusively from the People's Republic and in many cases are better stocked than Friendship stores. The Chinese Arts and Crafts stores sell more expensive items, but both have prices comparable to those in China.

A recent U.S. Customs policy change has upped the duty-free allowance to \$300 per person. Antiques are not dutiable – but make sure a red stamp is attached to your purchase proving its authenticity. Friendship stores carry antiques, but the best selection is in the shops on Liu Li Chang Street in Peking, which is included on most itineraries in the capital. It is also the only place in China to buy stone rubbings, undoubtedly the best bargain of all.

To find the really inexpensive buys and unique items available nowhere outside of China, you have to go where the Chinese shop. In every city there is at least one shopping district and in every shopping district, one department store. None of the items they sell is high-priced and if you go in with \$100, you will be very hard-pressed to spend it all.

Of course you will find your own

treasures, but let me share some of mine with you. My favorite gift item is a "chop" – a signature stamp. These are usually made of marble or some other hard stone and topped with a carved figurine such as a Chinese dog. On the bottom your name is engraved, either in English or transliterated into Chinese characters. You can also have a Chinese name made up for you by your guide, based on the first syllable of your last name followed by one or two from your first. Mine came out Bai Jieh-fu. (See illustration.) Chops make attractive, personal gifts and can cost as little as \$3.00, depending on the type of stone and the number of characters. Since they are



custom-made, you must purchase them in a city where you will be staying at least two days. You will also want to get a beautifully decorated porcelain ink container with the customary red ink, available in Friendship and department stores.

While Chinese clothes tend to be plain and simple, this does not apply to household items. Enamelled metal washbasins and spittoons, great as planters, are always decorated with brightly colored designs, usually flowers or pandas. The same is true for the excellent-quality thermoses found everywhere in China. Cotton pillowcases delicately embroidered with flowers and landscapes and edged with ruffles are easily found in most department stores.

The plain-and-simple rule does not apply to children's clothes either – brightly colored T-shirts printed with the latest slogans, padded jackets, print hankies with multicolored pictures of minority children. Tell the salesperson your child's age and he or she will guess at a size (usually one size too big!). If you are planning to buy cotton products, you will need ration coupons which your guide can provide if given advance notice.

Most people want to buy a "Mao" jacket and hat. In fashion-conscious Shanghai, particularly in the No. 1 Department Store, you will find jackets and matching pants in a dozen styles and a variety of conservative colors. One millinery store on Xi Tan Road in Peking has a variety of "Mao" hats in summer-weight fabrics and vinyl as well as many types of peasant straw hats. ("Mao" jackets, incidentally, were introduced by Sun Yat-sen, leader of the 1911 Democratic Revolution. He in turn had brought them from Japan, where they were part of the students' uniforms.)

In stationery, you can buy notebooks with the name of the city you are visiting on the vinyl cover and pictures of the city inside. On Wang Fu-ting Street in Peking, there is an excellent bookstore which carries the largest selection of English books to be found in China and the latest Chinese posters. Any posters you don't find there, you're sure to find in Shanghai, the poster capital of China.

In the but-how-can-I-ever-get-it-home category are the plaster sculptures featured in another store on Wang Fu-ting Street, ranging from life-size busts of Mao and Lu Xun (Lu Hsun) to three-foot-high peasant and army scenes. They are as beautiful and inexpensive as they are heavy and breakable, a real find – if you can get them home. I have no suggestions about accomplishing this feat, but in general the hotel staff is very helpful in mailing packages. You can mail up to \$10 duty-free from your hotel each day. However, the hotels do not supply packing materials; these should be purchased while you are shopping.

You may also find time to squeeze in some shopping when you visit communes and towns in the countryside. The small village stores do not have as wide a selection as the city stores but occasionally you might find something unique, like the coat embroidered with a cat fishing which I bought for my daughter. Shopping in these stores will also give you a sense of what is available to the people in the area. At the Korean Minority Brigade Store I discovered a metal rice cooker that the salesgirl

JEFFREY BERGER, an assistant professor of philosophy at Community College of Philadelphia, recently returned from a shopping spree in China.



In the beautifully tended tea gardens of China, many varieties of gourmet teas are carefully plucked and manufactured.

Production of fine gourmet and broken graded teas have increased in quality and quantity since the founding of the People's Republic of China.

Unique teas such as Keemun, Yunnan, Pingsuey, Ching Wo, Jasmine, Rose, Magnolia, Lychee, Gunpowder and Young Hyson are available in bulk and in ornamental tins.

China's exquisite teas are available through

西北中國出入口公司

CHINA PRODUCTS NORTHWEST, INC.

2207 Seattle Tower, Seattle, Washington 98101

Seattle
(206)622-6010

Chicago
(312)537-3460

New York
(516)887-3338

Discounts available to non-profit organizations promoting U.S.-China relations

assured me was superior to the type used by the Han Chinese for sealing in flavor. This pot, originally made for the Koreans, has also become popular with the Chinese.

Souvenirs are as popular with Chinese tourists as with foreign guests. At our guesthouse in the Daqing (Taching) oil field we were able to buy notebooks, enameled teacups with lids, buttons, thermoses, and tea holders, all with a colorful Daqing emblem.

Your guide will undoubtedly arrange to go shopping with your group at least once. But don't feel shy about going out on your own for a more leisurely tour. Cabs are relatively inexpensive, and your cab will wait for you while you shop. If you go by bus, take a piece of stationery from your hotel and someone will make sure you get on the right bus going back.

Hand gestures are usually an effective means of communication since the clerks, as well as other shoppers, treat foreigners as honored guests and are willing to spend time to see that you get what you want. Or you can take an English-Chinese dictionary and point to the appropriate characters. The only Chinese you should need is "you mei you," (pronounced "yoh may yoh"), "do you have?" If the answer is "you," they have it. If it's "mei you," they don't. Anything more and you are on your own. You are probably being told where to find what you asked for. On one occasion a customer escorted me to a nearby store to help me get what I wanted. I had been trying to buy a straw hat I saw in a shop window in Peking and didn't understand whether the salesperson was indicating the next counter or the next shop. Finally a bystander took my hand and led me down the street to the right place.

Often other shoppers will point you to the front of the line. It is polite to accept. In any case, they are likely to insist, so you will have no choice. Because there is no bargaining in stores, your lack of Chinese won't be a barrier. Furthermore, you are guaranteed that prices do not go up at the sight of a foreigner coming. And since prices are the same throughout China, if you see something you like, buy it. Another reason not to wait until the next city is that some items are produced and sold only regionally. For example, the only place I saw silk-embroidered baby carriers was in the Friendship Store in Guangzhou (Kwangchow). And the only place I found blue batik peasant cloth was in the Friendship Store in Peking.

Finally, remember to get a green canvas bag with "Shanghai" or "Peking" stenciled on the side to carry back all your treasures. These are also a favorite with Chinese tourists. Good shopping - and don't forget to bring back something for me. ●

ONLY IN ROMANIA CAN YOU FIND THE ORIGINAL



DR. ANA ASLAN'S FAMOUS GERIATRIC TREATMENT

Did you ever wonder why certain world-renowned actors, actresses, writers and statesmen seemed to have the secret of eternal vigor and youth? Have you noticed that many of them have made the pilgrimage to Dr. Aslan's clinics in Romania?

Only in Romania can you receive the life-revitalizing benefits of the original Gerovital treatment. In clinics under the supervision of the great Dr. Aslan, specialists experienced for over 30 years administer Gerovital along with stimulating physiotherapy and the mineral waters of Romania's spas.

**2 WEEK ALL-EXPENSE TOUR INCLUDES TRAVEL,
TREATMENTS AND ENTERTAINMENT FOR \$1200** Double occupancy

- Transatlantic round-trip flights and Bucharest airport transfers
- All meals and accommodations (deluxe and first class)
- Medical treatments and consultation. X-ray, lab tests, prescriptions and medication
- Sightseeing in and around Bucharest, the Carpathian Mountains; opera, theater, nightclubs (optional)

ROMANIAN NATIONAL TOURIST OFFICE Dept. ...
573 Third Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 697-6971

Please send full information on geriatric treatments and tours in Romania

Name _____

Address _____


City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Visit Romania en route to the People's Republic of China.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WORLD

The People's Republic of China

vast, mysterious,
far-away
or is it?



The
US~China
Peoples
Friendship
Assn.

invites you to **EXPERIENCE CHINA**

1979 CHINA STUDY TOURS NOW BOOKING

13 days in China
\$2400 — \$2825
19-day all-inclusive tours
includes enrichment program

The beauty and excitement of
PEKING & CANTON
and/or 1 to 3 other cities

Contact your China Study Tours regional office for our 1979 brochure.

**China Study Tours
East**
P.O. Box 707
Stony Brook, NY 11790
(516) 331-9058

**China Study Tours
Midwest**
P.O. Box 793
Detroit, MI 48232
(313) 868-0082

**China Study Tours
South**
P.O. Box 5939
Austin, TX 78763
(512) 454-6607

**China Study Tours
West**
635 South Westlake Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90057
(213) 483-6060

**China Study Tours
Hawaii**
P.O. Box 1613
Honolulu, HI 96806

Watercolors and Oil

The Death of Woman Wang. By Jonathan D. Spence. The Viking Press, New York, 1978. 169 pp. Cloth, \$10.95. "As Jen's hands drove deeply into her neck, woman Wang reared her body up from the bed, but she could not break free. His hands stayed tight around her throat and he forced his knee down into her belly to hold her still. Her legs thrashed with such force that she shredded the sleeping mat, her bowels opened, her feet tore through the mat to the straw beneath, but his grip never slackened and none of the neighbors heard a sound as woman Wang died."

Thus Jonathan Spence describes how, in mid-17th-century China, woman Wang was murdered by her husband. Woman Wang was not an innocent. She had just returned to her husband after attempting to run away with another man. Still, even by the laws of that time, her husband was justified in murdering her only if he caught her in the act of adultery and could not control his rage.

The story of woman Wang is one of the tales Spence tells about peasants in an obscure, poverty-stricken county in Shandong (Shantung) Province. His purpose is to give an idea of what life was like for people "who were below the educated elite" and had no bureaucratic connections or lineage organizations to help them through constant times of trouble.

The stories are woven together in montage form, most of them only a few pages long. Each of the five chapters has a central theme around which the stories and related facts (earthquakes, famines, law, geography) revolve to build a fuller picture.

Spence draws his facts and narratives, both true and fictionalized, primarily from three sources: a local history of the county compiled in 1673, a magistrate's handbook written in the 1690s, and the contemporaneous works of a fiction writer, a number of which appear in their entirety. The first chapter - "The Observers" - sets the scene for the rest of the book and also deals with the lives of the authors of the three works.

The total effect of the book is almost that of an oral history. It makes absorbing and

sometimes shocking reading - the times were horrible for the poor of China, as they continued to be until Liberation in 1949. And despite the fact that Spence is a scholar, the book is written with a popular audience in mind, although there are notes and a long bibliography for those who want to explore the subject further.

The picture Spence gives is far from complete. (He himself points out that his sources were limited.) It would take a much longer book, or perhaps a historical novel, to describe precisely how the poor lived during that semi-feudal period, including their relationship to the other classes in society. Spence touches on this infrequently, and often lumps the peasantry and gentry together and portrays the government as the enemy of both. Little is mentioned of the role played by local or absentee landlords. Still, the book should be read for what it offers, which will keep the reader interested throughout. - STANLEY MARCUS

China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead? By Selig S. Harrison. Columbia University Press, New York, 1977. 317 pp. Cloth, \$12. Some economists predict that by 1990 the Chinese can achieve an oil production level equal to Saudi Arabia's (400 million tons). The "conflict ahead" of Harrison's title concerns major offshore drilling programs in waters also claimed by Japan, North and South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Chiang regime in Taiwan. Harrison traces the development of China's thinking on law-of-the-sea policies, as well as the policies of other East Asian states. This discussion is helpful in clarifying issues and identifying possible future conflicts, especially for those who have been following the international Law of the Sea Conference.

China, Oil and Asia begins with an assessment of China's oil potential and describes the economic and political factors that will influence its development. There is a country-by-country discussion of East Asia, with chapters on oil and the future of Taiwan, Korea, and China's substantial oil connection with Japan. The implications and importance of China's energy policy are also well analyzed.



"The Legendary He-He Brothers with a Frog" by Xu Bei-hong (Hsu Pei-hung). From *Chinese Watercolors*.

In addition, Harrison provides detailed maps and technical explanations of the pros and cons of possible Chinese policies relating to the level of future oil exports, including the economic and political advantages to China of using its tremendous oil resources. The book, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, provides enough detailed information to satisfy the reader who has a deep interest in the field. For those who want only an introduction to China's oil potential and policy, a shorter treatment might suffice. - GORDON MCNICOL

The Committee of One Million: "China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971. By Stanley D. Bachrack. Columbia University Press, New York, 1976. 371 pp. Cloth, \$14.95. The 1950s and 60s were the heyday of a virulent pressure group known as the China Lobby. The group helped create an atmosphere in

which resolutions opposing admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN were unanimously approved in Congress. Debate about China was ordered off-limits to West Point and Annapolis debating societies, apparently to avoid "confusing" future officers. A few dissenting voices advocated a two-China policy and were accused of being "soft" on communism. Those who wrote favorably about the PRC were targets of harsh invectives, as in a long Senate speech in 1966 called "Red China's Man in America," which accused writer Felix Greene of being an agent.

That 1966 speech was written by a public relations firm and paid for by the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the UN, the guts of the China Lobby. Reprints of the speech were included in the kits supplied to congressional candidates that fall, and a majority of congressmen belonged to the committee. The group lobbied indefatigably in Washington, sent out huge mailings, produced books and films (one was titled *Red China - Outlaw*), planted articles in friendly publications such as *Reader's Digest*, circulated petitions, and ran full-page ads in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. It had close links with William Buckley's *National Review* and a consortium of conservative and right-wing groups. But much of its effectiveness was due to its success in enlisting liberal Democrats, notably Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois. What the liberals didn't know was that the committee was working covertly with the Taiwan embassy.

Stanley Bachrack's informative account of the committee's 18-year history makes an excellent complement to Ross Y. Koen's pioneering volume, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, which was withdrawn from publication by the Macmillan Company in 1960 because of State Department and right-wing pressure and finally appeared in 1974.

Bachrack makes good use of a new source, the papers of the Committee's secretary and principal operating officer, Marvin Liebman, on deposit at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto. He is able to throw light on the false charges, made much of by the committee, that the PRC was engaged in international drug trafficking. Henry J. Anslinger, U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics, repeatedly made headlines with the allegations, which some believed because of his official position. But narcotics agents in the field said Anslinger had no proof whatsoever and accused him of impairing the agency's credibility.

Bachrack speculates that the committee may have been the brainchild of the CIA, but the evidence is circumstantial. His suit to force the CIA to reveal this information

was thrown out of court. He also puzzles over the source of a vast increase in the committee's funds before its final defeat in 1971. Could Taipei have poured money into the lobby in a last-ditch attempt to keep the PRC out of the UN?

Members of the USCPFA will be particularly interested in Bachrack's information on such antecedent friendship organizations as the Committee for the Review of Our China Policy (based on the West Coast) and Americans for Reappraisal of Far Eastern Policy (created at Yale). — HUGH DEANE

Chinese Watercolors. Text by Josef Hejzlar. Photographs by B. Forman. Octopus Books, Ltd., London, 1978. 170 pp. Cloth, \$10.95. This stunning book contains 100 full-color reproductions of Chinese watercolors plus many black-and-white illustrations from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The paintings are marvelous examples of the Shanghai School, whose greatest artists include Qi Bai-shi (Chi Pai-shih) and Wang Pin-hong (Huang Pin-hung). Many of these works were done during the years just before and immediately after Liberation and illustrate the continuity of one of the most important styles of traditional Chinese painting.

The author gives an overview of Chinese art history with emphasis on this free-spirited tradition that existed as early as the Sung Dynasty (about 1000 A.D.). It was the tradition of the non-court painters, who were often called eccentrics and wild men. In their loose, intuitive, not formally structured style, the ink and color are brushed directly on the paper without outlines — a technique diametrically opposed to the meticulous and mannered tradition of the court. This intuitive style has appeared in every century of Chinese art, and the Shanghai School continues it even today.

The paintings show some influence of Japanese woodcuts and of modernists like Matisse but it is the connection with and continuation of the past that make these paintings uniquely Chinese. A fresh beauty, intimacy, directness, and strength are visible in their interpretation of nature, which is their most important subject. There are also refreshing and humorous human characterizations.

The book contains excellent biographies of Qi Bai-shi and Wang Pin-hong, as well as other great masters who are little known in the U.S. Today, after a period of eclipse during the Cultural Revolution, the Shanghai School has reappeared for the first time since the 1950s as a dominant trend. Exhibitions of their works and those of their young followers are being held in major Chinese cities. — RUTH NESI



People's Republic of CHINA

Monthly Departures for 1979

PEKING • SHANGHAI
CHENGCHOW • SINCHIANG
SIAN • NANKING • NANNING
SHENYANG • KWEILIN

"People to people participation developing friendship through cultural appreciation, historical understanding, and educational experiences. An in-depth view of modern 'China's' achievements since the revolution."



TRAVEL HEADQUARTERS
Specialists in Asia Travel
21 Lafayette, Circle
Lafayette, CA 94549
(415) 283-5404

Group applications now being accepted for 1979

RARE CHINESE TEAS

From the People's Republic of China

Enjoy the teas that only visitors to China have the opportunity of tasting. China's tea-graders judge these to be the best China produces. Every year only limited quantities are available, and these teas are unsurpassed in leaf, brew, and flavor. Each tea comes in its own distinctive Chinese-designed tin. For information on our complete line of Chinese teas, please send for free brochure.



<input type="checkbox"/> Please send me free brochure on complete line of Chinese teas	
<input type="checkbox"/> Please send me samples @ \$2.00 for each tea checked:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Please send me the following tea(s) packed in beautiful tins:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Spring Sprouting Jasmine, Spring crop's finest (5 oz)	9.50
<input type="checkbox"/> Goddess of Mercy Oolong, Champagne of Oolongs (5 oz)	8.50
<input type="checkbox"/> China Keemun Black, The original English breakfast (10 oz)	7.50
<input type="checkbox"/> Dragon Well Green, Best known Chinese green tea (7 oz)	7.50
<input type="checkbox"/> Special Gunpowder, Pearl-like leaf, flavorful green (10 oz)	7.50

I enclose my check or M.O. (no CODs please) for \$ _____
(Add \$1.00 for handling and shipping.)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

East Horizon Import Corp., Dept. NC
35 Walker St., New York, N.Y. 10013

Peking Alphabetic Dictionary

By **TIANN Honng Wenn**

田 红 文

Available in four volumes:

- Volume I Chinese-English
- Volume II Pinxxie-English
- Volume III English-Pinxxie
- Volume IV Computer code-Chinese

The Pinxxie System

The Peking Alphabetic Dictionary is the result of new research based on the Pinxxie (拼写) principles:

- Pinyin (Pinvin) by the Committee of Language Reform in Peking
- The letter-doubling technique for the four tones e.g., **ma** (*mā*), **mma** (*má*), **mmaa** (*mǎ*), **maa** (*mà*)
- The use of the letter **v** as a silent letter, e.g., **vi** = yi
- The use of silent endings for Han radicals, e.g., **-xx** = 女 as in **Maxx** (妈); **-yj** = 广 as in **Mmayj** (麻); none in **Mmaa** (马); **-dd** = 骂 as in **maadd** (骂)
- Capitalized nouns
- The use of block letters for surnames, e.g., **ZHOU Enxn Llai**

This Pinxxie dictionary has the power to facilitate English translation and to transcribe both classical Chinese (Haanzii) as well as modern spoken language (Putonghua) in one unified phonetic alphabetic system.

The Pinxxie system eliminates the use of diacritic marks through the letter-doubling technique and can distinguish the different homophones by the silent word endings.

LETTER-DOUBLING FOR THE FOUR TONES

ma (*mā*) **mma** (*má*) **mmaa** (*mǎ*) **maa** (*mà*)

SILENT ENDINGS FOR RADICALS

Maxx (妈) **Mmayj** (麻) **Mmaa** (马) **maadd** (骂)
 mama hemp horse curse

Pinxxie means every Chinese character can now be written **uniquely** with the alphabet.

Revolutionary Contribution

The Peking Alphabetic Dictionary is a revolutionary contribution to the Chinese language reform in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions: "The written language must be reformed; it should travel the common direction of the phonetic alphabet of the world's languages."

“文字必須改革，要走世界文字共同的拼音方向。”

“Wenzii biixu ggaaigge, yao zzoou Shijie Wenzii goongtonngde Pinvin Fangxiaang.”

Simplified Character Alphabet

To preserve cultural continuity with the entire sinology, the simplified character alphabet uses 26 letters which integrate latin letters with Chinese characters.

PA	IB	IC	DI		
阿	伯	词	的		
IE	IF	IC	DI		
俄	佛	歌	喝		
I	打	秋	L	模	恩
一	机	科	了	模	恩
OP	IP	Q	R	思	特
喔	坡	期	日	思	特
U	V	W	X	Y	子
乌	世	我	希	了	子

ORDER FORM: PEKING ALPHABETIC DICTIONARY

Volume I Chinese-English @ \$50.00/copy * \$ _____
 Volume II Pinxxie-English @ \$25.00/copy \$ _____
 Volume III English-Pinxxie @ \$25.00/copy \$ _____
 Volume IV Computer code-Chinese @ \$25.00/copy \$ _____
 Subtotal \$ _____
 Plus 5% for postage & handling \$ _____
 TOTAL \$ _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Send this order form with your check or money order to:
 World Journal Press, P.O. Box 859, East Lansing, MI 48823
 *limited number available.

Detroit Youth... and San Francisco Mural

Detroit Youth in High Gear for China Trip

Few Americans have worked harder or more collectively to visit China than the two dozen young people who make up the Detroit Inner-City Youth Tour. Ranging in age from 14 to 26 and coming from predominantly working-class families, they mirror the auto capital's Black, Latino, and white population. They are currently working to raise \$42,000 for an 18-day trip through the People's Republic this March.

The Youth Tour grew out of the USCPFA's work in the Latino barrios of southwest Detroit. The group has learned a great deal from the experience of a similar Philadelphia youth tour in 1975. The project did not spring to life, however, until one young Detroit, Angelo Figueroa, returned from China in December 1977 with a strong commitment to help other low-income minority people make the same trip. Although he is now a full-time firefighter for the city of Detroit, he spends just as much time and energy building friendship between the American and Chinese people.

"When I came back I had to share what I'd seen," says Figueroa. "I had to help give others the same gift China had given me."

Figueroa and a Detroit USCPFA member soon convinced a dozen young Latinos that they also could visit China, a country that had given its own young people respect and responsibilities. This core group reached out to Detroit's young Blacks and whites and soon grew to 25 members. In February 1978 they elected their own steering committee to provide the necessary leadership to guide the group's work.

No one had any illusions that getting to China would be easy. Enthusiasm stayed high but everyone was aware that a great deal of hard work was bringing in only a trickle of funds. By summer 1978 the group had raised only a few thousand dollars beyond the \$8,000 that its members had pledged to raise personally among families and friends. There had also been some problems and letdowns. Some young people had drifted away as months of



The peasant paintings of China inspired this mural at China Books, 2929 24th Street, San Francisco. (Photo: P. Horner)

silence followed the group's application to the Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries in China. Even though most tour members expected that their request was being seriously considered, the long wait tested their resolve. On one occasion they had to cope with the effects of not being taken seriously by the US-China Peoples Friendship Association, and they also had to work out problems of competition and possible disappointment, since not all members would be making the trip.

Nevertheless, they had put this time to good use by learning as much as they could about the People's Republic. Osvaldo Rivera, a barrio youth organizer from Puerto Rico, heads the Youth Tour's internal education committee. The committee's educationals on normalization, workers, youth, and national minorities in China contributed enormously to the group's political growth. The impact of these sessions and months of collective work can best be gauged by the participants' changing motives for visiting China.

"I'd never heard about the new China when I got into this," says Wanda Redmond, 17, a student at Detroit's

Central High, "All I wanted was to see another country. Now I've got a better reason. The Chinese have accomplished so much so fast that I'm sure we can learn from them and practice some of their ways over here."

Sandra King, 19, agrees. "Maybe we can learn how to unite people, how working people can stick together instead of going all-out for themselves."

Far from hoarding its new understanding of China, the Youth Tour has become a model for successful outreach work. It has put together a Detroit-China slide show and shown it in homes, schools, teen centers, and social service agencies. Its members have appeared on local radio shows, and they launched an "East Meets West" bike rally through downtown Detroit that made the *Detroit News* front page in July.

As summer ended the group was greatly heartened by news that China had accepted its application and by a faster flow of funds. Several Detroit USCPFA members formed a support committee that has begun to raise money throughout lower Michigan. At the San Francisco USCPFA convention an

New York's Great Chinese Restaurants

*



RAYMOND A. SOKOLOV

Uncle Tai's Hunan Yuan

1059 3rd Ave. (bet. 62nd and 63rd Sts.) • 838-0850

DAVID K's

1116 Third Avenue (65th St.) N.Y.C. • 371-9090

Szechuan East

1540 2nd Avenue, cor. of 80th Street • 535-4921

Each offers a wide selection of ORIENTAL DISHES at its finest...but "ONE TASTE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS"...so drop in soon at your most convenient location for LUNCH or DINNER

*Uncle Tai's rated four stars 1/23/73

additional \$8,000 was earmarked for the tour.

There is still much work to do before the trip finally takes place in March 1979. While the group has tried hard to generate sizable chunks of money, it has relied mainly on small contributions. In this way the Youth Tour members have built the broadest kind of support for their trip.

Meanwhile, the disbelief that once greeted the group has given way to admiration. "One youth's mother wouldn't hear of the trip when first told about it last year," says Sue Chandler. "She thought it was a terrible idea. Then her daughters got after her and told her of all that was happening in China. Now *she* wants to go!"

There is still time to make a tax-deductible contribution to help send these young people to China. Please send a check or money order immediately to: Detroit Inner-City Youth Tour, 1926 Central, Detroit, MI 48209. Make it payable to the US-China Peoples Friendship Association and indicate that it is for the Youth Tour. — DETROIT SUPPORT COMMITTEE

San Francisco Mural

The Huhsien peasant painting exhibition which toured six U.S. cities in 1977-78 has inspired a work of people's art in San Francisco's multinational Mission District.

A dazzling 480-square-foot mural, commissioned by China Books and Periodicals to commemorate the Huhsien tour, combines scenes and motifs from several peasant paintings with strong images that evoke the experience of the many Third World peoples who live in "the Mission." The work was created by the Precita Eyes Muralists. Like the artists of Huhsien, they are spare-time painters who involve community people in their art, seeking out their ideas and criticisms and encouraging their participation in the actual painting.

"In the process of studying the peasant paintings, and viewing films and reading books and magazines" from China, the muralists have written, "we learned much about the New China. As painters we were impressed with the joyous vitality of the colors and patterns. We took from these references what we felt were our common goals: that all men, women, and children of the world unite and share the world's resources. Our struggle is against nature and not against one another."

In the center of the mural, beneath the terraced hills and the bright dawn sun, is a Friendship Bridge. On it, standing closely together, are depicted the people who live in the Mission community — "an expression of our friendship to the peasant painters and a hope that someday we shall meet one another." — ELEANOR MICHAEL

Travel Anywhere and Everywhere

Complete arrangements for
individuals and groups to
China and all around the world

FOCUS ON TRAVEL

11-16 154th Street
Whitestone, NY 11357
(212) 767-5455

Moving?

The post office will not forward second-class mail. In order not to miss an issue of **NEW CHINA**, send both your new address and the mailing label from a recent issue directly to us four weeks in advance. Thank you!

New China
Subscription Dept.
41 Union Sq. West
Room 721
New York,
N.Y. 10003

Turning Point at Tian An Men

*William Hinton discusses
how the people changed the course of justice*

New China: In mid-November wall newspapers suddenly began to appear in great numbers in Peking. Large crowds gathered to listen to speakers, some of whom raised questions concerning democratic rights. A few posters even criticized Mao Tsetung's role in the Cultural Revolution. What caused all this to surface at this time?

William Hinton: The immediate stimulus for this public debate was a November decision by the Peking Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that the Tian An Men incident of April 1976 was revolutionary and not counter-revolutionary as it had been designated at the time by the CCP Central Committee, and, so far as most people knew, by Mao Tsetung himself. Deng Xiao-ping (Teng Hsiao-ping) said that this new decision was approved by the Central Committee, that it was in fact a decision of the Central Committee. All this transformed the political atmosphere in Peking.

NC: Why should a decision about a demonstration two years earlier so influence the political climate?

WH: Because the Tian An Men incident was not just another scuffle in the square, not just a clash between two factions, it was



At the Friendship Farm in Heilungkang Province in fall 1978. (Photo: courtesy of W. Hinton)

an outpouring of popular sentiment and protest that changed the course of Chinese history. Many people in China think it is as important as, if not more important than, the May 4th Movement of 1919, which is often taken as the starting point of China's modern history.

In 1919 the main threat to China came

from abroad. At Versailles the Allies agreed to turn over German territories and privileges in China to the Japanese. A weak national government, dependent on foreign aid and paralyzed by threats of intervention, prepared to sell out the nation. Massive action by the people, protest demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts forced the government to reject the treaty. It was imposed anyway, but the May 4th activists went on to develop a movement that challenged not only all imperialist intervention in China but the right of the compradors and landowning gentry to rule the country.

In 1976 the main threat to China came from a small group inside the Chinese Communist Party that used ultra-left rhetoric and astute political maneuvering to attain decisive power in certain localities such as Shanghai and Shenyang and to control such areas as culture, propaganda, and education on a national scale. This group, the "gang of four," was preparing to seize supreme power as Mao Tsetung neared death. The Party organization was all but paralyzed in the face of its manipulations.

Suddenly, in April, massive intervention



A caustic condemnation of government officials who engage in criminal activities is included in these wall posters that appeared on a Peking street in December 1978. In November 1978 government support of the events at Tian An Men encouraged the expression of a wider range of criticisms. (Photo: P. Schmidt)

by the people exposed the rotten situation, galvanized resistance to the “four” all across the nation, and created the political climate and the political conditions necessary for a showdown. The Tian An Men incident was like a flash of lightning, illuminating and energizing the whole nation. Without it, it would have been very hard for Hua Guo-feng to rally the majority that eventually confronted the “four.” Without it, they might well have taken power, thus precipitating civil war.

NC: We previously understood only that the Tian An Men incident was an outpouring of sentiment for Premier Chou En-lai. Why do you say that the target was the “gang of four”?

WH: Chou En-lai’s death and funeral in January 1976 became the focus of struggle between the “four” and the rest of the Communist Party and the people. Chou alive was the primary target of the “four.” After his death, mourning developed into a mass movement with political content that threatened to expose the “four.” They therefore cut short the period of mourning in January and ordered all wreaths, flowers, and other tokens of respect removed overnight from Tian An Men Square. Frustrated and angered by this order, the people chose the next appropriate moment, April 4, 1976, as a day to honor Chou. This was the date

of the spring festival when the Chinese traditionally honor the dead, visit their ancestors’ graves, and sweep everything clean. As this date approached, the number of people visiting the square increased day by day until on April 4 the crowd numbered over two million (some say three million), which is between a third and a half of the total population of Peking. People brought with them wreaths, portraits, poems, and streamers dedicated to the Premier. Many of their poems and statements went further and attacked by name or easily identifiable symbols the Shanghai group of Jiang Qing (Chiang Ching), Yao Wen-yuan, and Zhang Chun-qiao (Chang Chun-chiao). Wang Hong-wen was not generally included as a target at the time.

NC: Can you cite any examples?

WH: One method was to use homonyms, Chinese characters with the same pronunciation, as substitutes for the real characters in the names intended. *Qing jiang* or “blue river” stood for Jiang Qing. The characters for “shaky bridge” and for “seen from afar,” both pronounced *yao qiao*, stood for Yao Wen-yuan and Zhang Chun-qiao.

One poem concluded:

As though those seen from afar
are innocent
While the Premier is tarnished! . . .

When you get to the root,
It’s the cliques of Shanghai
and Liaoning.
Overwhelmed by fame-seeking and
avarice,
Burning to set up their own dynasty,
Abducting the emperor to lead all
the others,
“Better Left than Right,” just like
Lin Biao’s clique.

The target could hardly be clearer. “Seen from afar” spells out Yao Wen-yuan and Zhang Chun-qiao. The Shanghai clique was well known to be Jiang, Yao, and Zhang. The Liaoning clique, headed by Mao’s nephew Mao Yuan-xing, was their closest collaborator. Their program, left in form but right in essence, carried on where Lin Biao left off.

The way many of the wreaths were made constituted a challenge to the “four.” Since the mourning wreaths had been removed overnight in January, people anticipated a similar provocation in April. Many made wreaths that would be hard to remove. Factory workers fashioned huge creations of iron and steel, some of which weighed tons and had to be put in place by a crane. “Let’s see the bastards carry these off,” they said.

NC: Some people say that all this iron and steel proves that the outpouring was not

spontaneous, that Party leaders in Peking, rightists using the Premier's name as cover, must have fanned up the incident.

WH: To me the iron and steel suggests the opposite. This is the kind of thing only workers would think up. It would be difficult indeed to order people to take this kind of trouble. Once workers made up their minds to make something heavy, they could certainly lay their hands on enough iron and steel. Almost every factory yard is piled with discarded equipment, scrap, odds and ends, new and old.

NC: Can one say then that the whole Tian An Men incident was a spontaneous mass movement of the people?

WH: No. That would not be entirely accurate. The mainstream was an outpouring of popular sentiment for Chou En-lai and against the "four." This reflected the main conflict in China at the time, the conflict between the "gang of four" and the people. But as with every major political event, there were other streams. Various forces with various axes to grind also put in an appearance. That is inevitable. In the course of a big upheaval like this, all political factions mix in, hoping to gain something, hoping to twist the events in their favor. Among those in the square shouting the loudest about their love for Chou En-lai were surely some rightists who hoped to use the terrible excesses of the "four" as an excuse for retreating from socialism altogether. Just as Lin Biao came forward as Mao's most faithful follower, so they posed as followers of Chou. Certainly the "four" also had people in the square. They were there not only to report on who was present, but also, if possible, to fan up violence which could then be blamed on others and used as evidence of counter-revolutionary intent. In the course of the factional struggles of the Cultural Revolution, provocation and counterprovocation had been developed into a high art, as each side tried to put the other in an unfavorable light. All this has historical precedent in China and also in the West. It is important to understand not only the main thrust of these events, but also their complexity and many-sidedness.

NC: In the end, fighting did break out in the square. Vehicles were overturned and set on fire, buildings stormed and set ablaze.

WH: Yes. The climax of the Tian An Men incident came on April 5 when people discovered that all their wreaths, poems, and other mementos had been removed overnight from the square, even those made of steel. This removal must itself be seen as a major act of provocation, for it could not help but enrage the population of the city. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands again turned out to protest. New poems were posted. Speakers stood up everywhere

"The Tian An Men incident was like a flash of lightning, illuminating and energizing the whole nation."

to commemorate Chou and condemn the "four." Angry groups confronted the security forces and demanded the return of the wreaths and placards. In the midst of this tense confrontation a student from Qinghua (Tsinghua) University in Peking where the "four" had set up their National Liaison Station began to denounce Chou En-lai and call him a capitalist-roader. The student was attacked by bystanders, manhandled, and hauled off to the police station at Congchun (Chungchun) Park for "punishment." A loudspeaker van issuing a call for everyone to leave the square was overturned, its speakers smashed. The broadcaster himself, when pulled from the van and asked to shout slogans in support of Chou En-lai, complied.

An angry crowd gathered in front of the joint command post, a small building from which orders were issued to PLA (People's Liberation Army) and militia units. People demanded the return of their wreaths and the release of all people arrested the day before. When nobody could be found to

talk to the command post, vehicles were overturned and burned. Finally the command post itself was set on fire.

Toward evening the Public Security Bureau, commanded by a Shanghai man brought in by the "four," ordered the square cleared. Police and soldiers with guns and clubs descended on the crowd, ordered them to disperse, clubbed and kicked people at random, and arrested over two hundred.

In the days that followed, a citywide hunt began for all those who had been in the square during four days of demonstrations. Each factory, each office, and each school was supposed to make a thorough investigation and turn in the names of all culprits. Thus began a campaign of suppression that threatened a major part of the population of the city.

This witchhunt developed into a political test for all cadres. Those who tried to carry it out live to this day under a cloud. Those who resisted it won the confidence of the people. The Tian An Men incident stands



On April 5, 1976, over one-third of the population of Peking filled Tian An Men Square to express their love of Chou En-lai and oppose the tyranny of the "gang of four." Without this massive display of public indignation, the Communist Party might not have been able to achieve a showdown with the "four." (Photo: J. Duray)

"People took to the streets, fed up with phony egalitarianism, cultural sterility, and arbitrary political condemnations."

as a critical touchstone for separating the gang of four, their followers, and all opportunists who followed orders because they were orders, from the people and the cadres who stood with them, even if only by dragging their feet.

NC: You have compared the Tian An Men incident to the May 4th Movement, but wasn't the former confined to the city of Peking while the latter stirred up the whole nation?

WH: The April movement to honor Chou and expose the "gang" was also nationwide. One of the first public actions took place in Nanjing (Nanking). On March 29 large numbers of people there protested thinly veiled attacks on Premier Chou in the Shanghai *Wen Hui Bao*, a newspaper edited by the "four." They put up slogans and marched to Yuhuatai Hill to place wreaths in honor of Chou En-lai. Slogans such as "We will never give up until the sinister boss behind the *Wen Hui Bao* is ferreted out" were written large on Peking-bound

trains and spread the campaign the whole length of the railroad. Peking residents responded with wreaths and poems in Tian An Men Square on March 30. On April 4, as the crowds in the square swelled to over two million, people in many other cities began to follow suit. Tributes to Chou En-lai laced with anger at the "four" took on a nationwide character and so did the countercampaign of suppression and arrests. A student acquaintance of mine traveling to Shandong (Shantung) Province told me he put up posters at every railroad stop. Others traveling in other directions did the same. Since all communications systems in China are designed with Peking as hub, liaison across the country, even by word of mouth, is particularly rapid. This was proven over and over again in the Cultural Revolution as various Peking Red Guard headquarters mobilized supporters in distant cities for joint action in a matter of hours.

What occurred in late March and early

April 1976 was a nationwide explosion of anger at the "four." People took to the streets, fed up with empty "left" rhetoric, phony egalitarianism, cultural sterility, factional favoritism, factional disruption, and arbitrary political condemnations, detentions, and arrests.

NC: Why did you say earlier that the Party organization was paralyzed?


WH: The word may be too strong, but how else can one describe the situation in 1976 after Chou En-lai died and Mao became gravely ill? The "four," monopolizing access to Mao and taking complete control of the media, produced whatever Mao quote they needed to carry through a counterattack on Deng Xiao-ping. Deng had been appointed Acting Premier with Mao's approval in 1975 to correct some of the excesses perpetrated by Lin Biao and the "four," get production moving, and reverse verdicts on countless victims of the unprincipled factional struggle that dominated the Cultural Revolution from 1967 on. He no sooner began this work than he became the target of an extraordinary campaign to label him an unrepentant capitalist-roader. Although many individuals and individual Party members resisted this attack, I am not aware of any countercampaign by the Party as a whole. Jiang Qing's status as Chairman Mao's wife made the whole problem very difficult to handle. Mao is quoted as having said the question of the "four" must be resolved "if not this year then next year, if not next year, then the year after," as if a crisis of this nature, with production falling into a shambles all over the country, could drag on from year to year without resolution.

It was at this juncture, in the face of this impasse, that the people stood up and in effect said, "We've had enough."

This outpouring of mass indignation, the exposure of the "four" that took place, and the leap in consciousness which occurred, enabling many confused people to see what was really happening, created the conditions for Hua Guo-feng to pull together a coalition strong enough to move on the "four."

NC: But wasn't Hua Guo-feng in charge of national security at the time of the Tian An Men incident? Wasn't he ultimately responsible for the suppression of the demonstrators? Didn't he repeatedly say, after he became First Vice-premier, that the campaign to criticize Deng Xiao-ping must be carried through to the end?

WH: All these questions must be answered in the affirmative, but they only relate to the surface of these phenomena. In actual fact, what Hua Guo-feng did was to preside over a Party and government that dropped the charges against all those ar-



Wreath made by the Shukuang Electrical Machinery Plant.
(Photo: Hsinhua News Agency)

rested for participating in the Tian An Men incident, phased out the campaign to criticize Deng, arrested the "four" on the eve of a coup planned by them, brought Deng Xiao-ping back into a major policy-making and administrative role, then proceeded to reverse any number of unreasonable policy and personal verdicts pushed through by the "four." Given this record, how can one postulate a major conflict between Hua and Deng? Surely they do not agree on everything, but just as surely they have been able to unite on opposing the "four," on reversing innumerable wrong verdicts, and on a program of modernization for China that is capable of mobilizing the vast majority of people for a major new national effort.

NC: From what you have just said it would seem that the verdict on the Tian An Men incident was reversed de facto long before the Party decisions of November 1978.

WH: That is true. Much that Hua did after becoming Premier helped to reverse that verdict, but still the Party leaders held back for a long time from any formal declaration. Presumably this was because there was no consensus on the issue at the top. Significantly, it wasn't until after Wu De (Wu Teh) was removed as mayor of Peking that the Peking Party Committee made its unanimous decision on the incident. Wu De shared responsibility for ordering the security forces into the square to break up the demonstration and later presided over the hunt to finger everyone who took part. As long as he held power in



Factory workers fashioned wreaths of iron and steel, some so huge that they had to be put in place with cranes, in order to prevent their being removed as they were a few months earlier. (Photo: Hsinhua News Agency)

did hold in China at the time of his death, he nevertheless took a series of steps that blocked them from supreme power. In 1975, after Chou En-lai became ill, Mao supported Deng Xiao-ping, not Zhang Chun-qiao, for the post of Acting Premier. When the Tian An Men incident was blamed on Deng and he was removed from

Take self-reliance, for instance. What Mao supported was self-reliance *in the main*, that is, he wanted China to stand on its own feet economically, maintain the initiative vis-à-vis foreign countries, and conduct trade in such a way as to make the internal economy strong. The "four" parlayed this into an absolute ban on goods and technology from outside.

Or take the question of intellectuals. Mao never despised intellectuals. He was an intellectual himself. He always found a way to unite with all intellectuals, whether bourgeois or not, who opposed imperialism and feudalism before Liberation, or supported socialist transformation afterward. At the same time he insisted that intellectuals should remold their bourgeois ideology step by step. The "four," in contrast, treated all intellectuals outside their clique as suspect, had no faith in any transformation, and persecuted or jailed large numbers of the most highly trained people in China.

Or take the question of the criterion for truth. Mao never implied that his words were truth in any absolute sense. He consistently advocated seeking truth from facts – "without investigation there is no right to speak" – and elaborated a theory of knowledge based on *practice* as the starting point. This is the polar opposite of the "whateverism" preached by the "four" (whatever Mao Tsetung said is true for all time). When Deng Xiao-ping advocates seeking truth from facts, he is in the main-

"A citywide hunt began for all those who had been in the square during four days of demonstrations."

Peking and as long as there was no decision reversing the verdict on the Tian An Men incident, the whole affair was clouded with ambiguity. Ordinary people felt deeply uneasy. Their willingness to speak out or to take part in political action was inhibited.

NC: Reversing the verdict on Tian An Men is just one of many decisions and policy initiatives that are being presented in our press today as a rejection of Mao Tsetung and a reversal of Mao's policies. The "four" are called Mao's most fervent supporters, while Deng is depicted as anti-Mao.

WH: This is a gross distortion. In the first place, although it seems to me self-evident that Mao must share responsibility for the measure of power which the "four"

office, Mao nominated Hua Guo-feng, not Zhang Chun-qiao, for the post. He also repeatedly criticized the "four" for forming a clique and for wanting to form a cabinet. Over and over again he blocked or reversed initiatives taken by Jiang Qing in the cultural field, as when he ended the public campaign against the Italian filmmaker Antonioni, or approved the film *Pioneers* which Jiang Qing had banned, or called her eight model works "one flower blooming." On all of this and much more the record is clear.

The policies pushed by the "four" were not Mao's policies but caricatures of them, extremes which turned them into their opposites, but which were nevertheless hard to combat because they were clothed in revolutionary rhetoric.

stream of Mao Tsetung Thought, not outside it.

All this is not to affirm that China's new leaders are not retreating from or replacing some policies favored by Mao. Some old programs, such as the sending of educated youth to the countryside, are being greatly modified. Forms of material incentive that

election, and vote within the Party or among the people.

Currently there is a pretty wide market for rightist tendencies, if only as a backlash from the pseudo-leftism of the "four," a "leftism" that made everything revolutionary seem absurd by carrying it to extremes. There are people who would like to return

tion are social realities. Where the majority concedes that counter-revolution should be suppressed – and this is certainly consensus politics in China – it is always tempting to treat honest dissidents as counter-revolutionaries and deny them all rights. Whenever the "four" held sway they did this wholesale. Others have also done it, albeit with more restraint. The best that can be said is that not too many people have actually been killed for their opinions. As the pendulum swings, thousands are released *alive*. This is progress. It is really quite remarkable, given the record of other revolutions.

Right now there is a thaw. In my opinion, Deng Xiao-ping means it when he says that people have the right to put up posters, and enough people believe him to create a lively situation in the streets. Some of the posters reflect official opinion, some reflect small groups of civil-libertarians, usually quite young, some reflect individuals with advanced or offbeat political ideas or simply individuals with grievances concerning past treatment. This is a healthy outpouring that can well be developed and consolidated. Western insistence that it is all a shadow play, reflecting struggle up above, only makes development more difficult. Reading so much into every word can only make some leading people in China nervous.

There is scant tradition of free speech in China. It is doubtful if even the most indignant demonstrators against arbitrary power in Tian An Men Square saw anything wrong with dragging the student who called Chou En-lai a capitalist-roader off to the police station. If your opinion of the Premier contradicts mine, this is clearly a matter for the police – so runs the consensus in China. Major changes in the productive forces, in social relations, and in political consciousness have to occur before such attitudes change much.

In the meantime, a solid foundation for democracy has been built in the cooperative system of agriculture, where the producers are equal shareholders in their community and each has a voice and a vote. The same holds true in industry, where all permanent workers are as much a part of the factory as the capital equipment and cannot be fired except under the most extraordinary circumstances. They too have a vote, and new forms, such as elections for plant managers, are being developed to give it expression and clout.

If one compares China and India, where all the forms of parliamentary democracy have been set up, yet the peasants remain virtual serfs under landlords who can kill for insubordination, one has to conclude that China is far ahead in real democracy for the majority of people and in democratic potential for the future. ●

"China has a huge bureaucracy that tends, through inertia, to maintain the status quo."

were once specifically condemned are again being tried – presumably because the alternatives were worse. But the shift is nowhere near as great as has been claimed, nor do the new initiatives turn Mao upside down, as dogmatists to the "left" and the right now maintain.

NC: We understand that there is a debate going on in China about "whateverism," with Hua Guo-feng and Deng Xiao-ping opposing it on one side and Wu De (former mayor of Peking) and Wang Tung-xing (Wang Tung-hsing) (former commander of the troops guarding the Central Committee) supporting it on the other. Such a debate implies a division. Is unity and stability really possible, or will there be major splits and confrontations in the future?

WH: Unity and stability tend to be relative, not absolute. There will always be struggle over line and policy, and sometimes it will be very acute. Right now there seems to be a broad consensus supporting modernization and a widespread desire for the unity and stability necessary to carry it forward. This should set the tone for the period to come. But within this consensus there are differences over how to modernize, on whom to rely – on the role of experts and their relationship to the people – on whom to educate and how, on how much and what to buy abroad, on priorities, and also on a broad range of issues relating to legality, civil liberties, and democracy of all kinds. For the time being most of these differences will be treated as contradictions among the people, that is to say, as family quarrels, and not as conflicts with class enemies, as was so often the case in the recent past. People are tired of "hat factories" that put bad labels on others, and "steel factories" that mobilize to beat down and smash others. Nevertheless there are two lines on all these issues that add up to class lines, and struggle over them that adds up in the long run to class struggle. It will not always be possible to resolve them by normal processes of debate,

everything to "normal," that is, to a pre-socialist norm, in the name of correcting excesses. It seems unlikely that such a move will get very far, but it will certainly engender struggle.

China has a huge bureaucracy that tends, through inertia, to maintain the status quo. In a sense the Cultural Revolution can be seen as an attempt to shake up and transform this bureaucracy and prevent it from congealing into a classic Chinese mold. This attempt did not really succeed, primarily, I think, because factionalism turned the evaluation and remolding of cadres into an unprincipled struggle for power. In the meantime, a vast program for the modernization of the country has been placed on the agenda. It cannot be carried through without tremendous changes in social relations – the industrialization of the countryside, for one – which will mean tremendous changes in the way things are administered. How can this be carried out without struggle?

NC: When wall posters go up, do they represent the thinking of ordinary people or are they always a reflection of some conflict at the top?

WH: The Western press assumes the latter and it is true that major poster campaigns are often initiated by Party leaders. Nevertheless, ordinary people do have the right to put up posters without any backstage support and often do, even though the consequences may be serious. That is to say, the local leadership may not concede them the right to say what they actually are saying, may arrange for the posters to be torn down, may start an investigation of the poster-writers, may mobilize public opinion against them, or even arrest them. In other words, the right to speak one's mind has to be fought for in China. This is true of any country in the world, but the struggle is much sharper in countries with a feudal tradition where the people have not had the right to speak in the past, and it is also much sharper in countries where both revolution and counter-revolu-



The overthrow of the “gang of four” in October 1976 set off a succession of swift changes that have raised many questions abroad and stirred debate about the course of the Chinese Revolution. Foreign friends visiting China have been prompted to do their best to get through to the unfolding realities and make sense of them.

Three articles resulting from such inquiries follow. They do not purport to give full answers to complex questions about changing situations but rather to clarify issues, offer relevant facts and observations, and correct some obvious misinterpretations. While their subjects overlap, each provides fresh information and insights.

Is giving bonuses to Chinese workers a sign of a fundamental change in policy? Fredric M. Kaplan addresses this question. As a member of a USCPFA tour of China in summer 1978, he made a point of asking

Modernization: Which Road Will China Take?

about workers' compensation in the factories he visited.

N. Patrick Peritore, also a member of a recent USCPFA tour, discusses both remuneration and another change that has caused controversy: the abolition of Revolutionary Committees in China's workplaces and their replacement by a managerial system that functions under the leadership of the plant's Party Committee.

These and related questions are assessed by the British economist Joan Robinson. Drawing on her years of study of China and a recent extensive visit, she challenges the critical views of Charles Bettelheim, a Marxist scholar who resigned from the presidency of the France-China Friendship Association because of what he calls China's “great leap backward.”

Bonuses, Red Banners, and Politics In Command

by Fredric M. Kaplan

A look at moral encouragement and material rewards

All over China this summer, there was no escaping the excitement people felt over a future that has been cast in terms as bright as they are explicit. The projections are everywhere – on factory blackboards, on streetcorner posters, even on a cake in a bakery shop window: by 1985, 60 million tons of steel, 30 large power stations, 10 natural gas fields, 5 large seaports, 6 new railroad trunk lines. And dancing around the figures, in a kind of science-fiction collage, are rocket ships and sewing machines, oil wells and astronauts, bulldozers and transistor radios. For Americans used to having their futures spelled out for them in vague if laudatory generalities, the effect is at once refreshing and provocative – the idea of ordinary citizens taking sustained personal interest in the statistics of national economic projections is, after all, quite foreign to our experience.

The endorsement of the “four modernizations” (industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology) by the Fifth National People’s Congress last March envisioned a vast surge of energy in pursuit of national economic development. Much of that energy, it is argued, had been pent up or diverted as a result of the

machinations of the “gang of four,” whose net effect seems to have been to deprive people of a sense of control over their own destinies. The socialist values that inspired people to work harder to help move the country forward had become so distorted and confused that the principle of “putting politics in command” was taken by some as a justification for questioning any attempts to enhance efficiency and productivity, as if such steps were, in and of themselves, antithetical to the goal of forwarding the revolution in China.

During the last years of the Cultural Revolution (1973–76), many enterprises suffered severe problems of morale. More than 8 billion yuan (1 yuan = about 45 cents) was said to have been lost due to strikes and work stoppages. Visitors reported the mood at many worksites as lax and lethargic, in contrast to the high level of interest and activity observed in earlier years. Apart from the deliberate attempts at sabotage and disruption which have been alleged, lapses in worker morale were judged to have arisen largely from a system that no longer took adequate account of above-average contributions from its workers. Indeed, hard work and extra initiative were not only *not* rewarded but, in many instances, were cast in a negative light, as if anyone who sought to upgrade production was trying to restore capitalism in China.

Hua Guo-feng, in his “Report on the

Work of the Government” delivered at the First Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress, noted that “the enthusiasm of the masses cannot be aroused if no distinction is made between those who do a good job and those who do a poor one, and between those who work and those who don’t.” Concurrently, Hua and the new leadership laid stress on the principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.”

The point is to promote a system of compensation with a flexible yet rational basis for determining wages and for calling due attention to those whose work-styles are to be emulated. By making the criteria for compensation clear, and by giving workers the chance to set these criteria themselves and to scrutinize their application, the system would be safeguarded against arbitrariness and allow procedures to evolve according to the conditions of each enterprise. Some jobs, for example, are a lot nastier than others, subjecting workers to hazardous or unpleasant conditions, or requiring a much faster pace in order to keep overall production on an even keel. Thus, steel workers might authorize extra compensation, for those laboring in the intense heat near blast furnaces. Similarly, those who by their own efforts help an enterprise exceed its quota or upgrade its working conditions might receive the kind of recognition that would encourage emulation by others. “In socialist labor emulation,” Hua noted, “moral encouragement and material reward must go hand in hand, with emphasis on the former.”

In practice, according to the most current observations, the policy of socialist labor emulation enunciated by Hua last spring has produced almost as many variations as there have been attempts to apply it. Virtually all worksites visited in China during the last few months have been festooned with the manifestations of moral encouragement campaigns – red banners, placards, streamers, and certificates honoring workers or work-teams for their quantitative or qualitative contributions. But on the side of bonuses – the principal vehicles for material reward – the response has been, by contrast, somewhat tentative and uneven. Which, if the need to pay attention to variations in local, concrete conditions is taken seriously, is how things should be.

This past July, our group’s initial questions about “material incentives” in China invariably met with a polite rebuke. “Material incentives,” it was explained, was a term invoked by the “gang” to discredit a practice more correctly described as “material rewards.” The distinction was subtle but important, since the Chinese we

FREDRIC M. KAPLAN is editor and publisher of *Eurasia Press* and co-chairperson of the *New York City USCPFA*. He was tour leader of the July 1978 USCPFA Eastern Region trip to China.

spoke with seemed clear enough that there was no intention these days to use material or monetary gain as a primary inducement to better work-style. In a socialist system, after all, a worker's performance on the job is properly subject to a much larger set of collective influences which stand to be affected very little by minor adjustments in personal remuneration.

Indeed, it was clear throughout our three-week visit that the question of material rewards was of far greater interest to us than to most of the Chinese workers and staff members we spoke with. Answers were always forthcoming, but almost always with an edge of impatience over an

annual award of blankets and tea sets. In some enterprises the bonus system is marginal and experimental, while in others the current practice represents no more than a continuation of bonus and differential wage patterns that have been in effect for years. In no instance were material rewards represented as anything more than an auxiliary device for calling attention to outstanding performance consistent with the principle of "to each according to his work."

At two sites we visited – a coal mine near Datong (Tatung) in northern Shanxi (Shansi) Province, and the Daqing (Taching) oil field – the policy of providing monetary

quotas. In June (the month preceding our visit), a surplus was produced, and most of the mine's 6,000 workers got bonuses. Members of all but one extraction team received bonuses of 20 yuan (the high end of the mine's eight-grade wage scale was 102 yuan per month). One team of 80 workers received no bonuses; the unit, one of the mine's most highly mechanized, had failed to reach its quota, and the problem was said to be poor maintenance of equipment. Administrative personnel also received bonuses, but these averaged only 8 yuan for the month.

At Daqing, in sharp contrast to Datong, a bonus system had yet to be enacted, and the basic question of material reward was being approached with extreme caution, if not reticence. Although one unit was about to try a reward system on an experimental basis, at least one official questioned the appropriateness of a bonus system at Daqing. There, it was argued, every effort had been made to inspire a spirit of selflessness among the workers, and morale was already at high a level. Another official suggested that if material rewards were to be used at all at Daqing, they would most likely take the form already in use at the oil field: instead of individual bonuses, funds would be used to upgrade facilities or services that could be shared by everyone and thus contribute to the spirit of building socialism as well as to the workers' material well-being.

Elsewhere, we encountered further variations. Back in Datong, across town from the coal mine, we visited a small carpet factory, a collective enterprise begun by eight housewives in 1970. At the time of our visit, the factory employed 200 workers, 90 percent of them women. The premises were bedecked with moral encouragements. The reception room walls carried impressive framed red and gold certificates of merit, several with photographs of the workers honored. The walls of the work areas were covered with charts meticulously recording the monthly output of each team, with red stars denoting those whose pace exceeded the quotas. Pay scales were low relative to other sites we visited, ranging from 21 to 65 yuan per month, but when we raised the question of bonuses, the reply was that there were none, and no plans to implement them. Material rewards were limited to the annual presentation of blankets, shirts, and other household items to leading workers – a practice that had been in effect for several years.

Our visit to the huge Peking Heavy Electrical Generator Plant revealed that, although the factory is a state-owned enterprise with 6,000 workers, its policy on bonuses is closer to that of the carpet factory than to that of the equivalent-scale



In 1978, posters symbolizing the national drive for modernization appeared in China. In this example from Peking, the four figures represent a peasant, a worker, a soldier, and an intellectual. (Photo: M. Ford)

apparent American obsession with material compensation at a time when people in China were obviously much more excited over their country's plans for modernization and development. Nevertheless, our questions persisted, and the picture that emerged was quite as our hosts initially suggested: the state has gone no further than to suggest that, given the existence of a production surplus at any enterprise, the workers may redistribute a small portion of that surplus (10 percent at most) in the form of material rewards.

From our observation, these rewards – when they exist at all – range from a monthly cash-bonus scale (the maximum level we came across was 20 yuan) to an

compensation for more difficult working conditions was firmly in effect. At the coal mine, people who worked underground were paid 1 yuan extra a day, while at Daqing, workers on drilling rigs (where winter temperatures may go below -40°C) receive a monthly increment of 30 percent of their wages.

Despite these and other similarities in wage patterns, and despite the fact that both Daqing and the Datong coal mine are large-scale, state-owned enterprises, the contrast in patterns of material reward could not be greater. At Datong, a bonus system has been in effect since January 1978. Bonus funds are made available monthly whenever the mine overfulfills its state

Datong coal mine. A system of cash bonuses was under discussion, but current awards, begun in 1977, were limited to clothing, tea sets, pens, and books. Thus far, about 50 percent of the plant's workers have received these awards, with the director and other members of higher factory management expressly excluded from the process. As at the carpet factory, work areas were heavily decorated with citations, graphs, and blackboards, covered with illustrated messages – criticisms, essays, poetry, and exhortations written by the workers. Graphs and charts posted throughout the complex provided detailed information on how the factory was doing and on each work-team's role in total output.

Finally, on the Shanghai docks – where only a few years before (1975), the “gang” had put up a poster promoting the slogan that workers should not become “slaves of tonnage” – we encountered the strongest advocates of the bonus system among the sites we visited. In the aftermath of the “gang,” Shanghai Dock No. 9 had set up a work-evaluation committee to try to bring some sense into what had apparently been a rather dispirited work situation. Using criteria of safety, work quality, attendance, and productivity, and relying on statistics produced regularly by the committee, the dock's leadership installed a three-tiered merit-bonus system consisting of 12, 8, or 5 yuan in monthly salary increments. The bonuses, when added to certain other unspecified salary supplements, raised the base salary of the dock's lowest-paid workers a full 50 percent – from 40 to 60 yuan per month. At that point, all but 2.1 percent of the dockyard's workers had received bonuses, including management personnel (whose rewards we were told, were pegged to a much lower rate). We were told that as a result of this system, the enthusiasm and initiative of the workers was high, and that even the record summer heat – which within minutes had wilted most of their American guests – had not prevented Dock No. 9 from exceeding its quota.

Although it is awkward, to say the least, to offer any firm conclusions after a three-week visit, most of us were struck by the flexibility of central planners in allowing for a wide range of innovative mixes of material and moral encouragements to workers. More than that, we were surprised to discover that, given the new freedom to experiment with material rewards, there was no universal rush on the part of workers or individual enterprises to apply them. Or is it, perhaps, as conditions at Daqing suggested, that hard work in China has already become its own best reward? ●

The Struggle for Socialist Management

by N. Patrick Peritore

China reassesses wages and Revolutionary Committees

Like many American visitors to the People's Republic of China, members of our tour group were vitally interested in changes in economic policy since the “gang of four.” In response to our request, we were able to spend almost four hours with Drs. Wu and Wang of the Institute of Economic Experts at the Peking Academy of Social Sciences. This briefing, detailed and far-ranging, greatly enriched our understanding of particular changes which had taken place at factories and other units we visited.

A major change was the replacement of Revolutionary Committees in all non-governmental bodies (factories, schools, etc.) by directorates under the leadership of Party Committees. Some Americans have seen this as a reversal of the policies established during the Cultural Revolution in the area of worker participation in management, but the Chinese with whom we spoke saw it as a rationalization and consolidation of those policies.

In effect, they pointed out, the directorate under a Party Committee is a renewal of the “Shanghai System” which developed spontaneously after Liberation in 1949. That system stressed collective leadership by the Party and mass organizations (such as trade unions, the Youth League, and Women's Federation) over managerial cadres who, in practice, had limited discretionary power and little in the way of management prerogatives. The system was entirely different from the Soviet-style

N. PATRICK PERITORE teaches economics at the University of Missouri and visited China in May 1978.

“one-man management” which the Chinese had adopted in 1953 in an effort to facilitate central planning.

The Soviet management model required minute specialization of tasks and a strict hierarchy of control and responsibility, which was reinforced by a system of bonuses and piece-rates based on technical expertise. The system worked well only in China's industrial northeast, and even there came under attack during the Great Leap Forward of 1958. It had not proved flexible enough as a system of central planning for the diverse Chinese economy. Worse, it had created a web of bureaucracy and bureaucratic regulations which hampered the workers and stifled their initiative. Under this system, the workers did not and could not become masters of their own economic units.

The Great Leap Forward was a political struggle that took place all over China between the forces led by Liu Shao-qi, who clung to the hierarchical, bureaucratic structure that was taking shape, and Mao Tsetung and his supporters, who saw clearly that the creeping bureaucracy was creating a new class of rulers over the workers and peasants.

By 1965, a strengthened Shanghai System was reasserting itself in many places, with the emphasis on worker participation and initiative. Five major management reforms were proposed for all factories: placing the factory director under the Party Committee's leadership; increasing cadre participation in labor and worker participation in management; intensifying political education of staff and workers; using “triple

combinations" (leadership and masses, labor and technique, theory and practice); and invoking socialist emulation campaigns to inspire and motivate workers.

However, at that time, many Party Committees at all levels had been strongly influenced by Liu Shao-qi's ideas. They had become managerial rather than ideological leading bodies, part of an entrenched Party bureaucracy remote from the masses. As such, they could not provide the necessary political leadership. As the Cultural Revolution unfolded, these committees were replaced in unit after unit - in some cases only after Red Guard seizures of power, or even through the intervention of the People's Liberation Army.

During the course of the Cultural Revolution, Liu's old Party bureaucracy was reformed and reconstituted. Some cadres were removed from positions of power until they recognized the gravity of the errors they had made; others, who remained in leadership positions, responded to the criticism of the newly vocal workers and to the enthusiastic spirit of reform which characterized the early years of the Cultural Revolution. By the early 1970s, reconstructed Party Committees were beginning to play leadership roles in relation to the Revolutionary Committees.

This process was interrupted during the period of about 1974 to 1976 - the period of the "gang of four's" greatest dominance, when power struggles within enterprises and economic sabotage for political gain seriously disrupted production and distribution. (During that period, the Peking economists told us, there was a hundred billion yuan loss in total industrial output and a drop of 28 million tons in steel production.) The problems of the period were exacerbated by followers of the "gang of four" who in many enterprises had gained power as members of the Revolutionary Committee.


The 1978 Constitution institutionalized the changes that had started to take place in the early 1970s - the replacement of Revolutionary Committees by a renewed Shanghai System of management under Party Committees in all non-governmental organs. In some places, the structural change merely confirmed already existing working relationships. For example, in the Shanghai auto factory we visited, the Revolutionary Committee was about to be replaced by a director and vice-director under the supervision of the Party Committee. The "new" directors had been the "responsible persons" of the old Revolutionary Committee, and the members of the Party Committee had been the working nucleus of the old Revolutionary Committee. The Party Committee had taken the lead in all major decisions prior to the structural change, because the

Revolutionary Committee structure had proved unable to follow or to implement the technical nuances of production planning.

From our observations, it was quite clear that the dissolution of the Revolutionary Committees in no way meant a return to "one-man management" or bureaucratic

extreme heat of summer in order to keep production levels constant, and technicians are expected to work on the shop floor, not only to gain experience alongside fellow workers but also to do practical experimentation in production methods.

Conversely, workers participate in management. Worker representatives dis-



The certificates at the top of the photo indicate that this woman is one of the outstanding workers in this Shanghai auto factory. The awards are usually based not only on production but also on observance of safety rules, care of tools and machinery, and relations with fellow workers. The bar graph tallies the results of a factory competition. (Photo: N. P. Peritore)

control. We visited the Mei Shan Project, an iron mill in the suburbs of Nanjing (Nanking) around which a complete "new town" has been built. The transition from Revolutionary Committee to Party/manager has been completed, and the central gain of the Cultural Revolution - the co-participation of cadres and workers in enterprise operation - is being strongly implemented.

At Mei Shan, cadres perform manual labor every Thursday, and rotate down to do full-time labor with a work-team for a month and a half a year. Cadres are also expected to do relief work during the

cuss production plans and technical innovations and perform administrative tasks regarding safety, use of materials, and propaganda within their work-teams. Opinions and proposals from the workers can be offered directly to the leadership, or indirectly through mass organizations or media. Policies are explained and discussed rather than being promulgated from above.

The Peking economists admitted to heated discussions within their own ranks over the problem of combining effective leadership with popular initiative, and throughout our travels the same discussion seemed to be in process everywhere. A

revitalized version of the Shanghai System is now seen as the answer to the first aspect of the problem, while the popular gains of the Cultural Revolution are being maintained and expanded through many forms of worker/cadre co-participation, re-creation of mass organizations such as the Youth Leagues, Women's Federation, and trade unions, and through a renewed commitment to due process and to freedom of thought and speech.

effort and collective responsibility leading ultimately to collective welfare. There is no doubt that in many parts of China real gains were made in political consciousness and production. However, the "gang of four's" attacks on material rewards of any kind led to the wholesale abandonment of bonuses all over China. But with the fall of the "gang of four" bonus systems began to be reintroduced, and the 1978 Constitution included a clause about "combining moral

state toward a completely developed communist society, in which the principle of distribution would be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." But this stage requires certain preconditions: a fully developed industrial economy with most commodities available in abundance; general equality of skills and education, so that economic contributions are roughly equivalent; and a very highly developed collective political consciousness to ensure that individuals willingly contribute what they can while taking what they need.


Obviously none of these preconditions is present in today's China nor will they be realized for some time to come. At this stage, the Chinese believe, some form of material rewards is necessary, and differences in wages according to skills, experience, and job particularities will continue to exist until the transition to a fully developed communist society is completed.

The big question, for the Chinese, is how to move forward from distribution according to need, while preventing a reversion to capitalist modes. One answer is the principle embodied in the 1978 Constitution, "combining moral encouragement with material reward, with the stress on the former." This acknowledges the need for material rewards, while placing the primary emphasis on political education and the raising of collective consciousness - thus continuing the forward movement of the Cultural Revolution.

From our experience in China, moral encouragement seemed to have clear priority over material rewards. In every production group we visited, charts listed the production records of different teams or outstanding individuals. On the walls were red banners and framed certificates, which are reallocated periodically. Notebooks, fountain pens, and enameled cups had just been distributed at the most recent awards ceremony at the Mei Shan Project in Nanjing.

Public honors and recognition as a motivating force, rather than material rewards, are only part of the story. At political meetings and awards ceremonies, through bulletin boards and the press, it is made clear to everyone just what these honors mean and why they are given. Awards are given for productive efficiency and political attitude. The relationship between individual and collective effort, and the building of a socialist society, are carefully explained. In effect, "socialist emulation campaigns" are part of the process of political education.

The distribution of material rewards (now being discussed and implemented in different forms in production units all over China) is being carefully considered in



Workers at the Peking No. 1 Electrical Generator Plant perform the delicate final operations of assembling a dynamo. Both workers and managers emphasized to American visitors the improvement in morale following the fall of the "gang of four" and the introduction of new managerial procedures. (Photo: S. Niemic)

Another major issue raised by the Peking economists and prominent in our discussions throughout China has been of interest to many Americans: the use of bonuses and other material rewards to motivate productivity. As early as the Great Leap Forward, the emphasis on Soviet-style bonuses and piece-work rates had come under attack. Under this system, factory managers awarded relatively large bonuses to individual workers solely on the basis of technical proficiency and productivity. The system tended to reinforce bureaucratic hierarchies and, in setting worker against worker, to destroy the collective spirit that is supposed to be the heart of socialist enterprise.

The Cultural Revolution laid great stress on political education, rather than individual material rewards, as the way to increase worker productivity: collective

encouragement with material reward, with a stress on the former." Is this a retreat from the gains of the Cultural Revolution?

The issue is a complex one. The Chinese agree with Karl Marx that the principle of distribution in a socialist society should be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Under a socialist system, then, a worker's wage is dependent upon his having contributed a certain amount of labor to society. In principle, a worker receives back from society somewhere near the value of what his labor has produced (whether it is by mining coal, running a lathe, or building a bridge). The greater the value produced by the worker (whether because of superior skill or because he works harder), the greater his reward.

However, the Chinese also follow Marx in considering socialism only a transitional

terms of its possible effects. For example, the over-fulfillment of production quotas might earn a bonus designed to decrease in amount as the over-fulfillment increases; thus, it would not become a primary incentive because of diminishing returns. Again, a fixed monetary prize not to exceed 15 percent of the salary might be given as a one-time reward for surpassing quotas, good political attitude, and good work habits. Finally, collective bonuses might be awarded to work-teams, and the distribution of bonuses determined by collective discussion.

While acknowledging the necessity for basic wage inequalities at this stage of development, the Chinese are also committed to a gradual reduction of those inequalities. For instance, the recent sixth national pay increase, affecting 60 percent of Chinese wage-earners, has meant an upward wage adjustment for 18 percent of the workers, and a raise of one grade of the wage scale for 46 percent. Priority in raises was given to the *lowest* end of the wage scale. Workers earning above 90 yuan per month were generally not eligible for a raise, and Party cadres have taken three progressive pay cuts. Political evaluation by the individual's work unit was a primary consideration in allocating raises. The result was to narrow the gap between the highest- and the lowest-paid workers.

Another factor mitigating the effects of differential wages is state planning to provide basic services to all citizens regardless of wage. Those provided free or at nominal cost include medical care, retirement benefits, education and day care, tailoring, laundry, shoe repair, etc. Rents are adjusted to 5 percent of family income, heating is free, and there is subsidized low-cost public transportation. Prices of consumer goods are planned and uniformly fixed. Prices of basic foodstuffs and medicines have declined over the years, as production has increased. Some goods in scarce supply — such as cotton cloth — are rationed in order to equalize distribution.

The Chinese are modest about their achievements. They are quick to say that they have a long, tortuous way to go before they achieve a fully developed socialist society, much less a communist society. However, running through our interviews with the economists and with the responsible persons in productive units from Peking to Nanjing was a strong strain of practical competence, democratic style, and humanist concern with social justice rather than mere economic efficiency. While China is still quite backward in terms of productive technology, it is perhaps a pioneer in the application of collective human reason to the creation of a genuine human community. ●

Ambitious Plans and Careful Steps

by Joan Robinson

An economist rebuts a critic of China's new policies

After his famous letter of resignation from the French Friendship Society, Charles Bettelheim was invited to visit China but he now declares that it was unnecessary for him to accept as he knows what China's new policies are from published statements and from broadcasts and the press. This seems to me to be a serious mistake; the content and style of Chinese internal propaganda is very misleading when read from a Western point of view. I sympathize to a certain extent with Bettelheim's initial reaction. I think we all had a lot of wind in our heads; it was hard to believe that, in a socialist country, policy could have been the sport of personal ambition and it was deflating to be told that the Cultural Revolution is over and that the new aim of policy is modernization. We know only too well what it is like to be modern. But it is foolish to judge policy merely from slogans. There is now more freedom and frankness of discussion, both among Chinese and between Chinese and foreigners, than over the last 25 years but there is still a hangover from the past in official propaganda which remains heavily monolithic — 101 percent one way or the other — and therefore unenlightening.

Political Economy

An example of Bettelheim's misreading of slogans concerns the doctrine "to each according to his work." Because the ultra-left was preaching egalitarianism, the

JOAN ROBINSON, *Professor Emeritus of Economics at Cambridge University, has visited China numerous times since 1953. This article is excerpted from China Now, No. 80, Sept.-Oct. 1978.*

official line is to stress that: "He who works more should earn more" is a socialist principle. This has given him the impression that a new system of "material incentives" has been introduced into Chinese industry.

In the work-point system in the communes, which organize the employment of three-quarters of the national labor force, the principle of reward for work was established from the first. This is not emphasized in the current propaganda, which merely recommends the primitive "work-quota" system, though the most advanced communes have long since evolved more flexible and effective methods, in the course of learning from Dazhai (Tachai), of linking material rewards to the quality as well as quantity of effort put forth.

The slogan "he who works more should earn more" is addressed to industry and it is repeated, without analysis or qualification, continually, bang, bang, bang. Yet during the period of the study of the dictatorship of the proletariat (1974-75) we were told that Chairman Mao had said that the eight-grade wage system in industry had been taken over from the Soviets and that it was an element of "bourgeois right."

To Western ears the slogan "to each according to his work" suggests monetary incentives, piece-rates, or even the type of "economic reform" that is proving disastrous in Hungary; actually, no such changes are on foot. It is obvious that a wage system to which a whole generation of workers has become accustomed cannot

掘进工程打眼技术比武成绩公布 6.21.

地点	打眼时间		火药消耗		雷管消耗		掘进进尺		巷道规格		爆破效果		总分
	规定时间	实际时间	规定消耗	实际消耗	规定消耗	实际消耗	规定进尺	实际进尺	规定规格	实际规格	规定效果	实际效果	
王秋廷	60'20"	61'18"	15个	74个	10个	17个	11'18"	25'20"	2.05, 2.9	左2.05, 右2.05	17	10'9"	100.5
马良义	58'48"	58'20"	70个	59个	18.5个	14个	11'	195, 28	2.25, 2.25	左2.25, 右2.25	20	9'	106.5



Miners at the Datong coal mining complex gather around a board listing the results of a technical competition. Friendly contests between individuals or teams are a popular feature of moral encouragement campaigns. (Photo: D. Bisdorf)

readily be changed. This is mere common sense, though propagandists like to dress it up in theoretical principle. When there was a raise of wages in October 1977, it was made by raising lower-paid workers each up one grade, while keeping the top grades constant. It admittedly required some "political education" of those who got no raise. This had nothing to do with "he who works more should get more." It can be plausibly explained as the simplest way available of redressing potential grievances, assisting return to regular work after the disruption and anarchy caused by the ultra-left, and making the socially most beneficial use of the increase in output of consumer goods in the upsurge of pro-

duction that followed the restoration of order in the factories. The main emphasis in the slogan of payment according to work is to justify a new system of bonuses. An elaborate system of bonuses and fines, copied from the Soviets, was swept away in the Cultural Revolution. To prevent this from causing an overall loss of income, each enterprise was given an allowance in excess of its normal wage bill equal to the sum of former bonuses; this allowance, which is still being paid, is at the disposal of the individual enterprise. Some distribute it as a flat-rate addition to wages: some as a proportional addition to earnings at a higher percentage rate on wages than on

cadres' incomes; some distribute it to the lower-paid workers only. Apart from this, a new system of bonuses is being tentatively introduced on an experimental basis. A few enterprises in each line have been chosen to try it out. Their experiences are to be discussed in due course and the system generalized if it is considered successful. The general idea is that when an enterprise has fulfilled its plan, in respect to quantity, quality, variety of output, and economy in costs and use of materials, it is to be allowed an addition of 10 percent on its total wage bill. (When the plan has been under-fulfilled the allowance is less and is to be used for bonuses to only a few outstanding workers.) The

bonus money is then distributed to work-shops and work-groups and each decides to which individuals the bonuses should be granted. The sums involved range from 2 to 8 yuan a month. The workers in each group propose the awards, subject to approval by the cadres. In one of the experimental enterprises we were told that generally 80 percent of the workers get something each month.

This clearly is nothing like a changeover to an incentive wage system. The bonuses are evidently to be token awards to restore and reinforce the discipline of criticism and praise among peers which broke down wherever ultra-left influences prevailed.

We were given an example of its beneficial effect. Wuhan used to be proud of the high reputation of its bus service; in the period of anarchy it fell into chaos and the conductors were often literally fighting with the passengers. They have been chosen to experiment with bonuses; now the buses are punctual and the conductors polite. Such a transformation cannot be attributed to the incentive of earning the price of a couple of packets of cigarettes. It must be due to the moral effect of having to examine what type of conduct deserves an award.

The bonus system is evidently intended to reinforce, not to undermine the principle of "politics in command." It will have to be generalized with circumspection. An all-round increase of 10 percent in spending money has to be met by a corresponding increase in availability of goods to buy.

Another point which distresses Bettelheim is the renewed emphasis on the requirement that enterprises should earn profits. The wage fund and bonus funds are given to an enterprise and the prices of all inputs and outputs are fixed. Profit – the excess of the annual value of output over costs – is mainly a reflection of economical and efficient use of materials (including sources of energy). Why should this be regarded as "taking the capitalist road"? If the purpose of production is "to serve the people," surely the more efficiently it is carried out the better its purpose is served.

Profits are handed over to the state (that is, to the next higher layer in the administrative hierarchy), not enjoyed by the particular enterprise to which they accrue. Investment funds are allocated under the national plan "taking the whole country as a chess board." Bettelheim does not explain why he believes that this system promotes regional inequality and checks the development of small-scale industry. He seems to react to the word *profits* without considering what it means in the Chinese context.

Bettelheim is also very much alarmed at the removal of Revolutionary Committees

from industrial enterprises. The institution of Revolutionary Committees arose spontaneously and haphazardly during the Cultural Revolution. At first, representation of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] was an important feature of the system, which faded out gradually. In the new constitution the political structure has been rationalized. Revolutionary Committees form the "basic organ of state power." They are installed in a hierarchy at communes, counties, cities (not at prefectures), and provinces, as well as in the autonomous units comprising national minorities. At each level there is a People's Congress consisting of representatives of various groups in society at the respective levels, selected for a two-year term, which is responsible for electing the corresponding Revolutionary Committee and discussing its affairs.

On paper, this is certainly the most democratic constitution in the world, but Chinese Communists are very well aware that democracy emerges through practice and cannot be guaranteed by a set of rules.

On this basis it would not be appropriate to include industrial and commercial enterprises in the hierarchy of Revolutionary Committees. In an enterprise, policy emanates from the Party Committee and has to be carried out by the whole body of workers, under the leadership, as the phrase is, of the executive management. As before, the plan of production is formed "from the bottom up and from the top down" in consultation with the ministry and the local authority concerned. Experience varies widely from one enterprise to another. In some the change from chairman of the Revolutionary Committee to director is only a change of name. In others, the imposition of a second layer of talk and argument between the Party Committee and the executive reduced efficiency without guaranteeing democracy.

Bettelheim assumes that the drive for increased production means tighter discipline, more rigid rules, and less consultation between workers and cadres. But if this destroys morale it will not promote production. The Anshan Constitution remains the ideal, though presumably there are differences between one enterprise and another as to how nearly the ideal is realized.

In the first phase of the Cultural Revolution, in many enterprises, the workers fell into factional strife, and later, wherever the "gang" was in the ascendancy, young workers, to the disgust of the veterans, took advantage of the ultra-left preaching to create anarchy and to draw their wages without doing a stroke of work. A revolutionary working class cannot be created between one year and the next just by drafting the children of peasants into

industry. Considering what the reaction would have been in France, or in Poland, to such an orgy of indiscipline, it is not very convincing to describe the Chinese manner of restoring morale as heading for authoritarianism.

Bettelheim seems to have absorbed the ultra-left doctrine that to be concerned with productivity is inimical to socialism. This view was emphatically disowned by the public at large when the influence of the "gang of four" was causing shortages of supplies.

Certainly there will be serious problems in introducing "modern," that is, Western, technology into Chinese industry. Western technology, developed under capitalism, has a strong bias towards saving "labor costs," that is, reducing the ratio of wages to the value of output, reducing requirements for skill, and preserving a sharp distinction between technicians and mere shop-floor operators. How will it be possible to take advantage of the most up-to-date technology without imposing its anti-worker bias? Can the necessary discipline be combined with a democratic style of management? And is the snob value of being "advanced" going to undermine the economic common sense of Chinese technicians themselves?

Admittedly, these are difficult questions, but neither as producers nor as consumers do the Chinese leadership and the Chinese workers want to evade them merely by Bettelheim's policy of going slow.

Politics

The history of the decade 1966–76 has been a profound shock. How could it happen that, under cover of Mao Tsetung Thought, a medieval drama of ambition and treachery could play itself out? How can such a thing be prevented for the future? Only by relying upon the political consciousness of the people. The rise and fall of Lin Biao and of Jiang Qing (Chiang Ching) has given them a sharp lesson. They are beginning to realize that their main danger is not so much the temptations of the capitalist road as their ingrained Confucian respect for hierarchy. The Cultural Revolution was a violent effort to break out of it which ran off the rails. For the time being, the people have won. The leadership has embarked upon a hitherto unprecedented course of combining an ambitious plan for accumulation and growth with open discussion and freedom of thought.

As Mao always taught, when one contradiction is solved, others arise. Bettelheim seems to think that he alone knows what the new contradictions will be. Let us hope that, this time, it will take less than ten years to see why he is wrong. ●

From East Harlem to China


An interview with Boricuas del Barrio

Boricuas del Barrio is a group of 21 people from New York's East Harlem community, the majority Puerto Ricans, who visited China for three weeks in July 1977. NEW CHINA met with seven members of the group: Marilyn Aguirre, Carmen Alustiza, Manuel Diaz, Emma Ramos-Diaz, Marta Lugo, Carlos Molina, and Yolanda Sanchez.

New China: How did you happen to go to China?

Carmen: The story of how our trip was organized goes back a long way – to November 1975, the time Nixon was going to China again. A group of us were sitting in Yolanda's living room when we came up with the idea: why can't we go to China? We took the idea very seriously.

We got in touch with a representative of the New York US-China Peoples Friendship Association who met with us and discussed the possibilities. We developed our own criteria and sent out questionnaires to see how many people would respond to the idea. Before we knew it, we had to start cutting down the number of applicants and do screening. We wanted our group to be representative of the people in East Harlem and also of the Puerto Rican community. That's why we tried to gather a group of different ages and educational levels. We had wanted to include an ex-drug addict, a senior citizen, and a teenager, but unfortunately our fundraising wasn't successful enough for all of them to go. We replaced them with others who could pay their own way. Our final group consisted of teachers, social workers, health workers, a Head Start worker, a law student, and a State Supreme Court judge. A teenager we had raised money for was killed in a tenement fire, which is typical of what goes on in the housing in East Harlem. We wrote to Luxingshe,



At Peking University, Emilio Gonzalez enjoys a conversation with an English language student. (Photo: M. Diaz)

China's travel bureau, and sent them our biographical sketches. Within four to five weeks they responded favorably to our request. We were invited to go in August 1976, but our trip was delayed because of the earthquake in China.

NC: Why did you want to go to China?

Manny: We probably went "because it was there" – the traditional answer – but more because China represented opposite extremes to what we have experienced in this country politically, economically, historically, and socially. We also perceived it as almost a vision of the future. I think we were all inspired by the events of the Cultural Revolution and, from the little we understood about it, we found it very appealing. When we went, we were very thirsty for knowledge, very open to it. Also we didn't want to go there as tourists. We saw the trip as an exchange. We tried

to bring some of our Puerto Rican culture with us. We took some children's stories, some manuscripts on the Puerto Rican migration to the U.S., and some music. We learned some of the street songs our children sing, such as a song-game called "El Coqui," and performed them in China.

Carmen: We got to be very good at our presentation. We even had our Puerto Rican judge playing the part of "la mariposa," the butterfly, in a Puerto Rican children's song.

NC: How did you feel among the Chinese people? How did they react to you?

Marilyn: I don't know if it was because we were Puerto Ricans or if they act that way with all their foreign guests, but it was marvelous.

Yolanda: Maybe we want to think it.



The group poses with guides at the Peking airport. The banner reads: "Puerto Ricans from the Barrio of New York City, 1977." "Boricuas" is an old Indian name for natives of Puerto Rico. (Photo: courtesy of M. Diaz)

But I think that the fact that we were Puerto Ricans – a national minority in the U.S. – was announced in advance and word would go out that these were not just Americans coming. We were impressed from the very beginning by how quickly they responded to our request to visit China and said "yes, come." We were led to believe that receiving a response from them as quickly as we did, that in itself was something. As of the day when we were accepted to go to China, I felt so special.

Carmen: I remember one of our guides saying to us, "You are so different; you are spontaneous and giving and have a lot to offer." They enjoyed being with us. We took our musical instruments and wherever we went we would give our presentation. At the Korean minority commune, we felt a common bond in the spontaneity of the people and their dances. At one point, when they'd finished their performance, they asked us to join in. One member of our group started playing a Korean drum and two others got up and started doing one of our typical Puerto Rican folk dances.

When we were on the train leaving China, Manny was trying to get us all to talk about what we felt. Everyone was quiet and emotionally withdrawn and sad. We all

wanted it to last longer. When we entered Hongkong it was like a shock.

Yolanda: China was what I wish for me as a Puerto Rican here – to be respected, to have people enjoy me for me, not pressure me to change or be someone else. There's no question that I saw only a certain part of China. I know nothing is perfect, nothing is utopia. But, it was as though I had found what I had been searching for. China was about as close as I can come to utopia in terms of the contrast to what I am here.

NC: How did you feel about the way minorities are treated in China?

Marilyn: When was the last time you heard an American child in the suburbs sing "El Coqui"? When we went to a school in Peking where all the children were from the dominant group, Han people, the children were performing Mongolian and Korean songs and dances.

Carmen: When I was in China, I was super-proud to be a Puerto Rican and I saw that the Chinese were super-proud when they were of a national minority. How much we are missing here in the U.S.! Children in China are encouraged to know about other cultures and other peoples.

Carlos: Something that I found refreshing was acceptance there of the notion of

bilingual education. We have to struggle here for the bilingual education we need for survival. They have bilingual education in China out of respect. That is what we are asking for and it's a constant fight. Minority people in China have the right to use their own language, and are encouraged to do so. Children can use their own language in school and learn Mandarin as a second language. There were some cultures in China whose languages were almost extinct or had not developed a written form, and the Chinese did extensive research to revive and preserve those languages.

We often say here that there are no health services in minority communities, but there is always a family-planning clinic. In China the whole attitude toward family planning is so different. They even encourage those minorities whose populations were decimated in the past by disease to have large families.

Marilyn: Their basic attitude toward birth control was important for me. The standard Malthusian line is that the reason we have poverty is that people have too many kids. Well, China never had a national birth-control program until after they got people fed and got some basic organization in the society. Their birth-

control policy is within the scope of building up the society, not for controlling a certain segment of the population. It's part of the struggle to make sure that people eat and children are born healthy and there are enough resources to go around.

Emma: I have been involved in the struggle to end abusive sterilization practices against poor minority women in this country, so I asked about sterilization practices in China. I was told that sterilization is usually not performed until after the birth of the third child. They don't like to perform sterilizations on women. Men can also be sterilized if they choose. Sterilization does not account for a high percentage of the methods of birth control. They use the pill, the diaphragm, and the IUD more frequently.

NC: As people who live in a poor inner-city community, how did you view city life in China?

Marta: What struck me is that I work in El Barrio and it's one building falling apart, another demolished, and nothing being built. In China, everything was utilized, every space, every inch. Even garbage has a second life in China through recycling.

Emma: One thing that really fascinated me was to see something in China that we have lost in our Puerto Rican culture because of the oppression we face. We've been forced to let go of the old ways that we treasured, not old oppressive ways that stop progress, but those traditional ways in which people related to one another, such as the high esteem and status the old person had in the family. Seeing that China is building on things that we know we've lost – I feel very sad about that.

Just to be able to walk in to get a needed service with dignity – that's the way Chinese society is geared. That's what we fight for and hope that our people will get – not to be penalized for being needy in any area, whether it be health care or anything else.

Yolanda: When we went to China, New York City was going through the turmoil of a fiscal crisis, with the closing of day-care centers and health facilities. We spend so much money, we are so conscious of advanced technology, yet when you look at China's "primitive" health-care system and realize the limitations the Chinese have economically, and look at what we have in East Harlem, you wonder, how irrational can we be? In China we saw medical care on the most basic simple level, yet there's no comparison in terms of the dignity, the service to people. I'm sure that they get better care than we do.

Carlos: I think the thing that really impressed me was that the level of health

of the Chinese people is superior to ours in East Harlem in relation to infant mortality and the like. It was very impressive to see the tremendous emphasis placed on primary preventive care as a part of everyday life – through education, through the work of the neighborhood centers, and how health workers go door-to-door to educate tenants on various health issues.

Marilyn: That's true. In our community, there's no such thing as prevention. The only time we get into a hospital is through the emergency room. It's catastrophic, crisis kind of health care. That's the way it's structured across the board because profits are built into it. Our people have had such difficulties with that system that they don't want to go near it unless they really have to. So they avoid seeing a doctor and end up with a severe medical problem.

Yolanda: One of the things that struck me was that just about every work-site we visited had two basic units attached to it – a day-care center and a health center. We had just left a city where they were cutting back services, and in China there it was every time we turned around – child care and health care. It seems so simple, yet it's the most complex thing for us to do here.

Marilyn: I went to China directly from working with adolescents in East Harlem. Our Puerto Rican kids – those are the kids I thought of in China. Our kids are being destroyed in the school system, which is racist and insensitive. They come to see us in an after-school program and you wonder, my God, how are we ever going to survive as a people in these conditions? We have to help these kids with clothing, health, school, housing – you just don't know where to begin. The problems are so multiple. And the services they need are so

fragmented and disorganized. You can't deal with a kid as just one total person. In our system, you have to chop him up. His mind goes to one place; his body goes to another place; his housing problem goes to yet another place. When I went to China and saw their healthy, stable, and happy children I couldn't deal with it. I still can't. I was very moved emotionally. If I have to pick the one thing that stood out for me in China as a Puerto Rican who works with our young people, it was this contrast, almost too painful to bear. The ones that suffer the most are our future generations.

Yolanda: In China, it's the opposite – children are the hope of the future. I know it's wrong for Puerto Ricans to worry only about Puerto Ricans. We should worry about the poor, across racial lines, about people in general. In China, more than ever, I resented having to function here in the U.S. solely as a Puerto Rican. Here I have to function along ethnic lines for "my group," when I'm really capable of caring about people in general. That became clearer in China. The issues that confront Puerto Ricans are the issues of the poor, the oppressed.

Marta: What stands out in my mind is the peace, the contentment. Over here, it's just rush and rush and madness. Everyone there seems to be so calm, so collected. There is no communication gap. Sometimes we wonder here what group we belong to, where we stand. We are insecure. I felt a security in China, a pace which made me aware, made me open my senses and my mind to what I was doing. It made me want to concentrate on one thing, to work at it and struggle for it.

Yolanda: As soon as Chinese kids can walk, they are doing gymnastics. As soon as they can open their mouths, they are



Members of the Shanghai Conservatory of Music admire gifts presented by the group – a set of maracas and a group poster in Chinese and Spanish: "Long Live the People's Republic of China!" (Photo: M. Diaz)



A young Mongolian student at Peking's National Minorities Institute wears a button presented by the group. (Photo: M. Diaz)

singing. Everyone is creative. There's not a selectivity. If later on you weed out those who are better than others, that's fine. That should be a natural process. But everyone is considered to have ability. I remember an incident when we were visiting a classroom of three- to five-year-olds. They were weaving the most delicate origami paper baskets with an admirable neatness, facility, and selection of colors. They were also modeling clay figures with a surprising degree of sophistication. Others were drawing with fine instruments; here, kids at that age are given chunky crayons to use.

Marilyn: These people obviously had never read Piaget. Kids of that age are not supposed to be able to do that. One of the teachers in our group just broke down when she saw those kids. She said that it contradicted everything she had ever been taught about the learning stages of children. Our Chinese guide was asked about the theory behind this. He said, "Everyone has potential." In China, there is no limit on the horizons of what a child can do. That notion is so contradictory to what our life is here. Think of the waste. If we were just able to make a slight shift in our thinking – think of what that would mean in terms of human potential. It's mind-blowing. That you start from the get-go

with the notion that every child who is born has potential.

Manny: We are all talking about the positive things we saw. Certainly there was an awful lot we could identify with, that we could applaud and appreciate. But we have a responsibility to look at those things we found disturbing. The thing that comes to my mind is those kids we saw shooting off rifles. These were kids ages eight to ten at the Red Guard Primary School in Dalian (Darien). They were having target practice, shooting at targets with semi-automatic 56-caliber rifles. It's part of their regular school curriculum. I guess it's part of my own value system. I thought that children should not be taught to kill. It's as simple as that. I understand the politics of it, but on a very real personal basis, I found it disturbing.

Emma: I think I viewed it as a healthy thing. I'm against killing and I basically believe that people can build a humane society. But I also believe that we live in times of war and that to deny children the reality of what goes on in the world is really not preparing them for the aggression and violence that's out there. I work with kids who know all about killing and who can talk about wanting to kill, but not for any meaningful purpose. I felt it was healthy that those Chinese children were learning

the purpose, to defend their country, and in that sense there was a sense of community and involvement with their society.

Carmen: I respected those children. I saw that they had a heavier responsibility on their shoulders than I did because they may someday have to go in actual reality and defend their country. They live in a border area near the Soviet Union.

Marilyn: What I didn't like in China was that the Chinese are the masters of protocol. That seems to be the remnant of a very elitist and structured society. They know who should sit where and who is the "most respected person." That rubbed me wrong.

Carlos: Two things that I found disturbing health-wise were the spittoons and the incredible amount of smoking. They do not seem to be as aware as we are of the dangers of smoking.

Emma: But the spittoons reminded me of home in Puerto Rico. Old people used them for spitting tobacco.

NC: What have been the reactions of people in your community to your trip?

Marta: I've talked to some students and friends of mine about it and I get very touched and enthusiastic in talking about China. They listen and they say, "Do you think this can ever happen here?" They say, "I don't know where to start, I don't know what would come first." My friends have been thinking about things like that. They come back to me and say, "Hey, I've been thinking about what you said. . . ."

Yolanda: What happened to me is that people write me off. They say, "You thought that way before you went there." I really think that I've been affected. But I find it difficult to convince family and friends who are not of my thinking that such things are even possible.

Emma: I think an important point to make with people is that China's poverty is not the result of socialism, but socialism is the way they struggle to progress out of poverty.

Carmen: Whenever I have presentations on China I find audiences come to hear what I have to say even though I am not an expert. People are very curious.

Yolanda: I will accept that there might be a hundred things wrong with China and I do accept that there are some good things about the country I live in now, but you come away from China with the feeling that there are no limitations. There is a constant movement forward – constant progress. After two weeks here, you lose that feeling and get right back into the rut. Here you are taught that there are limitations. But who the hell says that 800 million people can't be fed, housed, and get good health care? What you come away from China with is the feeling that – my God, it's possible – the revolution. ●

The Red Guards: Making Revolution and Making Mistakes

by William Hinton

Chen Yong-gui discusses the lessons of the Cultural Revolution

The Socialist Education Movement known as the Four Cleans (1964-66), described in the two previous issues of NEW CHINA, merged with the Cultural Revolution in 1966. The Cultural Revolution began in the middle schools, colleges, and universities of Peking, then spread to the schools and colleges of the whole country, then to government offices, factories, the transportation network and trade, and finally right into the countryside.

Not long after the call went out in December 1966 for the peasants to take part in attacking revisionism, a mass organization of workers seized power in Shanghai by overthrowing the old Communist Party leadership. Power seizures then became the order of the day, and all over China, even in small grassroots communities, groups of rebels rose up to take over.

In this they were often aided by wandering Red Guards, student activists from the big universities who were joined by eager young recruits from local colleges and

middle schools. Red Guards from Peking, Tianjin (Tientsin), Shanghai, Hangzhou (Hangchow), and Guangzhou (Kwangchow) dispersed throughout the country to spark and lead this activity. They tended to concentrate on nationally known places such as Dazhai (Tachai), large coal mines such as those at Yangquan, in Shanxi (Shansi), or oil fields such as Yumen in Gansu (Kansu). Red Guards brought a fresh wind of rebellion and revolution wherever they went. They also brought with them disagreements and splits, for the Red Guards were never a unified national organization, but rather a diverse conglomeration of local units that were already engaged in serious internal contests for power on their home campuses and often sought outside alliances more as levers against the local Red Guard opposition than as a means of making revolution in China as a whole.

Overthrowing the old power structure proved easier than establishing a new one. Like the Red Guards who sparked action, people everywhere tended to disagree over which old leaders to unite and work with and which to set aside. Factions developed

that often fought bitterly for control, convinced that only they meant to make revolution, while the opposition represented counter-revolution. The army - the only organization still intact on a nationwide basis - had to intervene to stop the fighting, bring the factions together, and set up new organs of power - the Revolutionary Committees. When the army made mistakes, this process was prolonged. There were areas in Shanxi Province where armed fighting on a fairly large scale occurred as late as 1969.

Through all these upheavals, confrontations, twists and turns, the issues raised by Mao Tsetung regarding the way to build socialism, how to take the socialist rather than the capitalist road, were considered and acted upon by hundreds of millions of people. Consciousness was raised and the main direction clarified. Learning from Dazhai was placed seriously on the agenda of every commune and brigade in China, and here and there certain key units began to leap forward in production and construction as Dazhai had earlier done.

In this interview Chen Yong-gui describes how power was seized in Xiyang

WILLIAM HINTON, author of *Fanshen and other books*, spent three months as an agricultural consultant in China in 1978.

(Hsiyang) County, some of the factional difficulties there and in the province as a whole, the role of the young Red Guards from distant cities, and some of the rhetorical excesses that tended to obscure the issues. Appraising the Cultural Revolution in late 1971, Chen concluded that without it China could not have advanced, without it Dazhai could not have become an example for the whole country, without it Dazhai itself might even have gone under.

Perhaps most difficult for the American reader to understand is the whole question of factionalism. In each case one wants to know who was right and who was wrong. But factionalism, as it developed in the Cultural Revolution, was defined as "bourgeois" – that is, as an unprincipled struggle for power between various groups, each with its own axe to grind. Just as in the Western world there is no principled reason to favor one monopoly group over another, so in China there was no reason to favor one faction over another. Both the main factions in Shanxi were composed primarily of workers, peasants, and students and contained among their leaders not only worker, peasant, and student representatives, but also old cadres, army commanders, and militiamen. Both also attracted, in addition, unprincipled opportunists – landlords, rich peasants, and counter-revolutionaries with old scores to settle. Such people did their best to fan up fighting and to discredit and put down all honest old cadres.

Lin Biao in his climb to power – and after him the "gang of four" – acted as the main force, the central headquarters promoting disunity, fanning up armed struggle, slandering old cadres, arresting them, or sending them to cadre schools in the countryside for indefinite periods that amounted to exile. As this situation developed, Mao Tsetung made great efforts to unite the factions and promote "Great Alliances," bring all good or comparatively good cadres back into leadership and get on with the work of remolding production, culture, and administration. But these efforts were constantly undermined and frustrated by the factional activity fanned up by Lin Biao and the "four" and enthusiastically supported by most of the original targets of the Chinese Revolution – the overthrown landlords, rich peasants, and other assorted reactionaries.

What these forces made use of was the feudal, the bourgeois, and the petty-bourgeois ideology still reflected in the minds of millions of ordinary people. Seeing certain personal advantage, people could temporarily be mobilized through super-revolutionary slogans and programs to attack one another and contest with one another for power. Those who consciously

stood out against all this were, for a time, few and far between. Outstanding among them was Chen Yong-gui, who had the personal support and advice of Premier Chou En-lai in his opposition to armed fighting and in his refusal to join either faction in Shanxi. Chen's clear-cut position, though very unpopular at the time, proved to be the only valid one in the end.

As the key figure in the administration working for unity in opposition to armed struggle, Chou En-lai became the main target of the "four" on a national scale. And all those who, like Chen Yong-gui, tried to implement this line, which was in reality Mao Tsetung's line, became main targets at the provincial, regional, or local level.

As Chen Yong-gui said in concluding this interview: "The lessons of the Cultural Revolution are very profound."

PART VII

Hinton: How was power taken over in Xiyang County?

Chen: Government power was seized twice in the county. The first time Red Guards from the Yuling District of Shaanxi (Shensi) Province took over the county seat. They didn't come to see me beforehand. They never told me what they planned to do. One day they just came here with a great big handbag and poured its contents out on my *kang* (bed).

"What's all that stuff?" I asked.

"It's the county seals," they said. "We seized power for you!"

"But why do that?" I asked. "Why bring these seals without telling me anything about it?"

"We found out that the county cadres were all against you," they said. "We think power should belong to you."

"How many people did you take over from?" I asked.

"Three or four."

"How?"

"We went into their offices and said 'Give us your seals!' So we gathered up the seals and brought them here."

Well, I criticized them. A few kids, 20 or 21 years old. They were very brave.

"Was this wrong?" they asked.

"Yes," I said.

So they put all the seals back into the bag and took them back to the county seat.

The second time power was seized there were Red Guard units here from mass organizations in Tianjin and Peking. County militia headquarters got in touch with some cadres on the county Party Committee. This was the start of the second takeover.

Hinton: Who made the contacts?

Chen: I had something to do with it. I

took some action behind the scenes, but most people didn't know that.* There were two factions among the rebels in the county and both of them took part. At first the two factions didn't conflict very much, but after they took power they began to disagree. They had an alliance at first, but after they took power the alliance broke up. One side said, "You take above, we'll take below, you take within, we'll take without." "Above" and "within" meant the administration inside the county seat. "Below" and "without" meant the administration of the communes and brigades in the surrounding countryside. But inside the county seat there were also two factions and they disagreed over who should hold power. Everyone wanted power. That created antagonism. The Red Guards from outside also split into two groups.

When I saw this situation I came out from behind the scenes.

Chen Prevents a Two-Year Quarrel

"Let's not carry on like this," I said. "We'll quarrel for two years and never get anywhere. Let's not struggle over who holds power at the county seat, let's go to the countryside, to the rural brigades. All the brigade cadres have been set aside [suspended] and work is not going well there. Let's go down and mobilize the people to solve the cadre problem correctly. Solve this first, then solve the problem of the county town."

When they saw me come out and speak like this they said, "Dazhai's stand is clear. If Dazhai people hold power, we will be safe." They quickly formed an alliance and soon thereafter set up a Revolutionary Committee.† From that day on [February 1967] things have gone well in our county. No matter what fighting broke out in the

*The second seizure of power was successful because Chen Yong-gui, working together with some cadres of the county militia headquarters, contacted a few sympathetic cadres already on the county Party Committee. These forces, supported by students from both inside and outside the county (Red Guards), plus newly formed mass organizations among the people, were able to take the county government out of the hands of the old leaders and run things on a day-to-day basis until a new government could be formed.

†This Revolutionary Committee satisfied the conditions set by Mao Tsetung for new governing bodies. It was a three-way alliance of representatives of the armed forces (the county militia), revolutionary old cadres, and the new mass organizations of workers, peasants, and students. Committees such as this were established all over China after power seizures in 1967, but not many of them were as stable and as broadly based as that set up in Xiyang County.

province after that it didn't influence our county. After the Revolutionary Committee was set up I led most of the county-level cadres down to the communes and brigades to work among the people. We made it possible for the good cadres to resume work. We carried out a correct cadre policy. We repudiated those with serious mistakes and let those with small mistakes start work right away. In our county grassroots cadres began to work again earlier than in any other county in Shanxi.

Hinton: Who suspended the cadres from their work in the first place?

Chen: This was done mainly by Red Guards from outside. They were very active all over the place. After the Revolutionary Committee was set up most of them left, so there was little obstruction on their part. Only a few hundred remained in the whole county. They came here from as far away as Anhui (Anhui) Province [in the Yangtze Valley]. We loaned them money so they could go home. Then we started a mass movement for the evaluation of the cadres.

Hinton: Was it right or wrong to set the cadres aside?

Chen: It was right in some cases, wrong in most of them. Most of the cadres in our county are of worker-peasant origin, but the situation is complicated. In 1964, during the Socialist Education Movement, Wang Guang-mei's "Peach Garden experience" was spread here.* Under this ultra-left attack 80 percent of the cadres at commune and brigade level were set aside. Then in the Cultural Revolution, along with their attacks on real capitalist-roaders, the Red Guards started to attack the local cadres all over again. The Red Guards thought that everyone in power, whether they held a big job or a little one, even including such a job as keeping the store-room, was a capitalist-roader. This was no different from Liu Shao-qi's revisionist line. No matter what reason you give, knocking down all the cadres is wrong.

After our Revolutionary Committee was formed, we corrected this cadre policy fast. Our decisions were not obstructed by factionalism. And this was mainly due to the influence of Dazhai. If Dazhai people hadn't stood firm, things might have been different. But the more the pressure, the firmer they stood.

*Peach Garden, or Taoyuann, was the name of a brigade in East Hebei (Hopei), where Wang Guang-mei, the wife of Liu Shao-qi (Liu Shao-chi), had managed to overthrow numerous good or comparatively good cadres. She then replaced them with notorious opportunists who were willing to follow her line. Wang Guang-mei also used tremendous amounts of state aid to attempt to make a breakthrough in the brigade's production.

Red Guards Expose Problems

Hinton: Were the Red Guards necessary?

Chen: Without the Red Guards it would not have been easy to rebel against the capitalist-roaders in the county and to seize their power. To rebel and seize power was correct at that time. To set everyone aside and grab power all the way down the line, right down to the smallest cadres, was wrong.

In the production brigades every cadre became a target. This was very dangerous because, as remains true today, class enemies were still alive and class struggle still existed. There were class enemies who joined the mass organizations and tried to make use of this mistaken thinking. This was most dangerous. The Revolutionary Committee of the Dazhai Brigade never wavered. Whenever bad things happened they went out to stop them.

Hinton: How did the Red Guards help?

Chen: Red Guards exposed all the problems in the county. Since they came from far away, I've never understood how they found out so many things. Most of them were pretty good. Red Guards from Peking and other places were elected to the Standing Committee of the county Revolutionary Committee. They knew that the old county authorities were against Dazhai. So they exposed and repudiated the revisionist line of the old county committee. They investigated it and exposed everything on big-character posters.

A few of the Red Guards were bad but most of them were good. They were good not just because they came in large numbers and reinforced our ranks. They were good because they exposed a lot of problems. They went through a lot of hardship, and they did a lot of good things. This must be affirmed. If they hadn't rebelled against the capitalist-roaders we could not have seized power. Even with their support it was not easy.

We can't just look at their mistakes. Even these mistakes must be examined realistically. The Red Guards had no experience in class struggle. They were young. Their biggest mistake was a tendency to rely on those who were dissatisfied with the cadres. Among the dissatisfied ones there were many class enemies. The Red Guards didn't rely enough on the poor and lower-middle peasants. In summing up, we can say that they never messed things up on purpose but sometimes got used by class enemies due to their lack of experience.

The Red Guards exposed the revisionist line Liu Shao-qi pushed in the Socialist Education Movement here. They exposed the way in which all the local cadres were knocked down. They exposed the bureau-

cracy, the blind directives. They exposed many, many things on their big-character posters.

Red Guards 90 Percent Good

Hinton: Did Red Guards sometimes create obstructions?

Chen: They started out in a very positive way. Later things changed to a certain extent and the change had something to do with the manipulations of the capitalist-roaders. The latter began to point the spearhead at the cadres who had already been victims of the Socialist Education Movement. The Red Guards didn't know the local situation that well. They didn't understand the class situation in the villages. Without experience they didn't know who had been a landlord, or a rich peasant. They didn't know who the poor peasants were. So they could be used by bad elements. These elements used the Red Guards' courage in rebellion to try and take revenge on the cadres. The Red Guards didn't do enough careful investigation among the poor and lower-middle peasants. They didn't talk with them very much. So for a period they made mistakes, but these were corrected quickly. There were only a few who persisted in their mistakes and refused to change.

The Red Guards who came from far away and those who originated in our own county were 90 percent good. One could convince them with facts. For instance, the students of the Tianjin First Middle School, who created problems in Jinge Brigade [a village adjoining Dazhai], felt so bad when I talked to them and criticized them that they cried. They felt so bad that they refused to eat. I had to persuade them to eat. In the brigade they were fooled by some bad people. After we investigated the situation we were able to expose the bad elements and repudiate them.

Hinton: Did you expect so many outsiders to come to Dazhai?

Chen: The Red Guards came very suddenly. The whole movement hit like a thunderbolt. The mass of the people weren't quite clear at the time what it was all about. Not only were there some bad elements in the mass organizations, there were some ultra-left tendencies. All this could be expected when a movement develops so fast.

Among the students of the Tianjin Girls Middle School the situation was complicated. Once one of the girls dropped her notebook when she went to eat. The book was picked up by some students of the opposite faction. In it they read that a certain girl had an older brother who was working in a mine in Hebei Province. When this girl visited her brother during Chinese New Year, he told her, "If you want to get

Dazhai, you must first unite all the small brigades around Dazhai, you must surround Dazhai. If you want to get Dazhai, you must knock down Chen Yong-gui. He is very able. If you can't knock down Chen Yong-gui, you won't get anywhere."

When the other side picked this up they thought they really had something! They wanted to give me this notebook. I told them to give it back immediately. "I don't

down below there were the people. How could it be so easy?

They weren't too happy about giving the notebook back, but they did.

A Rich Peasant's Son Takes on Dazhai

Hinton: What happened at Jinge Brigade?

Chen: We found out that the person who whipped up the anti-Dazhai wind in Jinge was a Party member. Actually he was

decisions were reviewed many times and after a lot of discussion. In order to narrow the enemy group as much as possible, some landlords were classified as rich peasants and some rich peasants were classified as middle peasants.

People said this young man behaved pretty well while in the army. But after he was demobilized and came home he was always finding fault with the village cadres. He was very sarcastic. When he saw anything that had once belonged to his family he would say, "Wasn't that mine?" They had to tell him, "It's not yours." When the Peach Garden experience was being carried out during the Socialist Education Movement, he became an activist. He joined actively in knocking down all the cadres. Then in 1965, after Mao Tsetung's Twenty-three Points* came out, the judgments against the cadres were reversed. He never accepted this reversal. So in the Cultural Revolution he could hardly be expected not to rise up and attack the cadres again. Once more he stepped out onto the stage. Since it was hard to deceive the people of his own brigade, he latched onto the Red Guards who came from outside. He also organized some young people who had not been through the land reform.

He became the leader of one mass organization in Jinge village. Thus he linked up with the organization formed by the students of the Tianjin First Middle School. A few brigades around Dazhai had the same outlook as Dazhai. The Jinge forces came up against the pro-Dazhai forces and violent fighting almost broke out.

A Red Army Man Sweeps Snow

One day I went there to attend a mass meeting of poor and lower-middle peasants. It was snowing hard. There were six inches of snow on the ground. The head of Jinge Brigade was an old Red Army man. I found him sweeping the snow off the street. It used to be that when they were holding a poor and lower-middle peasants' meeting you'd only find landlords sweeping the streets. I thought to myself, "How come this old Red Army man is sweeping the street? How come no landlords or rich peasants are in sight?"

I stopped the car and asked him, "Why aren't you at the meeting?"

He started to cry. He hugged me and said, "Now landlords and rich peasants all join the meeting but I can't go."

*A document which posed the struggle in terms of the capitalist versus the socialist road. In it, Mao saw "Party people in authority who are taking the capitalist road" as the primary target for the movement. This document was used by socialists in their counteroffensive against Liu Shao-qi.



Drawing by Lynn Levin.

want it. I don't need it. To take it is wrong." They said they had this firsthand material on the anti-Dazhai forces. I said, "Is it all that easy? Just one notebook and you can knock down Dazhai!" I ordered them to give the notebook back. The girls would worry like anything if they lost their secrets. They were just young people. What did they know about Dazhai? These children didn't know what they were doing. It was the capitalist-roaders who wanted to knock down Dazhai. Of course they wouldn't say anything good about it. Of course they would say bad things. But up above there was the Central Committee, and

against Dazhai because he wanted revenge for his class. In the land reform much of the wealth of his family had been distributed. His father was a rich peasant; but before land reform was completed he himself joined the People's Liberation Army.

In Jinge the class-consciousness of the cadres was not too high when the land was divided. Some of the landlords and rich peasants tried to buy the cadres off. They invited them to meals. In the end, when it came time to classify everyone, this rich-peasant family was placed in the middle-peasant category. The final classification came after the struggle was over. The

He was a long way from the meeting place. I told him to put down his broom and shovel and I took him there myself.

As I went in I asked, "Whose meeting is this anyway?"

"The poor and lower-middle peasants' meeting," said those in charge.

"If an old poor peasant can't join in, the landlords must have a hand in it," I said. "This could never happen if they didn't. Landlords and rich peasants had better get out," I shouted.

At that point not a few walked out.

"Your mothers. . .," I said. "Now you think the world belongs to you again."

The young Red Guards from Tianjin who were at this meeting had never been through land reform. They didn't know which people had been landlords and rich peasants. I wanted them to see for themselves.

Then before I had to leave to join a repudiation meeting in the county seat, I said a few words to them. They cried and they refused to eat.

Excessive Rhetoric

Hinton: Perhaps it was hard for the Red Guards to find their way through all the slogans?

Chen: In the Cultural Revolution there were even more empty slogans than the revisionists originally put forward. The cadres who were most afraid of the masses, the ones who had the most problems, they were the ones who shouted the most.

Just to prove how loyal they were, these people started off with a few Mao quotes. By the time they got to the end of their speech you couldn't find a particle of Mao Tsetung Thought. All this "morning request" and "evening report" – it was nonsense. Mao Tsetung didn't have time to listen to the "morning request" and "evening report."^{*}

Mao doesn't like this sort of thing. He favors action and results, not empty words. If you want me to recite Mao's words about forestry I can't do it, but we at Dazhai plant trees and protect them. There are some people who think that recitation is action. There was a period in the middle of the Cultural Revolution when we couldn't get by without frequent recitation. We also

^{*}During the Cultural Revolution, taking their cue from the army, various units developed the custom of gathering their members together before work in the morning, repeating in unison some words from Chairman Mao, then asking him for the day's directive. After work, before going home, the same thing was repeated in the form of a report to the Chairman on the day's work. This ritual turned into something very close to a religious ceremony. Few had the courage to criticize it for fear of being labeled anti-Mao.

had to put up a constant stream of posters and slogans. If we didn't the Red Guards would criticize us. But even if one does these things under pressure, it is still wrong.

At that time I didn't dare make telephone calls. To talk on the phone one had to first repeat some quotation. Then the party at the other end had to reply with a quotation. What a mess!

Someone would call and say, "Serve the people."

What could one answer?

In meetings nobody dared speak out. Before anyone said a word they had to recite a quotation. As a result most people just shut up.

I didn't know what quote to use, so I just kept my mouth closed. If you were to say I was not loyal, that would be untrue. But I was not good at spouting quotations, so I had to talk less.

Hitting, Smashing, and Grabbing

Hinton: Was the pressure applied to Dazhai primarily pressure for more Mao Tsetung quotations?

Chen: Far from it. The primary thrust was pressure for violent action, for armed struggle. In many parts of Shanxi bourgeois factionalism was serious. There was violent fighting. Some people were proud of their hitting, smashing, and grabbing. They put pressure on us. "Your mothers. . .," they said. "There is no armed fighting in your county. How can you carry out the Cultural Revolution?"

"That's easy for us to understand," we replied. "The Cultural Revolution should be carried out without violence. To whom do you listen? To Chairman Mao, or someone else? When Chairman Mao says to use reason and not violence, he is talking about the whole country. When you say we are wrong, what you are actually saying is that Chairman Mao is wrong. We firmly stand for using reason and not force."

During this period, in the whole of Xiyang County all the guns of the militia remained in the hands of the rank and file. We did not collect any guns, yet none were used. None of our guns was seized by outsiders, and none of our people went out to fight. Not only did we not lose any guns, we actually gained one. Some people came to start a fight. When we confronted them, they ran away so fast they dropped one of their guns. People often came and tried to start fights. We didn't fight them. We just sent lots of people to debate with them and persuade them to leave. We mobilized all 400 brigades in the county to do this work. Whenever people came and tried to start something, we urged our members to go out and convince them to leave. We did this because we saw the damage done by all

this fighting. In other places some cadres were badly beaten.

Shelter in Xiyang

As violent fighting in Shanxi escalated and grew fiercer, some people without weapons took refuge here. We used local grain to feed them. Then it was said, "Xiyang County is an air-raid shelter. It is a nest of bad people."

But how could there be so many bad people?

We didn't know who came from what group or faction, we only knew that most of them were workers, peasants, or students. Maybe there were some bad people among them. If so, they were certainly a minority. We can't say that the ordinary people taking refuge here were bad or against Mao's line.

Among those who came seeking safety were some who asked our help to put down the other side. But we refused and only gave them some grain to eat. We would not help them carry on their violent fighting.

Those who came in were panic-stricken – severely wounded, weeping, clothes torn and worn out. We gave them food and asked them to live in peace here.

Because of this, more and more pressure was applied to us. Dirty, mean tricks were played. Some people put on PLA uniforms, then came to search for their factional enemies.

Tens of thousands took refuge here and among them were some who wanted to start up the struggle on the spot. Sometimes they started fights, or they took a shot at someone passing by. Sometimes when our own members left the county to visit relatives, they were beaten or even fired on. This was done to provoke fighting in Xiyang. Outsiders hoped we would respond. But I would never allow any response. Once fighting started here hundreds would be hurt.

With all the weapons in the hands of the militiamen a rumor was spread that a so-called anti-PLA faction had seized weapons in Xiyang. But this was a lie. How could we supply weapons to enable others to fight when we refused to fight ourselves?

Slanders were spread about Chen Yong-gui. They said I turned over arms and food to the "anti-PLA" faction. Hence I must be anti-PLA. But could we allow refugees to starve? No. So they called me an anti-PLA element. Since some refugees from the faction called anti-PLA were here and we fed them, then we must oppose the PLA. Is this logic? The fact of the matter was, we didn't know what side they were on. We didn't know if they were supporters of Liu Ge-ping [chairman of the provincial Revolutionary Committee] or of Zhang Er-qing [commander of the provincial

“So I went right up to the highest point of the wall and shouted into the darkness.

‘I was sent here by the Central Committee to stop all this fighting.

Whoever opposes this should shoot right this way. Shoot here where you hear my voice!’ ”

armed forces].* All we knew was that these people could not go home. As soon as they went home they would be beaten up by the opposition.

In the end a directive came from the Central Committee saying that all refugees should go home. They should not be afraid to go home. After they left we don't know what happened to them. But anyway, they left here as individuals and not as organized groups. When they arrived home some people asked them what kind of poisonous influence they had met up with in Xiyang County. People charged them with having been poisoned by us, then sent back to make trouble. “What kind of poison did you soak up from Chen? What task has Chen given you to do?” It was so bad that when they ran away a second time they didn't dare come to Xiyang County. They were afraid they would give us a bad reputation.

Later some said that Chen was a bad guy – I was rumored to be a landlord from Hebei who ran away to settle in Dazhai. Here indeed was a class enemy! Then it was discovered that this Chen was not born in Hebei but in Henan (Honan) – thus I became a tyrant from Henan. So, speaking of class struggle, I myself became a class enemy.

Only Old Chen

Hinton: Were you ever assaulted or detained?

Chen: In those days, if I started for Taiyuan, the provincial capital, the factional leaders would get word of it. They would order their henchmen to guard the highway with fixed bayonets and hand grenades. They told everyone a class enemy was coming. Whenever a big car came along, the guards jumped out and yelled “Stop!”

“I won't move,” I said. “I'm not a class enemy.”

When the people opened the car door and saw that it was only me, they said,

*Liu Ge-ping and Zhang Er-qing took power in Shanxi together in January 1967. They later fell to quarreling and each eventually headed up a province-wide faction that contested for power through armed struggle in region after region. All efforts on the part of central leaders to bring these factions together collapsed. In the end both leaders were removed from office and both failed to be re-elected as members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at its Tenth Congress in 1973.

“Sorry, so sorry. It's only old Chen.”

So I sighed and went on my way.

How could I say that these people were engaged in counter-revolution? I only saw that they had been tricked into some bad activity by bad people. If they had been counter-revolutionaries, they would have stuck me with their bayonets.

Sometimes they fired a few shots at my car. But regardless of the pressure applied to me, I would never support any faction. Even at the risk of death, I didn't care. If they followed Mao Tsetung's policy, I supported them. If they didn't, I opposed them.

At the time of the power seizure in Shanxi Province, when the Revolutionary Committee was formed, the Central Committee in Peking supported Liu Ge-ping as Provincial Chairman. So I supported Liu Ge-ping also. Afterward, Liu Ge-ping made mistakes, but that happened later. When Liu first came to power, we followed the Central Committee and supported him. How could we support the opposition? But since we gave that support at that time, we are now called bad and wrong. The opposition says we should have opposed him from the start instead of joining the Central Committee in giving support. All this led to rumors that Chen Yong-gui supported Liu Ge-ping and was therefore immersed in factionalism.

They put lots of pressure on me. Once at a meeting of 100,000 people [a mass meeting of both factions called by the Shanxi Revolutionary Committee], the whole crowd surrounded me six or seven times. They tried to get me to say which faction I supported, but I refused. They said, “If you supported the wrong side, it doesn't matter. Just correct your mistake.” But I said, “I've never done any such thing, I've never supported either side.”

So then I was labeled the *ding men guer* [the door brace] of Shanxi.*

*Because he would not support either faction against the other and particularly opposed violent fighting between factions, Chen was accused of blocking the development of the Cultural Revolution in Shanxi just as a wooden brace behind a door blocks access to a peasant's house. This accusation was made by people on both sides of the factional split who hoped to come to power through armed struggle – a process that was alien to the whole concept of the Cultural Revolution as envisioned by Mao Tsetung.

Finally, after dark, a car came to get me out, but I refused to leave because there were 20 or 30 people who had come with me and I wouldn't go without them.

On Pingyao City Wall

Once the Central Committee sent me to Pingyao County to try to end the violent fighting there. I was surrounded for 24 – no, 36 hours. They closed the gates of the town wall* so I couldn't get out and they cut all the telephone lines. Then they blew bugles all night long and shouted, “Charge!” and “Capture Chen alive!”

Before I went to Pingyao I sent a person from central Shanxi to announce that the Central Committee had asked me to visit the city to try and solve the factional conflict. But instead this person reported that I had come to support one side and suppress the other. He didn't say that the Central Committee had sent me to try and stop the violent fighting, but only that I had come to support one side against the other. Those who feared suppression were very upset. Since I came with 120 soldiers, all fully armed, members of the apprehensive faction surrounded us. People surrounded the house where I stayed, and people manned the city wall on all sides. Outside the city wall more people gathered. These people didn't really oppose me, it was only some of their leaders. The soldiers with me were frightened. It looked as if the struggle would be very sharp.

Some of the factional leaders, people who were really stirring up all the fighting, said, “We are worried about your safety. We'll find you a place to hide.”

But I said, “I won't take a dog's road. I'll take the broad highway.”

So I went right up to the highest point of the wall and shouted into the darkness. “I was sent here by the Central Committee to stop all this fighting. Whoever opposes this should shoot right this way. Shoot here where you hear my voice!”

The response was silence.

When the masses outside the city learned that I was surrounded there, they sent for help. They sent a cable to the Central Committee. The Central Committee sent a Liberation Army battalion to save me and take me out. The people who surrounded me were all dispersed. At the same time,

*Pingyao's wall has been preserved as an historical monument.

both province-wide factions set out to save me. They sent 1,200 trucks to Pingyao. The trucks came from both sides. This proved that I was no factional leader. Both sides sent forces to save me. So many people and so many trucks! They almost crushed the city.

People elsewhere sent cables saying they too wanted to rescue me. By that time I could answer that the problem was already solved.

Factionalism Is Very Complicated

So I think both these mass organizations were revolutionary and the rank and file on both sides were revolutionary. Once they got directives from the Central Committee, they followed them. As a result, the conflict at Pingyao was settled well. But some of the factional leaders thought they gained nothing from the settlement. They were unhappy. In the organization on both sides there were a handful of bad people, and for a while the rank and file were unable to recognize them. Later, both factions ferreted out the bad people hidden in their ranks. A distinction was made between the mass of the people and the bad characters. We can never say that the mass of the people are bad, or that when they struggle against each other they are engaged in class or line struggle. Only when the struggle is directed at bad people can it be called class struggle or line struggle.

This whole problem of factionalism is very complicated. Bad things and bad people expose themselves bit by bit. Some of them act on the stage and some of them act off the stage. Some play their role behind the scenes and some do it right out in front.

As for me, I have strong feelings for the mass of the people and vice-versa. Whenever I have been in trouble, it is always the people who have saved me. Can this be called strange?

What is really very strange is this – whenever I meet with the mass of the people, they welcome me. But when I am out of touch with the people, I keep hearing rumors that they are all against me. Some people are working hard at all this. It is not so easy to figure out what goes on.

There is one lesson that I learned, one thing that I paid a lot of attention to during the Cultural Revolution – that was not to be afraid of the people. I was careful not to go too near isolated individuals. But as long as there were lots of people together, I dared go near. When I got off the train in the provincial capital, Taiyuan, as long as there was a crowd I was not afraid to mingle with it, even if the people were

holding guns and sticks. Bad people are always in the minority. They act in secret. They try to hide themselves whenever there is a crowd. As soon as the people gather around, nothing too bad can happen. The driver of my car was afraid of crowds. When he saw large numbers of people with guns, he was afraid to bring me near. But I said to him, “That’s just where I do dare to go.”

I was certain that all those people advocating hitting, smashing, and grabbing would collapse in the end. When the time came, all debts would be repaid and all accounts with bad people would be settled.

The Army Takes Sides

Hinton: The struggle between the factions was said to be principled class struggle in southeast Shanxi, but unprincipled bourgeois factionalism in Shanxi Province as a whole. How could this be?

Chen: I can’t explain it. I wasn’t involved. People say that I was involved in factional struggle, but really I was not involved very much. In our county the struggle between mass factions wasn’t serious. It certainly never developed to the point of hitting, smashing, and grabbing. We county leaders never supported one side against the other, so I don’t have a profound understanding of factions. But from handling the problem as I did and by seeing the way the Central Committee handled it, I gained some understanding.

Originally the mass organizations were unanimous in their opposition to Liu Shao-qi and the capitalist-roaders. They supported Mao Tsetung and opposed Liu Shao-qi. There were many mass organizations but their overall aim was the same. Gradually these mass organizations congealed into two big opposing factions. Once this occurred the struggle between them became very serious. Each wanted to be called revolutionary while calling the other side royalist [reactionary]. As the struggle between the two sides escalated, capitalist-roaders, renegades, and enemy agents sneaked their way into the ranks and did bad things. They were able to deceive and mislead some of the people. They created splits. Then the struggle escalated further. This occurred just before the Revolutionary Committee of the province was formed. It was at that time that the People’s Liberation Army stepped into the scene.

In southeast Shanxi, the army found violent fighting. Fists, sticks, and stones were being used. In fact, bad people were trying to sabotage the formation of a Revolutionary Committee for the southeast region. One faction came out in support of the proposed committee, the other

opposed it. At the height of the struggle, the People’s Liberation Army gave support to one side. The other side then began to oppose the army. If the army had been even-handed, there would have been less trouble.

One faction was first called “conservative,” then “anti-army,” and finally “counter-revolutionary.” This made its rank and file members angry. Mao Tsetung said that all the people, the masses, were revolutionary. As soon as the army called one side “counter-revolutionary,” the members on that side became upset. Struggle arose between those called “revolutionary” and their opposition. Weapons were brought out, no one knows from where. Some of these weapons were of high quality. Those who had none had to find ways to get some immediately. So they raided the arsenal.

Hinton: What issues divided the factions?

Chen: The issue of cadres, for one. All those cadres who were overthrown were set aside for a long time. Then young Red Guards unfamiliar with the history of these people, and judging only from current impressions, liberated certain cadres and formed alliances with them.* One group supported one set of cadres. The opposition group supported another set. Then each investigated the cadres supported by the other side, and charged the other side with supporting renegades and traitors.

Actually bad people were busy fanning up trouble, trying hard to pit one mass organization against the other. If they found one bad person who had sneaked into a leading post on the other side, this served as an excuse for calling that whole side bad. In truth there were bad people on both sides, but only a handful. One couldn’t label the whole organization bad because it contained a few bad people.

I have always held that the masses on both sides were good, while a few trouble-makers on both sides fanned up factionalism and misled people.

Two-line struggle is struggle against capitalist-roaders. Struggle that pits the masses against each other can’t be called two-line struggle. Such an approach makes the scope of attack too broad. Too many people come under fire. You can’t say that when two bad leaders clash it is line struggle, nor can the broad masses be the target of revolutionary line struggle. If you take such a position it puts too much pressure on the people. You make them the target of attack.

As you can see from all this, the lessons of the Cultural Revolution are very profound. ●

*“Liberated” as used here meant to call the cadres back to work and back into the political struggle.

Lu Hsun

by Stanley Marcus

Portrait of the Artist as Revolutionary

The young cadets of Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou (Kwangchow) had several times invited Lu Xun (Lu Hsun), the great modern writer of China, to speak to them about revolutionary literature. Lu Xun kept putting it off, feeling he had nothing useful to say. Finally, on April 8, 1927, he showed up in the rain to give a short talk entitled "Literature of a Revolutionary Period." After pointing out that he knew little about literature and that the first subject he had studied seriously was mining, he proceeded to lay out precisely the relationship between revolution and literature.

In his talk, he referred to an incident that had occurred in Peking a year before – on March 18, 1926. On that day, Duan Qi-rui, a warlord who was president of the provisional government, ordered police to open fire on students demonstrating against the Japanese demand to close a fort at Dagu (Taku). Over 200 people were killed, including one of Lu Xun's own students, a young woman named Liu He-zhen, who was brutally murdered, riddled with bullets as she and the others marched gaily toward the government house unaware of the trap. Not only had Lu Xun been grieved by the deaths, but he was shocked that those whom he attacked day in and day out in his writings could actually stoop to such a barbaric act. He spoke up for the students, urging them to fight even harder and with more than just bare hands. Because of this, he had to go into hiding and eventually flee south to Xiamen (Amoy).

Now, a year later, standing before the young cadets at Huangpu, he recalled



LU XUN (1881-1936)

how at such times literature had little influence. It was time to fight back. "A poem could not have frightened away Sun Quan-fang [a warlord defeated by the Communist-Nationalist army]," he told them, "but a cannonshell scared him away . . . I myself would rather hear the roar of guns, for it seems to me that the roar of guns is much sweeter to listen to than literature."

It was only four days after his talk and two days after pointing out in an essay that revolutionaries should not get so intoxicated with recent victories against the warlords that they forget about counter-revolutionaries working in the dark, that Chiang Kai-shek and the right wing of the Guomindang (Nationalists)

initiated a reign of terror against the Communists and their allies and sympathizers. Thousands of people were slaughtered and the first civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists began. "All my warnings have actually been verified by facts," Lu Xun recalled sadly later. "I only happened to make these predictions a few days in advance."

Despite the Guomindang's terror campaign, Lu Xun was no more about to withdraw from the fight in 1927 than he had been the year before. He was dean of Sun Yat-sen University, and when a protest against the arrest of some of the university's students failed to gain their release, he resigned his post. Once again he was in danger and had to flee, this time to Shanghai, where he was to live out his life.

It was not only his writings but actions like these, in which he risked his life – although, as one of his critics noted, with his literary reputation he could have been "sure of winning rank and riches" – that made him a hero among the progressive forces of his time and a national hero in present-day China.

Mao Tsetung mentioned Lu Xun a number of times in both *Talks at the Yen-an [Yan'an] Forum on Literature and Art* (1942) and in *On New Democracy* (1940). In the latter work, he said of Lu Xun: "The chief commander of China's cultural revolution, he was not only a great man of letters but a great thinker and revolutionary."^{*} Yet despite Mao's praise

^{*}Mao does not mean any specific cultural revolution here, but the "new cultural force," as he wrote in the same essay, that was trying to make culture (literature, art, philosophy, economics, etc.) more meaningful to the Chinese people.

and Lu Xun's fame in his homeland, and despite the fact that many people who know his writings consider him one of the literary giants of the twentieth century, few Westerners – even those familiar with world literature – seem to have heard of him.

Perhaps only China scholars know that Lu Xun's real name was Zhou Shu-ren. He was born on September 25, 1881, in Shaoxing, Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province. His family was of the scholar-official class, but at the time of Lu Xun's birth the family fortunes were already on the decline. When Lu Xun was 13, his grandfather, an official in Peking, was imprisoned for bribery. The family never recovered from the blow. His father was an unemployed scholar who could not provide decently for the family. When his father fell seriously ill and lingered for three years before dying, the family was reduced to poverty. All the money went to pay for quack doctors and ineffectual medicine. "For more than four years," he wrote in his preface to *Call to Arms*, "I used to go, almost daily, to a pawnbroker's and medicine shop. I cannot remember how old I was then; but the counter in the medicine shop was the same height as I, and that in the pawnbroker's twice my height. I used to hand clothes and trinkets up to the counter twice my height, take the money proffered with contempt, then go to the counter the same height as I to buy medicine for my father who had been long ill." He got to know the cold indifference that confronted the poor and unfortunate. His mother, the daughter of a scholar, managed to keep the family going, and it was from her – her maiden name was Lu – that Lu Xun derived the pen name he finally settled upon.

As a child he was educated in the classics. Not wanting to end up like his grandfather or father, at the age of 18 he enrolled in the tuition-free Jiangnan Naval Academy in Nanjing (Nanking), where for the first time he was exposed to such Western subjects as history, natural science, and arithmetic. A year later, dissatisfied with the naval academy, he transferred to the Railway and Mines Academy, also in Nanjing. There he was introduced to T. H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, and for many years after, the theory of evolution formed the basis of most of his thinking. According to his interpretation, this theory meant that as life evolves, it becomes more perfect and more meaningful, and therefore the new should always take precedence over the old.

He graduated in 1901 and the following year received a government scholarship to study in Japan. The experience of his father dying at the hands of charlatan doctors was still vivid in his memory. He thought of all the others who had suffered at the hands of such quacks and he wanted

to change that. Having read that Japan's modernization began with the introduction of Western medicine, he thought he could do the same for China. He chose to go to medical school.

But while he was at medical school in Japan, something happened that caused him to change his mind about medicine. In one of his classes lantern slides were used to show microbes. Sometimes, when the lecture ended early, the instructor would show slides of scenery or news items to pass the time. "This was during the Russo-Japanese War," he related in the preface to *Call to Arms*, "so there were many war



September 1933: family portrait with wife Xu Guang-ping and son. Xu became a leading figure in the government after 1949.

films, and I had to join in the clapping and cheering in the lecture hall along with the other students. It was a long time since I had seen any compatriots, but one day I saw a film showing some Chinese, one of whom was bound, while many others stood around him. They were all strong fellows but appeared completely apathetic. According to the commentary, the one with his hands bound was a spy working for the Russians, who was to have his head cut off by the Japanese military as a warning to others, while the Chinese beside him had come to enjoy the spectacle."

From that time on, he was convinced that medicine was not the way to help China. What the Chinese people needed was something to awaken them from the spiritual lethargy they were suffering. He had been introduced to the works of writers such as Byron, Shelley, and Pushkin, and he began to see literature as the way of

making the kind of contribution he thought necessary. "The people of a weak and backward country," he continued in the preface, "however strong and healthy they may be, can only serve to be made examples of, or to witness such futile spectacles; and it is not necessarily deplorable no matter how many of them die of illness. The most important thing, therefore, was to change their spirit, and since at that time I felt that literature was the best means to this end, I was determined to promote a literary movement."

After some unsuccessful literary adventures in Japan, he returned to China and ended up teaching first at Zhejiang Normal School and then in his hometown at Shaoxing Normal School, where he became principal. When the 1911 Revolution came, he welcomed it enthusiastically. The overthrow of the Manchu emperors and the establishment of the Chinese Republic was something he had long hoped for. (He had been involved in the anti-Manchu movement in Japan.) But now that it had been accomplished, Lu Xun was disillusioned to see how little had actually changed. China was still a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country and the same people were still in power. It was a republic in name only.

He became a member of the Ministry of Education in Peking. When he was not carrying out his official duties, he spent his time compiling and annotating various classical works. He felt helpless in the face of what was happening to the young republic despite the efforts of its leader Sun Yat-sen. Warlords were setting up independent domains, there was constant civil war, and the imperialist powers were still battling over who would get what from China. Depressed by the chaos, he withdrew into himself. He still had not gotten over his literary failures in Japan. He felt lonely, empty. But in 1918, after persistent requests from a friend who was an editor of *New Youth*, the most influential progressive publication of the time, he finally wrote and published his first short story – "A Madman's Diary" – and began his literary career in earnest.

Lu Xun was to write three collections of short fiction – two of realistic stories and one, *Old Tales Retold*, based on myths and ancient tales – a collection of prose poems, a collection of reminiscences, a brief history of Chinese fiction, numerous miscellaneous pieces, including poems in the classical style, and 16 volumes containing close to 700 essays. Besides his original writings, he translated a large number of foreign works into Chinese. The most important of these were works of Russian authors such as Plekhanov, Lunacharsky, Gorky, Gogol, Serafimovitch, and Sho-

lokhov. (Russian works, due to the success of the Russian Revolution, were very popular in China. In fact, Gorky outsold

knowledge”) while Chinese in essence, it is considered the first modern story written in China. It brought Chinese literature

to write, since he felt that the people who were enthusiastic about the revolution had the right ideas and he wished to add what little strength he had to theirs. “That is why I cut out some of the gloom and assumed a faint look of gladness, so that my stories might hold out some rays of hope,” he wrote in the “Preface to My Selected Works.” Thus, in “Medicine,” after a young revolutionary is executed, his mother, while visiting his grave, discovers a wreath placed on it by an unknown hand. Lu Xun wanted to encourage the fighters not to lose heart. *Call to Arms*, which contains his most significant stories, was “‘written to order.’ But the orders I carried out were those issued by the revolutionary vanguard of that time, which I was glad to obey, not orders sent down by an emperor, or dictated by gold dollars or at the point of a sword.”

Although Lu Xun said his stories fell “far short of being works of art,” that is hardly the case. They have all the ingredients of great fiction. Not only do they depict the downtrodden who have been victimized by hundreds of years of feudal ideology and feudal rulers, but the circumstances and characters in each story are prototypes of the period. The stories function on more than one level, although at their most basic they are powerful and moving episodes in the everyday lives of an unbelievably oppressed people.

The stories are almost clinical in their approach to the horrors of life in China, yet at the same time Lu Xun’s bitterness, his anger, and his compassion can be felt in every tense line. The writing is spare, precise. “The old Chinese theater has no scenery,” he wrote in “How I Came to Write Stories,” “and the New Year pictures sold to children show a few main figures only. . . . Convinced that such methods suited my purposes, I did not indulge in irrelevant details and kept the dialogue down to a minimum.”

Perhaps the best story he wrote, and the most internationally known – at least during his lifetime – was “The True Story of Ah Q.” A mixture of realism and satire, it is about a disreputable peasant who lives by his wits, or lack of wits, in the semi-feudal society just prior to and during the 1911 Revolution. Ah Q has been placed in a typical village among typical people who are reacting in typical ways to the events around them. The story is almost an allegory, demonstrating the political and social reasons why the 1911 Revolution failed.

“A Madman’s Diary” was followed by the publication of Lu Xun’s first important essay – “My Views on Chastity.” This essay was a scathing attack on Confucian ideas of women’s chastity. It was considered



Woodcut by Li Hua: Lu Hsun shows a class woodblock printing, Shanghai, 1931.

all native Chinese writers with the exception of Lu Xun himself.)

From the beginning, Lu Xun did not consider himself a writer of great works. Almost everything he wrote, whether short stories or essays, was written to help awaken his countrymen so that China could be changed. “Of course, a man who writes stories cannot help having his own views,” he wrote in “How I Came to Write Stories.” “For instance, as to why I wrote, I still felt as I had a dozen years earlier, that I should write in the hope of enlightening my people, for humanity, and of the need to better it. I detested the old habit of describing fiction as ‘entertainment,’ and regarded ‘art for art’s sake’ as simply another name for passing the time. So my themes were usually the unfortunates in this abnormal society. My aim was to expose the disease and draw attention to it so that it might be cured.”

The publication of “A Madman’s Diary” was probably the most important event in the literary history of modern China. Not only was it written in the spoken language – the vernacular – rather than classical Chinese, but because of its realism, its compassion, its anger, and the fact that it was Western in style (“I must have relied upon the hundred or more foreign books I had read and a smattering of medical

down from its inaccessible pedestal and became the foundation for all the progressive literature that followed.

“A Madman’s Diary” is the seemingly illogical journal of a man who had been suffering from a persecution complex and is now cured. The crux of the “madman’s” problem was his belief that he was going to be eaten, either by his neighbor, his brother, or others he comes in contact with. In the course of trying to understand his fear, he reaches the conclusion that he lives in a society where people are eaten by other people – in which the downtrodden, the rebellious, or the just “mad” are eaten by those in power. The story is much more than a mere diary of a disturbed person. It is a passionate attack on the man-eating feudal system that was devouring the masses of Chinese people.

Lu Xun said in his preface to *Call to Arms* that from the time of writing “A Madman’s Diary,” he “could not stop writing, and would write some sort of story from time to time at the request of friends, until I had more than a dozen of them.” He had not gotten over his despair at the failure of the 1911 Revolution and his stories of this period reflect his bleak outlook. He had little enthusiasm for things that were happening at the time, including the “literary revolution.” Yet he continued

Tea Drinking

1933

When a certain department store had another sale, I went and bought two ounces of good tea at 20 cents an ounce. To start with I brewed a whole pot, and wrapped it in a padded jacket to keep it warm. But when I drank the tea with due respect, it tasted much the same as my ordinary tea. The color was muddy too.

I realized this was my mistake. Good tea should be drunk from a bowl with a lid. So that was what I did next. And indeed, after I had brewed the tea this way it was clear and sweet, faintly fragrant yet slightly bitter. Yes, this really was good tea. It required tranquility and leisure though, and as I was in the middle of writing "Living on Religion," when I picked up the bowl to drink the aroma had somehow got lost again and once more it tasted just like ordinary tea.

To have good tea and be able to appreciate it is one of the "refined pleasures." But in order to enjoy this, one must have leisure and a trained, connoisseur's palate. Judging from this trifling experience, I imagine that when a man doing heavy manual labor is thirsty, even if you give him the choicest "Dragon-well" tips or "Pearly Orchid" [two of the finest brands of tea], he will not find them very different from hot water. The same is true, in fact, of "autumn ennui." Sensitive souls and literary men may feel: "Ah this autumn ennui!" Wind and rain, clouds and shine cut them to the heart, and this is one of their "refined pleasures." But old peasants simply know that this is the season for getting in the rice.

Thus it is sometimes taken for granted that such refined sensitivity is not for men of common clay, but is a hallmark of the upper-class élite. I fear this means that this hallmark is pretty well finished. While sensitivity to pain makes us suffer, it also enables us to guard against danger. A man lacking this would feel nothing even if he were stabbed in the back, and would not understand what had happened even after he lost all his blood and collapsed. If such sensitivity is highly developed, however, he will not only feel a small thorn through his clothes, but the seams of his garments, too, and the stuff they are made of. Then unless he wears a "seamless divine garment," he will feel pricked all over and life will become quite unbearable. Naturally this does not apply to those who simply pose as hypersensitive.

Refined and sensitive feelings are obviously more advanced than numbed obtuseness, but they must serve evolution. If they fail to do so, or are actually harmful, they are aberrations which will soon die out. If we compare these elegant gentlemen with their refined pleasures and autumn ennui with the coarse fellows in rags who eat rough fare, it is quite clear which will survive. So as I drink my tea and look up at the autumn sky, I think it is just as well that I cannot appreciate good tea and have no autumn ennui.

better for a woman to starve to death rather than lose her chastity. And if she were raped or if her husband or fiance died, she could show her true chastity by committing suicide. Lu Xun attacked the domination of women by men. Of the Confucian tenets handed down by the ancients, he wrote that many "are completely irrational" and that the ancients who handed them down were "anonymous, unconscious assassins" responsible for who knew how many murders. He likened to these murderous ancients those of his contemporaries who urged a return to the past as the salvation for China – as if unchaste women and the state of the nation's morality were the reasons for China's terrible condition.

With the publication of his first two stories ("Kung I-chi" was the second one) and the one essay, Lu Xun had established himself as one of the leading progressive writers. He helped launch the May Fourth Movement of 1919, a mass revolt of students and intellectuals against the anti-China Treaty of Versailles specifically, and against imperialism and feudalism in general. The May Fourth Movement served as a spur to the literary movement. Mao was to refer to it as China's first cultural revolution.

In 1920, Lu Xun began lecturing at Peking University and Peking Normal College. He became very much involved with the students, especially with the

young writers. He revised their works, helped them establish progressive literary organizations, defended them when they were attacked as immature by "gentlemen of superior intellect," "destructive critics [who] have great fun galloping over tender shoots." In 1923, he began teaching at Peking Women's Normal College, supporting its students when in the following year they forced out their reactionary president and were subsequently attacked by thugs hired by the new president, who was just as reactionary. (One of the students – Xu Guang-ping – was to become his wife.)

After 1925, Lu Xun for the most part stopped writing stories and concentrated on his essays, his ideological weapons in the fight against reaction. They form the bulk of his original writings. In present-day China the essays are considered the most important part of his work, not only because they were the most influential during his lifetime, but because they deal directly with the class struggle and other revolutionary problems. They cover an astonishing range of subjects – everything from classical Chinese literature to why he cut his moustache straight so it pointed neither down nor up. Many of the essays, especially the shorter ones, have trivial-sounding titles, such as "Tea Drinking," "Toys," "Pushing," "Random Thoughts." Yet they are never without some deeper meaning. He would use a commonplace concept or thing as a starting point and symbol for a significant observation. Thus his essay "On Bats" is certainly about bats, but it is also about blindly accepting ancient ideas without question, or, to put it in more contemporary Chinese terms, the necessity of seeking truth from facts.

Since literature was his weapon, he used it in whatever form it proved effective. Short stories were too restricting. They could not deal with day to day political and social events. Their purpose was to expose, but exposure was no longer enough. "At an urgent time like this," he wrote in his "Preface to *Demi-Concession Studio Essays*," "the writer's task is to serve as sensory nerves, as limbs to resist and attack." As an essayist he could quickly write short, polemical pieces that were like "daggers and javelins" hurled at the reactionaries, exposing their hypocrisy and lies and urging people to fight back.

Despite the fact that Lu Xun regarded art "as merely a social phenomenon, a record of the times" which was bound "to grow out-of-date or to perish," and although he never thought of his essays as art in the first place, many of the essays are brilliant examples of what can be done in this short, polemical form. His conciseness, his wit, his pinpoint satire, his use of

innuendo and allusion, especially in his later pieces which had to get past a censor (and often didn't), make his essays an exceptional body of writing. From them the reader can get a good idea what life was like under Chiang Kai-shek's rule. Thus there are the book burnings, the torture and murder of progressives, the beheadings, the indiscriminate bombings,

the foreigners, the Guomindang's capitulationist policies toward Japan, and of course everything that was happening in literary circles. With thoughtful and careful reading, certain stylistic devices (and ideas) that Mao Tsetung was to use in his own writings can be detected - for instance, the way the subject is introduced in the opening paragraph of an essay, and the

way classical tales are used to illustrate a point.

In Shanghai, where he had fled in 1927 after resigning his deanship at Sun Yat-sen University, he devoted most of his time and energy to writing and literary movements. He could no longer accept some of his previous ideas. "I believed in evolution," he wrote in the "Preface to *Three Leisures*,"

MARKETPLACE

樓澤豐新 TEMPLE GARDEN

16 Pell St., Chinatown, N.Y.C.
(near 20 Bowery)

One of the best Chinese restaurants in New York featuring Mandarin, Szechuan, Hunan, and Cantonese cuisine. Dine in a friendly, relaxing atmosphere seven days a week. Cocktail lounge available. Facilities for parties and banquets. Call 233-5544 or 962-9191.

寧 浙 四 五 六 飯 店

For the best in Chekiang cuisine

Say Eng Look Restaurant

1 East Broadway, New York City
(212) 732-0796, 233-9598

Four Five Six Restaurant

2 Bowery, New York City
(212) 964-5853, 964-5854

Cadre Imports

A wholesale source for products from China, acupuncture materials, silk diaries, kites, wooden combs, scissors, and much more.

124 28th Ave., San Mateo, CA 94403 (415) 341-4204

四 新 商 店

Chinese Native Products, Ltd.

We carry the greatest variety of products imported directly from the People's Republic of China. Mail orders available.

22 Catherine Street
New York, NY 10038
(212) 732-0363

New York **Pearl River** Chinatown
Chinese Products
Emporium,
Retail Wholesale
Inc.

New Store - Just Opened

13-15 Elizabeth Street
New York, New York 10013
(212) 966-1010

竹 桥 编 译 社

Bamboo Bridge Associates

English-Chinese
Chinese-English
Translation Service

Dr. Glenn Y.S. Ma, President

- Promotional Literature • Documents
- Commercial & Technical Proposals
- Audio-Visual/Slide-Tape Presentations
- Bilingual Booklets & Business Cards
- Correspondence • Oral Interpretations

3320 Seventh Avenue
Rock Island, IL 61201 (309) 786-5666

Joe's Chinatown Restaurant

大 江 南 酒 家

The taste of Chinatown in the heart of New York's financial district.



196 Broadway, New York City
(between Fulton & John St.)
(212) 227-2345

和 THT
A Division of Oriental Language Bureau, Inc.
212/243-3670
101 West 12 Street • New York City 10011
JAPANESE • CHINESE • KOREAN
PHOTOTYPOGRAPHY

Advertise your
China-related products
and services in
New China.
Call (212) 691-5040.

“was sure that the future would be better than the past and the young better than the old” – life would become increasingly better as the young of each generation took over. “Indeed,” he continued, “such respect did I have for the young that if they stabbed me ten times with their daggers I only shot back one arrow.” But later, when he saw the young people breaking up into opposing camps, with some informing the authorities on others, he began to realize that reforming society was not a simple matter of evolution.

It was at this time that he began a serious study of Marxism-Leninism, a philosophy of the development of society which had interested him ever since he first heard of the October Revolution in Russia. Through his essays the reader can trace Lu Xun’s growth from a revolutionary democrat who believed in evolution to a Marxist dialectician who believed in socialist revolution. By the early 1930s, he was openly declaring himself a Marxist: “The future belongs solely to the rising proletariat,” he wrote in his “Preface to *Two Hearts*” in 1932.

Besides his writing and the political work he did among young people, he was also involved in numerous other activities, many of them organized by the Communist Party. Perhaps the most important of these was the China League of Left-Wing Writers, which was organized in 1930 with Lu Xun as one of its founders. The League was made up of Communist writers and sympathizers who sought to create working-class literature and to win others to the cause of the working-class. Partly because of Lu Xun’s leadership and prestige, the League was very successful, especially in enlisting well-known and respected writers. It was also during these later years that he translated Russian Marxist theoretical works such as Plekhanov’s *The Theory of Art*.

His essays, especially those on literature, began to reflect his Marxist stance. In criticism of those who pretended to be above events and classes and who created “art for art’s sake,” he wrote in “On the ‘Third Category’”: “To live in a class society yet to be a writer who transcends classes, to live in a time of wars yet to leave the battlefield and stand alone, to live in the present yet to write for the future – this is sheer fantasy.” He argued that by its very nature all literature is propaganda, but not all propaganda is literature, and therefore revolutionary writers must also be concerned with technique. He criticized the “salon socialist” who talked about revolution but did nothing to bring it about: “A revolutionary writer must at least share the life of the revolution or keep his finger on the pulse of the revolution,” if he

wanted to write for the working class. These ideas, and others, were repeated and expanded upon by Mao in his Yan’an talks on literature and art.

At the same time that he was helping to define revolutionary literature, he also continued to attack the “encirclement and suppression” campaigns the Guomindang was trying to carry out against both the Communist armies and proletarian culture. His attacks dealt solid blows to the prestige of the Guomindang. Nor did he forget about Confucianism and how the reactionaries used it to further oppress the people.

It was in 1931 that the Japanese attacked China. The Guomindang did little to defend the country, being more concerned with killing Communists. Lu Xun thoroughly supported Mao’s united front against the Japanese, and in his “Reply to a Letter from the Trotskyites,” who criticized his stand, he wrote, “I count it an honor to have as my comrades those who are now doing solid work, treading firmly on the ground, fighting and shedding their blood in the defense of the Chinese people.”

Because of his continuous attacks on the reactionaries, Lu Xun’s life was constantly in danger. He had to go into hiding frequently and wrote his essays under

Further Reading

Selected Stories of Lu Hsun. Foreign Languages Press (Peking), 1972. 255 pp. Cloth, \$3.50.

Old Tales Retold. Foreign Languages Press (Peking), 1972. 136 pp. Paper, \$1.25. Short stories based on Chinese myths and classical tales.

Dawn Blossoms Plucked at Dusk. Foreign Languages Press (Peking), 1976. 120 pp. Paper, \$1.25. Reminiscences.

Wild Grass. Foreign Languages Press (Peking), 1974. 68 pp. Paper, \$.95. Prose poems.

Lu Hsun: Writing for the Revolution. Modern China Series No. 2. Red Sun Publishers (San Francisco), 1976. 207 pp. Paper, \$2.95. Essays by and on Lu Xun from *Chinese Literature* (see below).

Silent China: Selected Writings of Lu Xun [Lu Hsun]. Ed. and trans. Gladys Yang. Oxford University Press, 1973. 196 pp. Paper, \$2.95.

Chinese Literature. Published monthly in English (and other languages) by Foreign Languages Press (Peking). Single copies and subscriptions are available through China Books & Periodicals. Frequently contains selections of Lu Xun’s works with explanatory essays.

Lu Xun, A Photographic Biography. Wen Wu Press (Peking), 1976. \$15. Photos of Lu Xun throughout his life with captions in Lu Xun’s own words, from his writings and conversations. In Chinese, with English-translation insert by R. Drake Pike.

more than 130 pen names. Despite all this, he was still a major force against Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang. Mao wrote in *On New Democracy*: “It was in the very midst of such campaigns of ‘encirclement and suppression’ that Lu Xun, who believed in communism, became the giant of China’s cultural revolution.” Mao ended his *Talks at the Yen’an [Yan’an] Forum on Literature and Art* with a quote from a Lu Xun poem:

*Fierce-browed, I coolly defy a thousand
pointing fingers,
Head-bowed, like a willing ox I serve
the children.*

The fingers were the enemy, and the children the working class and the rest of the people. Mao urged revolutionaries of all kinds to learn from Lu Xun “and be ‘oxen’ for the proletariat and the masses, bending their backs to the task until their dying day.”

Lu Xun never joined the Communist Party, but there can be no doubt that he was, as Mao said, a believer in communism. Whether in the Party or not, in his later years he fought for its policies, and after the successful completion of the Long March in 1935, he sent a congratulatory telegram to the Communists, saying that the hopes of China and the rest of humanity lay with them.

During these last years, his health was slowly deteriorating. But he would not stop his work. Friends encouraged him to go abroad, to go to hospitals, but he refused. He would not leave his post. When a doctor warned him he would die soon, he said, “Instead of living a few years more by not working, I prefer to live a few years less but work more now.” Suffering from tuberculosis, he died on October 19, 1936, at the age of 56, in extreme poverty. He did not live to see the Revolution succeed nor the People’s Republic of China established, but it’s hard to imagine him doubting its success whether he was there or not.

Lu Xun was a great writer and a great fighter for the people. If “serve the people” means anything, then it means what Lu Xun’s entire life and work exemplify. There have been very few great writers in the history of mankind who have laid their lives on the line the way he did. Mao said of him in *On New Democracy*: “Representing the great majority of the nation, Lu Xun breached and stormed the enemy citadel; on the cultural front he was the bravest and most correct, the firmest, the most loyal and most ardent national hero, a hero without parallel in our history. The road he took was the very road of China’s new national culture.” It is this road that China’s culture is following today. ●

US-CHINA PEOPLES FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION

National Office: 635 S. Westlake Ave., Los Angeles, Calif.
90057 (213) 483-5810

WEST

Western Region: 50 Oak St., Rm. 502, San Francisco, Calif. 94102
(415) 863-0537

Albuquerque: 1146 Vassar N.E., Albuquerque, N.M. 87106
Bellingham: 2515 Victor St., Bellingham, Wash. 98225
Big Island: P.O. Box 160, Keaau, Hawaii 96749
Denver: P.O. Box 4502, Santa Fe Station, Denver, Colo. 80204
East Bay: 2054 University Ave., Rm. 401, Berkeley, Calif. 94704
Eugene: P.O. Box 3272, Eugene, Ore. 97401
Fresno: P.O. Box 5634, Fresno, Calif. 93755
Honolulu: P.O. Box 1613, Honolulu, Hawaii 96806
Humboldt County: P.O. Box 352, Trinidad, Calif. 95570
Long Beach: P.O. Box 14617, Long Beach, Calif. 90814
Los Angeles: 635 S. Westlake Ave., Rm. 201, Los Angeles,
Calif. 90057
Marin County: Box 595, San Rafael, Calif. 94902
Maui: P.O. Box 967, Wailuku, Maui, Hawaii 96793
Mid-Peninsula: 424 Lytton, Palo Alto, Calif. 94301
North Bay: P.O. Box 894, Sonoma, Calif. 95476
Olympia: P.O. Box 2578, Olympia, Wash. 98507
Orange County: 2107 N. Greenbrier St., Santa Ana, Calif. 92706
Pasadena: c/o 1st Cong. Church, 464 E. Walnut St., Pasadena,
Calif. 91101
Phoenix: 919 E. Southern, Phoenix, Ariz. 85040
Pomona Valley: 1013 N. Huntington Blvd., Pomona, Calif. 91768
Portland: P.O. Box 10595, Portland, Ore. 97210
Reno: 1405 Dartmouth Dr., Reno, Nev. 89509
Sacramento: 1919 Rockwood Dr., Sacramento, Calif. 95825
Salem: c/o Rotkin, 114 Vine S.E., Salem, Ore. 97302
San Diego: P.O. Box 3636, San Diego, Calif. 92103
San Francisco: 50 Oak St., Rm. 502, San Francisco, Calif. 94102
Santa Barbara: P.O. Box 2052, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93120
Sonoma County: P.O. Box 7217, Santa Rosa, Calif. 95401
South Bay: 317 E. Julian, San Jose, Calif. 95112
Taos: P.O. Box 214, San Cristobal, N.M. 87564
Tucson: 2451 N. Santa Rita Ave., Tucson, Ariz. 85719
West Side Los Angeles: P.O. Box 24480, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024

Western Region Organizing Committees

Chico: 1219 Jackson St., Chico, Calif. 95926
Kauai: c/o Lundgren, RR 1, Box 9A, Lihue, Kauai,
Hawaii 96766
Las Vegas: c/o Lipp, 1493 Elizabeth, Apt. 2, Las Vegas, Nev. 89109
Rogue Valley: 2132 Sardine Creek Rd., Gold Hill, Ore. 97525
Salinas: c/o Michael, Box 851, Salinas, Calif. 93901
Santa Fe: P.O. Box 2328, Santa Fe, N.M. 87502
Seattle: 1314 N.E. 43rd St., Seattle, Wash. 98105

MID WEST

Midwest Region: 407 S. Dearborn, Suite 1200, Chicago, Ill. 60605
(312) 922-3414

Ames: P.O. Box 1085, ISU Station, Ames, Iowa 50010
Ann Arbor: P.O. Box 7337, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48107
Carbondale: 1508 Taylor Dr., Carbondale, Ill. 62901
Central Indiana: 1962 Schvier Court, Indianapolis, Ind. 46229
Champaign-Urbana: P.O. Box 2889, Sta. A, Champaign,
Ill. 61820
Chicago: 407 S. Dearborn, Suite 1200, Chicago, Ill. 60605
Cincinnati: 7252 East Lawn Drive, Cincinnati, Ohio 45237
Columbus: P.O. Box 3104, Columbus, Ohio 43210
DeKalb: P.O. Box 59, DeKalb, Ill. 60115
Detroit: P.O. Box 793, Detroit, Mich. 48232
Greater Lansing: P.O. Box 1341, East Lansing, Mich. 48823
Iowa City: P.O. Box 1625, Iowa City, Iowa 52246
Kansas City: P.O. Box 6179, Kansas City, Mo. 64110
Madison: 1127 University Ave., Madison, Wis. 53715
Mansfield: c/o Wareham, 1680 University Dr., Mansfield,
Ohio 44906
Milwaukee: c/o Peoples Books and Crafts, 1808 N. Farwell,
Milwaukee, Wis. 53202
Minnesota: P.O. Box 35416, Minneapolis, Minn. 55435
Mt. Pleasant: P.O. Box 151, Mt. Pleasant, Mich. 48858
Northern Prairie: c/o Zimmermann, 1329 Main St., Carrington,
N.D. 58421
Northwest Indiana: Box 2206, Hammond, Ind. 46323
St. Louis: P.O. Box 3111, St. Louis, Mo. 63130
Midwest Organizing Committees
Columbia: 123 Middlebush Hall, Columbia, Mo. 65201

Lafayette: 1127 N. 9th St., Lafayette, Ind. 47904
Oberlin: c/o Blecker, Dept. of Govt., Oberlin College,
Oberlin, Ohio 44704
Toledo: c/o N.Rey, 1066½ Oakwood, Toledo, Ohio 43607
Upper Peninsula: Box 8, University Center, Northern Michigan
University, Marquette, Mich. 49855

EAST

Eastern Region: 720 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 02139
(617) 491-0594

Albany: Box 7301, Capital Station, Albany, N.Y. 12224
Baltimore: P.O. Box 5372, Baltimore, Md. 21209
Binghamton: P.O. Box 135, Johnson City, N.Y. 13790
Boston: P.O. Box 63, Essex Station, Boston, Mass. 02112
Buffalo: Box 73, Squire Hall, SUNY, Buffalo, N.Y. 14214
Burlington: P.O. Box 212, Underhill, Vt. 05489
Central New Jersey: Box 748, Princeton Jct., N.J. 08550
Columbia: P.O. Box 522, Columbia, Md. 21045
Connecticut Valley: P.O. Box 17042, Bishops Corner, West
Hartford, Conn. 06117
Fairfield County: c/o Sills, 32 Charcoal Hill Rd., Westport, Conn.
06880
Ithaca: 211 Cobb St., Ithaca, N.Y. 14850
Metropolitan New Jersey: P.O. Box 2563, Plainfield, N.J. 07060
Nassau County: P.O. Box 337, Glen Head, N.Y. 11545
New Haven: c/o Thomas, 139 W. Shepard Ave., Hamden,
Conn. 06514
New York: 41 Union Square West, Rm 1228, New York,
N.Y. 10003
North Jersey: 653 Maitland Ave., Teaneck, N.J. 07666
Philadelphia: 3500 Lancaster Ave., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104
Pittsburgh: P.O. Box 2496, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15230
Plattsburgh: c/o Link, Gravelly Pt. Rd., Plattsburgh, N.Y. 12903
Providence: P.O. Box 6905, Providence, R.I. 02904
Richmond: P.O. Box 201, Richmond, Va. 23202
Stony Brook: P.O. Box 707, Stony Brook, N.Y. 11790
Storrs: P.O. Box 381, Storrs, Conn. 06268
Upper Valley: P.O. Box 283, Norwich, Vt. 05055
Washington: P.O. Box 40503, Palisades Station,
Washington, D.C. 20016
Westchester: P.O. Box 313, Main P.O., New Rochelle, N.Y. 10802
Eastern Region Organizing Committees
Amherst: 3 Langworthy Rd., Northampton, Mass. 01060
Charlottesville: 111 Washington Ave., Charlottesville, Va. 22903
Keene: RFD #2, Lane Ridge, Claremont, N.H. 03743
Mid-Hudson: c/o Barnett, 27 Dug Rd., New Paltz, N.Y. 12561
North Shore: P.O. Box 144, West Lynn, Mass. 01905
Orono: Box 334, Stillwater, Me. 04489
Raritan Valley: P.O. Box 156, Piscataway, N.J. 08854

SOUTH

Southern Region: 4384 Varsity Lane, Houston, Tex. 77004
Atlanta: P.O. Box 54664, Atlanta, Ga. 30308
Austin: P.O. Box 1152, Austin, Tex. 78767
Birmingham: P.O. Box 3342, Birmingham, Ala. 35205
Charlotte: 1901 Shoreham Dr., Charlotte, N.C. 28211
Dallas: c/o Lin, 7823 Woodstone, Dallas, Tex. 75240
Houston: P.O. Box 6614, Houston, Tex. 77005
Knoxville: c/o Jourdan, Rte. 4, Asheville Highway, Knoxville,
Tenn. 37914
Louisville: P.O. Box 70382, Riverfront Station, Louisville,
Ky. 40270
Memphis: P.O. Box 11305, Memphis, Tenn. 38111
Miami: P.O. 381047, Miami, Fla. 33138
Nashville: P.O. Box 12474, Nashville, Tenn. 37212
New Orleans: P.O. Box 15735, New Orleans, La. 70175
North Carolina Triangle: P.O. Box 2598, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514
Palm Beach County: 906 Camellia Dr., RPB, West Palm Beach,
Fla. 33411
Sarasota: 3909 Glen Oaks Dr. E., Sarasota, Fla. 33582
Tampa: P.O. Box 3123, Tampa, Fla. 33601
Tuscaloosa: P.O. Box 65, University, Ala. 35486
Southern Region Organizing Committees
Broward County: Box 25156, Tamarac, Fla. 33320
Chattanooga: c/o Troy, 4411 Drummond Dr., Chattanooga,
Tenn. 37411
Jacksonville: 1831 Riviera Pkwy., Apt. 8, Jacksonville,
Fla. 32205
Mobile: c/o Kaufman, 207 Ridgewood Pl., Mobile, Ala. 36608

Let the Past Serve the Present

HARVEST (1935), by Yeh Tzu. Six stories of peasant struggles in the 1930s. Cloth, \$5.95

SCHOOLMASTER NI HUAN-CHIH (1929), by Yeh Sheng-tao. Novel. An intellectual is drawn into political life in the turbulent 1920s. Cloth, \$7.95

SONG OF YOUTH (1963), by Yang Mo. Novel. A romantic middle-class girl becomes a clear-minded revolutionary in the student struggles of 1931-35. Cloth, \$7.95

SUNRISE (1935), by Tsao Yu. Drama. Life in the 1930s under the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. Cloth, \$4.95

THUNDERSTORM (1933), by Tsao Yu. Drama. Youth rebels against a decaying feudal order. Cloth, \$3.95

SELECTED PLAYS OF KUAN HAN-CHING. Eight plays by a 13th-century writer who risked death defending the common people. Cloth, \$4.95

CHU YUAN (1942), by Kuo Mo-jo. Drama. The hero is a 3rd-century B.C. poet-statesman who fought the tyrants of his day. Cloth, \$3.95

SELECTED POEMS FROM "THE GODDESSES," by Kuo Mo-jo. Early lyrics and poems of rebellion from the May 4th period of 1919. Paper, \$2.50

WRITINGS BY LU HSUN

SELECTED STORIES (1918-26). Cloth, \$3.50

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE FICTION (1924). Cloth, \$5.95

WILD GRASS (1927). Paper, \$.95

OLD TALES RETOLD (1935). Paper, \$1.25




Illustration from the famous 18th-century novel *A Dream of Red Mansions*. Silk, \$14.95. Half-cloth, \$10.95.

**China Books
& Periodicals, Inc.**

CHINA AT YOUR FINGERTIPS !

The best China resource available is our free 40-page catalog, containing over 1,000 China-related items which can be ordered by mail. Write to Dept. NC at China Books in San Francisco.

To order one of the titles listed above, send prepayment. Add \$1.00 for postage and handling. Include sales tax in New York, Illinois, and California.

2929 24th Street
San Francisco, CA 94110

125 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

174 West Randolph Street
Chicago, IL 60601